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1ONE 
Introduction
Dora’s story
Dora is Romanian. She came to Austria at the age of 20 to work in prostitution. 
She says she had a normal youth. She finished school at the age of 19. Her 
mother always pushed her hard: “Learn, learn, learn. My mother was obsessed 
by it.” She wanted some quiet now. She says that perhaps “she had it too good”. 
Her entry into sex work “just happened” (“war einfach so”). She didn’t have much 
experience as a young woman in Romania. She had had sex 10 times perhaps, and 
she detested blowjobs: “With this mouth I kiss the pictures of saints in church!” A 
woman in Austria who was a friend of the father of her school friend explained to 
her what sex work entailed. She also had little experience with alcohol. The night 
before she left for Austria she got drunk on gin and tonics for the first time in 
her life. She had to throw up. She is grateful that she hasn’t become an alcoholic. 
She travelled to Austria with a girlfriend from school and the father of the 
girlfriend. Later three more women joined them. The father agreed with the 
women that they would give him their earnings. He would save these for them 
and when they stopped working he would give them the savings. Dora says she 
trusted him, but in hindsight she concludes: “He said one thing and what really 
happened was something quite different.” One of the women had been with this 
man much longer. One evening she drank too much and said in tears that the 
man had lied and that he would never return their earnings. Dora tells that the 
evening before his arrest the man fought with his son. His son accused him of 
treating the women badly. The son’s girlfriend also worked for the man. 
The women decided to jointly file a complaint against the man for pimping, rape 
and physical abuse. Dora only filed a complaint for pimping; she said he never 
beat or raped her. The man received two years. The witness testimonies in court 
were not anonymous. The man is now free and lives in Germany. Although he 
is her neighbour in her hometown in Romania, she says she doesn’t fear him: 
“These people often threaten but they don’t do anything; although you’re never 
sure.” After she accused him the police guarded her parental home for a while. 
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Dora went to work in the establishment in Wels where she works now. She initially 
worked there from 2003 to 2006. After a change in Austrian immigration law, she 
had to leave the country in 2006. She didn’t want to go back to Romania so she 
and her partner (who is also a sex worker) decided to go to Italy. They worked 
in Italy for six months. “It was very difficult. The work is illegal there, you don’t 
know anybody, you live with someone, and you don’t even know what papers 
you have.” Dora and her partner worked as dancers, but they had few clients. 
She never did escort work because she was too afraid of that. She got to know 
a man. They got into a fight over money. He wanted €100 a month from the 
couple. She asked him if he was out of his mind and offered him a one-time 
payment of €200. After that he damaged the couple’s car all the time, so that 
Dora had to have it repaired constantly. 
Dora, her partner and two other women were arrested at work. “The police were 
funny. I started flirting with them.” The police took them into another room 
and asked if the women would show their breasts. Dora said: “No problem.” 
She thinks she was lucky because she had nice breasts. She was able to get all 
the women released. However, they were on the street now, without house or 
car, as the car was in the garage because of the damage inflicted by the man 
she had argued with. At the station they got to know some Romanian people, 
who, when they heard of the couple’s hopeless situation, invited them to stay 
with them. Dora thought that one of the men wanted to have sex with her, but 
when he came to her in the middle of the night he just put a blanket over her. It 
turned out that he was from Interpol, but he had no information on them and 
when he checked that the car was indeed in the garage, they were free to go, 
but they had to leave Italy. 
Dora and her partner decided to go to Spain. Romania was not yet part of the 
European Union (EU) and they had overshot the legal period of stay in the EU 
by then. They were once more illegal. They were arrested when the police raided 
the club where Dora worked. She spent 28 months in a detention centre waiting 
to be extradited. She had the right to engage a lawyer, but the lawyers said, and 
the other inmates confirmed this, that their case was hopeless. The couple then 
opted for voluntary return to Romania. The living circumstances in the detention 
centre were tough. There were women there who had been in prison who said 
that prison was better. The guards were all “arseholes”. While Dora was awaiting 
her trial, she and her partner were put in a cell with men. She was handcuffed 
to an older man and the guards made fun of them. The food was terrible: “In 
Romania that food would only be good for pigs.” They mostly ate bread. When she 
later asked to be locked up in one cell with her partner, the guards deliberately 
separated them. She cried a lot in those days. She and her partner wrote to each 
other every day; that made it easier. She still has the letters. A client who liked her 
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visited her sometimes in “prison” and brought them some of their possessions. 
When she was at last deported to Romania, all her belongings were returned to 
her, including her money. 
Dora is happy to work in Austria again because sex work is legal there. She says 
that working illegally in Italy and Spain caused her much stress: “You always 
have to be careful whom you talk to, which clients you take, when there would 
be police controls. It burdened me a lot. I have done enough illegal sex work. I 
never want to do that anymore.” However, in Austria, “You go to sleep with one 
law and wake up with another. Things are very uncertain here.” (Here Dora is 
referring to the abolishment of the so-called prostitution visa in 2006; that is 
why she had to leave Austria for Italy.) 
She says that her legal position is nevertheless far from ideal in Austria: “I am 
powerless here. I don’t get a wage slip. I can’t take out any credit or loans. I can’t 
lease a car. I pay the tax office, I pay social security, but I won’t get a pension. I 
don’t get anything. I also don’t get unemployment benefits. I don’t need them 
because in this profession you always find work easily. I can’t do anything in my 
name.” She adds that she needs a work permit for gainful employment, although 
she has already lived in Austria for a long time and pays taxes and social insurance.
We begin this book with Dora’s story because it presents the face 
of prostitution in Europe today. It is representative of the stories of 
many sex workers that we encountered in the course of our research. 
What does Dora’s story tell us? What lessons does it contain about 
prostitution in contemporary Europe? And how does it speak to the 
challenges of regulating prostitution in a just and effective manner? 
First, the rule of law is crucial for the position of sex workers. In the 
contemporary, fierce debates about the best ‘policy regime’ for sex 
work, this basic fact is often overlooked. Even imperfect forms of 
regulation are better for the human rights of sex workers than the 
illegality that automatically comes with the outright prohibition of 
prostitution. Dora’s story suggests that illegality is inextricably bound 
up with arbitrary behaviour of state officials, police corruption, and 
living in constant fear of being arrested (Kempadoo, 2012b, p 252). 
One argument that we will develop in this book is that policy choices 
have consequences. What looks good and morally just on paper has 
concrete, real-world consequences once policy is operationalised and 
implemented. It is every nation’s sovereign right to prohibit or legalise 
sex work, but in the final analysis such policies come as ‘packages’ 
of beliefs about and attitudes towards women, laws, rules, agencies, 
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professionals, policy instruments, practices and consequences, both 
intended and unintended. Whenever we talk of policy, what we should 
have in mind is the totality of what policy entails in the real world. 
Second, sex work is an occupation that is dominated by immigrants. 
Over 90 per cent of female sex workers in Austria and about 70 per 
cent in the Netherlands are immigrants; in this these two countries 
are representative of the other countries of north-western Europe. 
Sex work requires no diplomas or entry requirements, earnings are 
immediate, it is a cash economy, it requires minimal language skills, and 
it allows for high mobility. This makes it attractive to new immigrants, 
people ‘not from the privileged class, gender or race’ (Chew, 2012, 
p 74), who attempt to exercise their freedom of movement in seeking 
better economic opportunities and, an often overlooked motivation, 
less oppressive gender relations. Sex work is not the only ‘entry 
occupation’ for immigrants as we will see, but the migratory nature 
of sex work has profound implications for the position of sex workers. 
One of those implications is that their position as single migrant 
women in a foreign country, and the criminalisation of their work 
environment, makes them vulnerable to exploitation (Chew, 2012, 
p 79). This is in addition to prostitution’s intrinsic vulnerability as a 
stigmatised occupation. Another implication is that the same qualities 
that make prostitution attractive to immigrants make it an exceedingly 
difficult ‘object’ for public administration and legal regulation. We argue 
in Chapter Five that the relationship between migration, prostitution 
and public policy is riddled with complexities. In Chapter Six we 
make suggestions for how to acknowledge these complexities in a 
constructive way. 
The third lesson is the opposite of the first: legal rules and regulations 
can make life very difficult for sex workers. In many countries the 
laws regulating immigration and those regulating sex work are deeply 
intertwined. The same goes for the national discourse on immigration 
and prostitution (Vance, 2011; Kempadoo, 2012a). Restricting the 
possibilities for lawful migration increases the demand for third-party 
assistance of the migrant (Gallagher, 2001, p 977; Chuang, 2010). Once 
they are settled in the arrival country migrant sex workers struggle with 
arcane and constantly changing rules that regulate the conditions for 
legal stay or work in the country. As Dora puts it trenchantly: “You go 
to sleep with one law and wake up with another.” Examples abound. 
In Dora’s case she had to leave the country after the law changed. In 
the Netherlands an overnight change in the rules prohibited Romanian 
and Bulgarian sex workers to make use of a special tax arrangement that 
allowed them to work independently. The result was that many of the 
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women to whom this change applied became dependent on proprietors 
or marital partners for finding a job or staying in the country. Female 
asylum seekers who are awaiting a visa decision can, according to 
Austrian law, de facto only work in prostitution. Non-EU women can 
only stay in the country for a few months at the time and have to leave 
temporarily to avoid becoming illegal. And for those migrant women 
who have lived and worked in the country for many years and have 
paid income tax and social security benefits, it is inexplicable that they 
do not have the same rights as other citizens, or at a minimum the 
right to work as an employee. 
Finally, Dora’s story is the story of trafficking. An older male 
acquaintance takes advantage of these young women’s vaguely 
articulated urge to leave Romania and try their luck in one the 
affluent countries of north-western Europe. Yet the story also shows 
ambivalences that complicate the straightforward trafficking story. Dora 
is well educated and can hardly be called naïve. She is vague about 
her entry into sex work (“It just happened”), but it is not a story of 
deception or violent initiation. After the Romanian trafficker was 
convicted Dora goes back to sex work. She says that the proprietor’s 
take amounts to about 45 per cent of her earnings, that she works 
eight hours a day (and at most 48 hours a week) and can more or 
less set her own hours, can decide herself which sexual activities she 
want to engage in and complains about the lack of hygiene in the 
club. She says she earns enough to live off, and regularly sends money 
home – “as every girl does”, she adds. Her legal situation in Austria 
is tenuous. Dora doesn’t complain, but from the perspective of what 
is considered legally and normatively acceptable in Austria, Dora’s 
work situation is one of labour exploitation. And although Dora can 
be seen as a victim, she does not behave like one. Instead she displays 
initiative in making a better life in another country and shows to be 
plucky and resourceful in difficult situations. Contrary to the pervasive 
narrative of sex workers as ‘victims’, Dora demonstrates considerable 
agency in organising and managing her life (Ditmore, 2012, p 110). 
Prostitution, far from ‘enslaving’ her, is in fact a self-chosen means for 
social and personal betterment. 
The primacy of policy in prostitution 
In contemporary societies prostitution as a social phenomenon cannot 
be seen apart from the efforts of authorities to prohibit, contain or 
regulate it. The different ways in which prostitution manifests itself 
– as streets of softly red glowing windows with scantily clad women 
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behind them, as groups of women huddled on the sidewalk of a 
city street, as discrete clubs whose advertisements greet you at the 
airport, as the woman who asks guests if they want to share a drink 
with her in a hotel bar, as the Thai masseuse who offers a ‘happy 
end’ for an additional fee – are the joint outcome of autonomous 
social-economic forces, government intervention and civil society 
reactions. Prostitution, in all its manifestations, is deeply entangled 
with the state. While trade liberalisation and the ensuing structural 
adjustments, poverty, migration trends, education and employment 
possibilities, and global connectedness through the internet influence 
the ‘supply’ of sex workers, an array of government interventions shapes 
the nature, organisation and location of prostitution markets. Zoning 
laws determine which urban spaces are designated for prostitution 
purposes; national laws determine the legal position and civil rights 
of sex workers, while the mandate, skills and expertise of professionals 
and administrators influence the health and work conditions of sex 
workers, police procedure affects the security situation of sex workers; 
and, as we saw in the interview with Dora, immigration laws influence 
sex workers’ mobility. Also, for reasons that we will explain in the next 
chapter, in most western countries, prostitution is considered a matter 
of considerable moral urgency. Policy makers and the media award it 
substantial amounts of their attention. No matter how policy towards 
prostitution is formulated, in every country it leaves its imprint on the 
market for sexual services.
Public policy is a woolly concept that has different meanings in 
different cultures. It is little wonder then that the literature provides 
dozens of definitions of public policy, but, with differences in emphasis, 
most of them contain the following elements: public policy comprises 
an expression of intent, often, but not exclusively, by one or another 
agency of government, that is translated into specific proposals, resulting 
in an authoritative decision (such as legislation or formal regulation) that 
in turn is implemented through the allocation of funding and staffing 
and the selection and application of appropriate policy instruments 
(Cairney, 2012, pp 23-24). Policy implies therefore a distinct moral 
and teleological relationship between the state and society. From the 
perspective of the state, policy formulated in a particular societal 
domain defines its values and aspirations regarding this domain, its 
responsibilities towards its citizens and the obligations of these citizens 
towards the state and each other, its preferred imagery of its citizens, and 
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its economic, cultural and moral position in the international world.1 
From the perspective of citizens, policy is at the same time a focal 
point for their needs, values, ideals, aspirations, meanings, self-image 
and identity, and a set of constraints and opportunities imposed on the 
way they organise their daily life. Policies are a practical and lexical 
space in which political struggles over needs, claims, understandings, 
values and opinion are acted out – struggles between citizens and 
societal organisations on the one hand and the state on the other 
(Hajer, 2003). Thus, in most domains of life, such as work, housing, 
health, education, adult care, safety, immigration, energy, urban space, 
or the natural environment, public policy is a key platform for the 
ongoing interaction between state and society. This is recognised in 
the many subdivisions of the policy literature that deal with sector-
specific policies. Yet, despite the central importance of policy in shaping 
and articulating societal domains and individual destinies, relatively 
little attention has been paid to prostitution policy in the literature 
on prostitution. Or, more precisely, much of the literature prefers to 
discuss prostitution either in non-policy terms or to reduce public 
policy towards prostitution to only one element of the policy process. 
Each academic field develops its own traditions; its own preferred 
foci of attention, problem definitions, and styles of writing. More 
specifically, in the academic literature, prostitution is predominantly 
discussed as shaped by society-wide extraneous influences, as broad 
(national) policy regimes, in terms of international governance regimes 
and human rights, as discourse, and as the outcome of broad shifts in 
governmentality. 
Extraneous forces. Several scholars argue that the shape of the sex trade 
is not so much influenced by public policy as by external determinants 
such as ‘rapid and large-scale economic and cultural transformations’ 
(Bernstein, 2007, p 168; Agustín, 2008). These authors urge us to see 
prostitution as ‘sex labour’ and thereby as one manifestation of profound 
changes in the nature, diversity and spatial location of service work in 
general. These changes then lead to ‘new configurations of intimate 
life as well as in new erotic dispositions’ (Bernstein, 2007, p  28). 
These larger economic and cultural transformations are deemed to 
be so powerful that national responses to prostitution are hardly more 
than the enactment of this ‘post-industrial’ sociological script. Against 
the inexorable forces of these socio-cultural tectonic shifts policy 
1 This is a simplified image of public policy. In contemporary society policy denotes 
a complex triangular relationship between state, civil society and the corporate 
world. 
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is considered as largely ineffectual. Analysts argue for example that 
policies as antithetical as the Swedish attempt at client criminalisation 
and the Dutch attempt at legalisation of sex facilities result in the same 
outcomes: the banishment of outdoor sex work from gentrified city 
centres and the proliferation of venues of sex work for a more affluent 
clientele (Bernstein, 2007, pp 168-9; Scoular, 2010). 
An important variant of the extraneous forces approach is the 
‘transnational feminist’ approach. This is the label for an important 
perspective on prostitution that explicitly situates the sex trade in 
large migration trends. These trends are the result of changes in the 
postcolonial global political economy, or, as Kempadoo puts it, in a 
formulation typical for this type of approach, of ‘hegemonic and local 
patriarchies, globalized capitalism, and the widening gaps in income and 
wealth, as well as by reconfigurations of empire under late twentieth-
century globalization that reinscribed international hierarchies around 
notions of racial, religious and national difference’ (Kempadoo, 2012a, 
p xix). Prostitution is thus part of a set of strategies of migrant men 
and women, often, but not exclusively, from developing countries, 
to improve their position and life perspective in the global economy. 
And although these men and women are vulnerable to deception, 
coercion and exploitation, they are ‘agents in their own right, with 
complex identities and subjectivities’ (Kempadoo, 2102a, p xix; see 
also Sassen, 2002). Despite the focus on global trends, the transnational 
feminist approach is explicitly grounded in the everyday experiences 
of sex workers. Research in this tradition foregrounds the voice of the 
individuals who work in the sex trade to enable scholars to redefine the 
dominant intellectual and ideological frameworks around prostitution. 
The ‘transnational feminist’ approach contains many important insights 
for a deeper understanding of an effective and humane prostitution 
policy, yet it does not draw these implications itself. It usually restricts 
itself to presenting a critical postcolonial alternative to traditional 
approaches to prostitution, emphasising that prostitution is not an 
isolated phenomenon in the urban landscape but instead a symptom of 
larger trends in the changing global political economy and the ensuing 
struggles for identity, recognition, human rights and citizenship that 
flow from it. In the remainder of this book, particularly in Chapter Five, 
we will draw on insights from the transnational feminist perspective 
in our analysis of prostitution policy. 
Policy regimes. The distinction between different policy regimes is a 
common trope in the literature on prostitution policy. In the policy 
literature the term ‘policy regime’ expresses a certain coherence and 
continuity of design and execution in a policy field. These derive from 
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the way a problem is formulated, the actors and organisations that are 
involved and make decisions, and the kind of instruments and solutions 
that are favoured. Howlett and colleagues say, for example:
The term ‘policy regime’ attempts to capture how policy 
institutions, actors, and ideas tend to congeal into relatively 
long-term, institutionalized patterns of interaction that 
combine to keep public policy contents and processes more 
or less constant over time. (2009, p 86) 
The concept thus refers to a recognisable and stable policy style that 
is the aggregate of organisational routines, habitual interactions and 
shared values and understandings among key actors. In the prostitution 
literature the concept of a policy regime is taken in a somewhat 
narrower sense. Outshoorn, for example, defines a regime as ‘sets of 
laws and practices governing prostitution that shape prostitution in 
their respective jurisdictions in distinctive ways’ (Outshoorn, 2004a, 
p 6, but see also Bernstein, 2007; Abel et al, 2010; Chuang, 2010; 
Weitzer, 2012). As this definition illustrates, prostitution policy regimes 
are thought to coincide with national borders and consider laws the 
main vehicle for policymaking. This perspective on prostitution 
policy is borne out for example in Outshoorn’s analysis of the national 
parliamentary debates that resulted in the decision to legalise the 
commercial exploitation of prostitution in the Netherlands, and her 
subsequent analysis of the changes that resulted in a proposal for, and 
subsequent defeat of, a new repressive national prostitution law of 
2010 (Outshoorn, 2004a; 2012). There is considerable debate about 
the type and proper nomenclature of the different regimes (Agustín, 
2008; Phoenix, 2009; Abel et al, 2010; Chuang, 2010; Scoular, 2010), 
but that need not concern us here. 
A different approach to policy regimes consists of the continuing 
efforts of transnational organisations such as the International Labour 
Organization or the United Nations to design international protocols 
and agreements on prostitution, trafficking, labour exploitation or 
organised crime. The 2000 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children is the 
most familiar and influential example in the prostitution literature. 
Similar to the policy regime approach, its attraction resides in a certain 
authority that follows from its generalised character – from the very 
circumstance, in other words, that broad moral end-point indications 
are not disturbed by potentially controversial details of execution. The 
UN protocol not only provides the definition of trafficking for states 
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that have signed up to it, but more surreptitiously, it imposes – and 
legitimises – a criminal justice approach to trafficking with an emphasis 
on prosecution of both traffickers and (migrant) victims instead of 
human rights and service provision (Chuang, 2010, p 1663; Smith, 
2011; Vance, 2011; Kempadoo, 2012a). It is less important in this 
respect that the protocol has been deliberately formulated in such a way 
that it allows states considerable leeway in formulating or continuing 
their own national policy approaches (Ditmore, 2012, p 115). Or, 
differently put, global governance regimes such as the UN protocol 
also require further specification to be able to function as effective 
forms of policy regulation. 
One of the reasons for the popularity of the regime concept is that 
it neatly coincides with the popular debate on prostitution. Opponents 
of prostitution argue for its prohibition or for client criminalisation; 
pragmatists for whom prostitution is an ineradicable element of human 
society argue for its regulation; and those who consider prostitution an 
occupation as any other argue for the legalisation or decriminalisation 
of the sex trade. These moral positions on prostitution, particularly 
the abolitionist framework, restrict themselves to broad-brush 
regime indications, generalised end-point indications, without much 
specification of how such regimes are to be implemented, sustained 
and evaluated.
Regime typologies have been criticised on several grounds. They do 
not necessarily coincide with national borders, they are insufficiently 
consistent as more than one regime can be discerned in the same 
country or even in one policy programme, and they ignore the 
complex and multi-level character of prostitution policy (Phoenix, 
2009; Skilbrei and Holmström, 2013; Wagenaar et al, 2013). Does that 
mean that the policy regimes in the prostitution literature must be seen 
as convenient shorthand for a complex set of processes, institutions 
and actors, somewhat as Howlett and colleagues’ definition implies, 
and that scholars can be trusted to be careful enough to elaborate 
when they analyse prostitution policy? In the hands of scholars such 
as Chuang, this is how the regime indications are indeed used. In her 
article she carefully reconstructs the legal regimes that underlie the 
different regime types (Chuang, 2010). But there is a darker side to 
the regime labels, as the uptake by popular discourse betrays. Regime 
labels are not just innocent summaries of complex policy processes. 
They tend to have a performative character. Not only do they function 
as banners under which proponents of different moral positions towards 
prostitution unite, but they also refer to ideal types – not in the usual 
Weberian sense of the word, but in the way that poststructuralists use 
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the term (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). Regime labels are instances 
of the fantasmatic in public policy. They highlight the crucial role of 
fantasy and utopian thinking in the design of policy, a fantasy that serves 
to fill uncomfortable cognitive gaps. We will encounter the importance 
of fantasy in prostitution policy later in this book, in particular in 
Chapter Two, where we discuss morality politics. 
Discourse analysis. Another common form of academic writing about 
prostitution focuses on discourse. Authors in this tradition usually 
explain the shape a policy has obtained in a particular country by 
referring to the national discourse about prostitution (Outshoorn, 
2004b, 2012; Sauer, 2004), or they explain how the issue of trafficking 
has come to dominate the (inter)national debate on prostitution 
(Chuang, 2010; Doezema, 2010; Sanghere, 2012). Discourse analysis 
comes in two forms. The first analyses broad national debates about 
prostitution and how these influence political decision making. 
Outshoorn’s analysis of the outcome of the Dutch parliamentary 
deliberations on the legalisation of the commercial exploitation of 
prostitution is an example (Outshoorn, 2004b; 2014). The underlying 
premise is that the way prostitution is represented in the national media, 
in policy reports and in speeches before parliament has consequences 
for the design of public policy. Outshoorn carefully traces how different 
actors have contributed to the shaping of a multi-site debate on the 
nature of prostitution in the Netherlands and how these imageries 
predispose to certain preferred solutions. This form of discourse analysis 
is good at explaining changes in prostitution policy. Outshoorn’s book 
is also a fine example of the way that discourse analysis can be used in 
a comparative way. Chuang’s analysis of the impact of the trafficking 
discourse on US prostitution and foreign policy is another outstanding 
example of this type of discourse analysis. Chuang argues that radical 
feminists in the US managed to capture the debate on prostitution and 
usher in a hegemonic ‘neo-abolitionist’ policy approach to prostitution 
(Chuang, 2010).2
2 A note on terminology: ‘neo-abolitionism’ is the term that is often used in the 
literature to indicate the current dominant movement to eradicate or suppress 
prostitution in society by applying criminal law to clients and third parties. As 
Chuang sates: ‘(I)n their (the neo-abolitionists) opinion, pimps, brothel owners 
and managers, clients and any third parties who assist women to travel and work 
in the sex industry should be prosecuted for rape, trafficking or both’ (2010, 
p 1669). In this ideological framework sex workers are victims of male patriarchy 
who should be ‘rescued’, although in reality, because of the criminalisation of their 
work environment, they become more vulnerable. As there can be no such thing 
as non-coerced prostitution, broad anti-trafficking laws and repressive enforcement 
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The second form of discourse analysis is more radically social 
constructivist. The central concepts in such analysis are myth, meaning 
and power. The purpose of constructivist discourse analysis is not so 
much to confront certain myths about prostitution (in particular the 
myth about trafficking as an epidemic worldwide phenomenon) with 
the reality of sex workers’ lives or the utter lack of reliable data, but to 
trace the origins (or genealogy) of these images, and how they succeed 
in convincing the larger world of their truth claims (Walkowitz, 1980; 
Doezema, 2010, p 10). By placing the discourse on trafficking in an 
historical perspective, the analyst discerns larger patterns of meaning 
making and the coalitions and mechanisms (such as funding decisions, 
organisational design, media attention) that fuel those meanings and 
succeed in imposing them on the wider public. Constructivist discourse 
analysis is particularly strong in its analysis of the role of experts who 
put forward authoritative truths about prostitution and trafficking. 
It explains the naturalisation of certain images and understandings 
through the repeated use of certain narrative tropes that are owned 
and supported by political, academic and moral authorities. 
Discourse analysis is an important but ultimately limited way of 
analysing prostitution policy. It mostly contributes to explaining 
the agenda-setting phase of the policy process where it demarcates 
how common metaphors and tropes suggest policy solutions and 
determine the limits of what is possible and permissible to say. In able 
hands, constructivist discourse analysis shows how ideology becomes 
embedded in laws, regulations and policy programs, and how, inversely 
these policy schemes bestow legitimacy on the reigning discourse 
(Walkowitz 1980; Corbin, 1990). Discourse analysis is particularly 
strong in tracing the ramifications of power and authority in a particular 
political-administrative domain and the decisive role that professionals 
and academic experts play in this. For example, through their careful 
and detailed analysis of 19th century arrangements for regulating 
prostitution, historians who work in this Foucauldian tradition 
have provided suggestive insights into contemporary policymaking. 
However, a similarly detailed, similarly comprehensive ‘history of the 
present’ of prostitution policy has not been written yet. While discourse 
schemes are the logical approach to prostitution (Chuang, 2010, p 1669). The 
label abolitionism explicitly refers to the 19th-century movement to abolish the 
transatlantic slave trade and the subsequent early 20th-century feminist movement 
to fight ‘white slavery’, or licensed prostitution. Neo-abolitionism is particularly 
strong in the Anglo-Saxon world, although its expression in public policy – client 
criminalisation and use of law as a pedagogical tool – was designed in Sweden. In 
this book we use the label abolitionism to refer to this ideology. 
13
Introduction
analysis is particularly well suited to drawing the different positions, 
it is much less adept at explaining how discursive constructions of 
prostitution are related to policy design. One of the purposes of this 
book is to do just that: to use discourse analysis to explain policy 
formulation and implementation in Austria and the Netherlands 
(Chapters Three and Four). We will see there that discourse itself 
is not sufficient as an explanation for policy change. We require the 
introduction of veto points for example to explain why the repeal of 
the brothel ban was first rejected by Dutch parliament, albeit passed 
a few years later.
Human rights and international governance. The human rights literature 
is largely concerned with international governance regimes in 
prostitution, in particular the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, as 
adopted in Palermo in 1999. Much of the literature attempts to assess 
to what extent the international governance of prostitution is driven 
by human rights or by a concern over security issues surrounding 
migration, generally concluding that the first takes a back seat to the 
second. Gallagher concludes, for example, that national states tend to 
focus on repressive measures against illegal migration and organized 
crime, rather than on strengthening migrants’ human rights (Gallagher, 
2001, p 994). Other recurrent topics are the exact interpretation of 
the various clauses of and definitions in the protocol, how the bitter 
conflicts between prohibitionist and legalisation camps have affected 
the wording of the protocol (Gallagher, 2001; Ditmore and Wijers, 
2003; Ditmore, 2012), the effectiveness of the protocol, and the 
importance of focusing on labour and criminal justice policies to 
strengthen the human rights of sex workers (Chew, 2012, pp 75-78). In 
its foregrounding of human rights and its tentative acknowledgements 
that trafficking includes other industries besides prostitution, most 
authors are guardedly optimistic about the protocol, noticing that it 
represents an improvement over the more repressive 1949 Convention 
for the Suppression of the Traffick in Persons and of the Exploitation 
of the Prostitution of Others. However, little or no attention is paid 
to the translation of the UN protocol into national policy. In fact, as 
some authors argue, the protocol has been kept deliberatively vague 
to accommodate almost opposing policies towards prostitution by the 
signatory nations (Ditmore, 2012, p 115). We will see that the effect 
of the protocol on national policy is often not felicitous, and that it 
has been used to legitimise repressive prostitution measures in which 
concerns over immigration overrule the human and civil rights of sex 
workers. 
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Governmentality. Finally, there is a group of scholars that is interested 
in changes in governmentality (Scoular and O’Neill, 2007). The term 
governmentality depicts a style of governing in which all aspects of 
public life and individual conduct are in principle subject to regulation. 
The process of governing should not be seen as the expression of 
a monolithic power centre or grand ideology, but instead as the 
accumulation of a myriad of micro-practices within local programmes 
such as schools, prisons, welfare agencies, corporations and disability 
programmes, that sustain, modify and even generate what we perceive 
and experience as the institutions of the state (Foucault, 1991, p 102). 
These regimes of government are made possible because state agencies 
rely on, and implicate, communities, neighbourhoods private businesses, 
professionals and citizens to achieve their ends (Dean, 1999, p 70). In 
a rather jargon-infested phrase, Walters summarises governmentality 
as ‘multiply constituted, polytemporal and recombinatory’ (Walters, 
2012, p 40). Governmentality is aimed at regulating populations instead 
of territories and it does that, almost surreptitiously, through weaving 
a web of techniques, tactics and vocabularies – ‘a relatively durable 
network of heterogeneous elements (discourses, law, architectures, 
institutions, administrative practices and so on)’ (Walters, 2012, p 36) 
– that aims to create a shared consciousness, particular identities and 
desired practices among the population. Rose and Miller have famously 
argued that governmentality operates along two channels of activity: 
political rationalities and governing techniques (Rose and Miller, 
1992). The first refers to the way that programmes of government are 
formulated within broad discourses of collective truth, proper ruling 
and moral justification.3 The second refers to a plethora of techniques 
that are deployed to put governmental rationalities into effect. Rose 
and Miller describe these technologies as the ‘complex of mundane 
programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and 
procedures that act on the subjects of governance, to coerce, persuade, 
cajole, suggest, or goad them to behave in certain preferred ways’ 
(1992, p 175). 
Scoular and O’Neill’s 2007 article is a good example of the 
governmentality approach to prostitution. The authors observe a 
movement in prostitution policy from ‘“enforcement” (punishment) to 
“multi-agency” (regulatory) responses designed to exit women from the 
sex trade’ (Scoular and O’Neill, 2007, p 764). This is part of a broader 
3 The governmentality approach is in effect another form of discourse analysis, except 
that it takes discourse in a much wider, more ontological, sense (Wagenaar, 2011, 
ch 6). 
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historical trend in the regulation of prostitution that proceeds from 
‘regulationism’ via ‘suppression’ to the current neoliberal ‘welfarism’. 
The ‘welfarism’ approach is characterised by two elements: a reliance 
on expert knowledge and the implication that the subjects are to be 
controlled through appeals to moral responsibility. As the authors put 
it: ‘Often termed “progressive governance”, these new matrices of 
power are increasingly organized around forms of specialist and expert 
knowledge which seek to manage crime prevention and control through 
strategies of self-governance and responsibilization’ (2007, p 76). Prior 
and colleagues use the governmentality framework to explain the 
distribution of the sex trade in urban spaces. Their conclusion is that 
seemingly neutral planning instruments such as zoning procedures in 
fact impose moral categories regarding prostitution and ‘good sexuality’ 
on the spatial layout of the city (Prior et al, 2013, p 354). Or, as the 
authors phrase it: ‘[T]hese geographies are reinforced through a range 
of legal and administrative techniques enacted by state agents such as the 
police, the judiciary, medical officials, planners, and licensing officers’, 
establishing so-called ‘moral geographies’ (Prior et al, 2013, p 355). 
These analyses have a distinct critical flavour; their aim is to expose 
the surreptitious working of power in what superficially looks like a 
benign or technically neutral approach to prostitution. However, the 
appeal to sex workers to take charge of their lives is not optional and 
the planning instruments are far from dispassionate. The underlying 
moral position of ‘responsibilisation’ strategies is that prostitution is a 
moral wrong and should be banished to carefully contained vice zones, 
while those sex workers who persist in their work and refuse to take 
part in exit programmes are to be subjected to a punitive regime of 
custody and rehabilitation (Scoular and O’Neill, 2007, p 773). 
Discussion. Each of these five approaches provides important insights 
into prostitution and its regulation. Yet, they also fall short of providing 
a convincing account of prostitution policy and how it affects the 
actors in the sex trade and the wider public. First, the exogenous 
forces and governmentality approach to prostitution amount to an 
exaggerated claim as an explanation of change and variation in the 
sex trade (John, 2012, p 98). Without a careful specification of the 
causal or interpretive factors that link wider developments in property, 
land and labour markets or in regimes of regulation to the place and 
manifestation of a social phenomenon such as prostitution, or even 
more elusive ‘intimate life’, in society, the argument begs the question. 
In fact, in both cases the argument is based on very thin empirical 
evidence indeed. Exhibit number one, the banishment of outdoor 
prostitution from many city centres in the western world, does not 
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hold up to closer scrutiny. There is indeed a remarkable convergence 
in the disappearance of street prostitution in many, but not all, cities in 
north-western Europe (Tampep International Foundation, 2009), but 
on closer scrutiny the motivation for these measures is quite diverse. 
In the Netherlands, for example, the tolerance zones that were set up 
in the late 1990s for vulnerable, addicted sex workers began to attract 
large numbers of young eastern European women, many of whom were 
believed to be victims of trafficking (interviews, service providers, The 
Hague). Service providers and municipal authorities felt increasingly 
uncomfortable with what they saw as abetting exploitation, and closed 
down the tolerance zones. In Vienna, street prostitution has been 
displaced to the periphery of the city because of a sustained campaign 
by residents, supported by a strident right-wing press and the capture 
of policy implementation by the police. And in Italy, the crackdown 
on street work was part of a populist law-and-order campaign of the 
Berlusconi government (Crowhurst, 2012). It could very well be that 
in all these cases urban development, gentrification and changes in the 
market for service labour are the ‘real’ drivers behind these processes, 
but this has to be demonstrated, otherwise it simply beggars belief that 
all these different actors in different national cultures were all marching 
in synch to the same supranational script. Even the argument that 
these different approaches to outdoor sex work can all be subsumed 
under an overarching movement to a ‘welfarist’ regulatory approach 
disintegrates under closer scrutiny. Exit programmes make up a small, 
almost negligible, part of prostitution policy in most countries. As 
we will see later, repressive policy measures have made a comeback 
in many countries, although admittedly, mixed in with social service-
based approaches. Moreover, both approaches lack a sufficiently fine-
grained description of the effects of policies, or of large-scale trends, 
on the target group, outdoor sex workers, and tend to lump dissimilar 
cases under similar theoretical categories. In the Netherlands sex 
workers who were banished from the tolerance zones were offered 
ample social services (Vos and Wagenaar, 2014). In Vienna outdoor 
sex workers ended up on the outskirts of the city in a risky, degrading 
environment without any amenities, and after being moved around 
by city authorities, lost their workplace altogether (see Chapter 
Three). In Italy, outdoor sex workers de facto lost their rights and were 
frequent victims of abuse by the police (Crowhurst, 2012). These 
examples demonstrate that an adequate understanding of the nature 
of, and changes in, national and local prostitution markets requires 
the detailed analysis of prostitution policy. The exogenous forces and 
governmentality approach are important sociological descriptions of 
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the wider social-economic and regulatory environment of prostitution; 
as explanations of policy and its effects, they fall short.
Second, all five approaches to a greater or lesser extent deny agency 
to the actors involved in the sex trade; both the agency of political 
actors and officials as well as that of sex workers, brothel owners, 
clients and others who are involved in prostitution. Actors tend to 
act on the way they understand social and political phenomena. 
The reigning trope in much of the prostitution literature is to posit 
large overarching constructs – political-economic forces, discourse, 
governmentality, global governance regimes – that somehow explain 
the size, manifestation and geographical distribution of prostitution. 
However, these constructs are not linear representations of objects 
‘out there’ in the world, which then compellingly determine people’s 
behaviour. Rather, actors in the context of their own (working) life 
interpret large socioeconomic developments, trends in government 
regulation, shifts in public opinion, or, more generally, situations 
in their own life circumstances. For example, Dora, in the example 
above, was exploited by a neighbour, but decided to file a complaint 
against him, because she knew that “These people often threaten but 
they don’t do anything.” As Bevir and Rhodes put it: ‘Social facts are 
cultural in that they exist only because of the meaning and beliefs 
of the relevant actors’ (2008, p  2). Because actors operate within 
steady practices and belief systems, ‘traditions’ in the vocabulary of 
Bevir and Rhodes, much of social and political life is relatively stable. 
However, every now and then actors face a disruption of their routines. 
How they react to such dislocations always contains an element of 
contingency (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). For example, if we take the 
agency of actors seriously, it is likely that policy acts both as a reaction 
to, and as a mediating force between, political-economic shifts and 
changes in the nature, composition and location of the sex trade. 
As John puts it: ‘[E]xogenous economic approaches do not offer an 
all-encompassing theory of political action – they suggest a set of 
constraints on action that impact on policy choices depending on 
the circumstances that policy makers face’ (2012, p 99). The analyst 
faces the essentially hermeneutic task here of explaining macro-events 
in terms of micro-practices and vice versa (Geertz, 1973; Wagenaar, 
2011, ch 2). In Chapters Three and Four by reconstructing the shifts 
in the implementation and formulation of prostitution policy and by 
situating these in the wider societal and political context of Austria 
and the Netherlands, we do just that to explain the course that public 
policy took in these countries. 
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With the exception of the global governance regime approach, 
a related objection to the above approaches to policy analysis in 
prostitution is that they downplay the possibilities for government 
interventions to have a positive or negative impact on the position of sex 
workers. Such an assumption would fly in the face of credibility about 
the ameliorative or harmful power of governments. We have already 
seen in Dora’s story how important the rule of law is for the rights 
and position of sex workers, and how the prohibition of prostitution 
creates opportunities for corruption and inhumane treatment of sex 
workers by the police. We have also seen how immigration laws induce 
unwanted mobility, tie workers to their employer, or force sex workers 
to give up independent employment and find a brothel to work in. 
There are at least three reasons why the study of policy in prostitution 
is important. First, every country, for better or worse, has a policy 
towards prostitution. Similar to sectors such as health, education, or 
housing, a range of different collective reactions towards prostitution 
exists across countries. This variation in itself is something that requires 
explanation (Cairney, 2012, p 3). Second, it is undeniable that there 
are considerable differences in the human rights and work conditions 
of sex workers across countries. Even if we are willing to entertain 
the hypothesis that government intervention has no effect at all on the 
sex trade in all of these countries, in other words that these differences 
can be attributed solely to the influence of large exogenous forces or 
to shifts in discursive formations, then this also requires explanation. 
Such a hypothesis would be so counterintuitive, among other things in 
the light of the well-established impact of public policy in areas such 
as health, education and housing (established through international 
comparative research among other things), that the burden rests 
on those who implicitly or explicitly entertain such a presumption 
to support it with convincing evidence. Instead of following this 
barely credible position we hold the position that public policy has a 
considerable, but not exhaustive, impact on the sex trade. 
Third, to entertain the hypothesis that public policy is ineffectual 
in influencing prostitution and the position of sex workers robs the 
analyst of any possibility to advise public officials. Dora’s story suggests 
that policy measures have unintended negative consequences for sex 
workers. As we will see in later chapters, many municipalities, under 
the influence of abolitionist discourses on prostitution, design and 
implement policies with the express intent to restrict the sex trade. 
Such measures usually have negative consequences for the labour and 
human rights of sex workers. The analyst’s task is, at the very least, to 
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point this out and suggest ways for a better balance between the rights 
of the community and those of sex workers. 
Anyone who discusses the subject of public policy in an international 
context immediately encounters semantic problems. The concept of 
‘policy’ has different meanings in different countries.4 For this reason it 
is important to state that we largely follow the Anglo-Saxon meaning of 
the terms ‘policy’ and ‘politics’. The term ‘policy’ attempts ‘to capture 
the idea that policy-making is a techno-political process of defining 
and matching goals and means among constrained actors’ (Howlett et 
al, 2009, p 4). Howlett et al argue that policy has two dimensions. The 
first is a technical one that seeks ‘to identify the optimal relationship 
between goals and tools’. This is generally seen as the business of state 
agencies whose task it is to manage public problems (Ansell, 2011, 
p 4). The second dimension of public policy is a political one ‘since 
not all actors typically agree on what constitutes a policy problem or 
an appropriate “solution”’ (Ansell, 2011, p 4). Politics is thus society’s 
way of dealing with the deep pluralism, the inevitable conflicts of belief, 
religion, value and interest that characterise all societies (Wagenaar, 
2011, ch 10). It refers to practices and institutions that ‘seek to establish 
a certain order and organize human coexistence in conditions that are 
always potentially conflictual’ (Mouffe, 2000, p 101). These institutions 
are the executive and parliament that bargain, negotiate and deliberate 
over policy goals and broadly defined courses of action.5 In democratic 
4 In the Anglo-Saxon world it is common to make a distinction between politics and 
policy. The latter roughly refers to the executive arm of government, the public 
agencies that manage societal problems, and the former to the decision-making 
process by elected officials. In the German-speaking world there is no term for 
policy; policy, polity and politics are all referred to as ‘Politik’. There is a separate 
term for public administration (‘Verwaltung’) that strictly refers to the executive 
branch of government. In the Netherlands there is a distinction between ‘politiek’ 
(the activities of elected officials), ‘bestuur’ (the management of societal sectors 
by both elected officials and civil servants, usually by ‘bestuursorganen’ such as city 
councils, umbrella organisations, corporatist bodies and so on) and ‘beleid’ (which 
involves all public agencies, including those that have been privatised, such as 
housing corporations.) In Norway ‘politikk’ covers both policy and politics (oral 
communication, May-Len Skilbrei). In Italy there is no word for policy; everything 
is politics (oral communication, David Nelken). To make things even more 
complicated: nowadays the concept of ‘policy’ has fallen out of favor as being too 
statist and is being replaced with the term ‘governance’, signifying the decentred 
nature of contemporary policymaking. 
5 The implicit normative principle is that there is a division of labour between the 
executive and public agencies in the management of public problems. While the 
first is at all times democratically accountable, the latter operates in relative freedom, 
albeit under a strict political mandate, to design and implement public programmes. 
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terms, policymaking as a technical process of managing public problems 
is at the ‘tail end’ of the representative chain that starts with election 
campaigns and parliamentary debate (Ansell, 2011, p 4). 
Public policy is the provenance of government. In the past two 
decades policy theorists have urged us however to shy away from the 
overly state-centred fixation of the term policy and adopt instead the 
broader term ‘governance’. There are different reasons for this shift 
in the conceptualisation of the process of governing in contemporary 
society. Policy analysts have become more sensitive to the demands 
of citizens and other stakeholders to have a say in the policy process. 
On the other hand, three decades of public sector reform, fuelled by a 
powerful neoliberal ideology, have irrevocably altered the administrative 
landscape (Hood and Dixon, 2015). The privatisation of services 
that were formerly provided by the state and the reorganisation of 
government according to corporate principles have resulted in a 
fragmented, decentred public sector where many different actors are 
involved in the delivery of vital public services and where responsibility, 
accountability and transparency are opaque. 
The concept of governance has different meanings (Rhodes, 1996, 
p 653), but in the context of policymaking it is generally taken as self-
organising networks (Rhodes, 1996; Sørensen and Torfing, 2008). A 
networked system of governance consists of public and private sector 
organisations (government agencies, third sector organisations, non-
governmental organisations [NGOs], representative bodies, activists, 
citizen groups) that deliberate, negotiate, and sometimes implement, 
public policy. These organisations are bound by mutual dependency; 
they exchange information, material resources and legitimacy. Stable 
policy networks develop their own rules and culture, and may achieve 
considerable autonomy from the state. In the early 2000s, for example, 
the city of The Hague initiated a policy network of brothel owners, 
municipal agencies, judicial officials and the police, for the purpose of 
In this way politics and administration are more or less kept separate. The key 
argument is that this allows specialised technical expertise to inform the design and 
implementation of policy programmes. In fact, as Manin (1997) argues, a cadre 
of specialised experts, wedged in between elected officials and the people, and 
who design and execute solutions to politically identified issues, is one of the key 
characteristics of liberal electoral democracy. However, in practice the normative 
boundary between politics and administration is highly permeable. Politicians 
regularly ignore or intervene in administrative processes, and in an increasingly 
plural, complex and adversarial society public agencies have to engage in complex 
negotiations with stakeholders to attain a modicum of effectiveness (Ansell, 2011, 
p 4; Wagenaar, 2011, ch 10).
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designing and implementing the newly adopted law that legalised sex 
facilities. It made use of the relationships between police, city officials 
and proprietors that had developed in the preceding decade of regulated 
tolerance (Brants, 1998). The goals of the network were to coordinate 
the many activities of the various officials and agencies, to inculcate a 
number of shared values, and to create sufficient support for the licensing 
system that was to be introduced in a field that initially resisted any 
government intervention (Wagenaar, 2006). This example demonstrates 
the main rationales for the emergence of policy networks in which 
different stakeholders participate in policy design and implementation. 
First, many policy arenas are so complex, diversified and dynamic 
that they overwhelm the capacities of the state to govern effectively, 
resulting in situations of ‘pluralised ungovernability’ (Warren, 2014; 
see also Wagenaar, 2007, 2014). Second, target groups often actively 
resist policy measures, or at the very least find accommodations that 
allow them to render policy measures ‘harmless’ or deflect their original 
purpose (Wagenaar, 1995). We will encounter many examples in this 
book of the ‘pluralised ungovernability’ and policy resistance of the 
prostitution sector. In Chapter Six we will make suggestions about 
how to harness this ungovernability. 
The goals of the book
Thus, the basic premise of this book is that in trying to understand 
the place of prostitution in society it is important to understand 
prostitution policy. Policy shapes the different manifestations of 
prostitution: the places where it is practised, the type of prostitution 
that is prevalent in a society, and the position and rights of sex workers. 
In its turn prostitution policy both shapes and is shaped by the public’s 
attitudes towards prostitution and sex workers. Prostitution policy 
expresses other, wider, social attitudes towards women, immigrants 
and sexuality. Policy is constrained and influenced by broader social 
and economic developments, and often struggles to absorb, channel 
or ameliorate such influences. Policy, as we will argue below, is a 
polyvalent, multidimensional concept. It involves laws, procedures, 
institutions, ideas, networks of actors, interest groups and power. All 
of these elements influence the formulation and implementation of 
public policy. 
The purpose of this book is threefold: first, it provides an overview 
and critique of how prostitution policy has been analysed to this 
point (see the previous section); second, it provides a policy analytical 
approach that both recognises the particular challenges of the field and 
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brings the concepts and tools of public policy analysis to bear; and 
third, it provides suggestions for how policy makers can move forward 
in establishing a fairer and more humane policy. Policy analysis is an 
established discipline that has been largely ignored in understanding 
prostitution policy. It is an important aim of the book to relate the 
insights of policy theory to prostitution policy. However, the discipline 
of policy studies proceeds through the analysis of concrete policy 
issues. For this reason, the empirical basis of the book is a three-year 
comparative study of prostitution policy in Austria and the Netherlands 
(see the Appendix for a description and justification of the design of 
the study). 
Both countries make interesting objects of analysis. Contrary to the 
US, where from around 2000 onwards prostitution policy was dictated 
by neo-abolitionism (Chuang, 2010), most western European countries 
followed a more or less pragmatic approach to regulating prostitution. 
When the Netherlands decriminalised brothels in 1999 it was widely 
regarded (and roundly criticised in radical feminist circles) as a vanguard 
of progressivism. Austria, although less in the limelight, has always had 
a tradition of societal acceptance, women’s rights and administrative 
ethos when it comes to regulating prostitution. Yet, as we will see in 
the following chapters, a fine-grained analysis of the formulation and 
implementation of prostitution policy in both countries reveals that 
under the surface the political forces opposing prostitution have found 
ways to undermine and eventually undo progressive policies. We think 
the analysis in this book leads to two important conclusions. First, 
prostitution policy is fragile. Legitimisation and decriminalisation are 
easily reversed, and revert back to criminalisation and heavy-handed 
regulation and control. This is a complex process that largely occurs 
at the local level, thereby deviating from, and even undoing, national 
policymaking. Second, without a detailed exposition and analysis 
of the design and implementation of prostitution policy at different 
scales of governance, statements about its nature or outcomes remain 
necessarily at the surface and are at worst misleading
In the course of using the ideas and insights from policy theory to 
make sense of prostitution policy in Austria and the Netherlands we 
realised that we were making an original contribution to three general 
topics in the discipline of policy analysis: moral policy (Chapter Two 
and its application throughout the book), the importance of domain-
specific challenges to policy formation (Chapter Two), and the concept 
of a complex policy field (Chapters Five and Six). For two reasons 
we have chosen to present a discussion of the relevant ‘chapters’ in 
policy theory in some detail in this book. First, to comprehend our 
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analysis of prostitution policy we need to discuss the relevant topics in 
policy with some exactness. We take care, however, to ensure that our 
account of general theoretical insights remains relevant to the topic 
at hand. We underscore this by illustrating our theoretical exposition 
with ample examples from our empirical work. Second, as we stated 
above, our application of policy theory to prostitution policy results in 
insights in and reformulations of the first that constitute a contribution 
to the policy literature. As domain-specific and general insights are 
closely interconnected it would be implausible to only report on the 
first and ignore the latter. Finally, we take a pragmatic approach to 
policy theory in this book. In explaining the formulation, development 
and outcomes of prostitution policy, we take as much as possible the 
perspective of the policy maker. Differently put, our analysis and our 
use of the insights of policy theory is guided by the question: What 
does the world look like from the perspective of the official? 
Taken together the book’s three goals, its foundation in policy studies, 
and its pragmatic stance result in an intricate and comprehensive 
argument that brings together empirical facts and normative arguments, 
aggregate trends and individual experiences, different scales of 
policymaking, and an array of conceptual insights in policy theory. We 
will argue that a broad, synoptic grasp of these disparate elements is 
required to arrive at an analysis of prostitution policy that does justice 
to its many challenges, intricacies and sensitivities. An explanation of 
the structure of the book is therefore in order. 
A reader’s guide to the book 
In Chapter Two we discuss five challenges to formulating, designing 
and implementing an effective, fair and humane prostitution policy, 
challenges that every policy maker in the domain of prostitution has to 
reckon with. These challenges are the pervasive stigma on prostitution, 
the deeply moral nature of prostitution policy, its confluence with 
immigration policy, the lack of reliable and precise data, and the 
inherently local character of prostitution policy. Chapters Three, Four 
and Five are devoted to the analysis of prostitution policy in Austria and 
the Netherlands. In ascending order the chapters represent the different 
scales of governance: local, national and transnational. However, 
this triptych of chapters will also illustrate the extent to which the 
three scales of governance are interrelated; Chapters Three and Four 
demonstrate the continuity of local and national policy, while Chapter 
Five illustrates how large global trends affect local policy. For reasons 
we will explain later, we begin our analysis with the implementation of 
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prostitution policy. Chapter Three begins with an account of the theory 
of policy implementation. We then demonstrate that the aggregation 
of numerous local measures in effect add up to an expedient, wholesale 
change (Netherlands) or modification (Austria) of national legislation. 
In Chapter Four we discuss national policymaking. Here we will see 
that national policy formulation takes place in networks of policy actors 
who contribute to, and are influenced by, evolving national discourses 
on prostitution. But, important as national discourse is in shaping the 
collective beliefs about and understandings of the sex trade, these actors, 
as we will argue, need access to decision-making arenas and procedures 
– so-called veto points – to effectuate legislative change. We will also 
demonstrate the importance of ancillary law for prostitution policy; 
labour, fiscal, immigration, social welfare and even data protection 
law are mobilised by policy makers to regulate prostitution. Chapter 
Five discusses the wider global trends in low-wage feminised labour, 
migration, labour exploitation and immigration law, and how these 
influence both the shape of and the policy reactions to the sex trade 
in the affluent countries of north-western Europe. The debate on 
migration and trafficking in prostitution suffers from exaggerated 
rhetoric and the widespread distortion of evidence. To counterbalance 
these trends, we illustrate the insights in this chapter with excerpts 
from our interviews with migrant sex workers. We suggest replacing 
the morally charged and ineffective concept of ‘trafficking’ with the 
more useful concept of ‘labour exploitation’. 
In Chapter Six we present an alternative to current policymaking: 
collaborative governance. We argue that the inclusion of the voice of 
sex workers in the design and implementation of prostitution policy will 
result in a form of policymaking that is more realistic, more effective 
and more just. To put this argument forward we draw on the theory 
and practice of collaborative governance and on concrete examples 
of collaborative governance in prostitution. The book closes with a 
summary of its argument and its main conclusions. The Appendix 
contains a description of the research project that forms the empirical 
basis for this book. 
The book is aimed at two types of reader. Those whose main interest 
is in prostitution policy can follow the following path: Chapters One 
and Two; the final three sections of Chapter Three; the sections on 
national policy in the Netherlands and Austria in Chapter Four, and its 
conclusion; Chapter Five (excluding the introduction); and Chapters 
Six and Seven. Those who have an interest in policy theory and only 
want to glance at the details of how the regulation of prostitution 
unfolded in the two countries are advised to read Chapters One and 
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Two; the first three sections and the conclusion of Chapter Three; 
the introduction and conclusion of Chapter Four; the introduction to 
Chapter Five; the first two sections of Chapter Six; and Chapter Seven.
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TWO 
Challenges of prostitution policy
The wider context of this book is the rapidly changing nature of 
commercial sex, and the international, national and local policy 
responses this has generated, particularly in the past three decades. 
We increasingly see a spatially and technologically mobile population 
of actors buying and selling sex in different venues (streets, massage 
parlours, hotels, flats, windows, clubs, saunas and private homes) 
and through different media (mobile phone, internet and via third-
party brokering). At the same time prostitution manifests itself most 
urgently at the local level, putting pressures on neighbourhoods and 
municipal administrations and conflicting with evolving ideals of public 
spaces held by citizens and policy elites. The drivers for these changes 
include migration, transformations in attitudes towards sexuality and 
gender, the widening income gap and the stagnation in wages, the 
mass tourism industry, the ensuing development and gentrification of 
inner cities, and an increasing emphasis on the competing demands 
of equality and human rights alongside concerns about security and 
social control in migration and prostitution, particularly related to 
cross-border prostitution and human trafficking.
National policy responses have been diverse, varying, as we have seen, 
from prohibition, client criminalisation and increased regulation to the 
decriminalisation of prostitution. Local policy responses have diversified 
in response to these pressures, tending either towards regulation or 
repression, especially of street prostitution. The media pays considerable 
attention to prostitution, with an emphasis on violence, coercion and 
trafficking. In the current climate of economic austerity migrants 
are regarded with increasing distrust, and we witness a resurgence of 
anti-immigration sentiments that directly affects national and local 
attitudes towards prostitution. As in Dora’s story, in many countries 
this has led to the violation of the democratic rights of a vulnerable 
group. Prostitution as a social domain thus presents policy makers 
and policy analysts with a number of challenges, both general and 
specific, which make the design and implementation of public policy 
exceedingly difficult. 
There are many definitions of public policy, but in a general sense 
it is a purposive course of action, authorised, though not necessarily 
initiated or implemented, by government, to deal with a problem or 
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matter of concern (Anderson, 1984, p 3; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003, 
p 7). All public policy faces certain general challenges, or key tasks that 
need to observed to realise a policy, any policy. Think of the challenge 
of setting a policy agenda and creating support for it (Kingdon, 
2011), addressing the intractable nature of the problem (Rittel and 
Webber, 1973), moving a bill through parliament, translating policy 
intentions into policy design and implementation (Howlett, 2011), and 
navigating networks of policy actors at different scalar levels (Rhodes, 
1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2003). These general challenges can best 
be seen as the generic tasks that policy makers face and the requisite 
skills that experienced policy makers need to possess to successfully 
formulate, design and implement public policy. In Chapter Six we 
will return to these generic challenges and frame them as dealing with 
complexity. Understanding how such intrinsic imperatives shape public 
policymaking is one of the central tasks of the policy analyst. 
In addition, to prepare for our analysis of prostitution policy in 
Austria and the Netherlands, we will need to get a grasp of the 
domain-specific challenges in prostitution policy. A domain-specific 
challenge is a circumstance or characteristic of a specific policy field that 
heavily influences the nature of and possibilities for concerted action 
in that field. For example, the actors involved in policymaking, the 
balance between agency and dependency, the availability of data and 
the salience of the issue are all determined by the specific challenges 
of a policy domain. Domain-specific challenges affect every phase 
and level of policymaking, and policy makers and policy analysts 
ignore them at their peril. For two reasons we present the challenges 
specific to prostitution policy in some detail. First, instead of it 
being merely a preparation for an informed analysis of prostitution 
policy, the presentation of challenges to prostitution policy is itself 
a form of policy analysis. Our discussions of the challenges contain 
important insights into the specific nature of prostitution policy. 
Second, policy analysis usually proceeds through the in-depth study 
of specific cases or domains, yet the explication of domain-specific 
obstacles to policymaking and analysis remains more often than not 
implicit. Some analysts distinguish between types of public policy that 
affect the nature or discretionary feasibilities of, for example, policy 
formulation or implementation (Lowi, 1972; Howlett et al, 2009). 
However, such typologies are hardly supported by empirical evidence 
and more often than not are too indiscriminating to be of much help 
in explaining either the specific characteristics or the possibilities and 
limits of policymaking in a specific domain. We discern five major 
domain-specific challenges to prostitution policy: prostitution suffers 
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from a pervasive social stigma; prostitution policy is a paradigmatic 
example of morality politics; precise and reliable data are hard if not 
impossible to obtain; prostitution policy has merged with policies aimed 
at containing immigrants; and, although prostitution policy, like most 
policy, is multilevel, local policy plays a decisive role when it comes 
to implementation. Any analysis of prostitution policy needs to take 
these five domain-specific challenges into account.
The stigma of prostitution and the paradox of control
‘Man bludgeons woman to death and stabs prostitute’ 
(Headline in Dutch newspaper, October 2015)
Whorephobia can be defined as the fear or the hate of 
sex workers. Sex workers like me would argue that it 
also embraces paternalistic attitudes that deem us a public 
nuisance, spreaders of disease, offenders against decency or 
unskilled victims who don’t know what is good for them 
and who need to be rescued. (Thierry Schaffauser, The 
Guardian, 23 October 2010) 
It is a truism that prostitution labours under a pervasive and near 
universal stigma. It is more interesting and important to trace the 
effects of this fact on sex workers and on public policy. We argue in 
this section that the effects of the prostitution stigma are widespread. 
Stigma, deliberately and surreptitiously, shapes laws, regulations, 
practices, institutions and policies, it undermines the effectiveness and 
fairness of the regulation of prostitution, and, in general, it results in 
the social marginalisation of sex workers. 
In her classic treatment of the topic, Pheterson argues that the 
prostitution stigma centres on a deep-seated, socially shared anxiety 
about and condemnation of unrestrained, unbridled female sexuality, 
or what Pheterson calls ‘unchastity’ (1996, p 12; see also Nussbaum, 
1998). It is probably correct to say that the prostitution stigma centres 
on the social organisation of sexuality and sexual expression, thereby 
implicitly defying deeply embedded, naturalised gender roles and 
hierarchies (ICRSE, 2015, p  2). And although it explicitly targets 
female sex workers, it implicitly controls all women. According to 
Pheterson the condemnation and prohibition of unrestrained female 
sexuality reflects gender asymmetries in the regulation of male–female 
relationships in four key areas: obligatory heterosexuality, marriage, 
reproduction and prostitution. In each of these four areas men strive 
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to control women through regulation, subjugation or violence (1996, 
p 14). This gender asymmetry is expressed in laws regulating work, 
wages, taxes, parenting and, of course, prostitution, as well as in 
discourses representing sexuality, female behaviour and identity, and, 
again, prostitution. The prostitution stigma is thus a flashpoint for a 
widespread social-legal-political complex that regulates the (sexual) 
behaviour and position of women in society. 
As the newspaper headline at the beginning of this section makes 
clear, one powerful expression of the prostitution stigma is that it 
is an identity ascription. That is, while men who visit sex workers 
are accused of disreputable behaviour, the women who provides the 
sexual services to the man is accused of being a prostitute. As Pheterson 
puts it: ‘She is bad for who she is, he is bad for what he does’ (1996, 
p 48).6 This identity ascription has wide and deep consequences for 
sex workers. The first is that prostitution is not regarded as work but as 
an aberration. Because it is an identity, ‘all the way down’, to the core 
of the woman’s personality, it cannot be a rational, considered, albeit 
misguided, choice.7 Instead of a transgression or lack of judgement, 
prostitution is a form of deviancy, a fall from grace, and inexplicable 
within the regular discourse on work, body and sexuality. One of the 
most common reactions to prostitution is the perplexed and visceral 
protestation: ‘But how can someone sell her body?’ Because prostitution 
is inexplicable it is deemed insidious and dangerous, a ‘menace to 
the social order and legitimate social norms’ (ICRSE, 2015, p  2). 
6 Corbin, in his magisterial study of the regulation of prostitution in 19th-century 
France, gives many examples of the essentialisation of the personality of the 
prostitute (Corbin, 1990). She is considered intemperate, lazy, wasteful, disorganised 
and of course, lascivious. To be a prostitute is to have a personality disorder. Zola 
immortalised the archetypical prostitute in his depiction of the courtesan Nana. 
By way of a footnote, in our times the Swedish government has made a concerted 
attempt to transform the occasional act of visiting a sex worker into a personality 
disorder (Kulick, 2005). 
7 This explains both the common search for the ‘causes’ of becoming a prostitute, 
such as hidden psychological wounds in childhood or the wholesale loss of agency 
through addiction or criminal coercion, and the widespread dismissal of (self-
reported) economic explanations for the choice of prostitution as an occupation. 
From here it is but a few short steps to common statements by those proclaiming 
the abolition of prostitution, that all, or the large majority of sex workers, are 
‘forced’. As Pheterson summarises it: ‘Examples abound of research designs 
which persistently treat the variable “prostitute” as a fixed identity rather than as a 
contingent social status, thus assuming prostitution to be a female trait or destiny 
removed from the dynamic realities of group relations and political power’ (1996, 
pp 9-10), and, we add, the realities of economic circumstances and life perspective. 
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Throughout history the prostitute has been associated with contagion 
– the physical contagion of sexually transmitted disease (STD), but also 
moral contagion. The prostitute is supposed to be a risk to the (fragile) 
moral rectitude of men and the integrity of marriage and family. The 
modern version of the contagion argument is the radical feminists’ 
claim that if one woman is a prostitute all women can in principle 
be treated as such (Sheila Jeffreys, cited in Chuang, 2010, p 1668). 
There lurks a fateful contradiction between the inexplicable nature 
of prostitution (something that no woman in her right mind would 
do) and the simple, unavoidable observation that so many women 
in every society engage in the act of prostitution, and often not for 
reasons of poverty, as our interviews clearly show (see also Dekker et 
al, 2006). It is little wonder then that ‘prostitutes’ – we deliberately use 
the more offensive label here – are regarded as a threat, to society, to 
the middle-class value system, and to institutions such as marriage, the 
family and motherhood.8 The upshot is that here is a direct connection 
between stigma as fear of contagion and the eradication, suppression 
and control of prostitution. We will see many examples of this in the 
pages to come. 
The second implication is that the inherent danger of the ‘prostitute’ 
both occasions and legitimises the involvement of the state. This 
results in, for example, a remarkable catalogue of human rights and 
civil liberties that are breached or lost as a result of being deemed a 
prostitute, such as the right to work, to start or own a business, to 
migrate, to have custody of one’s children, to refuse medical checks, 
to enjoy adequate labour relations and work conditions, to appeal to 
unjust tax claims, in general to access the justice system with grievances, 
to open a bank account, enter a mortgage or business loan, take out 
health insurance, start a sex business with other women, or support 
a husband or partner. (See Pheterson, 1996, pp 42-3 for a more 
extensive listing. See also ICRSE, 2015, and Jahnsen and Wagenaar, 
in press, for an overview of prohibitions on sex workers’ behaviour in 
21 European countries.) The International Committee on the Rights 
of Sex Workers in Europe (ICRSE) considers the prostitution stigma a 
form of structural violence. Structural violence is ‘a form of violence 
resulting from and perpetuated by broader social arrangements, such 
8 It is also no wonder that arguments that point to the fluid boundaries in sexual 
economics lack persuasion in the eyes of the public (Pheterson, 1996, p 9). Material 
compensation for female sexual services to men when integrated into marital or 
long-standing relationships are considered to be qualitatively different from such 
compensation outside such relationships. 
32
Designing prostitution policy
as historically rooted social structures and relationships, political 
organisation, and the logic of the economic system’ (ICRSE, 2015, 
p 1). It is deemed structural because it is ‘inscribed in the very social 
structures in which sex workers live and work’ (ICRSE, 2015, p 1). 
The structural nature of the prostitution stigma explains the implication 
of the state in its enaction and perpetuation. In the following pages 
we will encounter many examples where well-meaning administrators 
design and implement measures that amount to a violation of the 
rights of sex workers and to their (implicit) designation as a lesser 
kind of citizen. Perhaps the most telling aspect of this breach of sex 
workers’ rights is the indifferent, commonplace nature of it; measures 
or conditions that would be unacceptable when imposed on or suffered 
by members of another occupational group under the rule of law, are 
met with unconcern by politicians, officials, the media, or the public 
when foisted on sex workers (Wagenaar, 2015a). The enacting of 
stigma by the state must not be regarded as a form of retribution for 
transgressive behaviour, at least not in the advanced democracies of 
north-western Europe. Instead it is a ‘business-as-usual’, a collective 
attitude or ethos that results in the tacit and unnoticed shaping of the 
institutional reaction to prostitution. It is to the aspect of state control 
that we turn in the remainder of this section. 
The stigma that is attached to prostitution makes prostitution a ‘job 
unlike any other’ (Jeffrey, 2015).9 Jeffrey argues that stigma has three 
effects on policy makers: it results in resistance to the location of sex 
businesses, in paternalistic approaches to prostitution that lead to the 
restriction of sex workers’ freedom of movement, and in the perception 
of prostitution and sex workers as problems to be managed, rather than 
behaviours to be regulated when necessary and experts to be consulted 
(Jeffrey, 2015, p 2). In other words, stigma invites control. In many 
countries this results in the outright prohibition of prostitution, but one 
of the pernicious consequences of the persistence of stigma is that even 
the regulation or decriminalisation of prostitution does not guarantee a 
lessening of the urge to control (Jeffrey, 2015, p 2). As we will see on 
many occasions in this book, the tenacity of stigma is the mechanism 
by which regulatory approaches to prostitution generate negative, 
unintended consequences and progressive policies get reversed. 
The alleged danger that is associated with prostitution results in a 
tendency of governments to control and restrict it wherever possible. 
9 This is pointedly expressed by a sign on the wall of the Prostitution Information 
Centre in Amsterdam that states: ‘Prostitution: a regular but not a normal 
occupation.’ 
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Usually the arguments are either the fear of an unbridled expansion of 
prostitution within a certain geographical area such as a municipality or 
nation, and/or the reduction of ostensible problems in the industry such 
as exploitation and trafficking. For example, after the Dutch parliament 
legalised sex facilities in 2000, every municipality immediately froze the 
number of allowable facilities to the ones that were already in operation. 
This, of course, gave greater oligopolistic power to the existing owners, 
most of whom were used to a business model in which the sex worker 
had few worker rights, and fiercely resisted the introduction of fair 
remuneration or adequate labour standards (see also Chapter Five). We 
can observe similar processes in Austria. In 1984, under the guise of 
protecting sex workers from exploitation, the Viennese government 
prohibited home-based sex work. A few Länder (Vorarlberg and Tyrol) 
subjected the licensing of sex facilities to the ‘needs of the market’, 
which resulted in a low number of facilities in Tyrol and the de facto 
prohibition of prostitution in Vorarlberg (Amesberger, 2014, p 239 
onwards; see also Chapter Three.) To this very day the control argument 
is used in the Netherlands and in Austria to prohibit sex workers from 
starting their own small businesses from home. The result is that the 
legalisation of the sex industry in both countries has barely resulted in an 
improvement of the work conditions of sex workers. In Chapters Three 
and Four we will see further examples of the defeat of the ostensible 
goals of regulation and legalisation by the pervasiveness of stigma. 
Prostitution politics as morality politics10 
Let us begin with an observation about language. The uninitiated 
observer will quickly discover that there is no neutral ground when it 
comes to discussing prostitution and prostitution policy. Even the most 
basic terms such as ‘prostitution’ or ‘sex work’ suggest a moral position 
towards the provision of sexual services for money. The first, although 
a long-standing expression for the sex trade in many languages, is now 
the term of choice for activists who consider prostitution the equivalent 
of abuse and slavery. (In this book we still use it in its pre-abolitionist, 
more or less sociological meaning.) The term sex work is firmly related 
to a particular moral position that construes prostitution as work, with 
all that that entails in terms of labour rights, workplace conditions, 
adequate income and attitudes towards (women’s) sexuality. Similarly 
when we define prostitution policy in pragmatic terms as the concerted 
10 This section is based on, and is a further elaboration of, Wagenaar and Altink 
(2012).
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attempts of administrators and elected officials to protect the position 
and rights of sex workers and diminish the negative societal impact of 
different forms of prostitution – a definition that is a fair description 
of the position that is still held by many officials in Austria and the 
Netherlands – this in itself represents a moral perspective. Abolitionist 
policy makers would instead define prostitution policy as the concerted 
effort to eradicate prostitution from society, and indeed, as we will see 
in later chapters, many administrators in the Netherlands have gradually 
moved from the pragmatic to the abolitionist definition of prostitution 
policy. These examples show that it is impossible to discuss prostitution 
and prostitution policy without occupying a particular moral position. 
This makes prostitution policy an instance of morality politics. 
Although policy theorists feel the need for the concept of morality 
politics, even a cursory glance of the literature shows it to be 
notoriously difficult to define in a clear, unequivocal way. Also, as we 
will see, it is exceedingly difficult to make general statements about 
morality politics, as there are always exceptions to the rule. In a general 
sense morality politics refers to policies in which first principles are at 
stake, over which exists deep conflict among the public, and which 
do not necessarily coincide with the left–right, liberal–conservative 
political divide (Mooney, 1999, p 675; Mooney, 2001; Engeli et al, 
2012).11 This usually results in a denotative definition, the ubiquitous 
list of life, body and ‘sin’ issues that are considered to belong to the 
class of morality politics: abortion, contraception, gambling, same-sex 
marriage, drugs, pornography, capital punishment, physician-assisted 
suicide and prostitution. 
In this book we choose to define morality politics through the effects 
that contestation over moral principles has on the policymaking process. 
We argue that while it may be difficult to define morality politics in a 
clear and consistent manner, certain policies that are characterised by 
seemingly irresolvable conflict over deep values show characteristics 
that not only set them apart from other policy fields, but also have the 
effect of making the design and implementation of a pragmatic, effective 
and humane policy exceedingly difficult.12 We speak of morality politics, 
11 This shows in the unusual political composition of the abolitionist alliances in 
various countries. The neo-abolitionist coalition in the US consists of feminists, 
neoconservatives and evangelical Christians (Chuang, 2010, p 1664). In many 
European countries, in addition to feminists and Christian parties, Social Democrats 
and, often, the populist right take an abolitionist position. 
12 See also Engeli et al (2012), who move away from a listing of characteristics of 
morality politics and argue for an impact-based approach that focuses on the 
political dynamics of conflict. 
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instead of policy, to indicate that the issue has moved from the realm 
of policymaking (which despite unavoidable conflicts over ideas and 
instruments has the moral and instrumental aim to resolve or ameliorate 
a collective problem) to that of deep and intractable conflict (in which 
the struggle over the prevalence of symbolic positions takes precedence 
over resolving collective problems). Differently put, morality politics 
indicates a situation where the minimum common ground that is the 
condition for engaging in effective collective problem solving, has 
broken down into irreconcilable conflict over moral positions about 
what is right or virtuous with regard to the issue at hand.13 In many 
countries this is an apt description of prostitution policy, with one camp 
finding all prostitution inherently coercive and the prime manifestation 
of men’s structural dominance over women, and the other camp 
arguing that women’s right to (sexual) autonomy and privacy includes 
the right to sell sexual services for money when they choose to do so. 
This deep moral divide runs through virtually all contemporary debate 
about prostitution. It is probably fair to say that it is foundational in 
shaping prostitution policy, and that acknowledging and countervailing 
its many unfortunate implications is one of the toughest challenges of 
prostitution policy to which we return throughout this book. 
We thus define morality policy by a configuration of substantive 
characteristics and effects as follows:
1. Morality policy is ruled by ideology. As Deborah Stone points out, 
all public policy is a struggle over the salience and interpretation 
of basic values (Stone, 1997). Concrete policy solutions embody 
different interpretations of such values. Two things distinguish 
morality politics from ‘regular’ policies with an ethical dimension. 
First, policies turn into morality politics when they are based on an 
unabashedly explicit ideology, or, differently put, when ideology 
13 Political theorists capture this breakdown of political communication in the 
distinction between antagonism and agonism. Mouffe, for example, defines 
antagonism as the ‘struggle between enemies’ and agonism as the ‘struggle between 
adversaries’. She argues that while conflict is unavoidable in pluralist societies, the 
purpose of democratic politics is to recognise this unavoidability of conflict and 
offer arrangements of governance and public debate to navigate and harness it in 
a productive way: ‘“Envisaged from the point of view of “agonistic pluralism”, 
the aim of democratic politics is to construct the “them” in such a way that it is 
no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an “adversary”, that is, 
somebody whose ideas we do not put into question’ (Mouffe, 2000, pp 101-2). 
This, to turn enemies into adversaries and arrive at some form of accommodation 
of conflict, is precisely what morality politics tries to prevent. In this sense morality 
politics is fundamentally regressive. 
36
Designing prostitution policy
begins to make up the larger part of the mix of evidence and doctrine 
that is the basis of all public policy (Hood and Jackson, 1997). 
Morality politics goes beyond the societal problem it professes to 
address and is usually a vehicle for a greater moral cause. For example, 
abolitionists use prostitution policy as a platform for various feminist 
causes, or to promote a conservative public order cause.14 Second, 
morality politics often has a pedagogical thrust. In its fully fledged 
form morality politics can turn into a moral crusade for one or 
another position (Gusfield, 1986). For example, one of the explicit 
aims of the 2014 Swedish Sex Purchase Act, for which the Swedish 
government allocates funds and mobilises its foreign service, was to 
export it to other countries. As Dodillet and Östergren observe: 
Pamphlets, websites, articles, books and movies have been 
produced and lobby activities have been conducted towards 
the European Union (EU) and the rest of the world with 
the help of this material and via workshops, seminars and 
debates.… At the core of the marketing campaign has been 
the stated success of the Sex Purchase Act. (2013, p 110)
However, there is very little impartial research on the effects of the 
Swedish law to support its alleged effectiveness. The pedagogical 
thrust in morality politics is the dead-knell for the open debate that 
characterises agonistic democratic politics. All argument in policy 
debates is aimed at persuading the opponent, but the overt goal of 
ideological politics is to become hegemonic in that it effectively 
attempts to crowd out other ideas and positions to the point that 
these appear dubious, wrong, or even utterly unintelligible. 
2. Moral policy is lay policy. Mooney considers this one of the key 
characteristics of moral policy (Mooney, 1999, p  676). Because 
the debate is about first principles and not the technical details 
of policy design and implementation, he argues, anyone can 
legitimately claim to be well informed. While in policy domains 
such as pensions, health or social security, experts occupy a central 
and generally accepted role of technical authority, in cases of moral 
politics everybody feels he has something worthwhile to say about 
the issue at hand. Morality politics is ‘owned’ by everyone, while 
sources of technical authority that might arbitrate conflicts of 
14 Similarly Lakoff (2014) argues that conservative anti-abortionists are motivated 
more by a desire to punish sexually active women than by any self-proclaimed 
goal of ‘protecting life’. 
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belief or opinion are either absent or drowned out. Instead, every 
member of the public and of a nation’s administration believes that 
he has an expert opinion about the issue at hand.15 The influence 
of the public makes it difficult for administrators to formulate and 
implement policy, as they always have to take into account assertive 
media reporting, pundits pronouncing strong opinions on policy 
measures, or elected officials who, often spurred by the media, 
impose abrupt changes in policy. In such cases it is often easier to 
just ‘go with the flow’ of public opinion and political expediency. 
Generalised issue ownership in combination with the dominance 
of first principles gives the media an influential role in morality 
policy. In our research we found that the media exhibited a 
strong bias towards depicting prostitution as dominated by violent 
organised crime. Sex workers were overwhelmingly described as 
the passive, hapless victims of trafficking. In general the language 
in which prostitution was described was sensationalist, emotive and 
melodramatic, and consisted of detailed descriptions of sexual and 
physical abuse. Media reports are replete with vague, elastic, but 
unvaryingly alarming indications such as ‘hundreds of thousands’, 
‘millions’, ‘rapidly increasing’, ‘epidemic’, or the currently popular 
‘tsunami’. The argument of choice was the generalisation to all sex 
workers of specific and carefully selected cases of, usually horrific, 
sexual and economic exploitation (Goraj, 2012; see also Fitzgerald 
and Abel, 2010; Vance, 2011). 
3. The explicit ideology and the public ownership that drive a moral 
policy have several effects. Morality politics is emotionally charged. 
Measured discussions of prostitution policy are rare. The emotional 
charge of morality politics goes beyond the emotional investment 
that characterises all public policy. Discussions of moral policies such 
as prostitution policy are animated with strong emotions. It pays off 
to explore some of the implications of this. 
15 We need to make an important caveat here. Ordinary people can and do play a 
constructive role in policymaking. This is the presumption – and observation – 
that underpins the argument for democratic participation. In countless instances, 
historical and contemporary, civil society has enriched politics. In fact, in Chapter 
Six we will argue for the inclusion of sex workers in the policy process as a 
deliberate policy strategy. One of the functions of the inclusion of ordinary people 
is to counterbalance expert opinion with experiential knowledge. But here lies the 
crucial difference: the lay influence in the case of morality politics is largely devoid 
of experiential knowledge and tends to act therefore as a corrosive to constructive 
policymaking. 
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The overriding emotions in debates about prostitution are anger 
and disgust. These emotions are close cousins (Giner-Sorolla, 
2006, p 50), but while the presence of anger in the debate is there 
for everyone to see, disgust plays a more insidious role. One of 
the recurrent tropes in the contemporary debate on prostitution 
is the vehement expression of revulsion by the fact that women 
indiscriminately ‘sell their bodies’ to large numbers of men every 
day, or sit behind windows, scantily clad, subjected to the leering 
of disorderly and often drunken men.16 The clients are portrayed as 
deviants who lust after sex with young girls, or who derive sexual 
satisfaction from lording over helpless women who are kept in 
servitude by pimps and criminals. Emotions are affective reactions 
characterised by immediacy and directness. Emotions affect us on 
an embodied level. They need no explanation or legitimation. 
Emotions are; they are beyond right or wrong. Yet, this quality of 
directness should not make us lose sight of the ethical dimension 
of emotions and their effects on law and public policy (Nussbaum, 
2004). 
Abolitionism is the determination to drive prostitution from society 
because prostitution evokes feelings of disgust and repulsion – as well 
as anger that such repellent behaviour is allowed – in the actor.17 
16 On ‘indiscrimination’ see Pheterson (1996). She argues that sex workers prefer 
to exert choice in the selection of clients, but are not always in a position to do 
so. Pheterson concludes: ‘It is important to understand, however, that lack of 
choice is not inherent to prostitution but rather to abuse, poverty, racism, drug 
addiction, poor working conditions, inexperience and/or despair. Whores, like 
other workers, want to change those circumstances without necessarily changing 
their trade’ (1996, p 39). 
17 Some examples: the caption of an article by an abolitionist group about the arrest 
of a pimp who prostituted a 16-year-old in the south of the Netherlands: ‘The 
Valkenburg case: disgust and anger’ (www.stoploverboys.nu/nl/2015/02/07/
valkenburgse-affaire-walging-en-woede); and a letter to the editor of the Volkskrant, 
a national newspaper in the Netherlands with a large circulation: ‘With disgust I 
have read the umpteenth article about forced prostitution and the ever increasing 
trafficking’ (www.volkskrant.nl/archief/prostitutie~a626617). Columnist Kathy 
Sheridan in the Irish Times writes under the heading ‘Love/hate, fantasy/disgust: 
telling the grim truth about prostitution’ the following: ‘In many ways, Debbie’s 
scene portrayed the sex industry as it likes to promote itself: benign facilitator of 
consensual, adult transactions in a safe, controlled, indoor environment. Debbie 
needed cash (for drugs in her case); punters paid. Win/win. The image went 
awry when the camera remained firmly focused on Debbie’s face – a contortion 
of disgust, pain, shame, resignation’ (www.irishtimes.com/opinion/love-hate-
fantasy-disgust-telling-the-grim-truth-about-prostitution-1.2006017). Roger 
Giner-Sorrolla explains the disgust reaction to prostitution as follows: ‘Evolutionary 
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Law, social etiquette, public policy and administrative regulation 
are inevitably suffused with emotions. Emotion can be the reason 
for a law or rule (as in anti-discrimination laws that directly aim to 
prevent emotions of hurt and humiliation in the protected group), 
or it can influence that law or rule in a more indirect way (as in 
the provision of services to refugees that are triggered by feelings 
of compassion). Nussbaum makes the important point that not all 
emotions are equal in providing valid grounds for the regulation of 
behaviour. While hurt, humiliation and compassion will generally 
be regarded as providing compelling normative and cognitive 
reasons for regulating behaviour – because we can think of many 
situations in which it is widely seen as reasonable to prevent (as in 
hurt and humiliation) or promote such emotions (as in compassion) 
– disgust, she argues, is a much more ‘dubious emotion to evoke’ 
in a policy context:
Disgust is very different from anger, in that its thought-
content is typically unreasonable, embodying magical ideas 
of contamination, and impossible aspirations to purity, 
immortality and nonanimality, that are just not in line with 
human life as we know it. (Nussbaum, 2004, p 14) 
Nussbaum’s quote is important for two reasons. First, she points to 
the utopian, if not eschatological, quality of aspirations of abolitionist 
thought. Not only do we not know of any society where prostitution 
is absent, but the underlying emotion that informs abolitionism 
psychologists would argue that attitudes towards prostitution start from a negative 
baseline for the same reason that promiscuous sex is seen negatively, people with 
facial birthmarks or deformities are shunned, and indeed any form of social deviance 
involving the body raises eyebrows. In this view, people unconsciously try to protect 
themselves against any trait or behaviour that might signal a risk of infectious disease. 
Rational or not, deep-seated contagion concerns can explain the disgust reactions 
many people, including some sex workers themselves, feel in societies where sex 
is regarded negatively. Some degree of disgust can be expected towards any job 
title that comes into contact with negatively regarded bodily substances…. Sex 
work, no matter how protected and antiseptic, can be expected to arouse the same 
aversion. Disgust, and its close cousin contempt – an aversion based on social status 
rather than physical grossness – are also notably directed by some sex workers at 
their clients. After all they are participating in the same activities. Anger is another 
moral reaction to prostitution, one tied to perceptions of harm and the violation 
of moral rights.… In studies of emotion structure … anger and disgust are very 
closely aligned. It takes very little for mere disgust to turn into anger, and to find 
a backup on the assumption of harm to others’ (Giner-Sorolla, 2006, pp 49-50). 
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evokes an idealised, utopian image of society that is outside the 
reach of ordinary human life. Second, and related to the first point, 
Nussbaum highlights the element of fantasy in regulation that is 
shaped by disgust as the overriding emotion. We will return to the 
role of fantasy in prostitution policy shortly. 
To grasp the ethics of emotions we need to keep four things in 
mind. First, emotions are public entities. The fact that the experience 
of emotion is by and large individual should not obscure the fact that 
emotions are first of all public expressions. Emotions are means of 
communication. While we can have private emotions (a lump in our 
throat at a moving scene in a play or movie), emotions are bound 
to their expression, and their expression is, or is not, recognised by 
others. The expression of an emotion, or the very possession of an 
emotion in a particular circumstance, can be judged inappropriate 
or even offensive. Think of the disapprobation that people incur by 
laughing at a tragic scene or weeping uncontrollably at the death of 
a remote public figure. Emotions emerge and are shaped in public 
to express and communicate a position, a judgement, on events 
that are considered important to the community. When they figure 
in policy debates their role is above all to express a point of view. 
This, second, implies that emotions are socially constructed, 
both in their content and their expression. They appear in public 
consciousness through exemplars, narratives, case stories and 
arguments in newspapers, policy reports and opinion pieces. These 
exemplars and narratives are repeated over and over again until both 
the explicit and implicit message have obtained an easy familiarity 
(Goraj, 2012). The affect of disgust that is currently central in the 
prostitution debate is evoked and constructed by carefully chosen 
detail: the 12-year-old girl who is sold into slavery and abused by 
adult men; the young adult woman, misled by ruthless criminals, 
who is ‘raped’ 40 times a day by men who prefer to look the other 
way; the young woman who is brutally beaten by pimps when she 
tries to gain her independence (Goraj, 2012). These images are 
repeated over and over again in newspaper articles, documentaries 
and movies. The point of these narratives is to evoke and anchor 
disgust and anger about the business of prostitution in the public’s 
mind (Fairclough, 2003).
Third, when emotions in policy debates are socially constructed, 
it is imperative to look into their function in the public debate. The 
key here is the quality of emotions qua emotion. While arguments 
can potentially be countered, emotions, as we have seen, are their 
own justification. Because of their immediacy and embodied 
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character, it is hard to argue with emotions. They function as 
an ultimum arbiter. By questioning, for example, the validity of 
disgust in the prostitution debate, or of the images and narratives 
that underlie disgust, the critic opens himself up to the charge 
that he is heartless and in support of the very practices that are 
‘obviously’ revolting. In this sense, emotions in public policy almost 
always imply an ethics of evasion. They absolve the adherents of a 
particular political position from engaging in a discussion about the 
rightness or plausibility of that position. For example, the centrality 
of disgust in the abolitionist discourse on prostitution absolves its 
adherents from a serious discussion of the presence of prostitution 
in society, the reason why women enter the prostitution business, 
and the effects, intended and unintended, of various approaches to 
prostitution policy, or, most importantly, from listening to the voice 
of sex workers. In this way the ethics of emotional evasion might 
be one of the most pernicious effects of the stigma of prostitution. 
It literally banishes sex workers and their interests from what is 
imaginable and acceptable in public debate.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, emotions suggest solutions. 
They bridge the normative gap between analysis and action. In the 
case of the public role of disgust this can become very troubling 
indeed. It is helpful to return to Nussbaum once more: 
Both of these emotions [Nussbaum also discusses shame as 
a problematic public emotion – authors] may easily become 
problems, however, both in the life of the individual and 
in the larger social life of which it is a part. In particular, 
both emotions are associated with forms of social behaviour 
in which a dominant group subordinates and stigmatizes 
other groups. In the case of disgust, properties pertinent 
to the subject’s own fear of animality and mortality are 
projected onto a less powerful group and that group then 
becomes a vehicle for the dominant group’s anxiety about 
itself. Because they and their bodies are found disgusting, 
members of the subordinated group typically experience 
various forms of discrimination.… An appearance of 
control is then frequently purchased by the creation of 
stigmatized subgroups who – whether because they become 
the focus for social anxieties about disorder and disruption, 
or because, quite simply, they are different and not ‘normal,’ 
and the comforting fiction of the ‘normal’ allows the 
dominant group to hide all the more effectively – come to 
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exemplify threats of various types to the secure control of 
the dominant group. (Nussbaum, 2004, pp 336-7)
Nussbaum does not specifically address prostitution in her analysis 
of disgust in law, but this passage faithfully captures the emotional 
dynamics of much prostitution regulation. 
The ubiquity of strong emotion in the prostitution debate is easy to 
observe. Expert reports, opinion pieces and government documents 
are written in the style of a moral crusade: a great wrong lives 
among us, here are some representative examples, it is imperative 
that we act forcefully and immediately (Asante and Schaapman, 
2005; Roessingh and Ramesar, 2011; Tonkens, 2011). Proponents 
of abolitionism regularly use redbaiting tactics by accusing those in 
favour of legalisation as being paid by pimps or being in the service 
of the ‘prostitution mafia’ (Ditmore and Wijers, 2003, p 84) ) or a 
‘prostitution lobby’.18 The purpose of a policy discussion in the case 
of morality politics is not so much the dispassionate exchange of 
ideas or the measured assessment of the expected effects of a policy 
alternative, but rather an opportunity to demonstrate the correctness 
of the speaker’s position in the face of much allegedly wrongheaded 
opposition. The result is that debates about prostitution and 
prostitution policy have all the characteristics of a ‘dialogue of the 
deaf ’: the angry reiteration of original positions, the unwillingness 
to listen to the opponent’s point of view, the demonisation of those 
who think differently.
4. Morality policy is resistant to facts. There are remarkably few precise, 
reliable facts available in prostitution policy. As we will see later in 
this chapter there are good reasons for that, but more important 
for the characterisation of morality policy is the apparent lack of 
interest from politicians, administrators and commentators to obtain 
the numbers or to get them right. Resistance to facts becomes 
disregard for evidence. In fact, data and evidence are one of the 
main battlegrounds in the morality wars between abolitionists and 
regulationists in prostitution policy. It needs little commentary that 
those who are on a crusade will have a strong incentive to inflate 
18 Under the heading ‘Hurentag: kein Tag zum Feiern’ (‘Whores’ day: not a day to 
celebrate’), the Austrian association Feministischer Diskurs (Feminist Discourse) 
accuses the so-called prostitution lobby of neglecting to acknowledge that 60 
per cent of prostitutes – it strongly objects to the term sex workers – experience 
mistreatment, coercion, rape and humiliation. The sources for this and other figures 
are ‘international studies’, but these are not listed in the article (www.stoppsexkauf.
at/hurentag-kein-tag-zum-feiern).
43
Challenges of prostitution policy
numbers. In the case of prostitution policy, abolitionists wilfully 
use inflated numbers on trafficked women, abusive clients or the 
proceeds of trafficking into prostitution to present their case and 
create a moral panic around trafficking (Weitzer, 2007; Doezema, 
2010). Moreover, the media are remarkably deficient in reporting 
reliable numbers (Goraj, 2012). But even more serious, scholars 
and government organisations uncritically cite numbers they have 
found in other publications.19 In fact, one of the most dispiriting 
phenomena in current prostitution policy, and a sure sign that 
we are in the realm of morality politics, is the willingness of the 
prohibitionist camp to simply fabricate numbers.20 In a book on 
clients by one of the feminist spokeswomen who represents the 
prohibitionist camp in the Dutch prostitution debate, the author 
‘quotes’ from scientific reports on clients, while in effect she was 
making up the numbers to fit her anti-prostitution position (van der 
Zee, 2015; http://achterhetraamopdewallen.blogspot.nl/2015/04/
de-nieuwe-oorlog-tegen-de-hoerenlopers.html?m=1). Similarly, 
94 academics have compiled a long list of wrong, misleading and 
tendentious use of data in Mary Honeyball’s (MEP) Report on 
prostitution and sexual exploitation and its impact on gender equality 
(Honeyball, 2014).21 Ideological disregard for the facts is part of 
official policy. The US State Department’s ‘fact sheet’ on trafficking 
claims that countries that legalise or tolerate prostitution show an 
‘increase in the demand for sex slaves and the number of victimized 
foreign women – many likely victims of human trafficking’, and uses 
this fabrication as a ground for sanctions (cited in Chuang, 2010, 
p 1681). Fabricating numbers is an effective strategy in morality 
politics. Usually the concocted figures get much publicity, while 
the retort is at best published on a website or blog that is read by 
19 See Weitzer (2007) and Doezema (2010) for a number of high-profile examples. 
20 Making up data is, sadly, not restricted to the prostitution debate. The Department 
for Work and Pensions (DWP) in the UK has admitted making up comments from 
supposed ‘benefit claimants’ that appeared in a leaflet about sanctions. The benefit 
sanctions policy is controversial because parliamentarians and other opponents 
consider the sanctions to be ineffective in helping people find a job and to inflict 
unnecessary hardship on them. The DWP had produced leaflets with photos and 
vignettes of people who claimed that the benefit regime had actually helped them. 
Both the photos and the stories were fictitious (www.independent.co.uk/news/
uk/politics/dwp-admits-making-up-quotes-by-benefit-claimants-saying-sanctions-
helped-them-10460351.html; www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-33974674). This 
example goes to show that morality politics can extend to almost any policy issue. 
21 In the spirit of disclosure of possible conflict of interest, Hendrik Wagenaar has to 
reveal that he was one of the signatories of the reaction to Honeyball’s report. 
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only a small number of people. The result is that the image that is 
desired by the activist has been planted in the public’s mind. 
Another manifestation of this aspect of morality politics in 
prostitution is the lack of interest in evaluating the impact of policies 
and programmes. For example, the assertiveness with which the 
Swedish government promoted its client criminalisation policy 
stood in inverse relationship to the availability of solid research to 
evidence its outcomes. For years after its introduction there simply 
were no data available and standard baseline measurement had 
been omitted. When the government finally did conduct a study 
its lack of the most basic academic standards was widely criticised 
in the international community of prostitution scholars (Dodillet 
and Östergren, 2013).22 Other commentators have noticed a similar 
reluctance to submit favoured approaches to evaluation. 23 Friedman, 
commenting on the exponential growth of rescue and rehabilitation 
programmes in the global South says for example: ‘The sector has 
to accept impact assessments to see what is working.… There has 
been a real resistance to this over the years, as if we don’t have to 
be accountable’ (cited in Kempadoo, 2012b, p 254).
5. A fifth characteristic of morality policy is a certain impatience with 
policy implementation. It has the appearance that for those who 
approach prostitution as a battle over morals, the formulation 
and announcement of policy is seen as more important than its 
implementation. Mooney thinks that the clash of first principles 
that characterises morality policy leads to a lack of interest in the 
outcomes of the policy. A stark example is again the 2014 Swedish 
Sex Purchase Act. Ten years after the Act was passed in the Swedish 
parliament, the results are downright disappointing (Florin, 2012). 
The decision to prosecute the clients of sex workers has led to 
only a modest decline in the number of sex workers and men’s 
attitudes towards prostitution have not changed (Dodillet and 
22 Of the other countries that implemented client criminalisation measures, Norway 
did conduct serious evaluation research. The outcome was not very positive for 
client criminalisation. Countries that have introduced legalisation are more likely 
to engage in serious policy evaluation. The Netherlands and New Zealand are 
examples. 
23 Meanwhile a new evaluation – commissioned by the Swedish government – 
was published. The evaluation was carried out by staff members of the County 
Administrative Board of Stockholm with the support of well-known academics 
like Charlotta Helmström from the University of Malmö. This report seems to 
adhere more to scientific standards (County Administrative Board of Stockholm 
et al, 2015).
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Östergren, 2013). More importantly, although health and social 
work organizations were supposed to play a central role in the 
implementation of the Act, no budget has been allocated for this 
(Florin, 2012). There is evidence that the situation of sex workers 
has deteriorated, with some cities having phased out all harm 
reduction programs.24 When confronted with these results, the 
Swedish minister brushed it aside as insignificant in light of the 
larger pedagogical goals of the law (Dodillet and Östergren, 2013; 
County Administrative Board of Stockholm et al, 2015). Without 
generalising too much from this example, we can conclude that in 
moral policy the symbolic dimension of the policy is at least as, if 
not more, important than its instrumental aspect (Edelman, 1985; 
Gusfield, 1986; Yanow, 1996). The purpose of the policy is to send 
out a signal to the world – both to supporters and opponents – that 
proponents of a certain policy proposal hold the right position on 
the issue.
6. Sixth, morality policies are vulnerable to abrupt and drastic change. 
Policy theorists are in agreement that in most domains policies are 
kept on course by a robust balance between stability and change. 
Constitutional and legal frameworks, fundamental social values, 
organisational structures and routines, and the secure membership 
of policy coalitions create stability. Change is mostly incremental; 
habit and the back talk of policy implementation initiate adjustment 
of the reigning order. Extraneous shocks might impel a more 
fundamental rethinking of goals, values and eventually policy 
programmes, but such transformations are black swans, rare and 
far between (Cairney, 2012, pp 207-9). These assumptions about 
stability in public policy have come under pressure in the years since 
2008, when governments have felt compelled to drastically curtail 
their budgets. Yet, even while in the face of unsustainable budget 
deficits large changes in the organisation and delivery of education, 
healthcare and retirement policy have been proposed in many 
countries, institutional drag or resistance check their realisation. 
Institutional drag is the awareness that the functioning of a social 
domain depends on many taken-for-granted institutional practices, 
habits and traditions that support other valued or necessary elements 
of the domain. Institutional resistance emerges from actors who 
have a vested interest in the status quo, experts who have a deep 
24 The new evaluation of the Swedish Sex Purchase Act 2014 does not deal with the 
issue of violence against sex workers and the provision of social and health services 
for them. (County Administrative Board of Stockholm et al, 2015).
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understanding of the underlying principles and real-world effects of 
the current system, and/or the public who have come to appreciate 
the benefits of the programme. Often such a situation does not 
exist in the case of morality politics.25 Morality politics turns the 
theorised balance between stability and change in public policy 
on its head. Radical change is not rare, and it happens, as we will 
see in Chapter Five, at the local level. By ‘abrupt’ and ‘drastic’ we 
mean changes towards policies that are based on wholly different 
values and underlying principles. We have already commented 
on the unwillingness to account for the proclaimed impacts of 
prohibitionist policies and rescue and rehabilitation programmes. 
The uncompromising nature of morality politics, in combination 
with a lack of reliable data and solid evaluation outcomes, has 
resulted in a situation in which policy debate is never settled 
(Tatalovich et al, 1994; Mooney, 1999, p 678) and policy makers, 
in the thrall of grand moral narratives of alleged policy failure, are 
willing to throw overboard, trusted values and clear evidence. That 
is what makes it politics instead of policy.
7. Previously, in discussing the popularity of the regime concept in 
discussions about prostitution policy and in our analysis of the role 
of strong emotions in abolitionism, we introduced the concept of 
fantasy or fantasmatic logics as the literature calls it (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007). To conclude this section on morality politics 
we argue that morality politics is particularly prone to the influence of 
fantasmatic logics. In fact, it is the play of fantasy that forms the 
driving force behind morality politics and explains its different 
characteristics, such as the emotional valence of public debate, the 
fast and loose treatment of evidence, the lack of interest in serious 
policy evaluation and the tendency to ditch extant policies for 
radically different policies. So, what are fantasmatic logics? 
In his 1971 classic on social change and organisational learning, 
the organisational theorist Donald Schön comments on what he 
calls ‘the stable state’:
I have believed for as long as I can remember in an afterlife 
within my own life – a calm, stable state to be reached after 
a time of troubles.… The afterlife-within-my-own life is a 
25 Outshoorn (personal communication) points out that abortion policies might be 
an exception. In western-European countries pro-life forces that attempt to roll 
back laws that allow abortion run into stiff resistance from both the general public 
and progressive political parties. 
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form of belief in what I would like to call the Stable State. 
Belief in the stable state is belief in the unchangeability, 
the constancy of central aspects of our lives, or belief that 
we can attain such a constancy. Belief in the stable state 
is strong and deep in us. We institutionalize it in every 
domain. (1971, p 9)
Schön then continues with listing some of these domains: personal 
identity, ‘the organizations and institutions in which we work’, 
‘the stability of certain values’ (1971, p 10). The function of the 
belief in the stable state is ‘to protect us from apprehension of the 
threats inherent in change’. The stable state is a bulwark against the 
threat of uncertainty’. And as it is invested with much emotion, 
‘[C]onsequently, our responses to attack on the stable state have 
been responses of desperation, largely destructive’ (Schön, 1971, 
pp 10-11).
A generation later, the social theorists Jason Glynos and David 
Howarth introduce the concept of ‘fantasmatic logics’ (in addition 
to social and political logics) to explain the transformation and 
stabilisation of social and political regimes (Glynos and Howarth, 
2007, p 133). In an echo of Schön’s notion of the stable state, the 
operation of fantasmatic logic ‘reinforces the social dimension 
of practices by covering over the fundamental lack in reality and 
keeping at bay what we have labelled “the real”. In this respect, logics 
of fantasy have a key role to play in “filling up” or “completing” the 
void in the subject and the structure of social relations by bringing 
about closure’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p  146). Fantasy in 
politics functions through a ‘narrative or logic that that promises 
a fullness-to-come once a named or implied obstacle is overcome 
– the beatific dimension of fantasy – or which foretells of disaster 
if the obstacle proves insurmountable, which might be termed the 
horrific dimension of fantasy’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p 147). 
And then in a sentence that is an uncanny prescient reference to 
the current prostitution debates, Glynos and Howarth add: ‘For 
example, images of omnipotence or total control would represent 
the beatific dimension, while images of impotence or victimhood 
would represent the horrific dimension of such fantasmatic attempts 
to achieve or maintain closure’ (2007, p 147). We recognise fantasy 
at work in public policy when there is an undeniable discrepancy 
between official statements and informal, unofficial reality. This is 
because fantasy attempts to bridge the gap between incompatible 
elements, for example between realistic statistics on prostitution 
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and the inflated figures that the anti-trafficking lobby puts forward. 
Finally, fantasy in public policy is not a topic for quiet mirth. Real 
people are subjected to the dark side of fantasy. When the beatific 
utopia of the stable state, a world without conflict and politics, is 
threatened, the threat is rarely abstract. In fact, in most instances the 
threat comes from a clearly designated and identifiable group: ‘[T]his 
beatific dimension of fantasy is supported with an opposite, which 
explains why things are imperfect. There is an important by-product 
to this balancing-act: the exclusion/demonization of particular social 
group’ (Yannis Stavrakakis, cited in Mert, 2015, p 43). It does not 
require much imagination to infer who the demonised groups are 
in contemporary prostitution policy (see also Wagenaar, 2015a). 
In a world that celebrates rational and reasoned decision making 
it might seem counterintuitive or frivolous to emphasise the central 
role of fantasy. Yet, as Schön’s remarkable reflections on the stable 
state and Glynos and Howarth’s theory of fantasmatic logics indicate, 
fantasy is an important, and often hidden, driver of policy and public 
debate, providing energy and coherence to a particular contested 
topic. The effect is not only that it moves a topic to the top of 
the political agenda; fantasmatic narratives also suggests courses of 
action that will deliver us from our current ills. Fantasy operates in 
all domains of public policy; however, when a domain inhabits the 
extreme end of the morality dimension it is particularly prone to 
the utopian effects of fantasy, which leads – as we will show in the 
following chapters – to insatiable hunger for more instruments of 
control. To close this brief interlude on the role of fantasy in public 
policy, with clear implications for the formation of prostitution 
policy, we quote Deborah Stone on the function of stories:
What all these stories … have in common is their assertion 
that there is choice. The choice may belong to society as 
whole, to certain elites, or to victims, but the drama in the 
story is always achieved by the conversion of a fact of nature 
into a deliberate human decision. Stories of control offer 
hope, just as stories of decline foster anxiety and despair. 
The two stories are often woven together, with the story of 
decline serving as the stage setting and the impetus of the 
story of control. The story of decline is meant to warn us 
of suffering and motivate us to seize control. (1997, p 144) 
To sum up, the purpose of this section is not to provide a hard and 
fast definition of morality politics. We have characterised morality 
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politics through its extreme position on a number of dimensions 
that characterise all public policy and the effects this has on the 
policymaking process. Our argument is that if policies are explicitly 
ideological, a proxy for a larger cause, almost exclusively owned by 
the general public, impervious to facts, discussed in emotionally highly 
charged language, concerned more with the symbolism of strong 
measures than the details of implementation, and prone to sudden 
policy reversals, we designate them as an instance of morality politics. 
In morality politics fantasy cuts a wide sway, motivating officials and 
citizens to act decisively to deliver society from a great wrong – no 
matter if the wrong flies in the face of evidence and the solution harms 
or excludes the very group that needs to be saved. We conclude that 
in most countries prostitution policy can be characterised as morality 
politics in this sense. That is not to say that there are no instances of 
dispassionate fact finding, measured searches for workable solutions or 
patient implementation of pragmatic policies in prostitution policy. We 
have in fact encountered quite a few such instances in our research. 
Our general argument is that the moral nature of prostitution policy 
makes it vulnerable to extremist positions, the breakdown of public 
dialogue, and the unchecked play of fantasy. In addition to the lack 
of data, the inaccessibility of the prostitution world, and the many 
exogenous forces that drive its development, the moral nature of 
prostitution policy is an additional obstacle to administrators and 
front-line bureaucrats to formulate, design and sustain a reasonable, 
pragmatic and humane public policy in this domain. Morality politics 
usually results in adversarial politics driven by the values and opinions 
of contesting factions. This places administrators and professionals 
who implement such policies in a difficult position. As Ansell puts 
it: ‘Agencies must now manage their business in an environment of 
divisive politics, in which their actions are scrutinized and challenged 
by opposing sides’ (2011, p 4).
Paradoxes of immigration
Elsewhere, walking around the muddy campsite [in 
Idomeni, at the border of Greece and Macedonia, next to 
the railroad that connects the harbour city of Piraeus with 
continental Europe, now blocked by the refugees – authors], 
which smelled of burning plastic and leaking toilets, there 
were people from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Somalia and 
Francophone West Africa – all now labelled ‘economic 
migrants’, regardless of their varied and complex reasons for 
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travelling.… Here in this valley between mountain ranges, 
three sets of interests had collided; the free movement 
of trade, the free movement of people in need, and the 
insecurities of Europe’s settled populations. (Daniel Trilling 
in the London Review of Books, 17 December 2015, p 19)
As Trilling captures admirably, sites like Idomeni, or countless lesser-
known crossings at the borders that divide southern and eastern Europe 
from the affluent, democratic north-west of the continent, capture 
the challenges and dilemmas of immigration policy in Europe today. 
While most migrants who travel to work in prostitution in north-
west Europe are not from the countries that Trilling mentions in his 
reportage, they are still perceived by the authorities as ‘economic 
migrants’, heading for an unwanted, stigmatised profession, thus 
doubly frowned on. Traditionally, prostitution is closely associated with 
migration. In western Europe until the early 20th century this was 
mostly rural to urban internal migration (Walkowitz, 1982; Gibson, 
1986; Corbin, 1990). This is still the case nowadays in many Asian 
countries (Kempadoo, 2012a). Today prostitution is caught up in 
shifts in the global organisation and distribution of capital, labour and 
citizenship and the large international migration streams that result 
from this. As Kempadoo argues: 
From a perspective that combined analyses of sexual labor 
and gendered migration, the global sex trade was defined 
as one, but not the only, site in which human trafficking 
could be located. Sectors that required unskilled or semi-
skilled non-sexual labour, such as domestic service and 
manufacturing, as well as the racialization and feminization 
of the global work force and migration processes produced 
through the globalization of capitalism, became relevant to 
the analysis. (2012a, p xix) 
As we will see in Chapter Five, migrants are attracted to prostitution 
because it offers various advantages over other occupations that 
are available to recent migrants. Over and over again, migrant sex 
workers declare that compared with other jobs in the low-end wage 
sector, prostitution offers a decent income, low entry thresholds, and 
a modicum of control over one’s work situation. It is also a job that 
can be done part time, in addition to other work, although that seems 
more common among male than female migrant sex workers (Mai, 
2009; but see Dekker et al, 2006). However, in almost all countries 
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the combination of prostitution and migration proves to be toxic. Laws 
pertaining to prostitution are entangled with restrictive immigration 
law, and in the public debate fears about immigrants get mixed with 
fears about sex workers (Tampep International Foundation, 2015). In 
the end, non-national sex workers labour under a double stigma: that 
of being a sex worker and a migrant.
Let us take a closer look at some of the implications that the 
conjuncture of immigration and prostitution has for public policy. 
Migration, prostitution and public policy are related in two ways. First, 
and perhaps most pernicious, is the conflation in the public debate and, 
as a result, in the public mind, of prostitution with trafficking. This 
‘hyperfocus of many governments and advocacy groups on trafficking 
into forced prostitution’ (Vance, 2011, p 933) has major consequences 
for public policy. It makes a serious debate on the situation of migrant 
sex workers and a form of regulation that balances their needs and 
those of society more or less impossible. A good example is the moral 
panic around pimps and criminal traffickers in many countries. Using 
migrant sex workers’ statements, in Chapter Five we report that the 
networks around migrant sex workers are mostly made up of family 
members and that the concept of pimp, a key term in the abolitionist 
discourse, has considerable ambiguity. However, as we discussed in 
the section on morality politics, the debate on prostitution, and the 
ensuing policy proposals, take on a shrill, unyielding quality, in which 
the only ‘reasonable’ outcome seems to be the strictest possible control 
of prostitution, and preferably its prohibition, for the purpose of 
‘saving’ the victim of trafficking and removing this moral blight from 
our midst. Only through close surveillance and control can ‘traffickers’ 
be discovered and their ‘victims’ rescued (Kempadoo, 2012a, p xv). 
The result is paradoxical. In most instances the alleged victim, the 
sex worker, is herself the victim of draconic measures that violate 
her human rights and civil liberties. Most measures inspired by the 
trafficking frame reduce the number of working places, make it more 
difficult for the sex worker to exert control over work conditions, or 
force her into unwanted dependency or mobility, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of the very same exploitation that the anti-trafficking 
advocates purport to eradicate. 
Moreover, the exclusive focus on trafficking of young female sex 
workers misdirects our attention from very real issues of exploitation in 
other low-end labour markets, as well as in prostitution (Vance, 2011). 
More than half of the cases of trafficking that were reported by the 
Dutch National Rapporteur in 2010 for example, are outside the realm 
of prostitution, yet in the media coverage it is prostitution trafficking 
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that gets all the attention (see also Ditmore, 2012, p 110). Sticking 
to the Netherlands, serious and repeated cases of labour exploitation 
have been reported in the construction, agricultural and meat-packing 
industry, yet no anti-trafficking activist has ever spoken out about these 
cases. Similarly, many underage asylum seekers have horrific histories 
of child labour or war trauma in their home countries, dwindle for 
years in forced idleness in asylum centres, and face the imminent 
threat of deportation. Yet, despite appealing to moral arguments of 
human decency and religious charity in the case of prostitution, the 
anti-trafficking lobby appears to have no interest in the moral scandal 
of the treatment of young asylum seekers. In fact, it took a moral panic 
about the alleged abduction of young female asylum seekers by criminal 
gangs to bring the issue of young asylum seekers to its attention – and 
then only briefly. The everyday exploitation of sex workers by the 
owners of clubs and window brothels (Altink and Bokelman, 2006; 
ICSRE, 2016) seems of little importance to activists and policy makers 
alike. In fact, as we will see in the next chapter, several measures that 
are currently enacted in Austria and the Netherlands are deliberately 
aimed at increasing the power of brothel owners in the regulation of 
prostitution and, as a result, increasing the dependency of sex workers. 
The second implication of the conflation of migration and prostitution 
is that much prostitution is regulated via immigration law. While, 
legally, immigration law determines the fate of sex workers, it has two 
characteristics that have a negative impact on their position in society. 
First, the purpose of most immigration law is to restrict the entry of 
unwanted foreigners. Second, even in countries that are governed by 
the rule of law, immigration law, both on paper and in practice, tends to 
operate with less robust notions of citizenship than domestic law. The 
result is that for sex workers as well as migrants in general, immigration 
law is often applied without the required recourse to human rights 
or legal appeal. For example, a combination of immigration and 
prostitution law tipped many foreign sex workers into illegality more or 
less overnight when the Dutch parliament legalised brothels in 2000.26 
Dutch immigration law at the time excluded prostitution as a lawful 
occupation, and the legalisation decision excluded non-EU nationals 
26 No one knows exactly how many non-EU sex workers were affected by the 
measure. Non-EU nationals have not been allowed to work in Amsterdam since 
1995, while in the cities of Groningen, Alkmaar and Rotterdam they were allowed 
to work with a special ‘toleration visa’. At the time of the repeal of the ban on 
brothels in 2000, many non-EU sex workers had already been ‘replaced’ with sex 
workers from association countries. 
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from working as sex workers in the Netherlands. Similarly, as the story 
of Dora with which we opened this book shows, sudden changes in 
immigration law – such as the Austrian government’s abolition of the 
so-called prostitution visa with which ‘dancers’ were able to work and 
stay legally in Austria – may mean that migrant sex workers have to 
instantly leave the country where they have settled, to start all over 
again in another country. Underlying this disregard for human rights 
is the paradox that trafficking is framed as a human rights issue but 
dealt with by criminal law (Vance, 2011, p  936). Vance observes, 
for example, that international treaties to combat human trafficking, 
although couched in human rights language, mandate a range of law 
enforcement measures but leave optional the provision of ‘rights-based 
services’ (Vance, 2011, p 937). But perhaps equally detrimental to the 
social status of sex workers is that in many cases it is police officers, with 
their attendant symbolism of crime and law enforcement, rather than 
administrative officials who handle sex workers’ encounters with the 
administrative face of society. The legal conflation of prostitution and 
immigration has the effect of criminalising the former. This, as we will 
see, has grave consequences for issues of trust and the willingness of sex 
workers to collaborate with government officials (Benoit et al, 2015). 
We encounter other examples of criminal law-based legal regulation 
and the ensuing matter of disregard for sex workers’ rights later in this 
book, but simply recording such infringements of sex workers’ rights 
does little to further our understanding of prostitution policy. It is 
important that we understand the position of officials entrusted with 
designing and implementing prostitution policy. As we have seen, the 
size and composition of the sex trade is influenced by supranational 
forces in capital and labour markets, the global linkages created by the 
internet and social media, the existence, and persistence, of systems 
of bonded and indentured labour in developed and developing 
countries, and large movements from one global region to another 
of predominantly but not exclusively poor populations in search 
of improvement. Some men and women in these large migration 
streams seek independence and freedom from the global supply chains 
through sexual labour; some are moved through organised channels to 
work under conditions of coercion and exploitation in the sex trade. 
Throughout modern history this internationalisation of labour has been 
accompanied by persistent, often racialised, discourses of ‘trafficking’, 
‘organised crime’ and more generalised condemnations of prostitution 
under the banner of the ‘social evil’ of prostitution, ‘white slavery’ and 
“trafficking’ (Doezema, 2010). Differently put, while in the preceding 
section we discussed the moral nature of prostitution policy in general, 
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conceptual terms, the entanglement of prostitution and migration 
results in a pervasive and dominant substantive ideology of prohibiting 
prostitution in the name of protecting victims of trafficking. At the same 
time we will see that much prostitution policy is local in nature. It is 
local policy makers who have to translate international regulation and 
national legislation into workable operational rules and procedures. It 
can be expected that most local officials have only a vague awareness of 
the larger, transnational, economic, demographic and discursive forces 
that shape the world they have to regulate. It is likely therefore that 
they will take the surface appearance of prostitution as it appears in 
the media – characterised by trafficking, migrants, crime, victims – at 
face value and act accordingly by tightening surveillance and control 
(Edelman, 1988, p 6). The challenge of the complex entanglements of 
prostitution and migration is, in other words, to design and implement 
policy in such a way that it does justice to the global backdrop of the 
sex trade and countervails the prohibitionist ideology that accompanies 
global migration. In Chapter Five we suggest modes of policymaking 
that do just that. 
Obstacles to obtaining reliable numbers about 
prostitution and sex workers
Numbers play a key role in policymaking. Numbers indicate the 
size and nature of a societal problem, trends in its development, the 
size and composition of target groups, and the effectiveness of policy 
interventions. No nation can formulate effective macroeconomic 
policy, for example, without reliable statistics of economic growth, the 
money supply, employment, national debt, inflation, and import and 
export figures. Without precise and reliable numbers policy makers 
are to all intents and purposes blind. This suggests an urgent plea for 
the availability of a robust basis of evidence in public policy. However, 
the relationship between numbers and policy is far from linear. 
Policy, or rather the societal issues that trigger policy interventions, 
are organised according to large cognitive-appreciative frameworks 
(Rein, 1983a; Schön and Rein, 1994). Frames are tightly integrated 
configurations of beliefs, understandings, values, norms, facts and 
action preferences (Rein, 1983a, p 96). They usually have a narrative 
form (Stone, 1997), which is probably why Schön and Rein call them 
‘diagnostic-prescriptive stories’ (Schön and Rein, 1994, p 26). People 
– politicians, administrators, stakeholders – use frames to structure 
vague, ambiguous and indeterminate situations and transform them 
into coherent, organised and recognizable ‘problems’ that allow for 
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collective solutions (Schön and Rein, 1994, p 26). This process of 
framing is ubiquitous; no policy issue escapes it. 
Not surprisingly, numbers are often contested in the adversarial 
environment in which policy is formulated (Stone, 1997, ch 7). There 
are good reasons for that. In most cases obtaining good statistics of 
a natural or social phenomenon is exceedingly difficult. Also, critics 
will contest the selection or interpretation of statistics. Under every 
act of counting, usually invisible to the outside observer, lies a decision 
as what to include and exclude from the category that is counted 
(Stone, 1997, ch 7). Often a barely acknowledged process of framing 
affords the selection of data and evidence as relevant or irrelevant 
to the problem at hand. In the field of prostitution all the above 
problems are compounded. Numbers are imprecise, unreliable, based 
on vaguely defined categories, and sometimes wildly off the mark. 
More seriously, in the contested morality politics of prostitution policy, 
some stakeholders resort to fabricating evidence, as we saw. Although 
not restricted to prostitution policy, numbers in prostitution are often 
used in strategic ways – not to inform but to promote. In fact, one 
central finding of this study is that, for good reasons, precise and 
reliable numbers on key aspects of prostitution are hard to come by.27 
This should put policy makers on alert, as media reports and academic 
publications blithely, and with seeming authority, report prostitution 
statistics as if they were hard facts. We have come to conclude that no 
statistic on prostitution should be accepted without questioning its 
sources and the procedures by which it has been generated. 
Nevertheless, it was an important goal of the project that informs 
this book to establish reliable and precise data on the number of sex 
workers in the participating cities, and possibly, countries. There are 
two arguments why precise and reliable numbers are important in 
prostitution policy. The first is that without a good understanding of 
the size, age and composition of the population of sex workers in a 
27 See Weitzer (2015) for a number of instructive examples in which researchers have 
used creative methods to arrive at more precise estimates of the number of victims 
of trafficking. It almost goes without saying that their estimates are much lower than 
the numbers of ‘victims’ the neo-abolitionists and the anti-trafficking industry put 
forward. In Cambodia researchers counted 1,058 victims, or 3.7%, in a population 
of 27,925 female sex workers. Weitzer (emphasis in original) comments: ‘Note 
that the total number of sex workers in this study is a fraction of the number of 
trafficked sex workers alleged by Cambodian NGOs (80.000–100.000).’ A study of 
over 5,000 households in five eastern European countries came to 108, or 2%, of 
people who fitted the profile of a trafficking victim. Of these, 22 were victims of 
sex trafficking (Weitzer, 2015, p 231). 
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particular locality it is difficult to make policy. Our second argument 
is an argument about moral hazard. Reliable, precise numbers form a 
factual counterweight in the moral debates about prostitution. Since 
the late 1980s prostitution has received unprecedented attention in the 
media and the entertainment industry, as well as in government reports, 
research studies, international conference speeches and statements 
from politicians. Bernstein speaks of a ‘discursive explosion’ and thinks 
that the almost obsessive attention given to prostitution mirrors that 
of social reformers of the early 20th century (2007, pp 12-13). The 
media, despite their interest in prostitution, are, however, remarkably 
deficient in reporting reliable numbers.28 But more serious scholars also 
uncritically cite numbers they have found in other publications. For 
example, Bernstein claims that there are 30,000 sex workers working 
in the Netherlands. She bases this number on a Swedish source and 
concludes that in the Netherlands the number of sex workers per 
capita is much higher than in Sweden (2007, p 163).29 Thirty thousand 
is a number that circulates on the internet and is often quoted in 
reports about the Netherlands, but there are good reasons to assume 
that it is a serious overestimate of the size of the prostitution market 
in the Netherlands.30 The dynamics of framing make beliefs quite 
28 For example, a recent report on the prostitution market in Amsterdam (van Wijk 
et al, 2010) gives several careful, and well-founded, estimates of the number of 
sex workers working in the city in all types of prostitution. The researchers were 
careful to distinguish between daily numbers and cumulative numbers (that is, the 
number of different women that have at any one moment in the year worked as 
a prostitute in the city). They estimated the annual, cumulative number at 1,090 
to 3,380, with the daily numbers for all types of prostitution about half the lower 
annual estimate. Nevertheless all newspapers and media reported that ‘5000 sex 
workers were working in Amsterdam’, with some newspapers, wholly unwarranted, 
adding another 50 per cent to that number to arrive at a total of 7,500. The Dutch 
prohibitionist parliamentarian Gert Jan Segers outdoes even these high numbers 
by insisting in interviews that on a daily basis 8,000 sex workers are active in 
Amsterdam. 
29 To be fair to Bernstein, she does mention in a footnote that providing precise 
statistical accounts of the sex industry is notoriously difficult. But she then 
uncritically asserts that her numbers provide a ‘rough portrait’ of the size of 
respective national prostitution markets (2007, p 234).
30 With regard to the Netherlands the number that is most often quoted nationally 
and internationally is 25,000 sex workers nationally. This number dates from 1999 
and represents an extrapolation of estimates of municipal public health agencies 
(van der Helm and van Mens, 1999). Van Wijk et al (2010) report that a few years 
later the municipal public health agency in Amsterdam estimates that 8,000 sex 
workers are active in the city. That number has been quoted since. In both cases 
the estimates are highly dubious. For one thing, they probably represent aggregate 
annual numbers, although that is not clear from the original sources.
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impervious to numbers and evidence. Usually a solid and relatively 
uncontested core of data and evidence is required to put the brakes 
on the free flight of values and beliefs in a particular policy area. But 
if the constraining relation between evidence and belief is weak and 
circuitous, the opposite does not hold. Where accurate and reliable 
data are not available, policy doctrine will encounter little push-back 
from the real world. Policy will be based on unchecked frames, and in 
some instances, as we saw earlier, on emotion and fantasmatic logics. 
In Chapters Three and Four we will encounter many examples of 
policy proliferation that is unchecked by evidence.
Conceptual obstacles. There are conceptual and practical reasons why it 
is difficult to obtain reliable, precise numbers about prostitution. The 
first conceptual reason relates to the contested nature of prostitution 
policy, which aggravates political struggles over numbers. As Deborah 
Stone explains, numbers in policy have symbolic value. To count is 
to count as, and where you draw the line, so that some things are 
included and some excluded from your categories, is always a political 
decision (Stone, 1997, p 164). All numbers in public policy present 
moral images to their intended audience: ‘Numbers make normative 
leaps’ (Stone, 1997, p 167). They are a call to action. Struggles over 
conceptual boundaries and definitions are inherent to public policy. 
The above applies in particular to prostitution policy. Even the central 
concept – prostitution – is the subject of intense debate. People define 
prostitution in different ways and include different types of sex work and 
sexual activity in the statistics. For example, are women who offer web 
cam/telephone sex or erotic massages subsumed under prostitution? 
What about actors in pornographic films? Or young, vulnerable girls 
from broken homes whose need for emotional support is sexually 
exploited by callous men in their environment? Does there have to 
be a certain degree of continuity and regularity for such activities to 
be called prostitution, or is it enough – as is the case in Austria – to 
take a financial/material reward once to be defined as a sex worker? 
The problem is that all of these images of prostitution are available ‘out 
there’ in the ‘real world’. The problem is compounded when it comes 
to categories such as ‘pimping’, ‘forced prostitution’ or ‘victims of 
trafficking’. In these cases the definition of the category is itself highly 
contested, as we will see in Chapter Six. Policy categories merge fact, 
moral belief and calls for action, and their adherents hold on to them 
with sincere conviction. Yet, the choice of what image of ‘prostitution’ 
or ‘pimping, or ‘forced prostitution’ or ‘victims of trafficking’, prevails 
has significant consequences for the nature and extent of the issue that 
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is the subject of public policy, as well as the type of policy instruments 
that are required for its solution. 
The second conceptual issue is the distinction between daily and 
aggregate numbers. Surprisingly this important distinction is not 
often made in media or policy reports, or even scientific publications. 
The daily number (the number of women working in prostitution in a 
particular area on a given reference date) will give an indication of the 
actual size of the prostitution market in that area. In addition to the size 
of the sex trade in a particular location, this number is also an indicator 
of the ‘pressure’ that prostitution exerts on that location. Think of public 
nuisance, clients’ cars driving through the neighbourhood, or the petty 
crime that is associated with some forms of prostitution. The aggregate 
number (the number of different women who worked in the area at 
least once in a given year) gives an indication of the total number of 
women who engage in prostitution in that area and of the intensity of 
mobility. The aggregate number cannot be used as an indication of the 
size of the local, or even national, prostitution market as it contains a 
large amount of double-counting (sex workers working in different 
cities in a particular year). It is useful, though, for service agencies to 
get an indication of the required capacity. 
Practical obstacles. There are also practical obstacles in counting 
the number of sex workers. The first relates to the accurate and 
reliable compilation of statistics. Prostitution is not a homogeneous 
phenomenon. It comprises different work types such as street, window, 
club, home and escort prostitution, each of which presents its own 
challenges to counting. Moreover prostitution forms a world that is 
closed to outsiders and, particularly in countries where it is prohibited, 
operates in the shadows. When prostitution is mixed with criminal 
intent, such as in trafficking and brute exploitation, these problems of 
visibility are augmented. Moreover, as we will explain below, the level 
of mobility in prostitution can be extremely high. As a result most 
data sources are problematic. Police records generally only register sex 
workers who have been involved in, or are victims of, some kind of 
criminal activity, mostly violations of visa requirements or as alleged 
victims of trafficking or pimping. Tax records are rarely updated and 
contain many expired files, while an unknown number of sex workers 
work outside the tax system or are not accessible. It is not surprising 
then that most countries do not have centralised data banks that keep 
track of basic statistics on prostitution (Jahnsen and Wagenaar, in 
press). And even where such data registers exist they are often based 
on unreliable sources. Austria, with its otherwise well-organised and 
experienced public administration, provides a good example. 
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Since 2007 the federal Ministry of the Interior in Austria has 
annually generated a Review of Situation (Lagebericht) with regard to 
prostitution. It contains data about the so-called red-light milieu in the 
country. The Lagebericht is compiled from data that are requested each 
year from the Departments of the Criminal Intelligence Services in 
the Bundesländer by the Department of Criminal Intelligence Service 
in Austria, a branch of the federal Ministry of the Interior. However, 
the police/criminal departments in the Bundesländer are not obliged to 
report to the Ministry of the Interior, because prostitution falls within 
the remit of these provinces. Therefore, the data are not collected and 
compiled in the same way in each province. At first blush the Lagebericht 
seems to give a comprehensive picture. Indeed the data derive from 
various sources like police investigations, checks of work sites, police 
district investigators in the milieu, reports of patrols and reports on 
imprisonment. However, the data are in reality highly unreliable. 
The definition of sex facility differs per province,31 registration of sex 
workers is differently organised per province, which results in different 
bases for estimates, and the number of unregistered sex workers is 
anybody’s guess.32
Similarly, in the Netherlands there is no central registration of 
the number of sex workers. The Dutch authorities order periodical 
evaluations of the effects of the 2000 parliamentary decision that 
legalised the sex industry (Daalder, 2002, 2007, 2015), in which 
educated guesses as to the size of the national population can be found. 
The tax office can only provide data on the number of sex workers who 
are registered taxpayers. It admits that its files are unreliable because they 
are incomplete and many registered sex workers have exited sex work 
or left the country. The National Rapporteur on Human Trafficking 
31 According to the information of the Criminal Intelligence Service in Austria 
there is no written definition about types of facility. It is said that the designations 
are related to the licenses given, but the licensing procedure does not distinguish 
between brothels and nightclubs, for example, while it leaves out Turkish-Albanian 
cafés or Tischdamenlokale, where prostitution takes place on a large scale, altogether. 
32 The number of non-registered sex workers differs greatly according to the source 
one uses. The police estimate the number at 3,000 to 4,000 nationally. According 
to investigations by LEFÖ-Tampep, which rely mainly on the observations of 
provincial health directorates, health services and women’s organisations, the ratio 
of registered to non-registered sex workers is 1:6. In the Austrian Tampep report 
of 2008/09 (Tampep International Foundation, 2009) it is assumed that 27,000 
to 30,000 sex workers (registered and non-registered) work in Austria. It is not 
clear if these are daily or annual numbers. Aware of the negative consequences of 
inflated numbers all counselling organisations meanwhile refrain from estimating 
the dark number.
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and Comensha33 present annual data about the number of ‘registered’ 
victims of trafficking; in practice this number is based on the number 
of cases that are brought to court, that are investigated by the police 
and/or public prosecutor, or, in the case of Comensha, the number 
of suspected cases based on entries in its anonymous crime hotline 
(about 450 victims in prostitution in 2009) (Nationaal Rapporteur 
Mensenhandel, 2010, p  98). Some municipalities contract research 
agencies on a regular or incidental basis to make an inventory of the sex 
industry in their region or town (van Wijk et al, 2010; Oude Breuil, 
2011). They rely on various data sources ranging from police and tax 
records to personal observation. 
The second practical challenge in obtaining reliable statistics on the 
number of sex workers is high mobility. Challenged by the absence of 
reliable numbers, we set out – in hindsight rather naïvely – to obtain 
more precise and reliable data on the number of sex workers who 
worked in the various types of prostitution in a particular location. We 
started out with what we thought would be the easiest type to count: 
window prostitution. The number of windows is available from the city 
administration, and although it has considerably decreased since 2000, 
it does not fluctuate very much in the short term. We used different 
sources: police records, municipal statistical offices and health agencies. 
We also went out to do our own counting. Our field workers took 
position on a street corner and counted the number of sex workers 
working the windows within our field of observation on several 
successive days. They also counted the number of women working in 
a representative sample of clubs. What we discovered was another, and 
as far as we know unreported, obstacle to obtaining reliable numbers: 
an astonishing amount of mobility. For example, of a particular group 
of six windows in The Hague, three would be occupied from 13.00 to 
18.00 hours, then all of them until midnight. However, the next day 
none was occupied until 18.00 hours and only two in the evening, and 
so on. Some women would only work for two hours, others the whole 
day. Through our interviews we discovered that mobility applied to 
33 Comensha is an NGO that collects and provides data on trafficking, organises 
shelter for victims of trafficking, and advises the government on measures 
against trafficking. Although it is a private company, it is financed by the Dutch 
government. The Ministry of Justice often relies on Comensha for its data. 
Comensha presents itself as a strong advocate against trafficking. Its website presents 
stories of victims and keep track of the cumulative number of reports of trafficking 
by citizens via its anonymous telephone hotline. Comensha is regularly criticised 
for inflating numbers, for example by including suspected cases of trafficking or 
exploitation. 
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location, geography, type of sex work and working hours. Subsequent 
discussion with police officers and other professionals confirmed our 
initial observation: high mobility is an intrinsic characteristic of the 
sex trade. In fact, many police officers told us that because of the high 
turnover of sex workers in a particular location, they had stopped 
bothering about the precise numbers (interview, police officers, the 
Netherlands). 
We conclude from this discussion on obstacles to obtaining accurate 
and reliable statistics on prostitution and sex workers that numbers – 
any numbers – in the literature on prostitution must be approached 
with caution. Ideally, the authors who publish numbers should 
provide their source, the methods of collection, and the strengths and 
limitations of the data. Similarly, readers must always ask themselves 
these same questions in assessing the quality of the reported numbers. 
Unfortunately these simple grounds for assessing the quality of the 
numbers are rarely presented. In fact, in the morally charged climate 
of prostitution policy, we have come to believe that the difficulty in 
obtaining accurate numbers about prostitution is treated as an invitation 
to provide ideologically expedient numbers. This would explain two 
persistent tropes in the literature on prostitution: the inflated estimate 
and the ubiquitous genre of the melodrama or ‘sad story’ (Vance, 2011). 
In the first case we encounter unsubstantiated estimates, always in 
large round numbers, always delivered with great authority, about the 
number of (street) sex workers, internet sex work, ‘forced’ sex workers, 
or victims of trafficking. The second feature capitalises instead on the 
absence of numbers. Here, the argument is grounded in, often lurid, 
tales of a single sex worker or victim who, by implication and through 
the use of vague quantifiers, ostensibly represents a large population. 
The purpose in both cases is the same: to make a moral point and 
to incite the audience to action. Numbers have symbolic value in all 
public policy. What distinguishes morality politics, as discussed in the 
preceding section, is that numbers are primarily used for their symbolic 
value, uncoupled from their factual, descriptive role, and with little 
reflection about the assumptions that determine the delineation of 
key categories. 
The ineluctable importance of the local in prostitution 
policy
Like most contemporary policy, prostitution policy is enacted at 
multiple levels. In the regulation of prostitution, international 
agreements, national laws and regional or local rules interact in complex 
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and unpredictable ways to shape the face of prostitution in society. 
For example, 117 nations have signed the UN Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children. These countries have subscribed to a certain definition 
of trafficking, have put trafficking on the policy agenda, coordinate 
their investigative and enforcement activities regarding trafficking 
with other national police forces, have created programmes to assist 
victims of trafficking and have created a national agency (the National 
Rapporteur) to document the number of cases of trafficking. On the 
next level, national laws frame the broad policy approach to prostitution 
that a country chooses. These are the well-known ‘policy regimes’, 
such as prohibition of prostitution, the criminalisation of clients, and 
the legalisation of prostitution and sex facilities. But national policy 
also extends to fiscal policy and the regulation of immigration, issues 
that have an immediate impact on the sex trade and its actors. The 
next level down is the regional or local, where a myriad of rules and 
regulations translates national policy into a workable policy design 
that can be effectively implemented. In addition prostitution policy is 
shaped by NGOs and charities. While some have a largely advisory role 
at the national level, many operate at the local level in implementing 
policy. Our argument in this section – and in the book as a whole – is that 
local policymaking is essential in prostitution policy. It is essential for the 
impact of policy on the daily lives and experiences of the target groups 
of prostitution policy: sex workers, owners of sex facilities, clients 
and citizens. And it is essential for understanding prostitution policy, 
for grasping why so often the regulation of prostitution deviates from 
national laws, fails to reach its stated objectives or has unintended or 
even perverse consequences. 
While international treaties and national law are obviously important 
in framing prostitution policy, we will argue that the local exerts 
sufficient autonomy to decisively shape the sex trade as it manifests 
itself ‘on the ground’. While this is in itself not surprising, much 
public debate and academic analysis concerns national policymaking. 
The current acrimonious public debate about prostitution is almost 
exclusively focused on the moral differences of various policy regimes 
(for example, legalisation versus client criminalisation). Similarly, one 
of the most famous, or notorious, academic studies of prostitution 
policy is wholly concerned with establishing the statistical relationship 
between legalisation and the extent of trafficking (Cho et al, 2013; 
see Wagenaar, 2015b for a critique). The focus on national policy 
has two deplorable effects on understanding prostitution policy. First, 
it deflects attention from the everyday business of policy design and 
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implementation that is crucial to the impact of prostitution policy 
on the target groups and on (urban) society. This can easily lead to 
the denial of the impact of policy on the sex trade in general. The 
earlier mentioned argument that large-scale economic or cultural 
transformations are the main drivers of the changes in prostitution, 
to the point that diametrically opposed policies are seen as ineffective 
in shaping its societal manifestation (Bernstein, 2007; Scoular, 2010), 
is one manifestation of this neglect of local policymaking. Second, 
the lack of attention to local policymaking prevents the analyst from 
understanding the complex relationship between the national and the 
local in shaping prostitution policy. 
One indication of the importance of the local in prostitution policy 
is the observation that local policies may deviate considerably from 
national goals. This is a universal phenomenon. For example, while 
the German federal government made work in a sex facility legal in 
2001, the Länder have so far resisted implementing the regulation (Pates, 
2012). And while nationally prostitution has been decriminalised, 
some municipalities in New Zealand use advertising and zoning laws 
to restrict prostitution (Knight, 2010). Local policy implementation 
may deviate from national policy formulation for various reasons. Local 
circumstances usually prohibit implementation to the letter of the law; 
local actors may be reluctant to implement measures they consider 
meaningless or onerous, or conversely, local actors may step into a void 
left by the national government (Crowhurst, 2012); and local actors 
may experience the unforeseen implications of one law as it contradicts 
established laws in relevant other areas (Florin, 2012). Another 
important reason is that national politicians are further removed from 
the everyday reality of prostitution than local administrators. National 
politicians receive most of their information from policy reports and 
the media (Edelman, 1988). Because prostitution is a highly moralised 
and contested topic as we saw earlier in this chapter, this information 
is likely to be filtered through powerful cognitive-ideational frames 
(Schön and Rein, 1994; Stone, 1997). Local administrators are clearly 
not immune from these frames (no one is), but their proximity to 
the everyday world of prostitution exposes them to the immediate 
consequences of their and others’ interventions on the actors in the 
field. The policy issues that they deal with are not abstract words or 
symbols but are embodied by actual people: sex workers, proprietors, 
and professionals (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003). The policy 
scholar Robert Reich puts this nicely when he says:
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Public Administrators may be in a better position than 
legislators to foster a national debate over certain value-
laden issues simply because the administrators deal with 
specific application of general principles. Legislators, on the 
other hand, often have an incentive to keep their discussion 
to a fairly high level of generality: delving into knotty details 
will likely be seen an invitation to controversy. (Cited in 
Ansell, 2011, p 156)
Differently put, when dealing with a controversial topic, elected officials 
tend to keep their distance from its real-world manifestations to avoid 
becoming embroiled in technical complications. Administrators do not 
have that luxury. At the local level ‘the world talks back’, as the policy 
scholars Donald Schön and Martin Rein (1994, p 34) famously said.34 
We will see examples of this dynamic in Chapter Four. 
The discretionary autonomy of local government works both 
ways, however. Local government may pursue policies that are either 
more emancipatory or more repressive than national policy. To make 
things even more complicated, activist local administrations will try 
to influence national governments, while national governments that 
feel they are hampered in their ability to make policy work through 
local governments try to get their way by other means. In this way 
the local and the national interact in complex recursive patterns. To 
give an example, in the early 1990s the German city of Dortmund 
experienced a serious street prostitution problem. Most of the business 
was concentrated in one neighbourhood: Nordmarkt. The nuisance 
created by clients cruising the narrow streets by night surveying 
the women disturbed the residents of Nordmarkt, a disadvantaged 
neighbourhood with a large percentage of ethnic minorities. The 
residents formed a coalition with the Mitternachtsmission, a local 
34 The policy scholar Murray Edelman has trenchantly described this distinction 
between distal and proximate politics. Edelman speaks of politics as a ‘spectator 
sport’ in which symbolic elements, images and slogans that summarise a particular 
position on an issue play a key role. These symbolic elements depend on a certain 
distance from the real world of the social domain that is at stake: ‘For most men 
[sic] most of the time politics is a series of pictures in the mind, placed there by 
television news, newspapers, magazines, and discussions. The pictures create a 
moving panorama taking place in a world the mass public never quite touches, yet 
one its members come to fear or cheer, often with passion and sometimes with 
action…. There is, on the other hand, the immediate world in which people make 
and do things that have directly observable consequences. In these activities men 
can check their acts and assumptions against the consequences and correct errors. 
There is feedback’ (1985, p 5). 
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charity, and persuaded the, initially reluctant, municipal government to 
create a tolerance zone for the outdoor sex workers. Because the city 
delayed the funds for establishing the zone, the residents helped out to 
set it up. This resulted in a working coalition between the residents, 
the charity and the police that successfully managed prostitution in 
Dortmund for over a decade, making Dortmund the only German 
city that attempted to implement the federal law that legalised the 
commercial exploitation of prostitution (Wagenaar, 2014).35
However, in today’s hostile climate local governments are more 
likely to find ways to introduce policies that are more repressive 
than the national law. The Austrian province Vorarlberg illustrates 
this interplay of administrators, police and justice to repress legalised 
prostitution. The provision of sexual services (still called Unzucht, or 
sexual transgression, in the Vorarlberg Police Act, a legal term that 
suggests a sexual offence) is only allowed in licensed sex facilities. 
While the establishment of sex clubs is formally allowed under certain 
conditions, it is actively discouraged in Vorarlberg by making a needs 
assessment by the mayor or district authority a precondition. Several 
times now such needs assessments have been legally challenged. In 
one case, although the Constitutional Tribunal annulled the decision 
of the district authority to reject the opening of a brothel, a renewed 
appeal by the prospective brothel owner was rejected again by the 
appeals commission of the town of Hohenems and finally also by the 
Administrative Court of the Land Vorarlberg. The Administrative 
Court justified its decision – based on a statement by a police officer 
– that brothels are not needed as no illegal prostitution is witnessed in 
Vorarlberg and pertinent advertisements in regional newspapers are 
no proof that sexual services are provided in the district of Hohenems 
(Hämmerle, 2015). In the Netherlands, almost immediately after the 
Dutch parliament in October 2000 legalised brothels as regular business 
establishments, Dutch municipalities began to use the licensing system 
for brothels as a tool to discourage or phase out sex facilities. Currently 
Dutch cities are closing window brothels at a rapid pace, have clamped 
down on all forms of prostitution, frequently violate sex workers’ rights 
and attempt to introduce sex worker registration and forms of client 
criminalisation. At the same time, the national government, following 
the lead of municipal administrations, congregates with the latter to 
find creative ways to discourage prostitution. We recount this story in 
more detail in Chapters Three and Four. 
35 Currently the toleration zone in Dortmund has been closed and the collaboration 
between citizens, charity organisations and the police has collapsed. 
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The lessons from these examples are twofold. First, local policy 
matters. The impact of prostitution policy on sex workers, proprietors, 
clients and communities is shaped by national legislation, but realised 
by local measures and regulations. The significance of this is that much 
of the local design and implementation of prostitution policy takes 
place on the edges of the democratic process. This is how our electoral 
liberal democracies function. Voters elect legislators in national and 
local parliaments, who then delegate the execution of their decisions 
to administrative agencies populated by experts (Manin, 1997). 
Administrators work under rules of democratic accountability and 
precepts of administrative ethos, but often their actions never reach 
city councils or national parliaments. In fact, as we will argue, there 
are good reasons to assume that certain marginal groups in society, 
such as sex workers, are less protected by the regime of democratic 
accountability than the rest of the polity (Wagenaar, 2015a). We will 
return to this in Chapters Five and Six. 
The second insight is that the scalar distinctions in public policy are 
fluid and shifting. There are contradictory forces at work here. On 
the one hand, constitutional rules decree the relationship between 
national and local levels of government. For example, the German 
or Austrian constitutions prescribe both the level of autonomy of 
the regions as well as the distribution of tasks between the federal 
and provincial level. In a unitary state such as the Netherlands the 
relationship between the national and the municipal level is decreed in 
the so-called Gemeentewet (Municipal Law) (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002). 
In addition the national–local relationship is dictated by the power of 
the purse. Although local levels have some powers of taxation, they 
usually receive a large part of their funding from the federal or national 
government. The ratio between these two sources of income, as well 
as the extent to which national budgets are earmarked, determine 
the level of autonomy of the local. On the other hand, discourse can 
unite what is divided. In practice discourse acts as a soft coordination 
mechanism, bringing the activities of a large number of disparate 
actors under the same denominator (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004). 
The Dutch example above illustrates the emergence of a discourse 
coalition around trafficking and ‘forced’ prostitution. This discourse 
coalition unites a wide range of actors from political and civil society; it 
is supported by its own authoritative institutions (parliament, national 
Rapporteur Mensenhandel), scientific research, media outlets and 
story lines. The result is an effective convergence of national and local 
policy. Germany, Sweden, France, Italy, the United Kingdom are all 
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examples of the power of discourse in bridging the national and local 
in shaping prostitution policy. 
Throughout this book, our focus will be on policy implementation, 
the phase of the policy process where plans and intentions are put into 
effect. This is the mundane but difficult work of establishing sufficient 
funding, assigning personnel, developing rules of procedure, selecting 
policy instruments, entering in negotiations with stakeholders, and 
organising public agencies, all with the purpose of making a difference 
in a particular societal domain (Stone, 1997; Howlett et al, 2009, 
p 160). Policy implementation relies on administrators, civil servants 
and professionals to design and manage the necessary actions, and for 
this reason usually takes place outside the glare of media attention. 
What distinguishes policy implementation from policy formulation is 
that it is always immersed in real-world situations. Policy formulation 
deals with ideas and ideals on the one hand and images and data that 
function as a proxy for the issue on the other. Policy formulation is at 
some remove from the world that is the subject of a policy initiative 
and therefore has a somewhat ‘constructed’ character (Edelman, 1988). 
Policy implementation, on the other hand, is always situated in a 
world where concrete individuals (administrators, sex workers, police 
officers, proprietors, citizens, media representatives) work and live. 
Administrators and professionals are likely to have face-to-face contacts 
with these individuals. Policy implementation is by definition local. 
Those engaged in policy implementation have to be highly attentive to 
the contextual particulars of the problem at hand. And they can be sure 
that their interventions will generate reactions, resistance and attempts 
at accommodation by the target audience and other stakeholders.
Policy implementation is crucial because it determines the outcome 
of a policy initiative. No matter how lofty, important or urgent a policy 
initiative is, if it cannot be translated into effective policy measures, 
the policy will fail, or worse, result in negative, unintended outcomes. 
But perhaps even more important in the case of prostitution policy is 
that policy implementation has a profound influence on the position 
and rights of a vulnerable group – sex workers. As we saw earlier, 
much of the literature moves on a higher level of aggregation, and 
even evaluation studies that try to measure the effects of national 
prostitution policies rarely relate these effects to the impacts of policy 
instruments and implementation measures. For two reasons we think 
this is an unfortunate bias in the literature. First, although macro-
developments clearly influence social phenomena at lower levels of 
social aggregation, it is important that we demonstrate with some 
measure of precision how, in what ways, along which mechanisms 
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these influences are realised. To explain social order we need to go 
beyond impressionistic indications of association. In modern social 
theory, structure and agency stand in a dialectical relationship to each 
other in which they bring each other into being (Giddens, 1984). In 
policy terms, social order is seen as the outcome of the more or less 
orchestrated practices of a large number of actors who move about in 
decentred policy networks (Rhodes, 1996; Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). 
We will return to these debates in the next chapter. 
Second, because prostitution in contemporary society is so entangled 
with public policy, it is essential that we understand both the effects 
of state intervention on prostitution and how these come about. With 
effects we mean both intended and unintended effects. Prostitution, 
for reasons expounded in this chapter, is a particularly policy-resistant 
domain. In the absence of reliable data and exposed to fierce moral 
debates, politicians and administrators who deal with prostitution often 
design measures on the basis of ideological preferences (Chuang, 2010). 
In addition the target groups of prostitution policies – sex workers, 
proprietors, citizens – tend to resist or ignore government measures, or 
try to find accommodations for them that make sense to them in their 
daily life (Wagenaar, 1995). The result is that many measures aimed at 
regulating prostitution have either no effect or are counterproductive in 
that they make the problem they address worse and/or erode the civil 
rights of sex workers. The upshot is that to understand the nature and 
manifestations of prostitution in contemporary society it is important 
to understand the design and implementation of prostitution policies. 
Analysing prostitution policy
In the remainder of this book we analyse prostitution policy in a way 
that is sensitive to insights into the policymaking process as formulated 
in the policy analysis literature. Thus, our analysis incorporates 
institutions, agenda setting, decision making, veto points, exogenous 
forces, actors, multi-level governance, ideas and discourse, and 
policy transfer. We do not pretend to integrate all these elements in 
one coherent framework that explains the shape of and changes in 
prostitution policy everywhere and at any time. This is not the state of 
policy theory in general, and given the complexity and contingency of 
the policy process, and unattainable aim overall. Second, our analysis 
also incorporates the five specific challenges of prostitution policy: 
stigma, the moral nature of prostitution policy, the lack of reliable and 
precise data, the role of migration in prostitution and prostitution policy, 
and the importance of the local in prostitution policy. In particular 
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such an analysis must constructively address the challenges and risk 
that flow from the abolitionist versus regulationist controversy that 
affects the contemporary debate about prostitution. Third, we will 
develop our theory through a detailed analysis of two cases: prostitution 
policy in Austria and the Netherlands. Instead of formulating a theory 
in the abstract, we will show how insights from the policy literature 
and our own analysis in this chapter help us to explain and interpret 
these cases. In the final chapter we will attempt to draw more general 
insights from these analyses. 
Our approach to policy analysis in this book is that in describing and 
analysing prostitution policy we consistently use the perspective of the elected 
official and public administrator. We try to put ourselves in the shoes of the 
officials and ask what the world looks like for them, and what challenges 
they face in designing and implementing prostitution policy. We opted 
for this pragmatic perspective for the following reason: the literature 
on public policy is an attempt to make sense of the policy process. 
This usually takes the form of identifying and describing the elements 
of public policy (actors, institutions, rules, power, ideas, traditions) to 
combine these in explanatory arguments about the development and 
outcome of the policy process (Cairney, 2012, p 2; John, 2012, p 2). 
With the exception of theories of administrative discretion, the official, 
and the way her/his world looks like, is conspicuously absent in these 
theories. That does not mean that these theories are useless; we will 
make ample use of the insights of policy literature in the chapters to 
come. But we do feel that we miss important aspects of the process of 
designing and implementing prostitution policy if we do not relate the 
policy literature to the challenges these officials face in their everyday 
working lives. 
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The local governance of prostitution: 
regulatory drift and implementation 
capture
In this and the next chapter we discuss the formulation and 
implementation of prostitution policy in the two countries of study. 
To arrive at our stated goal of establishing a more comprehensively 
theorised understanding of prostitution policy, we link our empirical 
material to insights from policy theory in these chapters. Given our 
repeated assertion that local policymaking or policy implementation 
is paramount in shaping the outcomes of prostitution policy, we will 
first describe the implementation trajectory of the Dutch and Viennese 
reforms in the regulation of prostitution. To prepare for our analysis 
of implementation practices we will begin with introducing three key 
analytic concepts from the policy literature: policy implementation, 
policy design and policy instruments. We conclude this chapter by 
formulating the wider lessons of our analysis about implementing 
prostitution policy. In Chapter Four we turn to the formulation of 
prostitution policy.
Policy implementation as policy formulation with 
different means 
National laws reflect the moral ambitions of the polity and/or ruling 
elite with regard to a particular social issue. The moral dimension of law 
is particularly pronounced when it comes to issues of morality politics 
such as prostitution. For example, at the introduction of the Norwegian 
Sex Purchase Act (2009) that criminalises clients, the Minister of 
Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, Audun Lysbakken, declared: 
“The law is one of the most powerful tools a society has to define its 
values and create attitudes” (cited in Jahnsen and Skilbrei, in press). But 
if law wants to go beyond a purely symbolic function, its ambitions 
require translation into action. This raises a host of normative, political, 
administrative and practical questions. Add to this the observation that 
prostitution policy can best be seen as a policy subsystem or policy 
network, with a large number of actors involved, from government, 
public administration and civil society (we return to this in Chapter 
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Four), all of whom are engaged in a diversity of practices, and it is 
clear that the implementation of such a contested measure as the 
legalisation of the sex trade is an unpredictable, contingent, if not 
downright messy, affair. 
This is not the place to reiterate 50 years of implementation 
research in the discipline of policy studies.36 Our perspective on 
policy implementation is that it requires distinct activities to translate 
policy intention into action, but that it is generally unhelpful to put 
too much weight on a strict distinction between policy formulation 
and implementation. Many of the same dynamics (such as national 
discourse), as well as actors (national government agencies, NGOs, 
pundits, stakeholders) that are involved in the policy formulation phase, 
are also involved in the translation of law into a workable practical-
administrative processes. Furthermore, in one of those recursive 
moments that characterise the field of prostitution policy, the translation 
of laws into action is often influenced and guided by judicial decision. 
For example, the decisions by the Supreme Court and the Higher 
Administrative Court in Austria, like the Sittenwidrigkeits clause, have 
shaped the direction of prostitution policies, sometimes binding, for 
decades. The point is not that (supreme) courts interpret the law – this 
is part of their constitutional mandate – but the example shows that 
the Supreme Court decision, by shaping the practical-administrative 
process, has contributed to a repressive turn in a policy that at the time 
tolerated prostitution. Besides the negative effects of the verdict on sex 
workers’ rights37 the Sittenwidrigkeits clause reinforced the stigmatisation 
of sex workers. The conclusion is that policy implementation and 
formulation are overlaid and intersecting configurations of practice, 
made up of overlapping competences, meanings and materialities, and 
often involving the same actors. In that sense policy implementation 
is part of ‘an ongoing process of policy making’ (Hupe et al, 2014). 
In early, so-called top-down, implementation theory, the law was 
seen as a set of instructions, or even less realistic, binding commands, 
issued by central government actors to lower-level administrators 
(Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Subsequent research into the actual 
activities of administrators showed that a law could more fruitfully 
be seen as a general suggestion or admonition to point activities of 
36 For such an overview, see Hill and Hupe (2014).
37 Just to give an example (more details in Chapter Four), an Austrian sex worker 
who initiated a law suit against her father because he had disinherited her lost her 
case as the court justified the rightness of disinheritance with the Sittenwidrigkeit 
of her profession.
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practical translation in a particular direction. One could say that the 
passing of a law triggers this process of translating law by the book 
into these practical-administrative processes. But what does this imply? 
First of all, different actors will interpret the practical implications, 
or even the goals of the law, in different ways. The interpretation of 
multiple and often conflicting values is an important part of the work 
of policy implementation. For example, in both the Netherlands and 
Vienna regulatory reform of prostitution has expressed a number of 
values, varying from containing and fighting trafficking to improving 
sex workers’ labour rights. In both locations, justice officials as well as 
municipal actors have attached much more significance to the control 
of what they see as unlawful or immoral behaviour than improving 
the rights of sex workers. This is not coincidental. In the Netherlands, 
the repeal of the ban on brothels met a local policy space in which the 
regulation of prostitution was framed as, and organised to attain, the 
containment of its expansion and the control of its most egregious side 
effects. But what was it that the new law (or in this case, the repeal 
of a law) had changed exactly? First of all, the repeal introduced an 
important new meaning into the local practice configuration. The 
commercial exploitation of prostitution was no longer a crime but, in 
legal terms at least, it aspired to be a regular business. But stating that 
prostitution is a regular business and actually believing it are not the 
same. Policy actors did not change their opinion of brothels owners or 
sex workers. As a police manager in the city of The Hague characterised 
brothel owners at the time: “It’s a different world. These are rogues. In a 
frank moment they will say: ‘We’re only in it for the money.’” He added: 
“We already knew in ’98 that we had to work towards a legalization 
of the sector. I know, these are the same boys and girls, but according 
to the law it is now a legal business sector” (cited in Wagenaar, 2006, 
pp 210-12). The aspiration expressed in the repeal, to transform the 
prostitution sector into a regular small business sector, was no longer in 
alignment, however, with the other elements of policy practice, such 
as the urge to contain and control prostitution, and the administrative 
routines that had developed over the years to bring that about. Local 
policy makers did indeed try to introduce new policy approaches that 
reflected the new situation. Brothel owners in The Hague were invited 
to participate in a deliberative forum to hammer out the details of a 
licensing system for brothels, although the pervasiveness of the stigma 
of prostitution did not change the habit of excluding sex workers from 
such forums. In hindsight, however, one has to conclude that this new 
approach was grafted onto an older practice of containing prostitution 
and overcoming the fragmentation of services within the city. In fact, 
The local governance of prostitution
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the licensing system with its attendant requirement to monitor sex 
facilities, although it was the cornerstone of the legalisation of brothels, 
was in fact subjugated to the overriding goals of containment and 
control. In terms of practice theory, extant local policy at the time 
of the repeal consisted of an elaborate configuration of elements of 
a policy practice, in which the repeal introduced new symbolic and 
material elements that triggered an unpredictable process of alignment 
between those elements. 
In contrast to the Dutch repeal of the ban on brothels, the new 
Viennese Prostitution Act (WPG) did not introduce a new meaning 
into the local practice orientation. Despite the attempt by the 
government to involve sex workers and other citizens – albeit only 
marginally – in the policy formulation process and the establishment 
of a steering group that oversaw the practical realisation of the law, 
the local practice configuration remained unchanged. Rather, the 
introduction of a licensing procedure for sex facilities as one of the 
main pillars of the WPG and its mastering was in alignment with long-
standing traditions of control and containment of prostitution under 
the guise of improving working conditions, reducing exploitation and 
confining trafficking. The police successfully maintained its long-lasting 
dominance, including its defining power regarding the nature of the 
problem. In terms of practice this means that a reconfiguration of 
policy practice requires a fundamental reorientation of policy in terms 
of meanings and required competences, whereas the mere addition of 
a policy goal like the improvement of sex workers’ situation does not 
evoke the necessity of other or new practical-administrative strategies 
and might get lost in the course of implementation and application. 
This leads us to our next issue.
Our second point is an extension of the first. Laws need to be 
translated into procedures and regulations that suggest how members 
of the target groups are expected to behave, and how relationships 
between government agencies and target groups, or between citizens 
and the state, are organised. In our later discussion of policy instruments, 
we unpack this statement, but here we want to make a different point. 
A new law and the procedures and regulations it spawns will have to 
be fitted into a dense landscape of existing procedures, practices and 
processes, both formal and informal. A considerable part of that work 
is technical and requires detailed, hands-on knowledge of hundreds 
if not thousands of rules, procedures and regulations. Another part is 
a deep, practical knowledge of the policy domain at hand, to ensure 
the workability and acceptability of the regulations. And, third, all this 
work has to fit local circumstances. While that fit with the regulatory 
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environment, the policy domain and local circumstances is far from 
perfect, administrators usually try to design rules that do not conflict too 
much with existing regulation and practices and that promise a desired 
outcome in the real world. It is for these reasons that administrators 
at lower, provincial or municipal, levels of government do most of 
that work. 
The work of policy translation does not start from scratch. Every 
legal-administrative system has routine, tried-and-tested procedures for 
handling new laws. While designing new regulation calls for a lot of 
creativity, much of the work is mundane and mechanistic. The work 
of policy implementation is always a fortuitous alliance between the 
habitual and the imaginative. For example, policy implementation 
requires that funding must be allocated to specific agencies and 
programmes, that personnel is hired or assigned, and that rules are 
formulated and procedures developed (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003, 
p 185). In most countries this work has been delegated to a professional 
administrative bureaucracy – or rather bureaucracies, as agencies at 
all levels and in different societal sectors have been authorised with 
designing policy implementation. In most countries this task extends 
to NGOs, charities and businesses (when public service delivery is 
contracted out). Civil and administrative law regulates the relationship 
between political decision makers and public administration. A variety 
of statutes designate which administrative level is assigned with the 
implementation of a policy, which agency is assigned which task, 
what type of regulation needs to be followed, how agencies and 
administrators deal with social organisations and citizens, and how 
appeal to administrative decisions is organised. The result is a densely 
interconnected, complex policy field. 
For example, the Austrian constitution and additional treaties 
codify the competences of the federal state and the Länder. Based on 
these, the competence for prostitution policy is assigned to the Länder 
and its implementation to districts and communities. Some Länder 
(such as Oberösterreich) have developed specific prostitution laws, 
while others regulate prostitution within the Police Act. According 
to the new Sexual Service Act in Oberösterreich, for example, the 
municipalities are responsible for licensing sex facilities. Larger cities 
did not have a problem with this, but smaller ones shied away from 
this task, fearing conflicts in the community. Moreover, in small 
towns, mayors, caught up in morality politics, feared that they would 
be blamed for the authorisation of a sex facility and that  adherence to 
the law would imperil their chances of re-election. Therefore, many 
small municipalities transferred this obligation back to the district. But, 
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whereas in Oberösterreich the responsibility of licensing remained 
with the municipality or the district, Vienna has entrusted this task to 
the police. When the Dutch parliament legalised brothels, it delegated 
the implementation of the task to municipalities. This decision was 
guided by the mixture of municipal autonomy and co-governance that 
characterises the role of municipalities in the ‘decentralised unitary 
state’ that is the Netherlands (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002). Prostitution 
policy is traditionally an area for co-governance in which central 
government enjoins broad guidelines, ‘allowing local government 
considerable leeway in their implementation’ (Andeweg and Irwin, 
2002, p 166). The task of coordinating the dozens of municipalities 
with a prostitution scene was entrusted to the Association of Dutch 
Municipalities (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, or VNG), 
an umbrella organisation that represents municipalities in its relation 
with central government. Anticipating the decision to legalise the sex 
trade, the VNG had designed a model for a licensing system for sex 
facilities, the key regulatory instrument prescribed by statute that would 
take the place of the regulated toleration system. 
Yet the contingent nature of the practical work of fitting new 
regulation into existing regulation and making it work in the real world 
should not be underestimated. It requires a refitting and coordination 
of organisational routines, it exposes weaknesses in the organisation 
that require repair, it reveals contradictions in practical goals and 
in the immediate interests of different actors, it can pit one agency 
against another, it requires securing commitment from competing 
stakeholders, and it throws up unexpected negative unintended 
consequences (Wagenaar et al, 2010). To navigate these different 
challenges, to make this kind of administrative work possible in the 
first place, requires remarkable amounts of practical judgment and 
administrative discretion from the administrators involved (Wagenaar, 
2004). Administrative discretion can take many forms, ranging from 
regrettable and unwarranted deviations from the law to the necessary 
situated judgement that makes effective local decision making possible 
in the first place (Kagan, 1978; Vinzant and Crothers, 1998). Examples 
of the first are the refusal of German states to implement the federal 
decision to legalise sex facilities (Pates, 2012), and the decision of the 
city of Stockholm not to provide harm reduction services to sex workers 
as it would facilitate prostitution (Ola Florin, personal communication). 
Another is the aforementioned refusal of the authorities in Vorarlberg 
to license sex facilities. An example of the second is the decision of 
the policy coordinator in The Hague in 2001 to create a platform of 
municipal regulators and local brothel owners to design a working 
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licensing system (Wagenaar, 2006). Lower-level rule making, as we 
will see, can become a laboratory for new policy experiments, or 
for the introduction of wholly new policy aspirations. However, we 
should never lose sight of the fact that all these activities are embedded 
in the everyday mundane practices of allocating funding, formulating 
rules, hiring and assigning personnel, providing information and 
holding meetings. All these dispersed activities aggregate into to what 
Brodkin calls ‘an indirect politics of administrative practice’ (2007, 
p 2). Differently put, this ‘secondary policy formation’, in many cases 
with far-reaching consequences for the actors involved, takes place at 
a very workaday organisational level, by (mostly) non-elected officials, 
at some remove from political accountability processes. 
Contemporary implementation theorists urge us to look beyond 
the so-called deficit model (Hupe et al, 2014). The original top-
down approach assumed that lower-level administrators adhered to 
the instructions from central government. Richard Elmore describes 
this approach to analysing policy implementation as follows: ‘It begins 
at the top of the process, with as clear as possible a statement of the 
policy maker’s intent, and proceeds with a sequence of increasingly 
more specific steps to define what is expected of implementers at 
each level’ (Elmore, 1980, p 602). When a policy fell short of its goals 
or failed altogether this was by implication ascribed to a failure or 
unwillingness of administrators – in other words to a deficit in the 
implementation process. Subsequent research showed that this image 
was empirically wrong (Hjern and Porter, 1981) and conceptually 
muddled (Elmore, 1980, p 603; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984, p 198). 
However its underlying logic and normative injunction of centralised 
control has always held a seductive sway over elected officials and 
policy analysts. We know that implementation is not hierarchy in 
action, but we feel that in a better world it should be. As our analysis 
so far shows policy implementation is only loosely coupled to political 
intent. Methodologically this leads to advice that the analyst’s focus 
should be on ‘micro-practices’ and different and unexpected outputs, 
without too much normative frontloading of the analysis towards 
attaining policy goals. 
However merely recording the activities of lower-level administrators 
might be empirically right, it also feels reductionist and morally 
empty. Loosely coupled is not the same as uncoupled. Implicit in 
the very idea of policy implementation is a notion of an ‘end state 
or policy achievement’ and an associated moral understanding, the 
moral ambition that is enunciated in the law. It is the responsibility 
of elected officials, administrators and professionals to realise that end 
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state (Lane, 1987, p 528). Differently put, the understanding that policy 
implementation is in reality a complex set of discretionary actions by 
local actors does not mean that we, policy actors and analysts alike, 
should lose sight of a normative ‘glue’ that holds the policy process 
together. Lane makes a helpful distinction between the responsibility 
and the trust side of the implementation process. The first refers to an 
accountability norm that puts certain constraints on the implementation 
process. Differently put, no matter how interactive, improvisational and 
discretionary the implementation process is, we are always justified to 
enquire to what extent objectives have been accomplished, and what 
outcomes mean in light of the law’s intentions (Lane, 1987, p 542). 
Even when the outcomes have little to do with the implementation 
process, we still ascribe them to the failure or success of a policy. For 
example, opponents of legalisation in the Netherlands insist that the 
law has failed because of the incidence of widespread trafficking and 
coercion in the licensed prostitution sector. Although the numbers 
on which this assessment is based are dubious, the impulse to evaluate 
a policy in terms of an accomplishment is both valid and inevitable. 
The trust aspect of policy implementation refers to the public power 
entrusted to politicians, administrators and professionals in a democratic 
system to put policies into effect (Lane, 1987, p 542). The trust aspect 
balances autonomy, necessary for making the practical judgements to 
design regulation, and accountability with the constraints that follow 
from the intent of the law and from a more generalised administrative 
ethos. The decision of the city of The Hague to engage in deliberation 
with brothel owners in designing a licensing system is an example of 
the trust aspect. This kind of autonomy is granted to administrators on 
the implicit understanding that they do not sell out to powerful target 
groups such as brothel owners, treat citizens fairly and respectfully, and 
do not replace the original goals of the policy. Policy implementation, 
as Lane says, can be about improvisation, adaptation and learning, 
but it is also about the ability to deliver the normative promises that 
are embedded in a policy (Lane, 1987, p 543). This in turn upholds 
the idea that we can assess policies on their achievement, not on the 
simplistic centralistic sense of deviation from a clear instruction, but in 
a more subtle sense of comparing the normative intention of a policy 
with its actual effects on the ground. This does not only imply the 
assessment of policy outcome relative to the policy’s normative intent, 
but also the rightness or feasibility of moral goals in light of the policy’s 
(unintended) outcomes. 
Perhaps the conclusion should be that the extent to which society’s 
values shape policy implementation and, subsequently, a policy’s 
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impact on society, is above all an empirical question. It will differ 
between policy domains and within the same domain over time. 
But more importantly, analysts needs to ask themselves in what ways 
democratically ratified values enter administrative regulation, and 
conversely, how the effects of regulation reflect on these values. We 
will see in this chapter that discourse is a potent carrier of values, 
shaping how the actors perceive outcomes, and infusing the selection 
and application of policy instruments. This is the true meaning of 
the phrase ‘indirect politics of administrative practice’. Although in 
many aspects a technical process, policy implementation also expresses 
the values that govern a policy domain, or, to put it differently, how 
society ‘feels’ about the policy issue at hand. This may result in value 
displacement, the extent to which another set of values replaces the 
values and aspirations that are expressed in the original policy. This is 
not necessarily a bad thing, as we argued earlier. Comparing outcomes 
and values is a two-way street. Inevitably, under the influence of 
experience and ‘backtalk’, understandings and sentiments regarding the 
issue at hand evolve. Nevertheless it is both necessary and legitimate to 
pose the normative question to what extent the implemented policy 
embodies the values of the original policy and/or if these values are 
still a fair representation of the collective standards and ambitions in a 
particular policy domain. 
Policy design and policy instruments 
Before we continue our analysis of the implementation of prostitution 
policy, we need to introduce two additional analytical concepts: policy 
design and policy instruments. Policy design is aimed at arriving at 
desired outcomes through the application of knowledge and experience 
about a particular social domain. It is less a purely technical activity 
of drawing up a blueprint and sticking to it, as an evolving activity of 
channelling the efforts of many actors in working towards an agreed 
goal. One can think of policy design as symbolic-material ‘containers’ 
or frameworks that channel ‘practices-as-performance’. A good 
example of this is the so-called ‘chain management’ that the Dutch 
cities have adopted in fighting trafficking in which a large group of 
relevant actors regularly meet to inform each other and coordinate 
their activities. (We will discuss chain management shortly.) As Howlett 
puts it, policy design is: 
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[T]he effort to more or less systematically develop efficient 
and effective means through the application of knowledge 
about policy means gained from experience, and reason, 
to the development and adoption of courses of action that 
are likely to succeed in attaining their desired goals or aims 
within specific policy contexts. (2011, p 22) 
Howlett speaks of policy design as contextually ‘constrained’. What he 
means is that the choice of policy instruments is shaped by the larger 
governance context; the same range of factor that influences policy 
implementation. Howlett fails to mention the influence that powerful 
ideas, practices and traditions (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010) – the frames 
of Schön and Rein (1994), as discussed in Chapter Two – exert on 
the design of policies. For example, as we will see, a long-standing 
Dutch tradition of taking the minority view into account in political 
decision making and of deliberating with the stakeholders of a policy 
has clearly influenced the choice of policy instruments at both the 
national and local level. On the other hand, although the policy 
environment constrains, it does not completely determine the design 
of a policy. As we will see, policy actors are free to insert elements from 
other governance styles into a design, thereby making every design in 
effect a patchwork of ideas and elements in which a national style is 
only vaguely recognisable. 
National laws already contain many design elements – another instance 
of the continuity between policy formulation and implementation. A 
recent proposal for a new national prostitution law in the Netherlands 
called for a national registration system for sex workers. (We will discuss 
this law proposal in the next chapter.) In this case a registration system 
is part of a general design in which state agencies attempt to control 
prostitution among other activities by obtaining information about the 
size, composition and characteristics of the population of sex workers. 
Alternatively, the Swedish prostitution law famously introduced the 
criminalisation of clients as the core of a national policy aimed at 
reducing prostitution in Swedish society. A central element of policy 
design, as these examples show, is the choice of policy instruments. 
Policy instruments are ‘the techniques or means through which states 
attempt to attain their goals’ (Howlett, 2011, p 22). The basic idea is that 
the concept of a policy instrument brings order to the dizzying array 
of activities and techniques that governments have at their disposal. 
It is common to distinguish between substantive and procedural 
instruments. Substantive instruments are ‘those policy techniques or 
mechanisms designed to directly or indirectly affect the behaviour of 
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those involved in the production, consumption and distribution of 
different kinds of goods and services in society’ (Howlett, 2011, p 25). 
An example would be a licensing and monitoring system to induce 
proprietors to offer a safe and hygienic work environment to sex 
workers. Procedural policy instruments affect production, consumption 
and distribution processes only indirectly. More specifically, they affect 
the behaviour of actors involved in policy implementation. An example 
of a procedural tool would be the creation of a centralised police unit 
to coordinate the fight against trafficking, or the dispensing of a subsidy 
to a sex workers’ advocacy organisation. 
Prostitution policy employs a variety of policy instruments, with 
each country displaying its own preferences and emphases in the 
choice of instruments. To comprehend the specific character of a 
country’s implementation efforts it is helpful therefore to understand 
the different types of instrument that the literature distinguishes (Hood, 
1986; Stone, 1997; Salamon and Lund, 2009). A common taxonomy 
is the one by Howlett (2011, p 129). Howlett distinguishes four types 
of instruments, as follows: 
1. Organisational instruments, which ‘rely upon the use of government 
institutions and personnel to affect policy output delivery and policy 
process change’ (Howlett, 2011, p 63). Examples from the field of 
prostitution policy are municipal agencies, police departments and 
the municipal public health service. An ad hoc steering group of 
elected officials, administrators, police officers and NGOs, created 
to implement the new municipal prostitution law in Vienna, is 
another example of an organisational instrument. 
2. Authoritative instruments, which ‘involve, and rely primarily on, the 
ability of governments to direct or steer targets in the directions they 
would prefer them to go through the use of the real or perceived 
threat of state-enforced sanctions’ (Howlett, 2011, p 83). Examples 
are laws such as the anti-trafficking laws that derive from the UN 
protocol that most countries have signed, as well as the myriad of 
quasi-judicial regulations that municipalities draw up to regulate 
prostitution. 
3. Financial instruments, which are ‘specific techniques involved in 
transferring treasure resources to or from other actors in order to 
encourage them to undertake some activity desired by governments 
through the provision of financial incentives, or to discourage them 
through the imposition of financial costs’ (Howlett, 2011, p 101). 
Financial instruments involve taxes and user fees, as well as grants. 
For example, the city of Vienna fines outdoor sex workers who were 
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working outside the designated areas. Authoritative and financial 
instruments merge into one another: when a sex facility has to close 
down for a month because of a breach of the rules, this has negative 
financial consequences for the proprietor. 
4. Information-based instruments, which are defined as ‘those policy 
techniques or mechanisms which rely on the use of information to 
directly or indirectly affect the behaviour of those involved in the 
production, consumption and distribution of different kinds of goods 
and services in society’ (Howlett, 2011, p 116). Good examples 
are the information campaigns in various ‘source’ countries to 
discourage women from migrating to the Netherlands to enter the 
sex trade, or the Dutch Wet Bibob, which allows for the collection 
of information on the antecedents of proprietors. (We will discuss 
this instrument later in this chapter.) 
To these four types of policy instrument, we would add a fifth: 
networking instruments. These consist of attempts by government agencies 
to bring together actors from government and civil society to inform, 
consult or deliberate on the design and implementation of policies. 
Examples are the aforementioned steering group established in the 
course of implementing the Viennese Prostitution Act 2011, and the 
network of municipal and law enforcement agencies and brothel owners 
that the city of The Hague created to design a workable licensing and 
monitoring system after the legalisation of brothels came into effect 
in October 2000 (Wagenaar, 2006). Networking instruments are a 
form of ‘governance-driven democratization’ (Warren, 2014). The 
purpose of networking instruments is to bring more, and more diverse, 
information and knowledge to bear on the issue at hand, to overcome 
the ‘pluralized ungovernability’ (Warren, 2014) that characterises 
contemporary urban government, and to encourage stakeholders and 
administrative agencies to commit to regulatory measures. 
To analyse policy implementation in a meaningful way, we need 
to be able to relate the choice of instruments to some kind of stated 
rationale (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003, p  197). As we will see, in 
the real world of policy design and implementation, the choice of 
instruments is a messy process that is influenced as much by knowledge 
(both formal and experiential) as by tradition, ideology, unrecognized 
intellectual frames, convenience, accommodations and symbolism. 
Policy instruments vary according to a number of features, such as 
resource intensiveness (administrative cost, operational simplicity), 
targeting (precision, selectivity), political risk (chances and nature 
of opposition, visibility), and constraints on state activity (difficulties 
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with coerciveness, ideological principles limiting state activity) (Linder 
and Peters, 1989). Some commentators argue that each type of 
instrument has a characteristic implementation ‘profile’ of advantages 
and disadvantages that policy makers take into account when they 
contemplate the realisation of a policy (Howlett, 2011, p 56). For 
example, regulations are reasonably cheap (although they require a 
monitoring and enforcement procedure to give them bite), and can 
be targeted with precision. However, they often generate resistance, 
they are rigid in that they do not take individual circumstances into 
account, and they might distort markets by burdening producers and 
consumers with additional costs. 
In addition, Linder and Peters argue, a nation’s policy style and 
political culture strongly influence the choice of policy instruments. 
Amesberger observes, for example, that in Vienna between 1965 and 
1983 local government dealt with prostitution exclusively through 
authority-based measures (prohibitions, registration, fines), which 
were largely implemented by the police. The authorities defined 
prostitution as visible prostitution that had to be controlled and pushed 
back. After 1983 the government began to consult others, but these 
were mostly ‘experts’ recruited from the police and public health 
officials (Amesberger, 2014; see also Chapter Four). Only with the 
latest change of law were sex workers consulted. However, as we will 
see in Chapter Four, despite the Viennese government’s attempt to 
promote the licensing of sex facilities, under the influence of a media 
campaign street prostitution became the focus of implementation and 
the police remained the most important authority in charge of it. 
While in Vienna a penchant for authority-based measures asserts itself 
against the intrusion of networking measures, we see the opposite in 
the Netherlands. A tendency for consultation and deliberation that is 
deeply anchored in the Dutch consociational political culture is now 
slowly suffused with authoritarian elements. The following extract 
from an interview with a city official illustrates this process: 
Official: “We always invite the brothel owners to discuss 
proposed measures before we implement them.”
Interviewer: “Do they have influence over the design of 
these measures?” 
Official: “We listen to them. But in the end they have to 
follow the rules.” (Interview, city official, The Hague) 
According to the policy analyst Deborah Stone, the term policy 
instrument gives the misleading impression of a more or less mechanical 
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procedure that will function and deliver in the same way every time 
it is activated. Instead, as she suggests, policy instruments should be 
considered a kind of governance strategy, or as she puts it, ‘ongoing 
strategies for structuring relationships and coordinating behaviour to 
achieve collective purposes’ (Stone, 1997, p 259). She then adds the 
important caveat that policy instruments are much more relational and 
reactive than the mechanical instrument metaphor implies: 
Effective maintenance of a community or pursuit of common 
goals cannot possibly be accomplished by governing every 
action or decision of individuals and organizations. Societies 
rely instead on broad structures and rules that will have 
a ‘multiplier effect’, shaping people’s behaviour without 
continuous and specific directions. And because individuals, 
groups, and organizations within society have their own 
goals, they in turn use these structures and rules to help 
accomplish their own purposes. (Stone, 1997, p 259)
Stone’s relational conception of policy instruments leads to two 
important insights. First, when officials employ policy instruments 
they must be prepared to encounter considerable ‘slippage’ between the 
policy’s objective as embodied by the design and choice of instruments 
on the one hand and the target group’s actual behaviour on the other. 
Policy is not the only, or even the most important, influence on 
people’s behaviour (Elmore, 1980, p 604). In addition, people will 
assess the impact of the policy on their work and life situation, on 
the complex of meanings, competences, identity and materiality that 
make up their performative life forms, and try to accommodate the 
policy so as to minimise its effect on ‘business as usual’ (Wagenaar, 
1995). For example, for more than 15 years now Dutch proprietors 
have resisted the introduction of labour rights in sex facilities, as it 
would imperil their tried and proven business model in which the 
costs of prostitution are carried by the sex worker and the profits by 
the proprietor (Roessingh and Ramesar, 2011).38 We must expect that 
38 The book Slaves in the Polder. How Sex Workers, Cleaners, and Seasonal Laborers are 
being Exploited (in Dutch) by journalists Martijn Roessingh and Perdiep Ramesar, 
both working for the national newspaper Trouw, ‘demonstrates’ the alleged failure 
of the legalisation of brothels in the Netherlands by ‘documenting’ the rise of forced 
prostitution. On publication the book received a lot of publicity and became a 
cornerstone in the abolitionist campaign. However it turned out that Ramesar 
had used fictitious sources as the basis of much of the book (www.trouw.nl/tr/
nl/5133/Media-technologie/article/detail/3815470/2014/12/20/Twijfel-over-
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the capacity of governments to influence other people’s behaviour is 
limited, particularly if they are enticed or summoned to do ‘what they 
otherwise might not do’ (Stone, 1997, p 259). This applies a fortiori to 
situations where the social and cultural distance between policy maker 
and target audience is large, where the central behaviour is surrounded 
by a strong stigma, and where a large part of the target audience prefers 
to operate in the shadows. Second, because governments cannot – and 
preferably should not – monitor people’s behaviour all of the time, 
and because the cost of sanctioning undesirable behaviours is often 
high (in terms of monitoring, enforcement and resistance), in most 
cases a more promising avenue of intervention is to collaborate with 
stakeholders to establish mutually agreeable norms, goals and delivery 
modes of the policy.39 This is a difficult and time-consuming approach 
that carries its own risks (co-optation of officials by stakeholders or 
vice versa), but ultimately it is probably the more effective and cost-
efficient approach to implementing policy. For example, after many 
years the public health authorities in most large Dutch cities have gained 
sufficient trust among sex workers and proprietors to run an effective 
STD-prevention programme that is exclusively based on voluntary 
cooperation by sex workers. We return to collaborative policymaking 
in the final chapter. 
Finally, the nature of the problem is an important factor in shaping 
policy implementation. Overall, the more complex and contested the 
problem, the greater the discretion that is required from administrators 
and the larger the range of actors involved. Clearly, apart from other 
factors, which we discuss later in the chapter, the morality politics of 
prostitution precludes any easy solution to policy implementation. 
In fact, the incessant, drawn-out contestation that accompanies 
the design and implementation of prostitution policy creates ample 
brongebruik-Ramesar-leefde-al-langer.dhtml; see also: https://utrechtkrijgtspijt.
wordpress.com/2014/12/29/ontslagen-trouw-journalist-ramesar-loog-ook-
over-prostitutie). After these revelations the publisher withdrew the book from 
the market and Roessingh publicly distanced himself from it. We nevertheless 
decided to use the book and refer to it in various instances. The sections we use 
and quote are based on publicly available sources. In addition, Hendrik Wagenaar 
has been extensively interviewed about his research by Roessingh and knows him 
as a journalist with high professional standards and integrity. The interview, which 
was critical of the repressive turn in Dutch prostitution policy, was almost integrally 
published in Trouw. Ramesar’s breach of professional standards is another instance 
of the corrosive effects that morality politics has on the use of evidence.
39 Currently the terms of this equation are being rapidly rewritten with the advent 
of electronic surveillance techniques and the increasing capacity for the collection 
and analysis of big data. 
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opportunity for different groups to try to insert their own agenda into 
the implementation process, not seldom resulting in policy stagnation. 
The continuing efforts of central and municipal officials to introduce 
some form of sex worker registration in the Netherlands, despite 
the fact that parliament has rejected registration twice on grounds of 
breach of privacy, is a good example of this. Third, the size, accessibility 
and legitimacy of the target group are important factors, as well as, 
fourth, the type of behavioural change the target group is required 
to make. A stigmatised and dispersed group such as (immigrant) sex 
workers is by definition in a disadvantageous position to officially resist 
policy measures. Finally, external conditions (economic, political and 
technological) may change, thus affecting the implementation of a 
policy. As we will see later, the decision to waive the visa requirement 
for citizens of so-called accession countries in 2004 played a large role 
in the repressive turn of Dutch prostitution policy. 
To sum up, policy implementation is an open-ended, contingent 
process. The selection of policy instruments, one of the key moments 
in the implementation process, is determined by cultural traditions, the 
‘cost profile’ of the instruments and the social status of the target group, 
as well as its cultural distance to administrators, and the preferences 
and experiences of administrators. In addition, members of the target 
audience do not accept instrument deployment passively. They assess 
the impact the instrument has on their life and act to defuse or moderate 
any effects they deem disruptive to their prospects and daily routines. 
As a result, the expected effect of a policy is highly unpredictable, 
encompassing the full spectrum from intended to unintended 
consequences to no effect. Effective intervention is often based on a 
laborious and time-consuming process of creating trust among hard-
to-reach and sceptical stakeholders. But even if administrative discretion 
is inevitable or is a requirement for efficacious policy implementation, 
it raises difficult issues of democratic accountability, particularly when 
administrators or police officers are dealing with a socially vulnerable, 
stigmatised population. Discretionary decisions affect the lives of 
real people. Because of the social and cultural distance between 
administrator and sex worker, an unfamiliarity that is easily accentuated 
and discursively amplified by the stigma adhering to prostitution, the 
consideration and fairness that citizens may expect in their dealings with 
servants of the state is easily overlooked (Edelman, 1988; Wagenaar, 
2015a). Later in this chapter we will see many examples of insensitive, 
and even harsh, administrative action towards sex workers. 
In the remainder of this chapter we discuss how local policy makers 
in Austria and the Netherlands have dealt with implementing national 
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policy. In Chapter Six we discuss some alternatives of policy design 
that promise to take the special nature of prostitution as a policy target 
into account. 
Local policymaking in the Netherlands
The social and policy environment in the Netherlands before the 
legalisation of sex facilities 
When in October 2000 the Dutch parliament abolished the ban on 
brothels from the Criminal Code, and legalised from then on the 
ownership and management of sex facilities, it had four broad goals: 
to separate voluntary from involuntary prostitution; to ‘protect the 
position’ of sex workers (Outshoorn, 2004b, pp 198-9); to fight 
trafficking and other crimes associated with prostitution; and to prevent 
prostitution among under-age individuals. By making the business 
of prostitution the subject of administrative law, which regulates the 
operation of sex establishments, and labour law, which regulates the 
labour rights and workplace conditions of sex workers, parliament 
aimed to decriminalise commercial sex. Criminal law, the original 
province of the regulation of prostitution, was to be restricted to the 
criminal activities that accompanied (some) prostitution. Barring 
criminal activity, the argument went, the state has no business in the 
transactions that occur between women (and men) and their clients. 
The assumption was that by normalising the business of sex work and 
bringing it into the institutional core of the Dutch administrative and 
welfare regulatory framework, it would be easier to crack down on 
the illegal and criminal aspects of the prostitution sector. The central 
policy instrument in the implementation of the law was a licensing 
and monitoring system for sex facilities. The Dutch approach was 
thus designed as a mixture of regulating and decriminalising impulses. 
As prostitution policy falls within the remit of municipalities, 
implementation was devolved to local government.
What was the situation in Dutch cities regarding prostitution when 
the ban on brothels was abolished in October 2000? Preceding the 
repeal of the brothel law, two developments had unfolded in parallel 
to each other. On the one hand, the national discourse on prostitution 
reflected both ambiguity about prostitution among political authorities 
and confidence about the government’s capacity for effective regulation 
among feminists and liberal opinion makers. On the other hand, 
in the 1970s and 1980s, under the influence of powerful external 
circumstances that caught the authorities unawares, the nature of 
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the sex trade had changed appreciably, from a self-contained, self-
regulated cottage industry to a variegated sex empire riddled with drug 
crimes and financed and controlled by organised crime. The Wallen, 
Amsterdam’s famous red-light district underwent a metamorphosis 
in the 1970s and 1980s. The once quiet canals and alleyways became 
gaudy corridors of live sex theatres, porn shops, bars offering erotic 
entertainment, sex museums, erotic cinemas and saunas, thronging 
with rowdy, boisterous revellers on weekend nights. Moreover, the 
population of sex workers had become much more international 
and included an increasing number of immigrant sex workers, many 
without legal papers. At the end of the 1990s the police departments 
of large cities such as The Hague and Amsterdam felt that they had 
lost control of the red-light districts. In the big cities prostitution was 
a closed market in which ownership was distributed among a handful 
of powerful individuals. Owners were unwilling to give up the profits 
and prerogatives they had obtained over the years by operating outside 
the legal order. Although informal contacts between owners and city 
officials existed, these were characterised by antagonism and distrust. 
As prostitution constitutes a 24-hour economy, according to police 
officials the large number of clients created serious problems for the 
inhabitants of the prostitution neighbourhoods. Residents complained 
of constant noise and nuisance caused by cars cruising through the 
narrow streets, shouting in the streets, clients urinating in people’s 
doorways, a generally threatening atmosphere, much criminal activity 
of drug addicts and pimps, and frequent muggings of clients. Turf fights 
between rival drug dealers led to shooting or stabbing incidents in the 
streets, some of them with deadly results. Police officers admit that 
enforcement was decidedly suboptimal (interviews, police officials, The 
Hague, 1993). The Hague even went so far at the end of the 1990s to 
assign its red-light district emergency status (interviews, police officials, 
The Hague, 1993). Public opinion at the time accepted prostitution 
as an acceptable job and supported the legalisation of brothels (Brants, 
1998, p 630). 
It was against this background that local officials felt the need 
for stricter forms of control. But they found themselves caught in 
a dilemma. While procuring and operating a brothel was officially 
a crime, enforcing the law and closing brothels was politically 
unacceptable in the tolerant cultural climate of the Netherlands in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The solution was the design of an informal 
model of regulation, based on ideas about legalisation that were 
being floated and discussed in political circles at the time. The policy 
theory was as follows: by bringing prostitution out into the open, 
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‘good’ ‘voluntary’ prostitution could be separated from ‘unwanted’, 
exploitative prostitution. By imposing a set of regulations on brothels, 
it would be possible to contain voluntary prostitution within a clean, 
monitored sector and prosecute procurers who exploited illegal sex 
workers. The result was a system of informal regulation that became 
known as ‘regulated tolerance’ (Brants, 1998). 
Regulated tolerance is the practice of not prosecuting certain offences 
while not officially legalising them (Brants, 1998, p 624). Regulated 
tolerance has been applied to social issues such as the use of soft drugs 
(the well-known ‘coffee shops’, so popular with foreign tourists in 
Amsterdam), the sale of pornography and euthanasia. Regulated 
tolerance, as Brants observes, is: 
[N]ot merely a matter of the police turning a blind eye. It is a 
well-tried policy strategy that sometimes develops gradually 
at a local level, but may well be deliberately designed by 
the central government. It is often elaborately described in 
policy documents from the Ministry of Justice and, as such, 
subject to a certain degree of political control. (1998, p 624) 
Regulated tolerance is motivated by a pragmatic understanding 
of the limits of criminal law in regulating certain activities, or the 
acknowledgement that, although an activity may formally be illegal, 
it is nevertheless socially common in statistical terms or morally 
widely accepted. Regulated tolerance is thus a form of semi-informal 
regulation. The philosophy behind it is a certain scepticism about 
criminal law as an adequate instrument for dealing with particular social 
issues (Brants, 1998, p 624). As Brants explains, regulated tolerance 
does not mean that the law is rescinded; the law remains in force. The 
legal basis for the non-prosecution of criminal offences is ‘the widely 
used discretionary power of the public prosecutor to refrain from 
prosecution on public interest grounds’ (Brants, 1998, p 624). There is 
a strong pragmatist element in this approach to law and its enforcement: 
in many cases officials felt the social damage done to the offender (and 
society’s values) by prosecuting the offence (for example possessing a 
small quantity of cannabis) was larger than the ‘crime’ itself, and/or 
that the issue was better addressed by other means than the criminal 
law (as in the case of assisted suicide). 
In practice, regulated tolerance involved a combination of written 
protocols and unwritten rules, and even, as in the case of Amsterdam, 
the creation of a new organisational policy instrument: the red-light 
district manager. Brothels, including window facilities, were asked to 
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comply with a number of building and safety regulations. In addition 
brothel owners were obliged by law to check the identity papers of 
women who wanted to work in their facility. Brothels that were up to 
standard were given a so-called declaration of suitability (Brants, 1998, 
p 632). The problem, of course, was that the informal, deliberative 
nature of the system made enforcement difficult. Nevertheless, 
regulated tolerance was a form of a proto-licensing that was formalised 
with the long-awaited official legalisation covering brothels in 2000. 
But perhaps more important for our analysis of the implementation 
of prostitution policy is the fact that in addition to guidelines and 
procedures, the collaboration of the prosecutor and the police with 
other city agencies (such as the municipal public health agencies, the 
fire brigade, the department that licenses bars and restaurants, as well 
as the tax authority) was necessary for informal regulation to work. In 
addition, city officials consulted organised interests such NGOs dealing 
with aspects of the sex trade, brothel owners, and the Rode Draad, the 
major Dutch sex worker advocacy organisation at the time. In fact, 
local and national policymaking was in unison here. The regulation 
of prostitution, both at the national and the local level, evolved into a 
political culture where consultation and participation were common, 
taken-for-granted elements. On the national level, in the run-up to 
the repeal of the ban on brothels, members of parliament regularly 
contacted NGOs that dealt with migrants and with trafficking. The 
Rode Draad was invited by the VNG to contribute to a handbook of 
prostitution policy that was to serve as model for Dutch municipalities. 
Brothel owners came together to formulate a ‘covenant against 
trafficking’. Within this culture of collaboration, regulated tolerance at 
the local level was much more than just a policy instrument – it was a 
‘configuration that worked’, an assembly of understandings, routines, 
actors and agencies, mutually understood roles, spatial distributions, 
relations, identities, values and feelings about prostitution (Shove et al, 
2012, p 14). It was the concurrence of all these elements, the taken-
for-granted interrelationships between people, and their activities, 
understandings and feelings, that anchored the regulatory system 
before the repeal firmly into Dutch public administration. And as 
in any complex practice configuration, the constituent elements do 
not necessarily neatly fit together, as they speak to different needs. 
This probably explains the peculiar, uneasy mixture of authoritative 
and networking instruments used to regulate prostitution in the four 
large Dutch cities in the late 1990s. While The Hague had regular 
consultations with the proprietors of the city’s major sex facilities, it 
also created an emergency measure to provide the police with more 
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powers to establish public order in the prostitution zones. Similarly, 
when Rotterdam closed its street prostitution zone in 2005, it consulted 
extensively with NGOs and other stakeholder organisations. 
The significance of the emergence of this policy network or 
subsystem for the implementation of the legalisation of the sex trade in 
the Netherlands is twofold. First, it involved a large number of actors, 
both governmental and non-governmental, in discussing, designing 
and implementing prostitution policy, and provided them with the 
necessary knowledge and expertise about prostitution. For years to 
come, these would be the actors who would be consulted in the design 
and implementation of prostitution policy. If they were left out of the 
loop by the authorities, they would assert themselves by criticising 
and commenting on new proposals; the legitimacy they had acquired 
by being part of earlier networks made it that much harder to ignore 
them. The networks of municipal agencies in particular became skilled 
in coordinating their efforts in policy implementation, as we will see. 
Second, the policy subsystem should not be seen as just a collection 
of actors, but as a large practice configuration, a configuration that 
stretched out in time and space and was connected though shared values, 
established relationships, mutually accepted roles and competences, 
routine activities, and joint understandings of the situation at hand 
(Shove et al, 2012, p 7). This is yet another argument not to place 
too much emphasis on the distinction between policy formulation and 
policy implementation. Many of the same actors who were aligned 
through this working configuration were involved in both stages of the 
policy process. This configuration also contained fractures and fissures, 
however. At the local level, public order was probably emphasised more 
strongly than at the national level. Brothel owners, while pretending 
to contribute to policy design, always pursued their own agenda of 
keeping the pre-repeal business model intact. Politicians from the 
religious parties were never happy with the repeal of the brothel ban 
to begin with. Later, as we will see, these fault lines would become the 
crystallisation points for far-reaching changes in the Dutch approach 
to the regulation of prostitution.
To sum up, in the Netherlands at the end of the 1990s, preceding 
the long-awaited legalisation of sex establishments, an approach to the 
regulation of prostitution emerged at the local level that would be the 
model for post-legalisation policy implementation. Its characteristics 
were a mixture of collaboration and control. While the keywords in 
the new regulatory regime were ‘licensing’ (vergunnen), ‘enforcement’ 
(handhaving) and ‘monitoring’ (toezicht), this did not preclude the 
inclusion of a large number of agencies and societal stakeholders. 
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However, while city officials and brothels owners had developed a wary 
form of mutual recognition, sex workers were consistently excluded 
from the policy network. The members of these networks developed 
considerable skills and knowledge about prostitution and its regulation. 
This would become a particularly important factor with regard to 
city agencies. While the bureaucratic landscape in most cities was 
fragmented and sundered with interagency rivalries, the experience 
of cooperation during the days of regulated tolerance would form the 
basis for the efficient and proactive collaboration in law enforcement 
and policy implementation after legalisation. While officials went some 
way towards a genuine form of deliberation with stakeholders, the urge 
to control prostitution usually would get the better of them, resulting 
in an uneasy and forced style of interaction with stakeholders. It would 
be wrong though to dismiss the habit of consulting stakeholders in 
Dutch prostitution policy. In the consociational political culture of 
Dutch politics stakeholder consultation is second nature. We will see, 
however, how other more repressive and authoritarian approaches and 
instruments came to diminish the participatory impulse.
Brothels legalised: developing administrative capacity 
Parliament’s decision to abolish the procurement article from Dutch 
criminal law and in this way legalise brothels left Dutch municipalities 
firmly in charge of prostitution policy. Municipalities have considerable 
autonomy in the Dutch policy system; they can decide for themselves 
if and how they want to develop the local regulation of prostitution. 
Parliament had advised that only licensed facilities would be allowed to 
operate under the new legal regime. Thus a licensing and monitoring 
system, a combination of authoritative and information-based tools, 
became the key policy instrument in the design and implementation 
of the legalisation of the sex trade. 
At the start of 2001 most municipalities faced an implementation 
task that was, by all accounts, difficult and challenging. A fragmented 
municipal apparatus faced a powerful and highly distrustful adversary 
that, after decades of operating outside the legal order, was unwilling 
to give up its lucrative practices. Administrators knew that well-
endowed brothel owners would challenge them in court if necessary, 
and in many cases they did.40 Also, while the larger cities had a small 
40 Part of the motivation to involve the court was to frustrate the implementation 
process. In The Hague the city had to go to court to establish clear-cut legal 
definitions of what constituted a brothel (as distinguished from a domestic dwelling), 
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number of administrators and police officers with experience in dealing 
with the prostitution sector, the smaller towns had no such capacity. 
It proved that most administrators preferred not to be associated with 
the prostitution sector, with the result that young, recently hired, 
and wholly inexperienced employees, who were no match for the 
savvy and often duplicitous brothel owners, were assigned to this 
task (interviews with administrators, and observations, 2002). These 
employees made certain to hand the task over to someone else as soon as 
they could, leading to rapid turnover in the departments responsible for 
designing and implementing prostitution policy (interviews, municipal 
administrators, 2002-03). It would take a number of years for this 
personnel situation to settle down and for administrative experience 
to accumulate in this sector. 
The large cities were reasonably well prepared and had attained some 
experience with informally regulating the prostitution sector within 
their borders. Moreover, the VNG had formulated and distributed a 
model licensing system. Although some municipalities in the orthodox 
Christian part of the country were reluctant and, in violation of the law, 
refused to allow sex facilities within their borders, most towns and cities 
organised themselves to implement a licensing and monitoring system. 
A 2006 evaluation of municipal prostitution policy in the Netherlands 
found that two thirds of municipalities had developed an explicit 
prostitution policy that was documented in a policy report (Flight 
et al, 2006). Licensing focused on clubs and window prostitution; 
escort and home prostitution was unregulated in more than half of 
the municipalities. In more than half of the municipalities city officials 
were in charge of policy; in a quarter it was the police. However in 
almost all municipalities the police were in charge of monitoring 
the licensed brothels. In 70% of cases, health and labour conditions 
were part of the agenda, although it not wholly clear in what ways. 
In about half of the municipalities trafficking is an explicit focus of 
local policy. We can conclude that until 2005 municipalities attempted 
to implement the new legal regime. Although there was a focus on 
control and containment through licensing and monitoring, the social 
and labour aspects of the repeal also received attention, particularly in 
the large cities where the municipal public health agencies continued 
who was responsible for the goings-on in a brothel during business hours, and 
to settle the issue of operating hours. Interestingly, in the end in many such cases 
all parties were pleased with the court decision, as it created much-needed legal 
clarity (Wagenaar, 2006, pp 214-15). The court had inadvertently acted as a policy 
instrument. 
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their practice of visiting brothels to provide services to sex workers 
(Flight et al, 2006). 
When the law that legalised brothels came into effect in October 
2000 it had three immediate consequences, all of which, although not 
directly related, issued from and reinforced the reinvigorated culture of 
control. First, all policies operate by creating categories of eligibility 
and non-eligibility. The definitions of and boundaries between these 
categories reflect the instrumental purpose of the law and the moral 
concerns of lawmakers. The repeal of the ban on brothels created a 
fourfold classification of sex workers that formed the basic architecture 
for its implementation (Outshoorn, 2012, 2014). The first category 
is the ethnically undefined Dutch sex worker who chooses to work 
in prostitution voluntarily. The second is the EU citizen who under 
EU rules has a right to work as a sex worker in the Netherlands and 
also works voluntarily. The third category comprises citizens from the 
accession countries (at the time of writing, Bulgaria and Romania) who 
are allowed to work as independent sex workers but not as employees. 
The fourth category consists of non-EU citizens who, because of their 
undocumented status, can only work illegally. As we will see in Chapter 
Five, because of their legal status the latter two groups are vulnerable 
to labour exploitation. In the public and political debate about 
prostitution the young woman from eastern Europe or the Balkans 
lured into prostitution by ruthless criminals became a dominant image 
(Outshoorn, 2014, p 181). In addition the law created a licensed and 
unlicensed prostitution sector. The first consisted of licensed brothels 
and was the subject of intense attention by agencies of the state. The 
second comprised escort agencies, home prostitution, massage parlours, 
bar prostitution and others, and was much less visible and therefore 
the subject of much concern and speculation among policy makers. 
However, there is little evidence of a displacement effect from the 
licensed to the unlicensed sector (Biesma et al, 2006). 
Second, the municipalities inherited a business sector that, according 
to the Dutch journalists Roessingh and Ramesar, operated within a 
‘shady business culture’. Black money, tax avoidance, bribery, drugs 
and the exploitation of sex workers were common aspects of the 
prostitution business. As Roesingh and Ramesar note: ‘Such a culture 
… does not disappear because in The Hague the parliament declares 
that it wants to “normalize” the sector’ (2011, p 173). This in itself 
difficult situation was made worse by another policy intervention that 
was informed by the stigma attached to prostitution. Although the 
expansionary days were over, municipal administrators charged with 
implementing a new licensing system feared an uncontrolled influx of 
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sex workers who would be attracted by the legalised nature of the sex 
trade in the Netherlands. Pre-emptively more than half of municipalities 
– in fact the majority of urban municipalities with a prostitution market 
within their borders – limited the number of brothels within the city 
limits. Usually the maximum consisted of the stock of existing brothels, 
but quietly a few municipalities adopted so-called ‘mortality’ models: 
each brothel that closed down would not be replaced with another 
one. By thus freezing the market, unintentionally, the government 
created an oligopoly of proprietors who employed a business model 
of maximal profits with minimal investment. This would become a 
stumbling block in the attainment of the goals of legalisation. 
Third, and perhaps most damaging to the position of sex workers, 
the government consistently refused to intervene in the labour relations 
between proprietors and sex workers, arguing that this was a matter 
of civil law and should be arranged between the two civil parties 
involved.41 The second goal of the 2000 repeal was ‘protection of the 
position of sex workers’. Sex worker advocates had lobbied for the 
formulation ‘improvement of the position’, and in their discussions 
with the Minister of Justice and her civil servants made it clear that 
they had improvement of labour rights and work conditions in sex 
facilities in mind. The minister’s position was that now that sex 
facilities had become regular businesses according to the law, labour 
rights would follow more or less automatically, similar to the situation 
in other business sectors. Proprietors would have to abide by labour 
laws, sex workers would be able to join trade unions, and proprietor 
organisations and unions would negotiate labour rights and work 
contracts, as was the usual practice in the Netherlands. The minister 
and her civil servants took a neutral position as to the nature of the 
relationship between proprietor and sex worker – labour contract or 
a contract sui generis – and, in hindsight naïvely, expected that this 
relationship would ‘as a by-product of the abolition of the prohibition 
of brothels sort itself out’ (Zuidema et al, 2006, p 3). For this reason 
the minister settled for the less binding formulation ‘protection’ instead 
of ‘improvement’. What ‘protection’ entailed was left unspecified in 
the law, as we have seen. In practice many municipalities interpreted 
41 As Zuidema et al say: ‘Minister Sorgdrager [Minister of Justice at the time] her 
successor Korthals, and after that Minister Donner, argued that the position of 
the prostitute is dependent upon the civil law framework in which her work is 
embedded and the agreements made within that framework: “Involved parties carry 
the responsibility themselves that such agreements also lead to improvements of the 
position of the prostitute. The government has no involvement in this relationship 
and the agreements that are made therein”’ (2006, p 2). 
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it as providing public health services and sexually transmitted disease 
(STD) checks (interview, member of Rode Draad). In practice, these 
two developments, the emergence of an oligopoly of brothel owners 
and the self-removal of the state from the negotiations around the 
labour rights of sex workers not only gave proprietors more or less a 
free hand to successfully resist any improvement in the legal position of 
sex workers, but also, as we will see, gradually led the government to 
abandon the goal of improving the labour rights and work conditions 
of sex workers. 
What did the practice complex of prostitution regulation look like 
five years after the repeal of the brothel ban? Most of the cities with 
a sizeable prostitution market within their borders had reconfigured 
the earlier routines of regulated tolerance. In terms of infrastructure 
and competences, they had expanded their public order and safety 
departments (Openbare Orde en Veiligheid) to include one or more 
officials who exclusively and routinely dealt with prostitution. The 
public health departments continued their outreach work. In stark 
contrast to Austria, the Dutch police were initially slow to take on 
prostitution as a policy regulatory practice. Their routine was to act 
when a crime was committed; prostitution regulation was largely an 
administrative activity. But in some cities police officers had the task of 
monitoring the licensed brothels assigned to them. Confronted with 
cases of trafficking and the difficulty of investigation and prosecution, 
the police began to organise and coordinate themselves nationally, 
creating a national network for investigating trafficking. In most cities 
a number of these officials and professionals developed considerable 
know-how about the prostitution scene within their municipality, often 
communicating directly with brothel owners. The new regulatory 
practice was supported by several laws and institutions. The repeal of 
the ban on brothels had made the licensing system the centrepiece 
of regulatory activity. Municipal prostitution officials developed 
administrative routines around the timely processing of licensing 
applications. This meant they had to communicate with a range of 
municipal agencies such as the housing and fire departments, the public 
health agency and the police, and file and synthesise information from 
all these different sources. Officials also had to develop a system of 
administrative penalties in case of infractions that was consistent and that 
would hold up when challenged in court. Although each city was free 
to organise its licensing as it saw fit, most followed the model licensing 
system that was developed by the VNG, making the licensing system 
a stable element in the creation of a nationally dispersed regulatory 
practice complex. 
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Practices function as placeholders. Faced with a new legal situation 
regarding the regulation of prostitution, the municipalities gravitated 
towards the familiar: controlling the prostitution sector through a 
combination of authoritative instruments and deliberation with a 
variety of stakeholders. In an administrative climate that was largely 
defensive towards prostitution this led to a concerted effort by 
municipal administrations to contain the sector as much as possible. 
The licensing system proved to be an excellent instrument for this. 
Although well-established brothel owners could initially resist and 
frustrate the imposition of a licensing system, smaller brothels were 
not in this position. Some of the smaller brothels had, often arbitrary, 
conditions imposed on them that effectively put them out of business. 
For example, the female owner of a club in the town of Zwolle was 
suddenly faced with an administrative order to install a large and very 
expensive outside fire escape, although the fire squad had already 
approved the fire escapes inside her building. As she could not afford 
this expense, she went out of business (interview, brothel owner, 
2003). The owner of a brothel in Rotterdam, an ex-sex worker who 
had opened a facility that operated in a sex worker-friendly way, was 
presented with so many petty building rules that she decided to close 
her business (interview, brothel owner, 2003). For these and other 
reasons (inability to deal with the licensing; temporary closure because 
of infractions) the number of brothels declined considerably after 
2000. In 2000 the number of (private) clubs was estimated at 800. In 
November 2014 there were only 247 clubs left – a 70% decline. Also 
the number of windows decreased in this period. In 1999 there were 
2,096 windows, in 2014 1,224 – a 42 % decline.42
It is difficult to gauge what know-how about the prostitution 
scene officials actually attained. The information obtained through 
the licensing applications and the recurrent monitoring of brothels 
42 Since 2014 more windows have been closed in Amsterdam, Alkmaar, Utrecht, 
Groningen and The Hague through the use of the Wet Bibob (see Chapter Four) 
and through direct policy measures aimed at reducing the size of the prostitution 
sector. The number of escort agencies increased, however, between 2006 and 2015 
from 90 to 125 (sources: window owners answering questions in 2009 on Hookers.
nl; data provided by the municipalities themselves; Daalder, 2015; van Wijk et 
al, 2015, p 107). The decline in clubs and windows cannot only be attributed to 
intensified regulation and enforcement on the part of the authorities. Innovation 
in the prostitution sector (the rise of internet prostitution and massage parlours), 
the sexualisation of the club scene, the economic crisis, and urban renewal leading 
to accelerating closure of windows all contributed to the overall decline in the 
number of sex facilities.
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largely concerned building safety, hygiene, the presence of drugs or 
arms, the presence of underage sex workers, the attendance of the 
owner or a manager on the premises during operating hours, and 
public nuisance around the facility. Owners were asked to check the 
legal papers of sex workers working in their facility, but were not held 
liable for not recognising falsified papers. The brothel inspections did 
not concern work conditions and labour relationships. As we will see, 
an industry-wide survey by the Rode Draad a few years later would 
reveal a considerable amount of labour exploitation of sex workers in 
clubs. And Hendrik Wagenaar, in his interviews with brothel owners 
in 2002 and 2003, in addition to a general attitude of accepting the 
licensing system, encountered quite a bit of evidence of corruption, 
illegal activity and hidden exploitation of sex workers, and a widely 
shared resistance against giving up the traditional ‘shady’ business model. 
In addition, officials had little or no information about prostitution 
outside the licensed sector, such as escort, bar and home prostitution. 
But overall, the shared perception at the time among officials and most 
stakeholders was that brothels, while far from being a ‘clean’ business 
sector, were more effectively integrated into a regulatory system than 
ever before. The excesses of the 1970s and 1980s in public nuisance, 
unbridled expansion, drug crimes and the illegal ‘import’ of sex workers 
from all over the world were a thing of the past. 
In terms of meanings, the dominant sentiment in those years seemed 
to be one of pragmatism. In the realm of public administration actors 
were willing to accept the new situation and give it a chance. In line 
with public opinion, officials did not have strong moral sentiments 
about prostitution and accepted it as an inevitable part of the urban 
scene. They accepted the distinction in the repeal decision between 
‘good’ voluntary and ‘bad’, coercive prostitution. As one police officer 
put it at the time: 
“[P]rostitution is of all times. So I’m careful to express 
moral opinions about it. You deal with morality only in 
cases of brute exploitation, or in cases where juveniles are 
involved. Then, I think, citizens, and also clients, should 
have an opinion about that. But it’s not to me to have an 
opinion about paid sex.” (Cited in Wagenaar, 2006, p 219) 
The licensing and monitoring system, in combination with the 
traditional Dutch practice of consulting stakeholders, led to a 
reconfiguration of the perceptions and feelings that actors had about 
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each other. Officials guardedly noticed a willingness to cooperate on 
the part of brothel owners. As a police official commented: 
“Am I pleased with my owners? Yes. It is printed in the 
newspaper. We have stated it straightforwardly: They’re still 
rascals, if they can pull the rug from under you they won’t 
hesitate. They’re only in it for the money, absolutely. And 
they only cooperate because they have no choice. But I 
also have to say that they have a positive attitude. They try 
to cooperate. They try to contribute ideas, and we really 
meet on a continuous basis…. They have very sensible 
ideas.” (Wagenaar, 2006, p 223)
Similarly, brothel owners also grudgingly accepted the new situation 
and the cities’ newly developed regulatory expertise: 
Owner 1: “We have to be honest to ourselves. We are only 
doing this for two years now, which means that you always 
have start-up problems. I don’t think we should say that 
the city administration did everything wrong. I don’t agree 
with that. If we’re objective and honest, then the way that 
the city succeeded in reducing street crime.…”
Owner 2: “… is just right …”
Owner 1: “… has been just right. Period.” (Wagenaar, 
2006, p 222)
It is safe to conclude that five years after the repeal of the brothel ban 
a recognisable, dispersed and relatively stable administrative practice 
had developed aimed at regulating the business of prostitution. Yet, 
as we can infer from the statements of the actors involved, it was 
an exceedingly fragile configuration. It did the job, but some of its 
elements were weak and its linkages unstable. And, as we have already 
seen, sex workers were conspicuously absent from the network of 
relations around regulation. However, change, driven by various factors, 
was to come soon. 
Despite the law’s objectives of improving the position of sex workers, 
in the implementation of the law municipalities continued along the 
path of regulated tolerance by focusing primarily on control of the 
sector. In hindsight, this is hardly surprising. Policy implementation 
is not a wholly rational affair driven solely by expertise and by the 
informed choice of policy instruments relevant to the task at hand. 
Rather, as we saw, policy formulation and design is influenced by such 
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factors as political and organisational culture, the actors’ interpretation 
of the problem situation, the familiarity of organisational routines, the 
availability of certain administrative competences, the continuity of 
actors and constraints on state activity (Linder and Peters, 1989; Shove 
et al, 2012). Policy design is suspended in other words in a shared, 
largely unspoken, performative understanding of the target problem. In 
Chapter Two we argued that one of the major challenges to prostitution 
policy is the pervasive stigma that attaches to prostitution. Regulating 
or decriminalising prostitution does not remove this stigma and the 
resistances to prostitution that attend it. Following Jeffrey, we argued 
that stigma and resistance would most likely lead to an attitude among 
administrators in which prostitution is seen as a ‘problem to be managed’ 
(Jeffrey, 2015, p 2) and a tendency to control and restrict the sex trade. 
We also argued that this would quite likely lead to negative effects on 
the civil rights and labour market position of sex workers. In hindsight 
this was the script according to which prostitution policy unfolded in 
the Netherlands in the 15 years that followed the legalisation of the 
sex trade. By channelling administrative energy into designing and 
implementing ever more detailed schemes of regulating and controlling 
sex facilities and sex workers, Dutch municipalities effectively 
reintroduced a repressive, prohibitionist approach to prostitution. A 
decisive shift in the discourse on prostitution was the most important 
factor that broke the fragile alignment between the elements that 
made up the administrative practice configuration that had regulated 
the sex trade in the Netherlands in the previous three decades. A 
discourse that identified prostitution with trafficking set in motion a 
shift towards a much more repressive approach towards prostitution. 
The new buzzword would be ‘enforcement’ and new administrative 
practices rapidly developed to make effective enforcement possible. 
The result was among other things a further weakening of the social 
position of sex workers. 
The repressive turn 
Even in the best of circumstances prostitution policy is a form of 
morality politics. As we observed in Chapter Two, prostitution suffers 
from a pervasive social stigma. In our society even if we legalise it, 
and approach it with a pragmatic attitude, that does not mean that 
we, emotionally or morally, accept it as a ‘normal’ activity. With many 
people prostitution generates feelings of fear (of corrupting husbands 
and sons, and losing our daughters to it), disgust (with the thought 
of engaging in intimate activities with unappealing men, or clients 
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having their way with helpless women), anger (in being confronted 
with prostitution and its side effects in our streets), anxiety (about its 
unbridled expansion in our cities), and compassion (with the victims of 
brute exploitation and violence at the hands of pimps and traffickers). 
Differently put, prostitution is an inherently unstable element in any 
regulatory practice, but particularly regulatory practices that aim at 
acceptance and normalisation. With many municipalities struggling to 
implement the legalisation of brothels, a number of powerful social and 
political developments occurred that would define the implementation 
path from 2005 onwards and shift it into a much more repressive 
direction. 
From the moment of the passing of the repeal of the prohibition 
on brothels, Dutch local prostitution policy had to cope with strong 
exogenous influences, in particular the entry into the EU of eastern 
European countries, a, partly policy-induced, decline in the number of 
sex clubs, and the rise of the internet as a platform for recruiting clients. 
In addition, in the first decade of the 21st century the political climate 
became more conservative, and the conservative-centrist national 
government as well as local governments of different political stripes 
were less hesitant to impose authoritative measures on the sex trade. 
Probably the most important development for local prostitution 
policy was the admittance to the EU of the countries of former 
eastern Europe. Until 2004 eastern European countries had accession 
status. For sex workers that implied that they could only work in the 
Netherlands as self-employed persons. As self-employment status had 
to be proven in the country of origin before departure and involved a 
laborious bureaucratic procedure. This put a brake on the number of 
women who legally migrated to the Netherlands to work in the sex 
industry. In 2004 most eastern European countries plus the Baltic states, 
except for Romania and Bulgaria, received full EU membership status; 
Romania and Bulgaria followed in 2007. In theory citizens from these 
countries could now work in salaried employment in the Netherlands. 
As economic conditions in these countries had not changed with their 
accession to the EU, and helped by affordable transportation possibilities 
such as budget airlines and bus services, labour migration began to 
increase – and not just in prostitution (Engbersen et al, 2009). The 
Polish construction worker and the Bulgarian agricultural day labourer 
became common figures in the Dutch labour market – and the media. 
In the wake of this increase in migration, exploitation and trafficking 
seemed to be on the rise. We choose our words carefully as reality 
and rhetoric mix in ways that are difficult to disentangle. For example, 
around 2002, outreach workers in the then still operating toleration 
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zones for street prostitution (tippelzones) in the large cities noticed a 
sharp increase in the number of young eastern European women in the 
zones. Most of them were dropped off by vans after the closing hours 
of clubs and picked up again when the toleration zone closed, strongly 
suggesting that third parties controlled them (interviews, outreach 
workers; personal observations, Hendrik Wagenaar). Because of their 
large numbers they drove down prices and displaced the addicted 
Dutch women for whom the zones were designed as a relatively safe 
alternative to the street. Outreach workers felt increasingly uneasy as 
they faced the dilemma that by providing support to the women they 
were abetting their exploitation (interviews, outreach workers). City 
officials also felt uneasy and in 2004 and 2005 Amsterdam, Rotterdam 
and The Hague decided to close down the toleration zones and abolish 
street prostitution within their borders. By 2005 street prostitution had 
more or less disappeared from the Dutch prostitution market. Only the 
cities of Arnhem and Utrecht still have a small toleration zone where 
access is regulated by a pass issued to the sex worker. 
Coinciding with the increase in eastern European migration was the 
struggle with proprietors over the employment status of sex workers and 
the fiscal status of the facilities. Although the tax office concluded time 
and again that on the basis of legally defined ‘facts and circumstances’ 
sex workers had a de facto employment relationship with proprietors, 
the latter were successful in avoiding fully-fledged labour contracts with 
the ensuing mandatory payment of social security benefits. Proprietors 
argued that sex workers were independent contractors to whom they 
rented out rooms. They effectively played regional differences in tax 
policy, went to court numerous times to appeal the decision of the 
tax office and, disingenuously but effectively, referred to the Dutch 
constitution and international human rights treaties to argue that it 
is illegal to issue work instructions to a sex worker because of her 
right to self-determination and physical integrity. The government 
in the meantime, in answer to questions from parliamentarians, took 
the position that sex workers should have to go to court themselves 
to challenge proprietors. However, sex workers were understandably 
reluctant to give up their anonymity (Zuidema et al, 2006, p 12). 
In 2008 the tax office finally decided to break the impasse over the 
festering issue of the labour relationship by the introduction of the 
opting-in arrangement (outlined in Chapter Four). 
The opting-in arrangement made it easy for citizens of EU countries 
to work in prostitution. Until 2012 women from Romania and 
Bulgaria were tolerated by the immigration service to work under 
the opting-in arrangement. At the same time there were signals of 
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the prevalence of exploitation of migrants in the sex industry. The 
Rode Draad published an extensive survey in 2006 that showed that 
different forms and degrees of sexual and economic exploitation were 
widespread in the licensed sector (Altink and Bokelman, 2006; see also 
Chapter Five). At the same time officials in the cities observed a new 
migration pattern. In addition to single women who travelled on their 
own or with the help of relatives or friends to work in the sex industry, 
groups of young women from Hungary, Romania or Bulgaria, often of 
Roma background, moved into the window areas, only to move out 
again after a short period. The fact that many of them did not speak 
English, and that they moved in groups, suggested that third parties 
organised their employment in the sex industry. 
But perhaps even more influential than these trends was an incident 
that had a profound effect on the national discourse on prostitution. 
In 2006 the national police started a large-scale investigation into a 
gang of Turkish traffickers (the Sneep case) who forced women to 
work in the sex industry. The sheer number of women (in the end 
120 women were thought to be under the influence of the Sneep 
gang, of which, based on telephone taps, 78 were considered victims), 
the violence, and the fact that it all happened in the licensed window 
sector, sent shock waves through the world of politicians, police 
and administrators. In the media the brutality of the Sneep gang was 
widely reported and became the face of trafficking; almost overnight 
prostitution had become synonymous with violence and organised 
crime (Goraj, 2012). In the national policy discourse trafficking became 
the dominant theme, and many elected officials openly questioned the 
wisdom of legalising brothels.43 Local politicians in Amsterdam and 
Utrecht stated that “between 50 and 90 per cent of women behind the 
windows were forced”. And the police report that was written about 
the Sneep investigation concluded that: ‘It is an illusion that a clean, 
43 Simultaneously with the Sneep affair, welfare and youth workers in the prostitution 
field were alarmed by the alleged rise in so called ‘loverboys’. These were young 
men, often from ethnic minorities, who seduced (sometimes very) young girls 
to groom them to work as sex workers. A bestselling book by one of the alleged 
victims (Mosterd, 2008) turned the loverboy phenomenon into a national moral 
panic, and many schools and welfare agencies started campaigns to warn young girls 
for the dangers of loverboys. A research study by a leading Dutch criminologist 
(Bovenkerk et al, 2006) concluded that the loverboys were a contemporary version 
of ordinary pimps and that the phenomenon was probably not as widespread as 
suggested. When the Mosterd book turned out to be a hoax, the loverboy panic 
subsided somewhat. But yet again, in the media prostitution was identified with 
crime and exploitation. 
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normal business has emerged. For years in the licensed window sector 
in Amsterdam, Alkmaar and Utrecht, traffickers, pimps and bodyguards 
could do as they pleased’ (KLPD, 2008, p 8). Although, as we will see 
in Chapter Five, trafficking is a fuzzy concept, and prostitution is not 
synonymous with trafficking, the lesson of the case was a real one: the 
monitoring of licensed facilities had not prevented the exploitation 
of sex workers by the Sneep gang. The monitoring had been mostly 
administrative and had focused on the women’s papers, but many of 
the women in the Sneep investigation had legal papers. Signals that 
the women were criminally exploited had been missed entirely. This 
lesson was not wasted on feminist and political opinion makers who 
had become increasingly unhappy with the legalisation efforts in the 
Netherlands, or on local policy makers, who saw an opportunity to 
increase their control over the sector. 
The Sneep case had the effect of rallying the hitherto dispersed 
discontent with the legalisation of the sex trade in the Netherlands. 
Dutch prostitution policy had transformed into a moral crusade. 
Weitzer describes moral crusades as ‘movements [that] define a 
particular condition as an unqualified evil, and see their mission as 
a righteous enterprise whose goals are both symbolic (attempting 
to redraw or bolster normative boundaries and moral standards) 
and instrumental (providing relief to victims, punishing evildoers)’ 
(Weitzer, 2007, p 448). Moral crusaders advance inflated claims about 
the magnitude and urgency of the problem, ignoring and fabricating 
evidence. In the absence of solid data to support their claims, the 
melodramatic case presented as representative of the issue as a whole is 
the rhetorical trope of choice (Weitzer, 2007; Vance, 2011; Wagenaar 
and Altink, 2012). In the Netherlands the main proponents of the 
trafficking crusade were politicians of the Social-Democratic and 
fundamentalist Christian parties and radical feminists. They were 
supported by largely complacent media that overwhelmingly portrayed 
prostitution as identical to trafficking and organised crime and declared 
the legalisation of the sex trade a failed policy (Goraj, 2012). 
On the surface nothing much changed. Licenses were still the 
cornerstone of Dutch prostitution policy. By 2014, 75% of Dutch 
municipalities had developed a policy towards prostitution, the majority 
of those that had not declared that prostitution was not an issue in 
their municipality. The focus of the policy was the licensing of brothels 
(92.8%), enforcement (69.2%) and monitoring (60.8%). Prevention 
(38%) and social services (24.5%) were much less common in municipal 
policy plans (van Wijk et al, 2015, p 50). As these numbers show, in 
addition to ‘licensing’ and ‘monitoring’, ‘enforcement’ had become a 
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key term in municipal regulation. Municipalities began to design so-
called ‘enforcement arrangements’ (handhavingsarrangmenten). The result 
was a rapid and decisive shift in the administrative practice complex 
aimed at the regulation of prostitution. 
The collection of information became one of the key instruments 
in Dutch local prostitution policy. The need for more accurate and 
precise information arose from the shift towards a policy that almost 
exclusively focused on preventing and fighting the exploitation of sex 
workers. Officials are aware that exploitation is a phenomenon that 
takes place in a murky netherworld that is exceedingly hard to track 
down. “Those guys [traffickers] are getting smarter and smarter,” as one 
seasoned police officer said to us. Officials see it as their task to stay as 
close as possible to, or disrupt, the activities of pimps and traffickers. 
As one police officer put it: “Because we collaborate closely, we are 
able to quickly anticipate issues for which no policy has been designed 
yet” (interview, police officer). 
Information gathering takes different forms and is an integral part 
of enforcement or networking. In Utrecht, sex workers who wanted 
to work in the window area of the Zandpad were required to first 
register with the public health service.44 In this way the city hoped to 
get information on the number and identity of the women who work 
there, and obtain early signals of trafficking (interview, administrators). 
An example of enforcement-based information gathering comes from 
The Hague. As an element of the monitoring regime, officers from the 
vice squad regularly visit facilities to talk with sex workers. (The officers 
we interviewed said they visited facilities on a daily basis.) Following 
the lessons of the Sneep case the purpose of the visits is to detect 
indications of “trafficking” (interview, police officer). However, until 
recently, when police officers found indications of gross exploitation 
or maltreatment they had few legal instruments to do anything about 
it. Criminal law stipulated for example that a proprietor had to be 
convicted for trafficking twice in the past five years for the authorities 
to close down his facility. This was seen as an overly limiting condition. 
The city acted to create an administrative instrument that allowed more 
immediate intervention. The Department of Public Order and Safety, 
the police, the district attorney and the city council collaborated to 
create an ‘enforcement arrangement’. The arrangement is organised 
44 The Zandpad was the major licensed window sector in Utrecht. It is a small 
lane along the river Vecht with 35 houseboats that contained about 140 window 
prostitution spaces. The area is now closed as we will explain later.
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according to the principle that “we don’t want to fight prostitution 
but the trafficking” (interview, administrator). 
When the police find signals of ‘trafficking’ the ‘victim’ receives a so-
called ‘negative work notation’. This notation is restricted to the facility 
where she works. The indications need to be sufficiently strong to hold 
up in administrative court if the sex worker or proprietor decides to 
challenge the notation. In case the indicators are deemed insufficiently 
convincing by the police, the officer puts the woman on a ‘watch list’ 
(aandachtsvestiging) to be followed up in future inspections. Indicators are 
among other things physical (bruises), not being able to speak Dutch 
or English albeit in possession of legal papers, not knowing one’s home 
address or how to get there, and being brought and dropped off by a 
third party.45 When there is a suspicion of being exploited the officer 
tries to persuade the sex worker to press charges against the trafficker 
and offers her access to social services. A negative work notation means 
that in practice the sex worker can no longer work in the facility where 
she was interviewed. The proprietor can still rent rooms to her but 
he runs a risk, under the terms of the enforcement arrangement, of 
incurring an administrative measure, such as a warning or a fine. In 
practice it means that the sex worker can no longer work in any of 
the licensed facilities in The Hague as proprietors now regularly ask 
the vice squad to interview any new sex worker who wants to work 
in the facility. Currently there are 80 women on the watch list and 
40 with a negative work notation. According to the police officer we 
interviewed there is little evidence that sex workers with a negative 
work notation end up in the unlicensed prostitution sector.46 Most 
go to other cities. 
A third type of instrument that plays an important role in local 
policymaking are networking tools. One of the characteristics of 
45 The Chamber of Commerce also alerts the police when they suspect that a sex 
worker who registers as self-employed is exploited. Sometimes the border police 
(Koninklijke Marechaussee) alert local police forces when a border control reveals 
that women who are suspected sex workers and their handlers are on the way to 
the city. 
46 The police officer thinks that these sex workers do not move to the unlicensed 
sector because “a trafficker wants to make a quick buck. Where can he do this? In 
window prostitution. Also clients don’t like to go to a shady apartment and run 
the risk of being robbed. Moreover, the woman who opens the door is usually 
someone else than the one from the picture on the internet.” Other cities have 
complained, he says, that they receive sex workers who are not allowed to work 
in The Hague. He thinks they should all follow the enforcement arrangement of 
The Hague, so that “all of the Netherlands becomes unattractive to traffickers” 
(interview, police officer). 
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local prostitution policy in the Netherlands is the large number of 
actors that is involved. In most Dutch cities, the following actors 
are directly involved in delivering prostitution policy: city officials 
of the Department of Public Order and Safety, different branches 
of the police (vice squad), Immigration and Naturalization Services 
(Vreemdelingendienst), the district attorney, the Chamber of Commerce 
(where sex workers need to register as self-employed workers), labour 
inspection, public health (different branches), social work and outreach, 
youth services and the tax office. In addition city officials consult with 
proprietors and representatives of sex workers. Each of these actors 
deals with different aspects of the sex industry, from regulating and 
monitoring licensed facilities to providing health services to sex workers 
to investigating and prosecuting trafficking. In the contemporary 
policy landscape, policy implementation in almost any domain, but 
particularly when it comes to social regulation (Moran, 2002), is 
highly decentred in that it involves a large number of actors with 
greater or lesser amounts of autonomy and mutual dependency. The 
large number of actors involved in the local regulation of prostitution 
shows two things. First, regulating prostitution is, at the operational 
level, a difficult and laborious activity. It is a social phenomenon of 
great interconnectedness and dynamic complexity that cuts through 
the usual ‘silos’ of local public administration. Part of the complexity is 
self-induced. For example, the three cities have separate agencies that 
deal with licensed and unlicensed prostitution. This distinction is an 
inescapable artefact of the licensing system and makes administrative 
sense. However, reality does not always follow administrative rules; sex 
workers without the proper papers or who are suspected to be victims 
of trafficking are also to be found in the licensed sector. Second, Dutch 
city officials are acutely aware that efficacy in such a densely connected 
organisational field requires close collaboration between a wide range 
of actors, each of which possesses specialised information or skills 
(interviews, municipal authorities). Thus they express an acute need 
for innovative, flexible collaboration and coordination arrangements. 
The rationale for coordinating services is obvious: collaboration 
enables agencies to provide integrated, comprehensive services. 
To achieve that, the division of labour that follows the historical 
professionalisation of service delivery needs to be undone when 
services meet real-world problems that do not respect institutionalised 
demarcation lines. However, multi-agency collaboration is exceedingly 
hard to achieve in public administration, and despite a proliferation 
of models and solutions, few administrative systems have succeeded 
in effectively integrating different administrative and professional 
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bodies. (Rein, 1983b; Peters, 2006). Most cities have more or less 
formalised their collaboration and coordination in something they 
call ‘chain management’ (Rosendal et al, 2009). In chain management 
complementary services are linked in a sequential chain, often led by 
a ‘chain manager’, in an attempt to coordinate resources for realising 
service delivery. But again, in practice chain management has hardly 
brought the hoped-for improvements in service coordination. To be 
successful chain management requires continuity of personnel and 
an attitude, shared among all participants in the chain, of ‘further 
professionalization of one’s own discipline and the importance of 
working together in multidisciplinary teams for the benefit of the 
client’ (Huijsman et al, 2009, p 384).
In the realm of interagency collaboration, the repeal of the ban 
on brothels, and the subsequent problems in implementing it, have 
resulted in genuine public innovation. Immediately after the passing 
of the parliamentary decision to repeal, the architect of the licensing 
system in The Hague complained about the problems he had in getting 
the different municipal agencies to work together: “The chain is as 
strong as its weakest link,” he repeatedly admonished the assembled 
agencies (interview with police officer, 2003). In the ensuing years most 
cities have mastered the art of multi-agency collaboration. The city 
of Rotterdam is a good example. It has developed a successful model 
of chain management that in slightly different form has been adopted 
by the other two Dutch cities in our project. The Rotterdam system 
consists of seven actors who regularly meet to manage prostitution at 
the operational level. The agencies are social work, police, the district 
attorney, labour inspection, municipal health services, youth services, 
and the tax office. Each partner in the chain has a mandate to make 
decisions for his or her agency to provide the organisational capacity to 
address the problems that come up and implement decisions.47 ‘Chain 
47 There is an important principle of administrative reform – recursiveness – at work 
here that needs to be brought out. Through recursiveness organisations can overcome 
the limitations of hierarchy and bring the experiential knowledge of frontline 
workers into the rule formulation and decision making of their management. 
Where hierarchy is important for safeguarding democratic accountability, it usually 
results in rigidity in operational procedure and the inward-looking perspective 
that thwarts multi-agency collaboration. Its limitations are acutely felt in situations 
that are characterised by dynamic complexity and require constant adaptation to 
circumstances that change in unpredictable ways. Recursiveness happens when an 
organisation is able to mix hierarchy with heterarchy. ‘When a level of organization 
shifts back and forth between superordinate … and subordinate … you have 
the possibility of a powerful form of recursiveness that possibly overcomes the 
tension between top-down and bottom-up organization’ (Ansell, 2011, p 107). 
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managers’ manage the collaborative arrangement. Their task is to follow 
up on any decisions that the partners have made and address any tensions 
that might arise in the collaboration. In the meeting concrete cases are 
discussed. (The meeting is called ‘case meeting’.) The purpose of the 
case meeting is “to get the victims out and prosecute the traffickers” 
(interview, administrator). Victims of gross exploitation receive care 
and traffickers are either prosecuted, or, barring prosecution, further 
information is collected to make future prosecution possible. The 
meeting allows the partners to exchange information and use their 
collective intelligence and administrative capacity to explore the best 
way to address an issue. For example, when one of the partners has 
encountered a case of gross exploitation the partners discuss the most 
effective response, for example to start a criminal investigation of the 
middlemen or to have the tax office go after their proceeds. Once 
every six weeks the group has a so-called ‘chain management’ meeting 
in which more overarching issues are addressed, such as trends in 
prostitution or changing migration patterns. The members of the group 
have not changed in the past years. This has allowed mutual trust to 
develop among the participants as well as an attitude that each partner, 
to be effective, has to take the interest and contributions of the other 
partners into account. Finally, the group is backed up by a so-called 
‘steering group’, made up of the heads of the participating agencies. 
The steering group decides on the direction that prostitution policy 
should take and safeguards the quality of the coordination in the chain. 
A fourth category of measures used in local prostitution policy in 
the Netherlands is authoritative instruments. An analysis of the design 
of local prostitution policy showed a considerable increase in the use 
of authoritative instruments (van Rooijen, 2012). The two most 
important of these are the ‘administrative measure’ (bestuurlijke maatregel) 
(in combination with the Wet Bibob), and, recently the introduction of 
the local registration of sex workers. Administrative measures belong to 
the province of administrative law. They are measures, with the power 
of law, issued by an administrative or elected body to put an end to an 
In organisational terms this means that organisational spaces are created in which 
subordinate staff members have temporary decision-making power over higher 
levels of the organisation. ‘In most organizations this is likely to happen on the 
behavioural rather than the structural level,’ Ansell adds (2011, p 107). This leads to 
familiarity of top-level managers with the operational world of day-to-day policy 
implementation, and shared ownership of problems. The power of recursiveness in 
organisations is that it allows for ‘a continuous and interlocking cycle of perspectives’ 
(Ansell, 2011, p 104). Recursiveness is considered a prerequisite for collective 
learning in (networks of) organisations. 
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infraction of the law or municipal ruling. In the case of administrative 
measures the district attorney and municipal officials may impose 
punishments without involving courts or judges. These punishments 
can be fines, restraining orders, or the revocation of licenses and 
closure of sex facilities.48 The administrative measure has gained in 
popularity in recent years. For example, in 2008 Rotterdam used seven 
administrative measures in regulating prostitution; in 2010 the number 
had increased threefold to 21 (van Rooijen, 2012, p 55). A common 
procedure in Rotterdam is the following: based on information from 
the information analysts and the police, the police set up an entrapment 
by inviting sex workers who advertise on the internet for an assignment 
in a particular hotel. When the sex worker does not have legal papers 
or cannot prove that she has a license in Rotterdam, she receives an 
administrative warning from the Department of Public Order and 
Safety. If she is caught again, she receives a fine of €5,000. One may 
question how useful this measure is. Many sex workers in the escort 
business work at a remove from the town where they live. Even if they 
have a license in one municipality, this is not valid in another. Warning 
them merely keeps them away from Rotterdam. This is yet another 
case of regulation-induced mobility. 
As this example shows authoritative instruments are used 
most effectively in combination with information instruments. 
Administrative measures, for example, are used in combination with 
the aforementioned Wet Bibob to contain and reduce the size of the 
prostitution sector. The core of the Wet Bibob is the coupling of a 
number of large national databases from the tax office, the Immigration 
and Naturalisation Service and the criminal justice system. Before 
issuing or renewing a license (not just for prostitution facilities but 
also bars, restaurants, coffee shops and call shops), municipalities 
ask the national Bibob office to do a search for any improprieties or 
criminal antecedents of the owner. This can be an unpaid tax bill, prior 
convictions, or irregularities in the ownership of the facility. If such 
irregularities are found, the municipality can issue an administrative 
measure, usually to deny the license. Proprietors have the right to 
appeal the decision. The Wet Bibob has been successfully used in the 
three cities to contain and reduce the size of the prostitution sector. 
Amsterdam has closed dozens of windows through the use of the Act. 
In 2009 municipalities submitted 260 requests for advice with the 
48 www.hetccv.nl/dossiers/boas-in-de openbareruimte/stappen/menu_
nalevingsstrategie/menu_sanctie/bestuursrecht.html
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national Bibob agency, 23 of which concerned prostitution; in 2010 
the numbers were 212 and 19 respectively. 
Registration systems similarly merge elements of authoritative and 
information tools, as in the example of Utrecht. Cities with a sizeable 
prostitution market, such as Amsterdam, The Hague and Groningen, 
have launched so-called intake interviews. Multi-agency enforcement 
teams hold the interviews. On pain of a fine or closure of their 
facility, brothel owners are obliged to register every new sex worker 
for an intake interview with the city. The purpose of these interviews 
is ‘to collect information and give advice’ and to collect signals of 
abuse (interview with administrator, 2003). In The Hague when the 
intake team believes that the sex worker is a victim of trafficking, it 
denies her a work permit. As far as we know there is no possibility of 
appealing this decision. It is unclear what information about the sex 
worker is collected, for how long that information is stored, and who 
has access to it. Given the popularity of registration among politicians 
and administrators as an instrument of control, it is useful to discuss 
its merits on the basis of empirical evidence. 
Part rule, part incentive, part information, registration is a hybrid 
instrument. It functions as a rule by adjuring sex workers and 
proprietors to engage in desired behaviour. It acts as an incentive in 
prescribing behaviour that results in the avoidance of fines or in access 
to state-provided services (Stone, 1997, p 282). Registration is meant 
to act as a disincentive to traffickers. And it provides authorities with 
information about the number, identity and characteristics of sex 
workers who are active in a particular geographic or administrative 
space. However, in the case of both rules and incentives there is never a 
direct correspondence between the measure as designed by authorities 
and as it is received by the target audience (Wagenaar, 1995; Stone, 
1997, p 272). In general, sex workers have little trust in authorities 
(Benoit et al, 2015) and consider registration a threat to their privacy. 
Moreover, the operational logistics of sex worker registration effectively 
preclude its use as an information instrument. The experiences with 
registration in Vienna might help us to obtain a better understanding 
of the way that this policy instrument works in practice. Registration 
has been mandatory in Vienna since 1968. Sex workers can only 
obtain their health-check booklet when they register with the police. 
Since 2011 sex workers have received a leaflet when they register that 
informs them about social services, and contains a referral to LEFÖ, 
an NGO for sex work. LEFÖ also declares that the mobility of sex 
workers interferes with the registration procedure. It takes about a 
week to register when there are no complications. However, when 
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the sex worker has worked abroad for while or when her last STD 
check was more than three months ago, she has to undergo a new 
health check. Until then she cannot be registered and, thus, cannot 
work legally. When rules are perceived to have a negative impact on 
the quotidian, the everyday practices that structure the target group’s 
life, the sex worker will attempt to adapt the rule so that it is either 
rendered ineffective or more convenient to the receiver (Wagenaar, 
1995). Many sex workers, according to LEFÖ, do not bother to 
negotiate this threshold to work and move to another part of Austria 
or work without registration. The police estimate that there were 
3,000 to 4,000 unregistered sex workers working in Austria in 2010.49
Not only does registration interfere with the world of the sex worker, 
the stated goals of registration are also often in conflict with each 
other. On the one hand, cities want to establish a connection with 
what they see as ‘isolated’ sex workers; on the other hand, they impose 
onerous measures on these sex workers. Moreover, cities’ definition 
of the problem – the risk of trafficking – does not correspond with 
the sex worker’s perception of the problems she faces, namely labour 
exploitation by a monopolistic brothel owner. In fact, by involving 
proprietors in intake and registration, sex workers become even more 
dependent on them and the city is in fact abetting this type of everyday 
exploitation. The intended incentive to the sex worker to seek help is 
interpreted instead by the latter as one more obstacle to making a living. 
We have focused on the feasibility and workability of registration in 
this section, not on the well-known objections regarding privacy and 
the disputed logic of singling sex work out as the only occupation that 
requires mandatory registration. Our conclusion is that registration has 
too many conflicting objectives, ignores the agency of the sex worker, 
violates administrative propriety, and results in evasion or ‘playing 
the system’. The experiences of Vienna and recently Utrecht throw 
doubt on the ability of registration to attain its stated goals of knowing 
who works in sex work, inducing sex workers to seek help and thus 
preventing trafficking. 
As the preceding analysis shows, since about 2005 local prostitution 
policy in the Netherlands has focused almost exclusively on the 
fight against trafficking. In practice this means that most policy 
instruments serve a repressive purpose. In the large majority of Dutch 
municipalities prostitution policy consists of a licensing system, a 
policy for the establishment of brothels (in many instances a so-called 
extinction policy in which no new establishment licenses are allowed 
49 As so often in prostitution, this number cannot be verified. 
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when a brothel closes down) and the execution of monitoring and 
enforcement. Prevention, harm reduction, social services and exit 
programmes are usually not part of formal policy plans (van Wijk et al, 
2015, p 109). In the large cities the municipal public health agencies and 
a variety of NGOs provide health and social services. Monitoring and 
enforcement has resulted in considerable public innovation, particularly 
in overcoming the coordination problem. Most municipalities now 
have a formal, so-called enforcement arrangement, and are also part 
of regional chain management configurations. Enforcement focuses on 
the licensed and unlicensed sector. In most cases the police organise 
the inspections. Monitoring of the licensed sector takes place through 
periodic inspections of brothels; enforcement teams hold intake 
interviews and register the passport details of sex workers. Inspections 
of the unlicensed sector take place through entrapment; the police pose 
as a client and invite escort workers who advertise on the internet to 
a hotel where they inspect their papers (van Wijk et al, 2015, p 111). 
Since 2010, municipalities have issued over 300 sanctions and written 
over 200 administrative reports, the majority against and about 
unlicensed home prostitution. 50 A concerted action in May 2013, in 
which 500 internet ads were selected and 73 inspected, resulted in 
the apprehension of two sex workers who were considered victims of 
trafficking (van Wijk et al, 2015, p 112).
In our analysis of the local implementation of the legalisation of the 
commercial exploitation of prostitution in the Netherlands, two things 
stand out. First, Dutch local policy is a classic case of regulatory drift 
and goal displacement. Regulatory drift denotes a gradual change in 
the focus of a policy as the result of a succession of small decisions at 
the implementation level, without any formal decision at higher levels 
of authority (Mitchell and Herring, 2006, p 5). Regulatory drift is 
the subtle shift in instrument choice over time, where each choice in 
50 Administrative reports are part of a number of information and authoritative 
instruments that local administrations can use in maintaining law and public order. 
The administrative report is compiled on the initiative of the district attorney with 
the help of different police and investigatory agencies. These reports describe 
‘signals, bottlenecks and unwanted situations in society’. These situations may 
concern public nuisance as well as organised crime. The objective of the reports 
is to provide advice to local administrations to prevent or terminate the unwanted 
situation. As mentioned earlier, there is no imperative to verify the assertions made 
in these reports. And, as the events in Utrecht described in the following section 
demonstrate, neither is there an obligation to publish their contents (www.hetccv.
nl/instrumenten/bestuurlijke-aanpak/menu-bestuurlijk-instrumentarium/index 
(accessed 9 September 2015).
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itself is legitimated by, what at the time, seemed good reasons. Since 
2000, we have observed a more frequent deployment of authority 
instruments such as punishments, fines and administrative measures. 
Information instruments are put to use in the fight against trafficking 
and the containment of prostitution. We speak of drift, as every 
implementation decision seemed in itself logical or warranted at the 
time, yet, taken together, they have resulted in goal displacement. Goal 
displacement implies the increased emphasis or de facto abandonment 
of policy goals. In the Netherlands we see this in the abandonment 
of the improvement of labour relations in the prostitution sector, the 
backgrounding of social services and harm reduction in municipal 
policy, and the almost exclusive emphasis on fighting and preventing 
trafficking. Fifteen years after the passing of the repeal of the ban on 
brothels, one of its central goals, improving the ‘legal position’ and work 
conditions of sex workers, has been more or less abandoned in favour 
of a focus on fighting and preventing trafficking and the curtailment 
of prostitution in society. 
Second, in a climate of antagonism towards prostitution, repression is 
an essentially open-ended objective. To the official there is always the 
possibility of more and better information that may lead to more and 
better containment of the prostitution business. In this way, repression 
easily results in a loss of perspective in which not only are the original 
goals of the policy abandoned but, more disturbingly, the violation 
of the rights of sex workers – supposedly the ‘victim’ that needs to 
be protected – also becomes accepted collateral of the policy at hand. 
The following example illustrates this point.51
In 2010 the city of Utrecht was the first city in the Netherlands to 
announce the introduction of a registration system for sex workers 
who chose to work in the Zandpad window area in the city. The 
measure is part of the so-called ‘barrier model’ in the prevention of 
and fight against trafficking. Another such barrier is that sex workers 
can only rent rooms for a minimum period of four weeks. According 
to city officials, this is to prevent the rapid turnover that characterises 
trafficking. In addition the number of hours a sex worker can work 
has been limited to 12, the number of inspections has increased (from 
four to 40 per year), there are more CCTV cameras, and support 
services have longer opening hours. The rationale behind the measures 
is that erecting administrative barriers to working in the prostitution 
51 In addition to reports and other publications, the following description of the 
Utrecht case has benefited from information provided to Hendrik Wagenaar by 
Marjan Wijers. Any errors or misinterpretations are the author’s only. 
115
sector, and the greater administrative scrutiny and visibility of the sex 
workers this entails, will act as a disincentive to traffickers. All sex 
workers who wanted to work at the Zandpad area had a mandatory 
intake interview before they were registered. The purpose of the 
interview was to detect ‘signals’ of trafficking, to provide the sex 
workers with information about support, and to disrupt the sex 
worker’s isolation, if only temporarily. Proprietors could only rent out 
rooms to registered sex workers. With the registration measure the 
city looked ahead to the new national prostitution law that intended 
to make national registration the cornerstone of Dutch prostitution 
policy (Bestuursinformatie Gemeente Utrecht, 2012, p 6).
The measures were evaluated by a commercial research agency. 
According to the official evaluation, the turnover of sex workers at 
the Zandpad decreased. In one in eight intake interviews, officials 
concluded that there were signals of trafficking and informed the 
police.52 In these cases, the sex worker was registered and obtained 
a work license, although the police doubted that trafficking would 
be prevented as a result of the interviews. Many women who hardly 
spoke Dutch, English or German nevertheless arranged for registration 
within a week (Bestuursinformatie Gemeente Utrecht, 2012, p 7). 
The police believed that the ‘quality of the signals’ had improved 
(Bestuursinformatie Gemeente Utrecht, 2012, p 8). The city concluded 
that collaboration between partners had also improved. Sex workers 
were unhappy with the four-week minimum rental period as it forced 
them to continue working when they are ill or had their period 
(Bestuursinformatie Gemeente Utrecht, 2012, p 7). The evaluation 
does not speak of the ‘contamination’ of the registration files; as far as we 
know, sex workers who moved to another city were not systematically 
deregistered and removed from the registration files. 
Given the alleged success of the registration system, the next move 
in Utrecht’s prostitution policy came as a surprise. In June 2013, city 
officials suddenly announced that all the windows at the Zandpad 
would be closed within a month. More than 100 sex workers lost 
their workplace. According to a so-called ‘administrative report’ drawn 
52 Interestingly, and not noticed by anyone involved in or commenting on the 
Utrecht case, 12.5% is much less than the alarmist numbers that are put out by 
the abolitionists in the Dutch prostitution debate. In fact, despite the circumstance 
that the ‘signals’ were vague and expansive and officials had an incentive to find 
cases of trafficking to prove the efficacy of the intake and registration system, the 
number is much closer to the number in our sample of 10% of sex workers who 
reported having been in an exploitative situation in their career as sex workers (see 
Chapter Five). 
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up by the city, unspecified abuses had been found in the window 
brothels on the Zandpad. The report has never been made public, and 
assertions that are put forward in administrative reports do not require 
independent verification. Subsequent inquiries with the police revealed 
that the ‘abuses’ included excessively high rental rates, a waiting list 
that could be ‘jumped’ for a fee, and unwanted behaviour towards 
sex workers by employees of the brothel owner; labour exploitation 
within brothels in other words. The police concluded that there were 
no instances of trafficking at the Zandpad as far as they could assert. 
Subsequent research has shown that many of the sex workers from the 
Zandpad ended up in non-licensed prostitution venues. Independent 
research concluded that the city’s measures to fight trafficking had 
negatively affected the position of sex workers (Siegel, 2015).53
The example shows that repression is indeed a hungry beast that 
continuously needs to be fed, a situation we explore further in Chapter 
Four. Around 2015 most municipalities were part of an integrated 
enforcement arrangement. These arrangements have been shaped by 
an ever more strident national discourse on trafficking, and have in turn 
influenced the proposal for a national Wet Regulering Prostitution (Wrp; 
Law for the Regulation of Prostitution). The Wrp has been defeated 
twice in the Dutch Upper Chamber (because of conflicts with national 
and EU privacy regulation and the lack of clarity about the enforcement 
of the proposed criminalisation of the clients of non-registered 
sex workers), but a revised version was passed in the Dutch Lower 
Chamber on 21 June 2016. It is currently scheduled for discussion 
in the Upper Chamber. In anticipation of the new law the VNG 
has formulated a model APV, or General Local Ordinance regarding 
prostitution. This model APV implies a quantum jump in repression, 
in many cases resulting in the de facto abolition of prostitution at the 
municipal level. Many towns and cities are closing window brothels; 
53 In the tellingly titled Closing Brothels or Closing Eyes, Siegel concludes that since the 
closure many women ‘are in worse condition: financially, mentally and physically’. 
Siegel found that sex workers did not understand why the windows had been 
closed. The lack of trust in municipal authorities has increased, as well as the mutual 
distrust among sex workers. The municipality lacks any knowledge about mobility, 
new work sites and the situation of sex workers since the closure. She concludes 
that: ‘Hundreds of sex workers, who were not affected by trafficking problems, 
have been the victim of the city of Utrecht’s ill thought-out and rash decision to 
close the Zandpad’ (www.ciroc.nl/uploads/ciroc/2015_ciroc_pdf/Zandpad%20
presentatie%203%20juni%202015.pdf; see also Siegel, 2015, p 148). 
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in Amsterdam this has become entwined with a general urban renewal 
and gentrification policy aimed at stimulating the tourist industry. The 
cities of Amsterdam, The Hague and Groningen have introduced de 
facto registration systems disguised as mandatory intake interviews, tests 
that assess the sex worker’s independence (Amsterdam) or a ‘positive 
work recommendation’ (The Hague). Groningen has announced to 
persecute the clients of illegal sex workers. And with the exception 
of Amsterdam and Rotterdam all cities have declared working from 
home illegal. The model APV and the ensuing step-up in repressive 
measures by Dutch municipalities are examples of the complex dialectic 
of local and national policy. Before we discuss this new twist in Dutch 
prostitution policy, we first need to discuss Austrian local policy and 
policymaking at the national level in both countries. 
Local policymaking in Vienna
The social and policy environment in Vienna before the reform law of 
2010 
In the Austrian political system the Bundesländer (provinces) have – 
contrary to the Netherlands – a strong position. Austria is a federal 
state and not a unitary one like the Netherlands. In the Federal 
Constitutional Law, competences and tasks are distributed between the 
federal state and the Bundesländer. Although the general competence 
for legislation and law implementation lies with the Länder, in fact only 
a few matters of legislation are within in their remit; regional security 
and prostitution are among them. Differently put, the provinces’ 
most important task is the implementation of national laws. Each 
Bundesland has an elected body, the parliament, with a six-year period 
of office. Vienna is one of the nine Austrian Bundesländer and has been 
governed for decades by the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ). Since 
2010 a coalition of Social Democrats and the Greens has ruled Vienna, 
which has brought some changes in the political culture. In the realm 
of prostitution the Länder have considerable autonomy, albeit national 
legislation like the criminal law, public health related and fiscal laws 
shape regional prostitution policy too (see Chapter Four). 
Both Austria and the Netherlands have a national tradition of respect 
for the rule of law and cherish an independent expert bureaucracy. 
The two hang together. Recruitment for a position in one of the 
state’s bureaucracies is based on the Weberian principles of expertise 
and merit. Changes of government after elections do not lead to 
wholesale changes in the composition of the bureaucracy. The result 
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is a bureaucratic ethos in which values of justice, fairness, transparency 
and equal treatment before the law are deeply ingrained. The difference 
between the Dutch and Austrian public administration is in the 
former’s propensity for innovation. While the Dutch bureaucracy is the 
originator of much public innovation, the Austrian one is more inclined 
to stay within its given task of applying legal rules and politically 
formulated aims. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages 
when it comes to prostitution policy. In the preceding section of this 
chapter we have seen how Dutch local officials’ constant ambition 
to innovate has resulted in a regulatory drift towards an increasingly 
repressive policy. However, as we will see, the more conservative 
Austrian administrative tradition is no guarantee of fair treatment and 
respect for the rights of peripheral groups. 
As in many European countries prostitution is more or less accepted 
as part of the social landscape in Austria. This does not mean that sex 
workers have the same rights or enjoy the same extent of citizenship 
as other citizens. The pervasive stigma that rests on prostitution makes 
itself felt in the way that prostitution laws are formulated (as we will 
see in Chapter Four), but above all in the design and implementation 
of administrative measures that aim to regulate the sex trade. Similar 
to the Netherlands, we will see that much of this regulation is not 
very effective. We will speculate about the reasons for this at the 
end of this chapter. But more worrisome is the observation that 
much regulation has been designed and is implemented without the 
necessary regard for the human and civil rights of sex workers. The 
goal of containing and controlling prostitution pervades every aspect 
of the political-legal-administrative system in Austria. This makes 
Austria a fascinating example of a larger pattern: even countries where 
prostitution is legalised and that uphold the rule of law and values of 
fairness, equality and justice in the relation between citizens and the 
state, show little compunction in suspending these values when it comes 
to the treatment of sex workers. This infringement of rights seems to 
be accepted by the responsible politicians in charge as an inevitable 
by-product of regulation that is designed to control prostitution; this 
despite politicians’ official rhetoric of protecting the position and 
circumstances of a vulnerable group. For reasons of comparability we 
focus on local policymaking in Vienna in this section. 
The regulation of prostitution in Vienna before 2011
Initially prostitution in Vienna was regulated within the Viennese 
Police Act; in 1984 a Prostitution Act followed and was amended 
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twice until the new Viennese Prostitution Act 2011 (WPG 2011) was 
enacted. In addition, several regulatory injunctions accompanied the 
implementation. With regard to the goals and design of prostitution 
policy the city administration has been consistent over this period. In 
the past four decades three tendencies have prevailed in the regulation 
of prostitution in Vienna: a continuous restriction of street prostitution 
through the extension of prohibition areas, the authorisation/approval 
of brothels, and the extension of police power. The policy instruments 
that the city has marshalled for the regulation of the sex trade are 
predominantly authoritative instruments (Amesberger, 2014, p 215 
onwards). 
Before the first Viennese Police Regulation for Prostitution (1974), 
several district authorities had already restricted street prostitution to 
specified areas or prohibited it altogether in their districts. Soliciting in 
prohibited areas was met by large fines. These authoritative measures 
were triggered by an alleged increase of outdoor sex workers due to 
the partial decriminalisation of prostitution with the amendment of the 
federal Criminal Code.54 The measures were aimed at repressing visible 
prostitution. The arguments provided for the necessity of restrictions 
are familiar: to promote cleanliness, to prohibit the harassment of 
residents, and to minimise (international) reputation damage for the 
city and the loss of earnings for businesses in street prostitution areas. 
As street prostitution bans were, and still are, driven by real estate 
interests and attempts at gentrification, it is not surprising that outdoor 
prostitution was gradually moved from the affluent first district to the 
poorer neighbourhoods along the Gürtel and the area around the 
Westbahnhof and, finally, to the industrial zones of Vienna.55 With 
the first Viennese Prostitution Act (1984) prohibition zone regulations 
were introduced; a 1991 amendment to the law restricted the outdoor 
54 Because of a lack of data it has never been clear whether such an increase was 
actually established or only feared. Moreover, the counting of outdoor sex workers 
in the designated areas from June to October 2010 by SOPHIE-mobil, a counselling 
and outreach organisation, resulted in a total number of between 100 and 120 
(SOPHIE-mobil, 2011, p 16 onwards). This is not a large number in a city of 
1.8 million inhabitants. We acknowledge, of course, that for the residents of the 
designated prostitution areas the presence of a couple of dozen outdoor sex workers 
and their prospective clients in their neighbourhood may present considerable 
nuisance.
55 The Gürtel underwent a multimillion-euro renewal at the end of the 1990s – co-
funded by the EU – which led to the displacement of outdoor sex workers. With 
regard to the area around the Westbahnhof the expulsion of street prostitution is not 
clearly connected with gentrification. Continuing protest by residents, supported 
by the media, is likely to have had a stronger influence.
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areas for soliciting clients even further.56 The gradual extension of areas 
prohibiting street prostitution resulted in confusing standards, which 
even for the police were opaque and difficult to enforce. For outdoor 
sex workers these regulations resulted in a large number of fines and 
high levels of indebtedness (source: interviews with sex workers and 
NGOs). As we describe in Chapter Four, instruments like zoning 
regulations and fining have not resulted in less nuisance or fewer 
conflicts with residents. 
Similar to the Netherlands, from the late 1970s onwards Vienna 
experimented with the semi-formal legalisation of brothels. With 
the new police regulation for prostitution in 1974 the authorisation 
of brothels became a possibility.57 The conditions for approval were 
rather minimal compared with today’s. A facility was approved when 
the general regulations concerning gastronomy, zoning regulations 
and a few safety standards were observed. Some of these standards 
were established for the protection of neighbours. The legislator was 
concerned about ‘unacceptable optical and acoustical harassments’ 
(WPG 1991) and also determined for the first time that sex facilities 
be equipped with sanitary arrangements. Rules for the protection of 
neighbours and juveniles were specified in building regulations and 
police decrees. Fines and the possibility of shutting down sex facilities 
were powerful authoritative implementation instruments. The law 
did not contain any requirements as to the suitability or reliability of 
sex facility owners and managers. That is, any adult citizen could run 
a sex facility.
Similar to the Netherlands, home-based sex work is forbidden in 
Austria. With the prohibition of apartment prostitution in 1984, the 
Viennese government simultaneously reduced the autonomy of sex 
workers and strengthened the position of facility owners. In both 
countries the prohibition of home prostitution follows from a desire 
by the authorities to control prostitution and sex workers. 
The police have always had a decisive role in Vienna in controlling 
prostitution, prostitution establishments and sex workers. In 1868 the 
gynaecologist Wilhelm Schlesinger, with considerable prescience, 
wrote in his booklet Prostitution in Wien und Paris (Prostitution in 
56 For example it was prohibited to solicit clients within a distance of 150m of 
churches, hospitals, elderly homes, schools and kindergardens. In other words, 
the opening of a school or kindergarden automatically rendered a former legal 
soliciting zone illegal. In theory, this restriction also applied to brothels, but it was 
never enforced.
57 The first brothel was approved in the first Viennese district in 1974.
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Vienna and Paris): ‘For the hundredth time in the last one hundred 
years, one wants to “regulate prostitution” in Vienna anew! The 
doctors want to do so, the municipal council shall do it, the police 
will do it!’ (Schlesinger, 1868, p 1; translation by the authors).58 This 
quote illustrates the position of the police as a central, and in many 
instances, determining actor in the implementation of prostitution 
policy in Vienna. One would assume that with the legalisation of 
prostitution the controlling power of the police would be diminished, 
but as the subsequent legislation shows, the partial decriminalisation 
seem to come at the price of extending the controlling and fining 
power of the police. In fact, this near monopoly of the police on 
policy implementation is so strong that we have called it agency capture; 
no matter what measures are proposed and enacted into law, in the 
end it is predominantly the police that appropriate, or are charged 
with, their implementation. As the police, like every government 
organisation can only operate according to standard operating routines 
and a set organisational culture, this means that prostitution policy, at its 
operational level, is framed by the organisational practices of the police. 
Already in 1968, an obligatory registration for sex workers with the 
police had been introduced. This was not abandoned later on, but the 
obligations on sex workers were extended: with the second amendment 
of the local prostitution law (1991) it became compulsory to announce 
interruptions in sex work (because of holidays, sickness and so on) or 
the termination of sex work. Although most registered sex workers 
did not observe this rule (source: interviews), the legislator stubbornly 
stuck to it until 2011. We will see more examples of agency capture 
later in this chapter. 
Police and politicians have high expectations about the effectiveness of 
the instrument of registration.59 Similar to the Netherlands, authorities 
58 ‘Zum hundertsten Male seit hundert Jahren will man nun wieder einmal in 
Wien “die Prostitution regeln!” Das Doktoren-Kollegium will sie regeln, der 
Gemeinderath soll sie regeln, die Polizei wird sie regeln!’
59 Registration regimes vary. Vienna is the only province where sex workers have 
to register with police; in some Länder they have to register with the municipality 
or district authority and in others, such as Oberösterreich, an indirect form of 
registration takes place – here brothel managers have to deliver all personal data 
of sex workers working in their establishment to the district authority and the tax 
office. Not announcing sex workers with the authority may result in fines of up to 
€5,000 (in cases of recurrence up to €10,000) for the facility owner. The fine for 
sex workers for non-registration in Vienna is up to €800 (in cases of recurrence 
up to €1,600). The fact that registration is mandatory and that non-registration 
carries heavy fines does not mean, however, that all sex workers register. The police 
estimate that only half of all sex workers in Austria have registered. It is assumed 
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perceive the merits of this instrument to lie in establishing contact 
with sex workers, in protecting them from crimes, in prohibiting 
human trafficking and in effecting a more efficient resolution of 
criminal offences. There is no empirical evidence that the instrument 
of registration has ever met these expectations. For example, in a 
meeting of the working group on prostitution (see Chapter Four) 
members of the police stated that among the identified victims of 
human trafficking in sexual exploitations the majority had registered 
with the police and only a few were detected when registering (for 
example, because of false papers). This means that in the majority of 
cases the exploitation happens after the sex worker has registered herself. 
As in the Netherlands, registration raises the matter of the protection 
of sensitive personal data and privacy. As it is only possible to become 
registered with medical proof of being free of STDs, an exchange 
of data between the public health office and the police is necessary. 
Furthermore, by request of the police, the outpatient clinic regularly 
exchanges information for the purpose of matching records with police 
data. Due to a lack of legal foundation this practice was dismissed 
for a brief period of time, but it gained legal footing with the WPG 
2011. Such cooperation between police and municipal health offices 
is an example of the use of collaborative instruments for authoritative 
purposes. General regulations relating to data protection dictate that 
records about prostitution be deleted after six months (before 1991, 
it was five years). 
Without effective enforcements, or at least the threat of enforcement, 
compliance with the law can be expected to be low. Inspections and 
fines are such enforcement instruments. Statistics about imposed 
penalties provide insight into the extent to which policy instruments 
are used (for example, controlling prohibition areas) and whether 
they result in the desired outcomes. The statistics show that these 
authoritative instruments are widely employed. The Viennese police 
routinely monitor sex facilities and outdoor areas, but also conduct 
raids and joint operations with financial and social insurance authorities 
and the magistrate. By way of illustration, in 2010, 19 joint operations 
took place, resulting in 273 inspections of sex establishments, 900 
police reports concerning managers and sex workers and 15 immediate 
closures of facilities (Presse- und Informationsdienst der Stadt Wien, 
that the number of Austrian citizens among non-registered sex workers is much 
higher than among registered ones as many of them work in their own homes 
(which, as we have seen, is illegal).
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2011).60 The figures about fines issued to individual sex workers after 
an ‘administrative’ complaint – primarily due to the police observing 
an infraction of the rules during an inspection of a sex facility or 
a soliciting zone – are a further indicator of the predominance of 
authoritative instruments in implementing laws. The number of fines 
imposed on sex workers in Vienna is remarkably large.61 In 2011, each 
registered sex worker was fined on average three times. Taking into 
account the estimated numbers of non-registered sex workers, the 
figures still add up to two administrative complaints per sex worker. No 
other Austrian province/Land has such high numbers of administrative 
complaints, neither in total nor per sex worker. Forty percent of all 
complaints concerned violations of regulations regarding street-based 
prostitution. That prohibition of outdoor sex work and fines do not 
deter sex workers indicates that there is a need for workplaces outside 
of brothels. However, the remaining 60% of charges concern illicit 
prostitution (for example, no registration or no valid health check). 
Law development in the area of prostitution – all state and federal 
laws are written by civil servants and/or the executive on behalf 
of politicians – has always been within the remit of a small, closed 
policy community of politicians and legal-technical experts. External 
experts from the field of health and social work became involved 
for the first time only when the WPG 1984 was amended in 1991. 
Women’s organisations had no influence over this process. This way of 
using the knowledge of domain-specific experts for advising on legal 
amendments continued in the years following the amendment with 
the inclusion of other professions and policy fields. For instance, once a 
sociologist was consulted, NGOs advocating for full decriminalisation 
and the improvement of working conditions, as well as the Department 
of Women’s Affairs and the Viennese equality body, were admitted by 
the authorities to the law development process. Although their actual 
influence on the content of the laws remains unclear, the inclusion 
of non-governmental actors/stakeholders in processes of opinion 
formation and decision making indicate a rethinking of politicians and 
administrators of the governance of prostitution in Vienna. However, 
despite this tentative opening to external experts, sex workers and sex 
60 The complaints did not only concern violations of prostitution related laws but 
also breaches of the commercial code and other laws.
61 In 2008, 7,609 administrative fines were imposed; in 2009, 10,819; in 2010, 7,609; 
in 2011, 10,592; in 2012, 8,694; and in 2013, 7,388 (source: Viennese police 
department).
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facility managers remained excluded from processes of law formulation 
and implementation design. 
Information policies targeting the wider public in Vienna have 
largely focused on awareness raising about human trafficking and sexual 
exploitation in the city’s sex trade. Information leaflets and a radio 
broadcast were aimed at sensitising clients to the existence of trafficking 
and a peer education programme (conducted by LEFÖ) sought to 
inform sex workers. Only in the course of the implementation of the 
WPG 2011 were sex workers and facility managers more extensively 
informed about the upcoming legal changes. Since the end of the 
1990s the city of Vienna has financed NGOs offering counselling and 
outreach work for sex workers. By outsourcing these tasks to NGOs 
the city acknowledges the necessity of support for sex workers and 
that politics, administration and the police have limited expertise in 
the field. The importance of such organisational policy instruments 
has been stressed once again in the new Prostitution Act, although in 
a somewhat conditional way, as it is stated that ‘given the availability 
of sufficient financial means’ counselling will be offered (WPG 2011, 
§ 5 (2)). 
Although new approaches have been tentatively applied in the course 
of law formulation and policy implementation of the WPG 2011, the 
deployment of predominantly authoritative instruments, such as the 
restriction of outdoor prostitution, the licensing of sex clubs, and the 
extension of police power, has continued. In the following section we 
will describe the challenges of a new approach to governing prostitution 
in Vienna, the policy instruments that have been employed and the 
outcomes of the various policy initiatives. 
New approaches, a new law and disappointing outcomes
In the first decade of this century, prostitution has been the subject of 
intense attention in Vienna. It was the heated political climate around 
street prostitution, and pressure from residents and their political 
representatives and the media, that led, first, to a so-called seven-point 
plan, and subsequently to a new municipal Act.62 Executive City 
62 In 2011 the three major Austrian newspapers carried more than 80 reports 
about street prostitution in Vienna. Residents of prostitution areas were in close 
contact with the media. The dailies and weeklies, as well as Viennese televison 
programmes, frequently reported on street prostitution, with an exclusive focus 
on the nuisance for residents. The media were very critical about politicians at the 
provincial and district level and their proposals for solution (especially the seven-
point programme and, later, the new law). The citizens’ initiatives gained a lot of 
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Councillor for Women’s Issues Sandra Frauenberger proposed the so-
called ‘seven-point plan’ in May 2010. It proposed support for residents 
of street prostitution areas and sex workers (through the establishment 
of a hotline for reporting nuisance and other problems), the relocation 
of street prostitution to two less populated streets, more police control 
of street prostitution, the intention to adjust the Viennese Prostitution 
Act, more outreach work by NGOs, and a financial contribution to 
the Dutch-Austrian research project on which this book is based. 
The genesis of the seven-point plan, and its evolution into a new 
Viennese prostitution law, forms an apt illustration of the dynamics 
of policy design and implementation in this area. First, we notice the 
continuous pressure from media, political spokesmen and the public. 
The intense media attention more or less forced elected officials into a 
particular framing of the problem of prostitution in the city. Despite the 
fact that Vienna had about 500 sex facilities at this time, the focus of the 
debate, and of subsequent policy initiatives, is disproportionally on the 
100 to 120 outdoor sex workers who work the streets of Vienna. There 
is little discursive space to consider alternative problem definitions or 
to listen to other voices, such as those of the NGOs that try to bring 
the rights of sex workers to the attention of policy makers. 
Second, some of the city’s authorities feel that they have few 
effective means to control prostitution. In a moment of candour, 
Ms Frauenberger, the Executive City Councillor responsible for 
prostitution, stated that she did not know what was realistically possible 
in terms of steering prostitution. She added that she wanted to attempt 
to mobilise “community-political instead of legalistic means” to 
achieve structural change (source: interview). Ms Frauenberger feels 
that prostitution in Vienna is largely driven by exogenous forces that 
are difficult, if not impossible, to control. With the city’s proximity 
to eastern Europe, the most potent extraneous force is immigration. 
The councillor’s statement also shows an awareness of different 
governance arrangements, as well as, given the policy-resistant nature 
of the prostitution field, a willingness to experiment with these. 
coverage by the media. The media reports were fuelled by district politicians of 
various political parties who exerted pressure on the Executive City Councillor for 
Women’s Issues. They introduced motions and resolutions at the city parliament 
and submitted parliamentary questions, such as that by the Greens regarding the 
seven-point programme. The right-wing Freedom Party issued a resolution from 
all  of its district councillors in September 2010 proposing the introduction of 
client punishment. The SPÖ (Social Democrats) of the 15th district issued a Bill 
concerning the relocation of street prostitution in February 2011. Politicians at 
the district level also exerted pressure through a large number of press releases.
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Governance modes are more or less consistent ‘packages’ of policy 
foci, understandings of state–society relationship, broad governance 
aims and preferred policy instruments (Considine, 2005; Howlett, 
2011, p  9). For example, ‘legal governance’ focuses on legality or 
the promotion of law and order and frames the relationship of the 
state to society in terms of legislation and administration, and its 
preferred instrument are laws, regulations and taxes. Ms Frauenberger 
expresses awareness of the limitations of regulation in a field such as 
prostitution that is characterised by dynamic complexity, and feels a 
need to open up the traditional monopoly of politicians and legal-
technical experts in designing policy measures. The alternative that she 
suggests has elements of another governance arrangement, ‘network 
governance’. Network governance focuses on relationships with the 
aim of promoting inter-actor problem solving, which sees the state as 
collaborating with society, and the institution of task forces, clientele 
agencies (such as NGOs) and stakeholder conferences. In terms of 
instrument theory the councillor introduced organisational instruments 
of a collaborative nature into the policy process. For example, in the 
implementation of the seven-point plan the city collaborates with a 
number of municipal departments (Promotion and Co-ordination of 
Women’s Issues and the Department for Elections and Specific Legal 
Affairs, officials from the STD-outpatient clinic and representatives 
of the city boroughs in which street prostitution takes place. In a 
subsequent phase of the project a formal steering group was formed 
to implement the new prostitution law. 
One of the driving forces behind the tentative introduction 
of networking instruments was the realisation among politicians 
and administrators that the organisations involved in regulating 
prostitution in Vienna were working without coordination, resulting 
in the duplication of efforts and organisations, often unknowingly, 
confounding each other’s activities (interviews, administrators). For 
this reason, Ms Frauenberger ordered the municipal Law Department 
to involve the relevant stakeholders in the formulation of the new 
Prostitution act. As the head of the Law Department emphasised, 
prostitution is a topic that straddles many administrative sectors and 
therefore requires the know-how of a wide range of actors. A period 
of intense consultation began. In two so-called structured dialogue 
forums, political representatives, administrators of various agencies, 
NGOs, residents, proprietors and sex workers were consulted. 
Additionally, the councillor invited over 20 sex workers to obtain 
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first-hand information about working conditions and their concerns.63 
Participants had mixed feelings about the consultation forums. 
Although they appreciated them as potentially valuable innovations in 
the traditionally antagonistic Austrian political climate, they also felt the 
participants did not come closer to each other or change their positions. 
The ‘dialogue’ amounted to a repetition of familiar positions. Some 
participants attributed this to the high escalation level of the issue of 
street prostitution, but it is likely that the dialogue was not adequately 
designed.64 For example, residents who did not object to prostitution in 
their neighbourhood were not represented at the forums.65 Moreover, 
soon after the consultation rounds the final formulation of the Act 
entered the political arena and was finally agreed with great difficulty 
in intensive and unyielding (beinharte) negotiations between the two 
coalition partners (interview, politicians and administrators). 
A third lesson, as will become clear, is that policy design is not a 
one-off process, but instead extends in time as an Act or rule slowly 
winds its way through the policy cycle, the administrative bureaucracies 
and the professional organisations. At each step the same pressures that 
shape problem definition also influence later design and implementation 
stages. One of the goals of the new legislation was to move street 
prostitution out of residential areas, but to continue to enable it in 
non-residential areas and in designated toleration zones (which can be 
in residential areas). In addition the goal was to make the regulations 
more transparent, in particular the rule that states that no prostitution 
is to take place within 150 meters of schools and churches, which had 
in the past led to a large number of fines for sex workers. However, 
63 Ms Frauenberger, who participated in the consultations with sex workers, declared 
later that she was struck by the fact that they were strong, self-sufficient women, 
who did not give the impression of being dependent or victims, and who strongly 
defended their right to work on the street. Not surprisingly, the outdoor sex 
workers especially argued for a repeal of the prohibition areas in Vienna.
64 The literature on public policy mediation and collaboration provides guidelines 
for the design of productive dialogue in contentious, adversarial policy situations. 
In general successful dialogue requires careful and patient acknowledgement of 
each party’s history, identity and position, something that, in a climate of deep 
and prolonged conflict, can usually only be accomplished with the help of an 
experienced mediator (Forester, 2009; Innes and Booher, 2010). We discuss the 
possibilities for successful collaborative governance in prostitution policy in Chapter 
Six.
65 Although the meetings were announced as ‘dialogue forum’, officials of the city 
administration state that they were not designed as such, but more as meetings in 
which angry residents could vent their feelings. They acknowledge that they fell 
short in calming the situation and encouraging people to listen to each other.
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good intentions do not automatically translate into good outcomes. 
Prostitution policy, as we saw in Chapter Two, is always vulnerable to 
moral pressure. The road to the implementation of the new Viennese 
prostitution legislation vindicates this point. Despite the involvement 
of many stakeholders in the design of the new Viennese Prostitution 
Act, including a limited consultation of sex workers, and a genuine 
desire among officials to try a more networked mode of governance, 
the situation of street workers deteriorated considerably. 
The publication of the seven-point plan did not decrease the pressure 
on the policy makers. Political parties, residents, media and NGOs all 
clamoured for a new prostitution law, albeit for different reasons. The 
Executive City Councillor then decided to set the formulation for the 
Prostitution Act (WPG), as already announced in the seven-point plan, 
in motion. The Act was to contain the prohibition of street prostitution 
in residential areas, the designation of a toleration zone for street 
prostitution, a licensing procedure for brothels, and fines for clients who 
solicit sex workers outside of the designated areas. From the very start 
the WPG was developed in a climate characterised by contentiousness 
and political manoeuvring. As evidenced by the high number of press 
releases and the many statements in the Viennese parliament, the 
political opposition in Vienna used the issue for political competition 
(interviews with politicians; media coverage; parliamentary debates). 
Also the WPG took shape within a clear law and order framework 
that maintained the dominant position of the police with regard to 
problem definition and agenda setting.66 Although the police did not 
write the first draft of the law, they had a strong influence on the new 
prostitution law. The police continually informed politicians about the 
shortcomings of the old law, particularly emphasising the insufficient 
means and instruments at their disposal to effectively deal with illicit 
prostitution. The police were involved in the development of the WPG 
in as far as they were invited to give their opinion on several measures 
and to comment on the final version. 
The goals of the new Act were to improve the work and life situation 
of sex workers in Vienna, to regulate street prostitution and to fight 
trafficking. The major instruments were a licensing system for sex 
facilities, the prohibition of street prostitution in residential areas, the 
66 The delegation by the city of law implementation and enforcement to the police 
dates back to the 19th century. This tradition was upheld in the 20th century with 
the regulation of prostitution within the Police Act. This long-lasting tradition 
meant that it was more or less self-evident that the police once again would have 
a strong role in the development and implementation of the new prostitution law.
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prosecution of clients who solicit outside designated areas, a lowering 
and if possible an amnesty of the fines that sex workers had accrued,67 
and an extension of police powers.
To expedite the implementation of the new Act a steering group 
was created in which political representatives, administrative agencies, 
police officials, NGOs and officials of the affected city boroughs 
participated. The idea was to keep all parties informed, coordinate 
policymaking, and create broad support for the new Act among the 
stakeholders. However, the participants were frustrated in their hopes. 
Very soon the group focused almost exclusively on the selection of 
the designated zones for street prostitution in the boroughs, as agreed 
in the difficult negotiations between the two coalition partners. This 
effort has failed so far. The steering group has no decision-making 
power and the boroughs have vetoed every proposal for a designated 
street-walking zone.68 
The city of Vienna has introduced further implementation measures: 
the Viennese government strengthened the role of NGOs LEFÖ and 
SOPHIE. Both received three-year contracts. LEFÖ was awarded 
funding for counselling newcomers in sex work and accompanying 
them (with their agreement) to the police for registration. According 
to LEFÖ, these services are welcomed and accepted by many sex 
workers (interview with LEFÖ official, 2012). SOPHIE received 
financial resources for outreach work and the operation of a hotline (for 
residents and sex workers). The city of Vienna also published online 
city maps designating the areas where sex workers are permitted to 
solicit clients outdoors.
At the time of writing this book, the implementation of the new 
Viennese Prostitution Act has fallen well short of its stated goals (the 
relocation of outdoor prostitution from residential areas, a transfer 
to indoor prostitution, the licensing of brothels and a reduction in 
human trafficking). While outdoor prostitution has been moved out 
67 Police officers had fined street workers who solicited outside the permitted areas. 
Many workers had outstanding fines amounting to thousands of euros. As they did 
not possess the means to pay the fines, they were in effect forced to work to clear 
them. The idea was to break through this vicious cycle. It turned out, however, 
that a general amnesty was legally impossible. 
68 The process was considerably more complex than described here. The designation 
of tolerance zones is statutorily only done by the regional police, the Landespolizei. 
After some political pressure the police formally put in a request with the borough 
administration for the designation of a tolerance zone within a residential area, 
which was subsequently rejected. The borough chairman explained that he feared 
that toleration zones would only attract more sex workers to the area. 
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of residential areas, and brothels in Vienna are required to apply for 
a license, only limited transfer from outdoor to indoor prostitution 
has taken place as far as we can see. NGOs and the police estimate 
that about half of street-based sex workers have moved to indoor 
prostitution. Both observe an increase in illicit apartment prostitution. 
The police assume that the remaining sex workers have left the city and 
that most of these have been replaced by newcomers.69 The policies 
also resulted in a number of negative unintended consequences such as 
the lack of infrastructure for outdoor sex workers, overcrowding and 
brawls among sex workers, pollution of parking lots, and the provision 
of sexual activities in public spaces. Meanwhile only a few sex workers 
solicit clients outdoors in two remote streets on the outskirts of the 
city, but as the continual high number of fines for transgressing zone 
regulations show, illicit outdoor prostitution has not vanished since. 
The Viennese experience underscores our claim that studying and 
understanding the dynamic of policy implementation is crucial in 
understanding the effects of prostitution policy. While the public 
debate almost exclusively focused on broad design templates that 
embody clear moral principles, the real story unfolds in the myriad 
interactions between administrators and professionals on the one 
hand and sex workers, proprietors, clients and NGOs on the other. 
The development of prostitution policy in Vienna demonstrates the 
complexity and interconnectedness of the prostitution domain, the 
enduring role of the police in shaping policy implementation, the gap 
between policy design and the lives of sex workers, and the continuing 
influence of problem framing and media pressure on each phase of the 
implementation process. For example, the licensing of 500 sex facilities 
in Vienna, as an instrument to improve the working conditions of sex 
workers, made hardly any progress in the year after the Prostitution 
Act was passed and has resulted meanwhile in a stark reduction of legal 
facilities. The Act stipulated that new facilities required a ‘license’,70 
while existing facilities had one year’s grace to apply for one. Despite 
an information campaign by the police, proprietors have been reluctant 
69 Source: interviews; contribution by Wolfgang Langer (Viennese Police Department) 
at the expert conference Exchange of Experiences on Regulatory Measures in the 
Area of Sex Work, Vienna, 10-11 June 2013.
70 We put ‘license’ in quotation marks as it is not a license in the strict sense of 
Austrian law. Proprietors must register the brothel and are permitted to operate 
if they fulfil the necessary requirements. In the strict sense of the word a license 
would make it necessary for neighbours and nearby residents to be heard by the 
administration. This is not part of the procedure in Vienna.
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to apply for ‘licenses’.71 Their argument for not doing so is that the 
costs of abiding by the new regulations for safety and hygiene as 
well as for structural alterations to their establishment are too high, 
especially for small establishments, but insiders believe that this was a 
tactical manoeuvre by the proprietors. Possibly the need for proof of 
the proprietors’ reliability (and for proof of on-site management) was 
another obstacle in applying for a ‘license’. The city was patient with 
reluctant proprietors, and did not immediately close down brothels 
that had not been ‘licensed’. 
We also observe that licensing authorities have created their own 
obstacles to obtaining approvals. Although guidelines have been 
formulated for equipping sex facilities in a safe and hygienic manner, 
they leave much scope for interpretation (regarding, for example, which 
kind of alarm system is necessary). Proprietors and civil engineers 
complained about functionaries’ arbitrariness and contradictory 
demands caused by a lack of specificity. The proceedings would often 
take so long that the licensing procedure would become unaffordable 
for small businesses.72 Three years after the enforcement of the WPG 
2011, about 300 sex facilities had received authorisation. This is a 
reduction of about 200 facilities. So far it is not possible to give a clear 
picture of the effects of the reduction in the number of facilities, but 
in general the pattern in Vienna after the introduction of the licensing 
system follows that in the Netherlands. The majority of the ‘licensed’ 
sex facilities is still small; about 80% have a maximum of five rooms. 
Thus, the number of legal workplaces has diminished dramatically 
whereas the number of registered sex workers has increased (from 
about 2,700 in 2011 to 3,600 in 2014). This imbalance of developments 
is to the advantage of sex facility managers. Fewer legal workplaces 
and more sex workers on the market mean that the managers have 
more negotiating power. It became easier for them to dictate working 
conditions (for example with regard to type of sexual services provided, 
and working hours and provisions). Insiders also witness a rise in illegal 
apartment prostitution related to the loss of legal workplaces (indoors 
and outdoors) (source: interviews). Also there is little evidence that the 
71 In September 2012, that is two months before the end of the transitional period, 
70 proprietors had applied for a ‘license’, eight facilities had been granted one, 
and one application had been turned down.
72 Contribution by Evelyne Tomes (head of the professional association of civil 
engineers for Vienna, Niederösterreich and Burgenland) at the expert conference 
Exchange of Experiences on Regulatory Measures in the Area of Sex Work, 
Vienna, 10-11 June 2013).
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city created an effective monitoring apparatus, of the kind discussed 
in the section on Dutch local policy. 
On the face of it, the prohibition of prostitution in residential 
areas can be called a success. Following an information campaign by 
NGOs and increased police presence in the affected areas, sex workers 
disappeared from the areas in a matter of days. At first this did not result 
in a decrease of the number of street workers. A few months after the 
Act became effective NGOs counted the same number of women who 
were by then concentrated in the two designated areas, the Prater and 
the Auhof, although half of the women were new. However, under 
pressure from residents and businesses near the Prater, and swayed by 
the argument that children and tourists should not be exposed to the 
sight of women soliciting, the city introduced two new regulations 
that constrained both the area and the times that street prostitution was 
allowed. Up until then about 20 women had been working in the area, 
but by 2012 more than 100 sex workers were fighting for a place. The 
result was that prices decreased drastically (to as low as €5 for oral sex, 
according to outreach workers) and physical fights among sex workers, 
often along ethnic lines, were quite common. Some businesses in the 
Prater organised an informal ‘security service’ that expelled women 
from parking lots and prevented outreach workers from doing their 
job. The police refused to act against this form of vigilance. Despite 
the repeated assertions of politicians to create an infrastructure for 
outdoor sex workers, there were no sanitary facilities in the Prater 
and the Auhof and no sites where sexual services could be carried 
out. Sex in cars is forbidden and there were only a few hotels in the 
vicinity of the Prater. Additionally, according to outreach personnel, 
sex workers who returned from a hotel within a residential area to the 
designated zone risked being fined for violating the rules, although the 
police deny this. As a result, the public parking garage in the Prater 
had, according to an outreach worker, been turned in a big open-air 
brothel. The stated goal of improving the work situation of sex workers 
has not been reached in the case of street prostitution since. 
Three years after the enforcement of the law the situation for street-
based prostitution had again changed dramatically. After imposing 
a number of incremental limits on street prostitution, the Prater, a 
traditional soliciting area (it has fulfilled this function for about 200 
years), has been declared a prohibition zone.73 For reasons of safety, 
the suitability of the Auhof as a site for outdoor prostitution has always 
73 The closure was expedited by concerns about the international reputation of the 
University of Economics and Business, which moved to the area in 2013.
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been disputed. It is a remote non-residential area without infrastructure 
(the nearby hotel denies access to sex workers) that is poorly lit and 
without public transport (source: interviews; media; observation). 
It was finally closed because the proprietors of the businesses in 
the area denied access to sex workers. Neither the sex workers nor 
the outreach workers of various NGOs were informed about this. 
Politicians at district level and in the city council also claimed to have 
been caught off guard by the shutdown. Following media reports, this 
was proven to be implausible as at least half of this area belongs to the 
city (Thalhammer, 2014). Thus, outdoor sex workers were expelled 
once more without due process. This incident illustrates how a lack 
of coordination and sloppy implementation violates the human rights 
of a vulnerable, stigmatised group. At the time of writing this chapter 
(February 2016), the area for street-based prostitution has been reduced 
to two small streets in outskirt industrial areas. Altogether about 20 to 
40 sex workers (depending on the season) solicit clients there. Despite 
this small number of sex workers and despite the fact that these streets 
are not located in or near residential areas, residents and some politicians 
continue to confront district authorities with protests and petitions. 
Authorities of the 23rd district have conceded to residents’ protests and 
have restricted the time for soliciting clients outdoors to night hours.74 
Especially harsh is the resistance in the 21st district, where about 15 
sex workers solicit clients. A member of the right-wing Freedom Party 
collected signatures to prohibit outdoor prostitution in the district on 
the grounds that it is responsible for drugs activity and car accidents, 
although the police do not see any evidence to back up these allegations 
(Amara, 2014 and other media/TV reports).75 Sex workers suffer from 
harassment by vigilante residents (taking pictures, verbal and physical 
attacks). Furthermore, the police report fights among the ‘protectors’ 
of sex workers and instances of sex workers paying protection money. 
The example of Viennese street-based prostitution demonstrates 
the negative effects that giving in to morality politics has on the 
policy process. Lacking any evidence, residents and politicians create 
74 See: Verordnung der Landespolizeidirektion Wien, GZ:P3/63593/10/2013, 
released 20 June 2013.
75 Voices that advocate for legalising outdoor prostitution and against further 
restrictions are rare, but among them are a few individual residents and residents’ 
groups like the Stuwer Committee in the second district, which launched a 
campaign called Lieber Rotlicht statt Blaulicht (Better Red Lights Than Blue Lights; 
see www.stuwer.info). The NGO LEFÖ protested in an open letter to the district 
and city politicians against the introduction of time restrictions for street-based 
prostitution. 
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the impression that the residents are endangered by outdoor sex 
work. Sex workers and prostitution are defined as a problem, not the 
policies towards prostitution. The police, who have traditionally been 
tasked with implementing prostitution law in Vienna, reinforce this 
perception. Police operating routines designate certain manifestations 
of prostitution as both ‘problematic’ and ‘feasible for intervention’. 
The result is that street prostitution, although a small part in 
Vienna’s prostitution market, has become the focal point of policy 
implementation, while the regulation of the much larger club scene 
proceeds slowly. 
Another lesson learned is that expelling street prostitution from 
residential areas will not pacify residents. It is the visibility of outdoor 
prostitution, itself largely an effect of excessive media attention, 
that disturbs and becomes a source of conflict. In an overheated, 
moralistic public climate, repression is an open-ended process. But 
the developments with regard to street prostitution are also a lesson 
about the resistance of sex workers who try to circumvent regulations 
perceived as disadvantageous to their work practices. Although sex 
workers vacated the main soliciting areas within residential districts 
within a few days after the WPG 2011 came into effect, it would be 
a mistake to conclude that the ‘problem’ was solved. On the basis 
of statistics on issued fines, just a few weeks after the prohibition of 
outdoor sex work in residential areas, some sex workers had returned. 
According to the Viennese Police Department, 3,536 complaints 
were filed in 2012 and 3,627 in 2013 (email correspondence with 
Wolfgang Langer, 22 August 2013 and 24 January 2014). From the 
point of view of Ms Frauenberger, the new Prostitution Act is (still) a 
success as the number of sex workers in the legalised soliciting areas has 
decreased and a number of outdoor sex workers moved indoors (source: 
interview; media reports). However, the goal of improving working 
conditions for outdoor sex workers has been set back considerably; 
the new regulations have been detrimental to the autonomy, safety, 
income and human rights of outdoor sex workers. Viennese police 
officers are satisfied with the new law, not least because they now have 
an additional instrument to investigate ‘secret prostitution’ and to shut 
down sex facilities with the help of undercover agents (interviews, 
police). Furthermore, they are allowed to enter apartments without 
the consent of the tenant or proprietor when illegal prostitution is 
suspected. Considering that illegal prostitution is not a criminal but 
an administrative offence, one might question the appropriateness of 
such an instrument. In the name of prohibiting illegal prostitution the 
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human right to privacy is sacrificed while the effectiveness of such 
measures remains low at best.76
Conclusion: policy implementation, morality politics and 
the corrosive effects of discourse 
What are the wider lessons for the possibilities and limits of regulating 
prostitution from our analysis of its implementation in the major cities 
of Austria and the Netherlands? In the introduction to this chapter we 
questioned the abiding notion of a stable and hierarchical relationship 
between politics and administration. On the other hand, we did 
not want to abandon core democratic principles of responsibility 
and accountability, both of which require that we do not narrow 
our analysis of policy implementation to a chaotic struggle between 
actors and instead uphold some basic notion of policy goals and 
policy accomplishments (Lane, 1987). We also want to go beyond 
the rather facile conclusion that policy implementation is political, or 
more precisely, that it is the continuation of politics at a lower scalar 
level. Although that observation obviously rings true, our aim in our 
analysis of the implementation of prostitution policy in this chapter 
is to take into account three major empirical findings: first, that the 
legalisation of brothels in the Netherlands and the new Prostitution 
Act in Vienna had clearly formulated goals that embodied progressive 
values concerning the regulation of prostitution and the position of 
sex workers in society; second, that the implementation of prostitution 
policy in both countries was entrusted to a cadre of experienced officials 
who operated within the rule of law and a long-standing administrative 
ethos of fair and responsible public administration; and third, that 
nevertheless in both countries, mostly through the instruments and 
techniques of policy implementation, progressive policy goals quickly 
transformed into a repressive form of regulation. The remarkable 
thing about this turn towards repression is that it occurred under the 
political radar as it were, largely beyond the influence of elected bodies 
such as city councils or national parliaments. We have observed two 
mechanisms: regulatory drift in the Netherlands, the accretion of 
dozens of dispersed administrative measures that add up to a reversion 
of the original more progressive goals of the repeal of the ban on 
76 According to a newspaper report, the Viennese police closed 14 illegal brothels 
up to February 2014 (Amara, 2014). In this article the head of the responsible 
police department stresses that the employment of an undercover agent was only 
the final step in long-lasting and expensive investigations. 
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brothels; and agency capture in Vienna, the narrowing and overturning 
of a balanced comprehensive policy by the operating routines and 
organisational culture of one organisation, the police, that was thrust 
into this position as the result of a century-long tradition. However, 
while these mechanisms describe the pathways towards the repressive 
turn, they do not explain it. That is, they do not explain how such 
a proclivity towards repression was accepted and why it has gone 
unchecked in two different countries with such different political-
administrative cultures. The answer is: discourse. 
Our first observation is that discourse matters as much in the 
implementation as the formation phase of public policy. In the next 
chapter we will see that national discourse plays a major role in the 
formulation of (national) prostitution policy. Not surprisingly the sway 
that discourse has over policymaking is not suddenly switched off 
when policies move into the implementation phase. As we have seen, 
discourse hypostatises conflict. Deep conflicts in society acuminate 
in discourse. But reversely, public discourse, through its contentious 
nature, has the effect of imposing on the policy process a recurrent 
dynamic of domination and resistance, of hegemony and subjugation, 
in this way, as it were, orienting the policy process away from its 
technical-instrumental aims and towards the realm of morality politics. 
How does discourse infuse every element of the policy process with 
irresolvable conflict? 
Every law has both an explicit and implicit meaning, but discourse 
provides the master narrative that gives moral significance to the social 
project that a law embodies (Stone, 1997, pp 138-47). Discourse 
provides the cognitive, moral and emotional link between policy values 
and intentions as expressed in the legal texts that enter a nation’s law 
books, the myriad activities of administrators and professionals that 
translate these intentions into workable regulations, and the effect these 
regulations have on society. Discourse also provides the backdrop to 
the sense of policy accomplishment by which we hold our politicians, 
administrators and professionals to account. And more concretely, 
discourse directs attention and shapes the assessment of outcomes 
and their presumed relation to policymaking. Both in Vienna and 
the Netherlands, administrators work in a relentless media climate 
in which prostitution is consistently associated with organised crime 
and trafficking. Administrators fear the media as much as they use 
them. When we discussed the final draft of the report of our study, 
for example, the three Dutch cities asked for postponement of its 
publication to prepare the mayor for possible questions from the media. 
In Vienna, hostile media almost compelled city administrators to submit 
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to an emboldened police and initially narrow the implementation 
of the ‘seven-point plan’ down to only one point: to remove street 
prostitution from the city centre. At the same time city officials in 
the Netherlands gave interviews to national media about the alleged 
prevalence of forced prostitution in their municipality, and made sure 
that raids on brothel areas in search of victims of trafficking were widely 
broadcast on local television. 
What these examples suggest is that, although the media exert 
enormous influence over the policy process, the relationship between 
policy implementation and discourse is more complex than that. 
Politicians are not just ‘dupes’ of media discourse, being swept up in 
discursive forces beyond their control. They also use the media to ‘plant’ 
their message in the public’s consciousness. By giving interviews and 
citing convenient figures, they carefully create a particular image of 
prostitution. The circumstance that it is a national politician doing this 
gives the message currency and authority. Activists repeat and embellish 
this message over and over again, until it has become a particular, 
taken-for-granted way of talking about and understanding the world 
whose political antecedents are effaced (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, 
pp 1, 37). In fact, elected officials, activists and journalist often work 
in tandem to actively promote a particular image of a social issue. Such 
moral entrepreneurship crowds out other ways of talking and thinking. 
By robbing these alternatives of credibility and authority, they come to 
be considered as marginal and suspect. In Chapter Two, in the section 
on morality politics, we described some of the tactics that resulted in 
this absolutist quality of certain problem framings: massaging the facts, 
imbuing statements with strong emotions and denouncing opponents 
are a few of them. 
Administrators work under a double injunction: the one that 
issues from the law and its objectives (no matter how ambiguous and 
conflicted these may be) and a national discourse that results in some 
understandings and interpretations of prostitution being taken for 
granted and becoming self-evident. The significance of this is that 
in the policymaking process administrators form the link between 
knowing and acting. A preference for certain policy instruments, 
or the way these are administered, are shaped by administrators’ 
understandings and interpretations of prostitution. A shared master 
narrative about prostitution mediates these interpretations. Discourse’s 
soft power explains how even administrators’ deployment of their 
discretionary capacity, the kind of off-the-cuff improvisation that 
is necessary to make policies work on the ground, is shaped by the 
master narrative – in our case a dominant narrative of prostitution as 
The local governance of prostitution
138
Designing prostitution policy
organised crime and trafficking. Before long, elected officials, pundits, 
the media and administrators formed what Foucault calls a ‘discursive 
formation’: an interconnected set of statements, knowledge, facts, 
procedures, routines, organisations, metaphors and ways of speaking 
that taken together define prostitution, or better, that prescribe what 
is sayable and doable in this policy domain, and what falls outside 
the spectrum of acceptable statements and actions (Rose and Miller, 
1992). At this point facts and data have lost a reasonable hold on policy 
makers. Instead policy makers mobilise their own facts to support a 
preconceived discursive position. For example, we set out to count the 
number of sex workers. And, while we acknowledged the difficulties 
that accrue to this task and described our methods in great detail (see 
Chapter Two), administrators from the three Dutch cities never really 
accepted our careful estimates that suggested that the sex trade was 
much smaller than was generally assumed. This applies even more to 
repeated ‘disappointing’ outcomes of inquiries into trafficking or raids 
on prostitution districts that fail to identify the predicted large number 
of victims.77 Low numbers do not fit the discourse of trafficking as 
a major social problem; thus realistic numbers are either ignored or 
‘neutralised’ with rhetorical statements that we are only witnessing ‘the 
tip of the iceberg’ or that the ‘dark number’ surely is much larger. In 
cases such as this discourse has firmly established a particular reality 
regarding prostitution, a reality that is sustained and held in place by 
the very actions that constitute it. 
The significance of this observation for an analysis of the policy 
process is that it upsets the balance of trust that, as a complement to 
the related notions of responsibility and accountability, governs the 
implementation process (Lane, 1987). Citizens, and the target audience 
in particular, are quite willing to accept that policy implementation 
requires interaction, negotiation and administrative discretion, but they 
also expect that politicians, administrators and professionals who are 
involved in implementation can be trusted to respect the moral thrust 
of the original intention, however ambiguous it may be, act within 
reason, respect the facts on the ground, and be impartial, respectful and 
sincere in their interactions with stakeholders. To actively promote a 
particular set of values in creating a discourse turns the official into an 
77 The low ‘yield’ of raids on prostitution districts for the purpose of catching 
traffickers and saving exploited sex workers is a recurrent but unacknowledged 
phenomenon. See, for example, www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/oct/20/
government-trafficking-enquiry-fails. 
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advocate, who is willing to narrow the law’s original intent to certain 
factional interests. 
Our second and related observation is the pernicious influence of 
morality politics on policy implementation. This statement contains a 
considerable inner complexity that we do not want to walk away from. 
As we noticed in Chapter Two, morality politics is not a characteristic 
of particular policies, although some policies, such as those relating 
to the ‘body’ and ‘sin’, seem forever mired in irresolvable moral 
conflict. Each and every policy can, under particular circumstances, 
become a pawn in a moral controversy. The bitter discussions about 
budgetary austerity or genetically modified food are examples where 
such knowledge- and technology-heavy domains as economic or food 
policy have moved into the realm of morality politics. What these 
examples demonstrate is that policy implementation is not a phase of 
a general ‘policy process’. One cannot discuss policy implementation 
in a particular domain without taking into account the substantive 
values that are at stake in the moral debate. This is the key message of 
Deborah Stone’s theory of public policy: public policy is not so much a 
process but a protracted struggle over the interpretation and realisation 
of important societal values (Stone, 1997). In addition, it is important 
to trace who dominates this struggle, in other words, who holds the 
balance of institutional and discursive power. In the case of prostitution 
policy this is, as we have seen, an alliance of politicians, administrators, 
the media, fundamentalist Christian groups, Social Democrats, activist 
feminists and academics. This is the discourse coalition (Hajer, 1993) 
that has promoted the abolitionist values that are linked to rhetorical 
arguments of the ubiquity of trafficking, organised crime and coercion 
in prostitution. 
The Dutch case shows the damaging influence that such a value 
position has on policy implementation. We have seen how policy 
implementation in Dutch cities have gradually become more repressive 
and how even seemingly neutral instruments such as networking that 
were initially used to enhance communication with target groups, have 
been used to inhibit and repress prostitution. We call this phenomenon 
regulatory drift. Regulatory drift denotes a gradual change in the focus 
and goals of a policy as the result of a succession of small decisions 
at the implementation level, without any formal decision at higher 
levels of authority (Mitchell and Herring, 2006, p 5). The selection 
and deployment of policy instruments is a key element of regulatory 
drift. Since 2000, we have observed in Dutch cities a more frequent 
deployment of authority instruments such as punishments, fines and 
administrative measures. Today, 15 years after the passing of the repeal 
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of the ban on brothels of 2000, one of its central goals – improving 
the ‘legal position’ and work conditions of sex workers – has been 
abandoned in favour of an almost exclusive focus on ‘enforcement’, 
fighting and preventing trafficking, and discouraging prostitution 
altogether. The significance of regulatory drift is that it may, and in 
our case did, result in a de facto new policy, that is antithetical to the 
original policy goals, without any parliamentary process. 
In Vienna on the other hand, then and now, the trafficking discourse 
has had the effect of allowing the police to move into a key position in 
the implementation of prostitution policy. We called this agency capture 
of the implementation process, not in the sense that the police actively 
lobby to obtain the authorisation to implement prostitution policy 
(although they did that too), but in the more covert sense of a complex 
of political, cultural and ideational forces that foreground the police 
as the logical actor for such a task (which explains why their lobbying 
was successful). The effect of the police as the organisation of choice 
is profound. The problem perception, practices and organisational 
culture of the police strongly shape the implementation process. As 
a result, policy implementation has focused on ‘easy’ targets (street 
workers, mostly ethnic minorities) and has been more circumspect 
with ‘difficult’ targets (licensing for sex facilities). What makes the 
latter target more difficult is that proprietors have more rights than 
street-based sex workers. The shutdown of a facility by authorities has 
to be justified according to legal provisions and the principle of legal 
certainty safeguards entrepreneurs (not just sex facility proprietors) 
from overnight changes. Although we do not have proof of direct 
political intervention by facility owners, it is likely that the high-end 
enterprises did exert such pressure.78 Furthermore, sex facilities are a 
more difficult target as appropriate guidelines relating to equipment 
and safety provisions had to be developed for a variety of sex facilities 
(notwithstanding different requirements for small and large facilities). 
The application of these guidelines has revealed their deficiencies; 
while they leave considerable discretion to the authorities, they increase 
the dependency of proprietors on the goodwill of civil servants. The 
reduction in the number of legal workplaces means that it is easier 
for managers to set working conditions unilaterally. The result of 
78 According to some interviewees, the police are less restrictive when it comes 
to the authorisation of such facilities. While these are rumours, they bear some 
probability. When it came to an amendment to taxation requirements on brothel 
operators and sex workers, the managers of sex facility chains intervened at the 
Ministry of Finance (interview, proprietor). 
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this process of implementation capture by the police is that over 
and over again the progressive policy goals of Viennese prostitution 
policy initiatives take a back seat to more repressive and regressive 
implementation practices. 
These observations about the implementation of prostitution policy 
in light of implicit notions of accountability and trust that govern 
this phase of the policy process have three further implications. The 
first is that repression is a hungry beast, as we concluded earlier. Our 
analysis shows that there is no end to the quest for ever more perfect 
means of detecting and repressing ‘trafficking’. The ‘fantasmatic logic’ 
of repression ushers in an irrepressible, escalating fantasy of ever more 
intrusive measures to incapacitate a powerful and devious opponent and 
effectively control the policy domain at hand. For example, despite its 
rhetoric of improving the situation of sex workers, the WPG 2011 in 
Vienna gives the police the authority to close a sex facility immediately 
without a court hearing (although such a decision has to be provided 
within one month after shutting down the brothel), to enter private 
apartments when prostitution is suspected and to use undercover agents 
to fight illicit prostitution and trafficking. In the Netherlands the moral 
panic that ‘forced prostitution’ was taking place in licensed brothels 
logically led to enforcement arrangements and the mobilisation of 
public innovation, a range of authoritative measures, and a tendency to 
seek out the limits of what is legally permissible. As forced prostitution 
by its nature was portrayed as hidden, clever detection aimed at 
outwitting the trafficker had the task of exposing this hidden crime, 
hence the introduction of intake interviews and ‘signals of trafficking’, 
for example. But what is a valid signal? If a sex worker does not speak 
Dutch, is dropped off at her work site by someone in an expensive car 
and does not know her home address, the chances are high that she 
is being exploited. But do we capture all cases this way? Do we really 
get at the dark number? Hence, the reliance on more exotic signs 
such as ‘takes a lapdog to work’ (to alleviate the isolation of the forced 
sex worker), ‘advertises on the internet’ (to increase business for the 
pimp), ‘sex worker seems sad’ (to indicate her despondency about her 
situation), and ‘recruits clients through recommendations from other 
clients’ (an indication of an underground circuit of predatory clients). 
We do not want to sound facetious here, because the implications are 
far from amusing. Once the sex worker has the status of ‘victim of 
trafficking’ ascribed to her by means of one or more of the indicators, 
she is denied a work permit and has to leave the city. As we saw, there 
is no possibility of appeal to this ‘verdict’. The municipality offers the 
opportunity to enter a victim programme, but only if the sex worker is 
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willing to testify against her traffickers. Few sex workers have sufficient 
trust in the authorities, or the effectiveness of such programmes, to 
take them up on this offer. We could retell this story with regard to 
entrapment schemes, the closure of windows, or the sudden revocation 
of immigration, work or fiscal rules. In all these cases, sex workers, 
who are engaged in a legal vocation, may have their rights revoked 
through an administrative measure without any possibility of appeal. 
And this is the second implication. The examples in this chapter 
show how the violation of the human and civil rights of sex workers 
are the casual outcomes of ordinary but ideology-driven administrative 
behaviour in a political-administrative system that abides in all other 
respects by the rule of law. However, a form of groupthink makes 
the violation of the human and civil rights of a group of citizens not 
only thinkable but also acceptable as the inescapable cost of fighting 
trafficking and discouraging prostitution. ‘Trafficking’ becomes a 
symbolic rallying point, an abstract but powerful signifier, in relation 
to which the fate of concrete individuals becomes insignificant. 
The third implication is that we need to ask ourselves what the 
repressive turn means for our assessment of the implementation of 
prostitution regulation in the context of its legalisation. In his overview 
of models of policy implementation, Lane makes the following 
important observation:
In whatever way implementation takes place, it is always 
valid to inquire into the extent to which objectives have 
been accomplished and the degree to which outcomes 
have occurred that work against the objectives. This is the 
basis for judging the accountability of implementors and 
the responsibility of politicians and officials. (1987, p 542)
In light of the accountability–trust nexus that implicitly governs the 
process of policy implementation, it is safe to conclude that Dutch and 
Viennese officials have drifted far away from the initially progressive 
objectives of their respective prostitution laws. Even when in the 
Netherlands a new national prostitution law was defeated twice in 
parliament, and a series of arguments had emerged that questioned the 
current approach and its assumptions, a coalition of local officials and 
national politicians worked behind the scenes to safeguard the main 
elements of the repressive approach. The logic of repression exerted 
an inexorable force on officials and politicians in both countries. 
Increasingly they closed themselves off from actors who had different 
ideas. Research reports that offered data and analyses that questioned 
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the reigning narrative of trafficking and victimhood were consistently 
ignored (Wagenaar et al, 2013; Siegel, 2015). Repression has become 
a self-propelling tunnel vision. However, one can argue that with the 
WPG 2011 in Vienna and the new 2016 national prostitution law in 
the Netherlands, the accountability dimension of the implementation 
process has formally at least been restored. It is to the story of national 
policymaking that we turn in the next chapter. 
The local governance of prostitution

145
FOUR 
The national governance of 
prostitution: political rationality and 
the politics of discourse
Introduction: policy subsystems and policy streams
In the policy literature, policy formulation, the emergence of 
policy agendas and the introduction of legislation are associated less 
with a particular identifiable phase of the policy process than with 
policy institutions and policy networks. Groups of organisations 
and individuals organise around a specific social issue to discuss 
solutions, ideas and political strategy. The formal arrangements of 
government – cabinets (working with ministries), legislatures – then 
make, or block, decisions. Policy networks are made up of members 
from government and civil society. They can, for example, include 
members of parliament, high-ranking civil servants and experts from 
municipal agencies on the one hand, and lobbyists, academic experts, 
NGOs and members of the target group on the other. What unites 
these groups is an interest in the issue at hand, expertise, resources and 
trust. Some actors in the groups harbour resources, such as money, 
information, influence, decision-making power or legitimacy, that the 
other actors need. When such groups are in operation long enough, 
its members develop mutual trust, sometimes even friendships, despite 
the fact that they might disagree with each other’s position on the 
issue. Policy networks may be open, loose and shifting (whence they 
are called issue networks) or stable and with restricted membership 
(whence they are called policy communities) (Rhodes, 1996). The 
policy network around prostitution in the Netherlands always had the 
more open character of an issue network with different actors being 
admitted when other members feel that these have a contribution to 
make. Some authors argue that each policy sector is characterised by 
a particular policymaking style that is itself explained by the nature of 
the policy network that is active in that sector. Such networks are then 
called ‘policy subsystems’ (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). It is difficult 
though to disentangle cause and effect here. Are policy styles the result 
of the composition and operating style of a network or has the network 
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adapted to the nature of the social issue and imparted a certain style to 
the issue at hand? Designing industrial or health policy is very different 
from dealing with a moral issue such as prostitution policy. 
In the sequential stage model of policymaking, policy formulation 
is usually framed in terms of the decisions that the legislature and the 
executive make. This image of policy formulation nicely fits with 
our image of how electoral democracy works. As John summarises 
it: ‘Policy emerges from the will of the people; constitutional checks 
and balances modify political decisions; and groups and experts seek to 
have an influence at the formulation and implementation stages’ (2012, 
p 18). Nowadays the consensus in the literature is that legislative or 
executive decisions are a provisional moment of desistance in a more 
unruly process of issue formulation and agenda setting, and, as we saw 
in the preceding chapter, policy implementation. Policy problems, no 
matter how apparently urgent, are not indubitable but constructed. In 
any policy sector an assembly of groups and individuals who strive to 
get their favoured solution and preferred problem formulation accepted 
actively constructs policy issues. Issues can move in and out of public 
consciousness. For example, while social inequality was high on the 
political agenda during the days of the expansion of the welfare state, 
it more or less disappeared as a political issue during the 1990s and 
2000s, only to reappear again after the financial crash of 2008. 
Current theories of agenda setting portray the process as an ‘organised 
anarchy’ of ideas, solutions and opportunities, in which ‘collections 
of choices [are] looking for problems, issues and feelings [are] looking 
for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions [are] 
looking for issues to which they might be an answer, and decision 
makers [are] looking for work’ (Cohen et al, 1972, p 4). From this 
dispersed, decentred perspective, Kingdon famously conceptualises 
agenda setting and policy formulation as consisting of three ‘streams’ 
of problems, solutions and politics that move along independently 
of each other (Kingdon, 2011). This is not the place to extensively 
summarise Kingdon’s seminal book on public policies. We restrict 
ourselves to a few key suppositions. First, the streams are uncoupled 
because of the different roles and mandates of the actors in the policy 
process. The executive dominates the agenda, but cannot determine 
the policy alternatives that are considered. Interest groups can bring 
an issue to attention, but cannot determine which solutions specialist 
communities of experts favour. Media and opinion polls can push an 
issue up the agenda, but not long enough for solutions to be developed. 
And experts can design solutions, but have little influence over the 
agenda. Second, one of the key functions of policy networks or 
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subsystems is the development of solutions. It takes a lot of time and 
effort to design feasible policy solutions – feasible, that is, in terms of 
technical efficacy, anticipated costs, receptivity among policy makers 
and public acceptability. To bridge the gap between the problem and 
solution stream, proposals are developed in anticipation of future 
problems. The policy stream, third, is about the receptivity of the 
political community and the public to certain problem formulations 
and solutions. Fourth, advocates, or ‘policy entrepreneurs’, lie in wait in 
and around government with their pet solutions in hand for problems 
to float by to which to attach their solutions. This, finally, may result at 
times in a sudden convergence of the three streams. As Kingdon states: 
Separate streams come together at critical times. A problem 
is recognized, a solution is developed and available in the 
policy community, a political change makes it the right time 
for policy change, and potential constraints are not severe 
… these policy windows, the opportunities for action, 
present themselves and stay open for only short periods. 
(Kingdon, 2002, p 174) 
In this chapter we show that the ‘organised anarchy’ of agenda setting 
and political decision making expresses itself in an ongoing tension 
between institutionalised political rationality and public discourse. 
By political rationality we mean those time-tested processes of 
parliamentary coalition building and decision making that make it 
possible for a polity to engage in collective problem solving. These 
are the dispersed but patterned processes that the great policy scholar 
Charles Lindblom calls ‘mutual adjustment’, and that taken together 
form the ‘intelligence of democracy’ (Lindblom, 1965). We show 
that these institutionalised processes are affected by unruly public 
discourse, in the process curtailing the inclusiveness and effectiveness 
of the collective decision-making process. In Chapters Five and Six 
we argue for political interaction and decision-making strategies that 
are better adjusted to the intrinsic complexity of prostitution policy.
National policy in the Netherlands 
The politics of policy formulation: slouching towards 
decriminalisation, 1970-2000
Although prostitution itself – the trade of sexual services for money 
– has been legal since the beginning of the 19th century in the 
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Netherlands, until 2000 the commercial exploitation of prostitution 
was forbidden. The Morality Acts of 1911 outlawed brothels and 
made pimping a criminal offense (Outshoorn, 2004b, p 185). In the 
1970s two developments occurred that undermined this prohibitionist 
approach to the sex trade: the rapid expansion of the prostitution 
market and a parallel feminist discourse on women’s rights, sexuality 
and prostitution. 
Counting sex workers is fraught with difficulties, as we argued in 
Chapter Two, and yet everyone agrees that the sex industry in the 
Netherlands underwent a period of rapid expansion in the 1970s. There 
is no single explanation for this expansion. A more tolerant attitude 
towards sex and pornography and the availability of large amounts of 
black money from the construction industry (Altink, 1995, p 100) 
resulted in the growth of the number of porn shops, sex theatres and 
sex clubs. Some neighbourhoods, such as Katendrecht in Rotterdam and 
the Wallen in Amsterdam, traditionally had a stable amount of window 
prostitution. For decades residents and prostitutes had lived in peaceful 
coexistence in these neighbourhoods. These residents were now 
suddenly confronted with owners who aggressively bought up buildings 
to turn them into brothels and sex theatres. As more and more money 
flowed into the sex trade, the business professionalised; in most cities 
a cartel of a few powerful owners dominated the market. Before long, 
residents were not only suffering from the nuisance and disturbance that 
a larger number of clients created in the neighbourhood, but were also 
intimidated by the pimps and small criminals that followed in the wake 
of the sex trade.79 Finally, to supply the expanded sex trade, owners flush 
with money began to import sex workers: women from south-east Asia 
and Latin America became familiar fixtures of the club and window 
scene. In an attempt to regain control, the city of Rotterdam floated 
the idea of setting up a government-managed Eros Centre. However, 
the courts turned down the proposal on grounds that it violated the 
ban on brothels. The Association of Dutch Municipalities (Vereniging 
van Nederlandse Gemeenten, or VNG) began to lobby for a repeal of 
the ban on brothels on the grounds that it would make the regulation 
of prostitution easier (Outshoorn, 2004b, p 186). 
Parallel to the industry’s expansion, an active discourse on women’s 
rights and prostitution emerged in feminist circles. Until the middle 
of the 1980s prostitution was the remit of the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare and the Ministry of Justice. This distribution of labour 
79 The expansion was not confined to the cities. In many rural areas so-called ‘sex 
farms’ in converted farmhouses emerged where prostitution took place. 
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represented the state’s twin concerns over prostitution for most of the 
20th century: sexually transmitted diseases and public order. At the 
beginning of the 1980s this changed drastically. In the early 1980s 
women’s emancipation became a formal policy goal of the Dutch 
government. In 1977 women’s emancipation was institutionalised 
through the creation of a dedicated secretary of state (staatssecretaris, a 
specialised second-tier minister who has a seat in the Dutch cabinet), 
and the Directorate for Coordination of Emancipation Policy (Directie 
Coördinatie Emancipatiebeleid, or DCE) to support the political 
office holder. The DCE was a department of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Labour Relations.80 With a well-established position in 
the institutional heart of Dutch government, and strong links to a 
well-organised bureaucracy, the DCE and its officials had considerable 
agenda-setting power. Sexual violence against women was one of the 
issues the directorate selected as its focus. The DCE organised the key 
conference on violence against women in 1982 (the so-called Kijkduin 
conference), and it wrote two important policy papers, one on sexual 
violence against women and one on the status of women, that attracted 
considerable attention in the media. In both policy papers prostitution 
and trafficking were also addressed. In addition, the DCE initiated 
and financed research on prostitution and trafficking, subsidised the 
First World Whore Congress in Amsterdam in 1985, and it funded 
two organisations that were to become key players in the prostitution 
policy network: the Rode Draad (Red Thread) and the Stichting Tegen 
Vrouwenhandel (Foundation against Trafficking in Women, or STV) 
(Outshoorn, 2004b; Haveman, 1998, p 174). 
80 In addition, the government installed a permanent advisory committee for 
women’s emancipation, the Emancipation Council, and parliament created a 
standing committee for emancipation policy. Women’s emancipation was, thus, 
strongly represented in the institutional core of politics and government in the 
Netherlands. This rapid institutionalisation was the result of pressure by the 
women’s movement. The social movement Man-Vrouw-Maatschappij (Man-Woman-
Society, or MVM) pressured the cabinet in 1973 to create a national committee 
for women’s emancipation. In reply to the societal pressure the cabinet created 
the Emancipation Committee in 1974. This was an archetypical case of a policy 
entrepreneur, the social movement MVM, using a policy window to advance its 
case. The window was created as a result of the cabinet being dominated by Social 
Democrats (the members of MVM had extensive contacts with the top echelons of 
the Social Democratic party) and the UN declaring 1975 the Year of the Woman. 
The Emancipation Committee formulated an emancipation agenda and created a 
blueprint for its institutionalisation. In 1981, it was replaced by the Emancipation 
Council. 
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Thus, in the 1980s a new policy network around women’s 
emancipation had emerged that was led by the DCE, and in 
which politicians, officials, academic experts, and advocates for and 
representatives of sex workers participated. The network benefited from 
the institutional authority and legitimacy of politicians and officials 
of the DCE. The DCE contributed considerable legal and procedural 
competence to the group, as well as access to key politicians in the 
Dutch cabinet and high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Justice 
and the Ministry of Health and Welfare (Outshoorn, 2004b, p 192). 
Through its position at the heart of the Dutch government it gave 
women’s emancipation and women’s rights an indisputable authority. 
But apart from its considerable institutional capital, to its members 
it presented the excitement and energy of developing new ideas 
and engaging in positive social action. The feminist network offered 
splendid opportunities for policy innovation and collective learning on 
the issue of how to effectuate women’s rights, fight violence against 
women and give prostitution an accepted place in society. It was driven 
by the members’ trust in each other, and some of the friendships that 
developed in those days are still at work in the current new sex workers’ 
organisation PROUD.81
It was this network that would dominate and institutionalise the 
national discourse on prostitution in the 1980s and 1990s, and it was 
one of the driving forces behind the repeal of the ban on brothels. In 
the feminist debates at the administrative and political centre of Dutch 
national politics the issue of prostitution was subsumed under the larger 
debate on women’s rights and the fight against sexual violence against 
women.82 The dominant image underlying this frame was that of the 
free, autonomous woman who voluntarily opted for prostitution as a 
job. Prostitution came to be seen in terms of work – sex work. From 
this framing of prostitution, an important implication followed that 
would be central in the design of Dutch prostitution policy until 2005: 
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary prostitution. 
This distinction followed from the concern with trafficking that 
was one of the outcomes of the 1982 Kijkduin conference on sexual 
violence. Participants to the prostitution debate were confronted with 
conflicting information. On the one hand, they heard heartrending 
stories of victims of trafficking (predominantly from developing 
81 We discuss the emergence of PROUD later in this section. 
82 The DCE was, for example, active in the struggle to raise consciousness among, 
largely male, police officers and the judiciary that rape is a serious crime and that 
the way a woman dresses can never be a mitigating factor in rape. 
151
countries); on the other hand, they listened to emancipated, assertive 
Dutch women who explained why they had chosen to enter the 
prostitution business. As Outshoorn comments wryly, few feminists 
were willing to ascribe false consciousness to these women (2004b, 
p 190). In fact, the testimony of these strong, autonomous women 
coincided seamlessly with the discourse on female sexual agency 
and self-determination that was the lingua franca of the discourse on 
women’s rights. In terms of this discourse, prostitution was seen as 
the private affair of free citizens – that is, as long as the exchange of 
sex for money is voluntary on the part of the woman, as is obviously 
not the case with victims of trafficking. As Haveman, a legal scholar 
and advocate for the decriminalisation of prostitution, wrote at the 
time: ‘The assumption of the right to physical and psychological 
integrity gives women the freedom to choose for prostitution. Not 
prostitution as such, but coercion and violence must be combated, 
because these violate the integrity of prostitutes’ (1998, p 175). And 
as long as prostitution is voluntary it must be considered work. These 
ideas strongly influenced the first bill on the legalisation of brothels, 
the so called Bill 18202 (Outshoorn, 2004b, p 190). 
Thus, one of the key elements in the feminist-administrative 
discourse on prostitution was the distinction between ‘good’ or 
voluntary prostitution and ‘bad’ or forced prostitution. Irrespective of 
whether this distinction would hold up in practice, it came to fulfil 
several important functions in the development of Dutch prostitution 
policy in the 1980s and 1990s. One of the most important was that it 
bridged the cognitive dissonance between the undeniable evidence of 
trafficking in the wake of the expanding sex industry and the deeply 
entrenched emancipatory women’s rights discourse in the Netherlands. 
But equally important was that it suggested a practical course of 
action that would accommodate the two contending frames of social 
control and women’s rights. The feminist lobby put three demands 
on the political agenda: repealing the ban on brothels to allow for 
more effective regulation, providing residence permits to victims of 
trafficking to enable them to testify against their traffickers, and setting 
higher penalties for traffickers (Outshoorn, 2012, p 234). It was for 
this reason that the feminist debate converged with the simultaneous 
political debate on the legalisation of brothels. 
While the feminist discourse unfolded at the national level, a parallel 
local discourse was developing in Dutch cities. As we saw earlier, the 
rapid expansion of the prostitution sector in the 1970s meant that 
towns and cities with a prostitution sector were confronted with the 
challenge of how to regulate a rapidly growing prostitution scene plus 
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the associated drug crime and public nuisance that were overtaking 
whole neighbourhoods. Looking back on this period, several of the 
police officers interviewed said that they felt they had lost control 
of those neighbourhoods; they had to fight their way back in, as 
one of them put it (interviews, police officers). The members of the 
municipal network were the mayor, police officials and members 
of the office of the district attorney, usually at the municipal level. 
Through their contacts at the Ministry of Justice and the VNG they 
were firmly linked to the national power centres. The dominant frame 
in thinking about prostitution in the cities was one of social control 
rather than women’s rights and self-determination. This meant that 
in the policy domain of prostitution two networks were active: a 
dominant feminist one that framed prostitution in terms of women’s 
rights and work, and a municipal one that framed it in terms of crime 
and public order. The two networks employed different root images 
of the sex worker: respectively as an autonomous self-determining 
woman who chooses sex work voluntarily, and someone, possibly a 
victim of gross exploitation, who is part of an unlawful world of sex 
and crime that poses a direct threat to public order in the city. The 
network structure of Dutch prostitution policy before 2000 was thus 
decidedly disjointed, although both legs of the network were linked 
to the political machinery of parliament, parties and the executive. 
Yet, in the Dutch consociational political culture the two networks 
were not wholly separated. Local officials of the large cities were 
regularly invited to events organised by NGOs such as the Rode 
Draad (interview, police officer; Wagenaar, 2006).83 The combination 
of a relatively favourable attitude towards prostitution among opinion 
makers and key national policy makers and a tradition of consultation 
among officials led to local policies in which it was common to 
deliberate with proprietors and involve NGOs and other stakeholders 
in policy design and implementation. The period of regulated tolerance 
is important for understanding the Dutch policy culture at that time. 
83 For purposes of disclosure, Hendrik Wagenaar participated in several of the 
conferences organised by the Rode Draad in the early 2000s. In one he was a 
keynote speaker. At these conferences, politicians and officials, both national and 
local, mingled with professionals, police officers, sex workers and brothel owners. 
Police officials and sex workers were seen to jointly participate in panels. The 
atmosphere was congenial, upbeat and positive. It felt as if participants sensed they 
were part of a, perhaps unique, social experiment. Yet, at one of those conferences, 
the author spoke to a female brothel owner who already complained about what 
she called administrative harassment by the administration of the town where her 
brothel was located. A year after that, she decided to close her business. 
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National law and local rules were rarely imposed unilaterally in Dutch 
political culture at the time. Even when a measure was clearly repressive, 
the affected group would be informed and consulted. Preceding the 
decision to abolish the ban on brothels, organisations representing sex 
workers, proprietors and social services were consulted by civil servants 
and members of parliament. By organising conferences and courses the 
national government created support among municipalities for the new 
law. At the local level the regime of regulated tolerance had created 
consultation channels and a modicum of trust between authorities and 
brothel owners. An indication of this was that proprietors formulated 
a covenant to keep trafficking out of their establishments, and, on the 
issue of a minimum client age, declared a ban for those under the age of 
18. We will see later, however, that the proprietors played a duplicitous 
role in the implementation of the new law. 
One of the problems of the policy network approach is its lack of 
explanatory power (John, 2012, p 74). It describes the topography 
of policy discourse and suggests how policy agendas and solutions 
are floated, but it hardly explains how policy decisions are made and 
outcomes realised. So it is with the networks that were involved in the 
repeal of the brothel ban in the Netherlands. The feminist and municipal 
networks were beholden to one of the most powerful practices in 
Dutch governance: coalition politics. Coalition politics are ruled by 
the principle of political rationality. The Netherlands is a republic of 
minorities (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002); in the proportional election 
system no party can ever hope to attain a parliamentary majority. 
Dutch politics is by definition coalition politics, and in order not to 
endanger the coalition, party discipline is strict during debates over 
political issues. However, in terms of values and competences, in this 
institutional landscape politicians and officials live by the principle of 
avoiding alienating a political opponent (as you might need him in the 
future to form a coalition) or riding roughshod over minorities (as you 
might need their vote in tight situations). The dominant competences 
are deliberation, negotiation and bargaining. Many generations of 
consociationalism – the deliberation between elites at the top end of 
denominational pillars – have installed an ethos in politicians that, in 
addition to their party, they represent the larger interest of preserving a 
political system that supersedes sectional interests. To make this practice 
of delicate balancing and compromise work, much of it takes place 
outside the glare of the media.84
84 The Dutch word for this kind of coalition dealing is ‘backroom politics’ 
(achterkamertjespolitiek). 
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In 1983 the Liberal Minister of Justice submitted a Bill to parliament 
to modernise the Penal Code. This was the beginning of a long, 
convoluted political journey that ended in 1999 with the repeal of 
the ban on brothels. During the parliamentary debates in 1983, the 
Christian Democrats suggested doing away with the prohibition 
on brothels to allow municipalities a more effective regulation of 
prostitution (Outshoorn, 2004b, p 188). A majority supported the 
amendment. The Christian Democrats, who would later oppose the 
Bill, took a pragmatic stance: prohibiting brothels had not prevented 
the expansion of the sex trade; regulation promised better results. But 
contrary to the parties of the left, who saw prostitution as work, and 
the Liberals, who framed it as a gender-neutral market transaction, they 
persisted in framing prostitution as a moral vice and the sex worker 
as victim. So, three parties with wholly different understandings of 
prostitution, each for their own reasons, supported the repeal of the 
ban on brothels. The by now widely accepted distinction between 
voluntary and coerced prostitution had to paper over this schism. To 
incorporate the amendment the Bill was revised and resubmitted to 
parliament in 1985 as Bill 18202, the repeal of the brothel ban. The 
Lower House passed the Bill in 1987. Pending acceptance by the Higher 
Chamber the ban on brothels had in effect been repealed. 
The Senate or Upper House discussed the Bill in 1989. In the Dutch 
parliamentary system the task of the Upper House is to review Bills 
on their concurrence with the constitution and with international 
agreements, and on their legal quality, including whether they conflict 
with other Bills in the body of the law. It does not have the right 
to amend Bills and can only pass or fail them in their entirety. The 
Christian Democrats in the Upper House objected to the sex work 
frame and wanted municipalities to have the option to refuse brothels 
on their territory. Other parties noticed that the way that coercion was 
phrased in the Bill did not correspond with the wording of trafficking 
in the Penal Code. In the absence of a majority, it was agreed that 
debate would be postponed until the new Bill on trafficking that was 
due in the Lower House was debated by the Upper House (Outshoorn, 
2004b, p 190). 
The DEC had increased awareness of trafficking and, working with 
sympathetic police officials and attorney generals, issued new guidelines 
in the fight against trafficking. In light of what is to come with regard 
to the debate on prostitution after 2000, it is important to make two 
observations at this point. First, before the commercial exploitation 
of prostitution was legalised, it was the feminist policy subsystem that 
insisted on a broadened definition of trafficking (in which trafficking 
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was defined as violence, the threat of violence, and deceit in the 
recruitment of women for prostitution) and to raise the penalties for 
this offence. This was meant to provide a legal foundation to the all-
important distinction between voluntary and coerced prostitution, 
which was at the heart of the legalisation of brothels. Second, the same 
policy term can have widely different meanings in different networks/
discourses. In the feminist-municipal policy networks of the 1980s 
trafficking was framed as a threat to a business that was defined by 
voluntary prostitution by autonomous women who exerted their right 
to sexual and occupational self-determination. In the 2000s trafficking 
became the symbol for a failed policy and a morally corrupt activity 
in which debased men impose their perverse desires on powerless 
female victims. It requires no explanation that these different imageries 
suggest different policy measures.85 In the 1980s politicians, officials 
and feminists were in agreement about the need for a reformulated 
trafficking Bill as an instrument in the regulation of prostitution. As 
a majority supported the proposal the Bill was revised to incorporate 
the legalisation of sex facilities. The revision, which was submitted 
in 1985, contained all the well-known elements and arguments that 
support the Dutch legalisation approach. 
Central to the Bill was the distinction between forced and voluntary 
prostitution. The latter should be regarded as work. Two important 
expectations were attached to the sex work frame. Defining prostitution 
as work would enable administrators to integrate the sex trade into the 
legal/fiscal/administrative framework that regulates the small business 
sector in the Netherlands. Barring certain peculiarities (such as the 
constitutional stipulation that women cannot be held by an employer 
to provide sexual services), prostitution would in principle not differ 
from other small business sectors such as hospitality or hairdressing 
businesses. In fact, by lifting the prohibition on running a sex facility, 
local authorities could employ the full range of legal and policy 
instruments – issuing licenses, prescribing opening hours, regulating 
fire hazards, setting health standards and improving labour conditions 
– to ‘normalise’ the prostitution business. The second expectation was 
that by making the business ‘transparent’ it would be easier to crack 
down on forced prostitution and maintain public order in the cities. 
85 Outshoorn observes that earlier representations of the sex worker included the 
victim of poverty, the ‘fallen’ woman and the psychiatrically disturbed woman. 
The essential difference between these and the image of victims of trafficking is 
that in the former cases sex workers were not criminalised and never lost their 
civil rights (2012, p 234).
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With hindsight this was an ambitious programme; indeed, it widely 
exceeded the more modest goal of legalising sex facilities. And because 
it fitted so well with the wider Dutch tradition of approaching moral 
issues in a pragmatic, ‘realistic’ way, few people in 1985 questioned 
the policy theory that underpinned the legalisation effort. The Bill 
communicated that prostitution was seen as an undeniable, enduring 
element of urban life that is best accepted and regulated so that the safety 
of sex workers and the quality of life of inner-city neighbourhoods 
are protected. Outshoorn provides a quote from the Liberal Minister 
of Justice from a speech before parliament at the time that captures all 
the assumptions and expectations that surrounded the legalisation Bill: 
“Prostitution has existed for a long time and will continue 
to do so. This requires a realistic approach on the part of the 
government … prohibition is not the way to proceed … but 
one should allow for voluntary prostitution. The authorities 
can then regulate prostitution and the prostitution sector. 
It can then become healthy, safe, transparent, and cleansed 
from criminal side-effects.” (Cited in Outshoorn, 2004b, 
p 185) 
The Liberal Minister of Justice introduced the Bill (Bill 21027) in 1988. 
It contained a more workable definition of trafficking that focused on 
coercion, higher penalties and increased services for victims. When Bill 
21027 was finally discussed in 1992 the political landscape had changed. 
This would have dire consequences for the legalisation of brothels. One 
of the central elements of parliamentary practices is that certain actors 
possess veto power. Actors with veto power can block policy. This 
gives them strong bargaining power and the capacity to shape policy 
compared with actors who do not have such power (Tsebelis, 2002; 
John, 2012, p 36). In general, parliamentary actors have veto power 
where, for example, the members of the feminist network do not. But 
within parliament some actors have more veto power than others. In 
the Dutch postwar political landscape, the Christian Democrats held a 
pivotal position. As the largest party they could either govern with the 
left or the right. The new Christian Democratic Minister of Justice was, 
both ideologically and personally, a staunch opponent of prostitution. 
When he introduced Bill 21027 to the Lower House in 1992 he had 
radically changed its character. The purpose of the Bill was to clarify 
the definition of trafficking. But in a highly unusual move the minister 
put the decriminalisation of the commercial exploitation of the sex 
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trade,86 which had been agreed by the Lower House in 1988, back in 
the draft of the trafficking Bill. This was unusual because first, the Bill 
was not labelled a Bill against trafficking but a Bill to repeal the ban 
on brothels. He reintroduced among other things the constitutionally 
dubious freedom of municipalities not to allow brothels within their 
boundaries. Second, the minister merged immigration policy with 
prostitution policy. Whereas in the original Bill trafficking was defined 
as coercion, in the new Bill this principle, and the adjacent distinction 
between voluntary and coerced prostitution, had been abandoned for 
women from outside the EU. Recruiting women from outside the EU 
to work in prostitution, as well as working as a non-EU resident in the 
sex trade, are considered criminal offences. The Penal Code was in fact 
used as an instrument for immigration policy. The opposition to the Bill 
was fierce. However, it became clear from the Christian Democratic 
spokesmen that opponents feared uncontrolled flows of prostitutes to 
the Netherlands. The explanatory memorandum that accompanied 
the Bill declared that one of its aims was to stop ‘the stream of foreign 
prostitutes’ (Outshoorn, 2012, p 236). The old stigma raised its head 
again. And although the Social Democratic party was unhappy with 
the Bill, in the end it voted with its Christian Democratic coalition 
partner and the Bill passed through the Lower House.
This was not the end of the story. By then the issue of the legalisation 
of the commercial exploitation of prostitution, seen by most actors 
involved in prostitution policy as a means for more effective regulation, 
was firmly in the hand of the legislature. Bill 21027 moved to the 
Upper House in 1993 where the critique was extensive and severe. 
The Christian Democrats always wanted Christian-dominated 
municipalities to have the freedom to prohibit prostitution within their 
borders. The Bill had a clause that gave municipalities considerable 
discretion in regulating prostitution. They had three options: to license 
brothels (for voluntary prostitution), to prohibit all prostitution, or 
to prohibit unlicensed prostitution. This would create three types of 
municipality when it came to prostitution policy. The Senate concluded 
that this created various insurmountable legal issues. Constitutionally, 
by handing over discretionary power to municipalities to declare 
unlicensed commercial exploitation of prostitution a crime, violated 
both the Gemeentewet, the law that regulates the relationship between 
the national and municipal governments, and the Penal Code. Criminal 
law is national and never territorial (Haveman and Wijers, 1993, p 31). 
86 This was possible because the legalisation Bill, although passed by the Lower House, 
had not yet been approved by the Upper House, as explained earlier. 
The national governance of prostitution
158
Designing prostitution policy
As the same behaviour could be declared criminal in one municipality 
and legal in a neighbouring one, criminal law experts feared that the law 
would be unenforceable. More generally, the Upper House was very 
critical that the Criminal Code was being used for immigration policy, 
and feared that the unintended consequence of the trafficking clause, 
whose purpose it was to protect vulnerable women from developing 
countries, would push these women into illegal prostitution (Haveman 
and Wijers, 1993). And, finally, senators found it unacceptable that the 
minister had reintroduced a ban on brothels when the Lower House 
had already repealed the brothel ban (Outshoorn, 2004b, p 194). 
In Chapter Two we listed morality politics as an obstacle to adequate 
policymaking in the case of prostitution policy. The story of Bill 21027 
demonstrates two examples of the effect of moralism on policymaking. 
First, prohibitionist, ideological zeal blinds authorities. Prohibitionism 
leads its proponents to deliberate attempts to move policy towards 
the limits of what is legally acceptable – and beyond – and results in 
technically deficient law- and policymaking. We saw examples of this 
in the case of Utrecht in Chapter Three, and we will see more such 
examples in the new national prostitution law discussed later in this 
section. Second, and somewhat related to the first effect, authorities 
may engage in abrupt policy changes. In the case of Bill 21027 the 
minister had no adequate answers to the Senate’s objections. When 
the Upper House threatened to fail both the original Bill 18202 (the 
repeal of the brothel ban) and the new trafficking Bill (Bill 21027), he 
withdrew the first and took the offending articles out of the second. 
The result was that, after the parliament had voted for the legalisation of 
brothels, legalisation was vetoed nevertheless through an unprecedented 
parliamentary backdoor manoeuvre. 
But the parliamentary veto did not mean that the legalisation of 
brothels was off the agenda. The feminist and municipal lobbies, each 
for its own reasons, remained active in pushing for a repeal of the brothel 
ban. The large cities began to anticipate the repeal by setting standards 
for brothels under the regulated tolerance regime. In 1994 coalition 
politics opened a new policy window. A new cabinet without Christian 
Democrats, consisting of a majority coalition of Social Democrats 
and two Liberal parties, drafted a new Bill that contained most of the 
elements of the original repeal Bill 18202.87 The Bill was introduced 
in the Lower House in 1997, and it was passed in 1999. Lawmakers 
expected that turning voluntary prostitution into work would lead 
87 This was the first time since 1918 that religious parties were not part of the coalition 
(Outshoorn, 2012, p 235). 
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to the normalisation and better control of the sex trade. However, 
the euphoria among sex worker advocates and progressive politicians 
over this political victory concealed considerable opposition to the 
legalisation of the sex trade. The vote was neatly split between religious 
and secular parties. The Christian parties stuck to their abolitionist 
position and could count on solid support from religious media and 
church-based organisations (Outshoorn, 2012, p 235). It would not 
require much additional opposition to the legalised sex trade for the 
repeal of the ban on brothels to be threatened. That opposition was 
not long in coming. Almost immediately after the Bill came into effect 
in 2000, developments would disprove the ideals and expectations of 
the supporters of the repeal. 
The return to (semi-)prohibition 
When the Dutch parliament enacted the repeal of the brothel ban, 
most actors, as well as national and international observers, saw it as a 
landmark in the struggle for a more effective and humane regulation 
of prostitution – or, alternatively, a deplorable symbol of misguided 
permissiveness. Yet, by 2000 the policy networks that were involved in 
the design of prostitution policy had undergone a significant shift. The 
institutionalisation of women’s emancipation in the Dutch executive 
had turned out to be remarkably fragile. One reason for this was that the 
various agencies and advisory bodies saw it as their task to coordinate 
emancipation policy across the other ministries. In the siloed structure 
of Dutch national government this put the issue of emancipation at 
an immediate disadvantage – something of an afterthought compared 
with core issues such as education, social affairs, or defence policy. In 
1986 the office of secretary of state for emancipation was abolished; 
its remit now belonged to the Minister of Social Affairs. By way of 
compensation a Ministerial Committee for Emancipation Policy, 
chaired by the Prime Minister, was created as a subcommittee of the 
Ministerial Council, the highest policymaking body in the country, 
consisting of ministers and secretaries of state. In 1991 the committee 
was abolished again. In 1994 the standing committee followed, and 
in 1997 the Emancipation Council was disbanded (Outshoorn and 
Swiebel, 1998). Early 2000 women’s emancipation had become a 
peripheral issue in Dutch national governance. The feminist network, 
so important in putting and keeping the issue of sex worker rights on 
the political agenda and for designing the legal-technical instruments 
to effect these rights, had disintegrated and lost its institutional hold 
inside the Dutch executive. What was left were the municipal network 
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and the perennial practice of coalition politics. This shift in the political 
equilibrium would have profound effects on the formation of Dutch 
prostitution politics after 2000. 
The repeal had always been controversial. It had only passed 
parliament because the Christian Democrats had been left out of 
the governing coalition. It is little wonder therefore, as Outshoorn 
observes, that the debate about the expected effects of the repeal started 
immediately (2012, p 237). The Research Agency of the Ministry 
of Justice, the Centre for Scientific Research and Documentation 
(WODC), conducted an evaluation of the repeal in 2001-02. Although 
it was too premature to make any conclusive statements, the general 
conclusion was that the effects of the law on the licensed prostitution 
sector were moderately positive (Daalder, 2002). Interviews with police 
officials in those days confirmed this guarded conclusion. A police 
official in a region in the eastern part of the Netherlands declared that 
despite much talk about “displacement effects” (prostitution moving 
from the licensed to the unlicensed sector) he had encountered very 
few instances of this so far (interview, police official, 2003). This echoed 
the mood among municipal officials who implemented the law, most 
large cities and towns began to implement the repeal with hopes to 
create a clean, well-controlled prostitution sector. The escort sector 
seemed to be thriving, but because it was not location-bound, little 
was known about it at the time. The National Rapporteur reported 
an increase in trafficking from 284 cases in 2001 to 909 in 2009, but 
that was largely because of the broadening of the definition in 2005 
and the inclusion of trafficking in other industries besides prostitution. 
What changed was initially not so much the reality on the ground, but 
the discourse about prostitution. 
The first shot in what would become a publicity war around 
prostitution came from an unexpected angle. In 2005, Karina 
Schaapman, a Social Democratic member of the Amsterdam city 
council and former sex worker, published a policy report for her party 
(with her colleague Amma Asante, also a councillor for the Social 
Democrats) in which she denounced prostitution in general and the 
legalisation of brothels in particular (Asante and Schaapman, 2005). It 
is easy to dismiss the report for its tendentious reasoning and its use 
of fabricated numbers, but its real impact was in resetting the tenor 
of the national debate on prostitution and its influence of the national 
leadership of the Social Democratic party. The rhetoric was one of 
rape, abuse, slavery and sex addiction. No self-respecting woman 
would voluntarily enter the sex trade; sex workers were pressured into 
it because of drug addiction, debts or childhood sexual abuse. To visit 
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a sex worker was ‘not normal’, and clients were despicable men who 
were acting out their ‘sex addiction’ (Asante and Schaapman, 2005). 
In effect, Schaapman introduced the angry, emotional, ad hominem, 
no-holds-barred rhetoric of radical feminism that had poisoned the 
negotiations around the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (see Chapter 
Two). This represented a significant change in the Dutch prostitution 
debate. So far the debate between proponents and opponents of the 
legalisation of brothels had taken place within the confines of Dutch 
coalition politics. According to the political rationality of coalition 
politics, this automatically imposed some constraints on the rhetorical 
amplitude of the exchange of opinion. Schaapman’s book and reports 
took the debate out of the coalition arena, set new standards of what 
is permissible and acceptable in the public discussion, and introduced 
the unbridgeable ideological divide between prostitution as work and 
prostitution as, by definition, coerced and illicit. The immediate effect 
of Schaapman’s report was that it convinced the powerful Amsterdam 
alderman Lodewijk Asscher (Social Democrat) and a number of Social 
Democratic members of the national parliament to take up the fight 
against prostitution (see also Weitzer, 2012, p 160). 
A second strand in the national discourse was the moral panic 
around ‘loverboys’. A moral panic may be defined as ‘an episode, often 
triggered by alarming media stories and reinforced by reactive laws and 
public policy, of exaggerated or misdirected public concern, anxiety, 
fear, or anger over a perceived threat to social order’ (Krinsky, 2013, 
p 1; see also Cohen, 2011). Moral panics are constructed by the media 
and have a clearly recognisable pattern in which they build up from 
early anxiety to a crescendo and then fade away again. The ‘loverboy’ 
panic started in 1995 when, in a trafficking case that involved adolescent 
girls and young Dutch-Moroccan men, the alleged victims, to the 
bafflement of the authorities, protected the defendants and declared 
to have engaged in prostitution out of love for them.88 Sporadic media 
reports followed in which young girls were portrayed as being preyed 
88 Details of the loverboy hype are from http://sekswerkerfgoed.nl/loverboys-een-
ernstig-probleem-een-hype-of-allebei.. The term ‘loverboy’ is pseudo-English 
that is used only in some continental countries The overheated discursive climate 
around prostitution has given rise to several short, sharp moral panics, such as the 
one about ‘Breezer sletjes’ (Breezer sluts), young girls at sex parties in ethnic minority 
areas who, according to social workers’ reports, ‘sold’ sexual favours for a Breezer, 
a low-alcohol drink. Another such case involved men who had paid sex with 
mentally handicapped girls, a spurious claim that even made it into parliamentary 
debates (Outshoorn, 2012, p 240). 
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on by handsome young men from ethnic minority groups. By 2000 
the loverboy phenomenon had taken on the proportions of media 
hype. The organisation Child Right estimated that there were 9,000 
female and 6,000 male victims of loverboys. Experts pontificated on 
television about the causes of the phenomenon, television broadcasted 
shocking documentaries, and youth service agencies were spurred into 
designing information and prevention programmes. The apex of the 
moral panic was a book by one of the alleged victims that sold over 
200,000 copies nationally (Mosterd, 2008). The author appeared on 
countless television shows, until her book was exposed as a fraud, after 
which the hype quickly subsided. A more measured report by the 
criminologist Bovenkerk and colleagues concluded that loverboys were 
a modern incarnation of the traditional pimp and that the phenomenon 
had been overstated. However, the report also concluded that the 
legalisation of brothels had not eradicated pimping from the licensed 
sector (Bovenkerk et al, 2006). 
By 2005 a veritable media industry had emerged around the issue 
of prostitution. Prostitution was invariably depicted as associated with 
organised crime, sex workers were seen as victims, and prostitution 
as an unstoppable ‘tsunami’ that had washed over the Netherlands. 
Newspapers featured lurid stories of sex and violence, and the favoured 
trope was the melodramatic story that was seen as representative of 
the whole industry (Vance, 2011; Goraj, 2012). The message that 
was repeated over and over again was that the legalisation policy had 
failed and that it had in fact generated massive amounts of trafficking.89 
The media gave ample coverage to a new network that consisted 
of prohibitionist activists made up of parliamentarians of the Social 
Democratic and the small Christian fundamentalist parties (and 
their ever-present spokesman Gert-Jan Segers), the aforementioned 
alderman and later Minister of Social Affairs, Asscher, radical feminists, 
and journalists from the orthodox Christian broadcasting network 
Evangelische Omroep (Evangelical Broadcasting). Members of the 
network had easy access to the media, and used the strident rhetorical 
89 By way of illustration of the mood of the times, in 2004 journalists of what was 
then one of the more serious television new shows approached Hendrik Wagenaar. 
They wanted to do an item on the effects of the repeal of the brothel ban. In the 
preliminary conversation about the item the programme makers declared that they 
wanted to demonstrate that the legalisation policy had failed. Wagenaar said that 
under those conditions he did not see a valid reason to participate. The programme 
makers assured him that the programme would give a fair hearing to all points of 
view. Needless to say, when the programme was aired it turned out be a diatribe 
against legalisation and the author’s more nuanced statements were not included. 
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tools that had been introduced by the Schaapman report: fabricated 
numbers, presented as ‘scientific’, that suggested a prostitution sector 
out of control; highly charged, emotional language; and personal attacks 
on the proponents of legalisation, including suggestions that they 
were paid by traffickers or pimps. Network members also organised 
prohibitionist conferences and a ‘scientific fact-finding mission’ to 
Sweden to study the successful model of client criminalisation.90 It was 
in this discursive environment that the Sneep case hit the headlines. 
We described this case of trafficking in the licensed prostitution sector 
in Chapter Three; here we focus on its discursive effects. Analysts from 
the National Police Force reconstructed the case to examine how it 
had unfolded. Their conclusion was no surprise to students of public 
administration: there had been little coordination of the activities of 
the agencies and actors involved with prostitution. Each had picked 
up signs of coercion but each failed to act on the signals for fear of 
jeopardising its own interests (KLPD, 2008, pp 104-10). The media 
focused mainly on one statistic that had been quoted by police officials, 
plus the conclusion of the report. The statistic that was repeated over 
and over again by the major actors of the prohibitionist network was 
that ‘between 50 and 90 per cent’ of sex workers who worked behind 
the windows in Amsterdam were ‘forced’ to do so. The conclusion was 
that: ‘It is an illusion that a clean, normal sector has emerged’ (KLPD, 
2008, p 8). By 2008 the discursive consensus in the Netherlands was 
clear: the legalisation of brothels had failed. It was time to formulate a 
new national prostitution law. In the public consciousness prostitution 
was framed in terms of vulnerable eastern European women who 
were the victims of ruthless Turkish or Balkan traffickers. A Christian 
Democratic parliamentarian summarised the mood of the time: “The 
romantic expectations about the repeal of the ban on brothels in 2000 
had led to nothing” (cited in Outshoorn, 2012, p 240).
While the media wars picked up steam, other, less visible, 
developments quietly undermined the official goals of the 2000 
legalisation of brothels. The purpose of the 2000 decision to repeal the 
brothel ban was to decriminalise prostitution by removing the sale of 
sexual services and its management from the Penal Code and transform 
what was traditionally a market that operated in the shadows into a 
regular business sector regulated by labour law, administrative law, 
90 This trip, which was made by a Christian fundamentalist and Social Democratic 
member of parliament and received intense coverage in the media, was paid for 
by the orthodox Christian broadcasting station Evangelische Omroep. This fact was 
conveniently left out of the media reports of the trip. 
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immigration law, the tax code and local health and safety regulations. 
This did not materialise, because three different legal and administrative 
measures proved to be the undoing of the goals of the repeal of the 
ban on brothels. 
Apart from a concern over vulnerable sex workers from Asian and 
Latin American countries, the issue of immigration was low on the 
agenda of the feminist network that ushered in the repeal of the ban 
on brothels. But immigration was intertwined with prostitution from 
the start. In debates in parliament the Christian Democratic Party had 
repeatedly expressed concerns that the tolerant Dutch prostitution 
regime would attract foreign women to work as sex workers in the 
Netherlands. This resulted in members of parliament formulating 
amendments to the repeal of the ban on brothels that made it illegal for 
sex workers from outside the EU or EEA, that is, European Economic 
Area countries to work in the Netherlands. As we have already seen 
this affected hundreds of women, but more important perhaps is 
that labour law was used to bar foreign sex workers from the Dutch 
market. From the start of the new tolerant regime, banning migrants 
became the unofficial policy of Dutch prostitution law. Many of the 
national laws that had a remit for prostitution were laws that regulated 
work undertaken by non-EU nationals (Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen, Law 
Regulating Work for Aliens) or were intended to combat trafficking 
(Mensenhandelartikel 250a Wetboek van Strafrecht, Criminal Code 
Trafficking Clause). At the same time licensing laws in combination 
with mandatory identification requirements that had been extended in 
2005 to everyone residing in the Netherlands, including sex workers,91 
made it almost impossible for persons without legal papers to work 
within the licensed sector of the prostitution market. Similar to Austria, 
laws and regulations aimed at migrants had a profound effect on the 
design and implementation of prostitution policy. This was partly the 
result of a sharp increase in labour migration after the 2004 expansion 
of the EU, when women (and men) from eastern European countries 
came to work in the sex industry in the affluent countries of north-
western Europe, and partly the effect of a renewed emphasis on law 
and order, both nationally and internationally, in the political debate 
on issues of crime and safety in the Netherlands. Another factor was 
stigma, with the attendant fear of contamination and uncontrolled 
expansion of the sex trade. Moreover, and again similar to the situation 
in Austria, rules and regulations pertaining to immigrants are changed 
91 Since 2005, everyone residing in the Netherlands is obliged to carry an identification 
card or passport.
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more easily and are less bound by administrative ethos than regulation 
in other domains. Both Dutch and Austrian governmental agencies 
issued rulings that changed the status of migrant sex workers overnight. 
We will return to the confluence of prostitution, immigration and the 
fight against trafficking in the next chapter. 
It is important to mention two additional national laws that were 
applied to prostitution and had the effect of undoing the goals and 
spirit of the 2000 legalisation. The first is the so called ‘opting-in’ 
arrangement. Although the improvement of the position of sex workers 
was an official goal of the repeal of the ban on brothels, the Dutch 
government considered labour relations to be an issue that belonged 
to civil law and something to be arranged between proprietors and sex 
workers without interference from the government. The government 
argued that, similar to other business sectors, labour rights in the area 
of prostitution should be negotiated between employers and organised 
labour. Although legally correct, this was a naïve position. There was 
no sex workers’ union in the Netherlands at the time. In the early 
2000s Dutch sex worker activists attempted to establish a union, the 
Dutch Federation of National Unions was willing to take on the cause 
of sex workers. However, very few sex workers signed up as members 
of the fledgling union and the effort was abandoned. The absence of 
organised representation for sex workers allowed proprietors in the 
Netherlands to frustrate the introduction of adequate labour contracts 
and work conditions in their facilities. 
While the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour Relations declined 
to get involved in regulating the sex trade, the tax office took the issue 
of labour relations on board through its attempts to design a proper 
fiscal regime for brothels and sex workers. After several attempts to 
settle the issue that foundered on the organised resistance of brothel 
owners, it came up with the so-called opting-in arrangement. The 
opting-in arrangement allows the wage–tax regime to be applied to 
those whose working conditions are not governed by conventional 
labour relations between employer and employee. The sex worker 
and the proprietor must apply for the opting-in arrangement at the 
tax office. The money that goes towards taxes is deducted before 
the owner pays the sex worker. The sex worker does not pay social 
security and neither can she claim the social protection rights that are 
connected with employment. In order to safeguard sex workers’ rights, 
a ‘package’ of conditions was included. This concerned the right of 
sex workers to set their own working hours, to wear clothing of their 
own choosing, to refuse clients and certain sexual acts, to refuse to 
drink with clients, and to get a receipt for income earned. There was 
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also an agreement relieving the sex worker of any obligation to hand 
over a percentage of earnings for unspecified ‘services’ to the owner. 
This ‘package’ was meant to remedy a flaw in the system. The opting-
in system was originally designed for workers without conventional 
labour rights, such as preachers or pastors hired by religious institutions, 
writers paid by publishers, and members of local councils. It was never 
intended to be used by brothel owners to exercise authority over sex 
workers. However, from the diary entries (see the Appendix) and 
the interviews that informed our research, as well as reports from the 
Rode Draad (2012), we conclude that most brothel owners tend to 
violate the conditions of the package with the exception perhaps of 
sex workers’ rights to refuse alcoholic drinks and to choose their own 
clothing. While well intentioned, the opting-in arrangement also had 
the unintended effect of removing the issue of labour rights from the 
political agenda. With the imprimatur of the tax office, sex workers 
were now officially regarded as self-employed. 
The third national law that undermined the goals of the repeal of the 
ban on brothels was the so-called Wet Bibob, or Integrity Assessment 
Act, that we encountered in Chapter Three. The purpose of the law 
is to assess the integrity of the proprietors of certain ‘sensitive’ business 
sectors such as brothels, gaming parlours, bars, and public contracts 
over €200,000. By combining a number of large databases, a national 
agency assesses the source of financing, the transparency of management 
and the integrity of the owner’s business partners. The owner has the 
right to view and appeal his file only after his application for a license 
has been refused. The Wet Bibob is the result of a 1996 parliamentary 
inquiry into new ways to fight organised crime. In fact it grants 
all municipalities in the Netherlands the right to initiate criminal 
investigations into any business registered within their district limits. 
If there is any suspicion of involvement in criminal activities (and just 
being befriended by someone who has been convicted for crimes 
can be sufficient grounds for suspicion), the permit of the business 
is withdrawn, forcing its closure. Soon after its implementation in 
2003, the municipality of Amsterdam deployed a Bibob procedure to 
shut down the glamorous high-class brothel Yab Yum. For years, the 
municipality had tried to close this brothel because of its ties with the 
Hells Angels motorbike club, which was at the time prosecuted for 
suspected involvement in organised crime. Although the then Social 
Democratic mayor Job Cohen portrayed the successful Bibob procedure 
as a legal victory, some prominent legal experts were critical. They 
argued that the law fundamentally reverses the burden of proof (as 
suspicion forms the basis of legal action). The Wet Bibob has been 
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used by some municipalities, such as Amsterdam and Alkmaar, to 
refuse owners of window facilities or clubs permission to renew their 
license. In this way, and by buying up buildings with a prostitution 
license, the city of Amsterdam closed down 100 of its windows between 
2006 and 2012 (Volkskrant, 29 May 2012). It is unclear, however, how 
successful this authoritative instrument is. Soon after his inauguration, 
the current mayor of Amsterdam, Eberhard van der Laan, initiated a 
series of Bibob investigations of brothels in the red-light district. None 
of these investigations found suspicions of criminal activities. However, 
the Bibob procedure in combination with administrative measures 
(bestuurlijke maatregel – see Chapter Three) have been used effectively 
to downsize the prostitution business in some cities. 
When in 2007 a new coalition of Christian Democrats, Social 
Democrats and a small Christian Fundamentalist party was formed, the 
issue of a new national prostitution law to reverse the legalisation of 
brothels was back on the agenda. A Bill was introduced to parliament 
in November 2009, called the Law for the Regulation of Prostitution 
and Suppression of Abuse in the Sex Industry, or Wrp (Bill 32211). 
The Bill in fact reversed the decriminalisation impetus of 2000 by 
designing a law that was specifically targeted at prostitution. As the 
title of the Bill indicates, its major aim is to intensify regulation to 
fight trafficking, crime and abuse in the sex trade. To this end the Bill 
proposed the scaling-up of several policy instruments that were already 
popular in the ‘enforcement arrangements’ that most municipalities 
had introduced over the years: licensing or prohibition of various 
forms of prostitution (most municipalities opted for disallowing home 
prostitution), raising the age for sex work to 21 years, the creation of 
exit programmes, a national registration system for sex workers (with 
penalties for sex workers who failed to register) and penalties for clients 
who solicited unregistered sex workers. In many ways the new national 
law represented the codification of developments at the local level. 
The cornerstone of the Bill was the proposed national registration 
system. The Bill was based on an image of comprehensive control. 
As the Minister of Justice (Liberal) declared: “By the introduction 
of a compulsory licensing system in combination with compulsory 
registration and the national register of escort services, an almost closed 
administrative system is erected that can improve the fight against abuses 
in the sex industry and the judicial suppression of forced prostitution” 
(cited in Outshoorn, 2012, p 241). The law led to much critique 
by NGOs of the privacy risks of the proposed registration and the 
unenforceability of the limited client criminalisation aspects, and had a 
negative reception from the Raad van State, the country’s legal advisory 
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institution that assesses the quality of new legislation. Nevertheless the 
Lower House adopted the law. The law encountered opposition in 
the Senate, however. The government introduced some changes, but 
on 30 October 2012 the Senate rejected the law, mostly because of 
concern about the privacy aspects of the proposed registration system. 
When on 28 May 2013 the Dutch Upper Chamber rejected a new 
version of the Wrp once again (on similar grounds of violation of 
privacy rules and for reasons of unenforceability) national prostitution 
policy had reached an impasse. The cities were furious that their 
efforts at registering sex workers has been frustrated by the rejection of 
national law (source: email from Platform 31 to Hendrik Wagenaar). 
At that point there was a remarkable development: local policy makers 
began to work in concert with national policy makers to implement 
a policy that was far more regressive than anything that had been seen 
so far. The format was the ‘enforcement arrangements’ that were 
already in place in most cities, but the spirit was blatantly abolitionist: 
the removal, or at least, reduction of prostitution from Dutch cities. 
The mechanism to realise this programme was a model General Local 
Ordinance developed by the VNG. 
On 1 March 2014, the Minister of Justice submitted a revised draft 
of the national law to the Lower Chamber.92 It contained a range of 
measures that, taken together, would alter the landscape of prostitution 
by creating a series of far-reaching powers for municipalities to constrain 
sex work. One of the most important elements of the proposal was to 
make home prostitution impossible. Through the rise of the internet, 
home prostitution, or working in a small collective of sex workers, has 
become an attractive alternative to working for a third party. By legally 
defining the home as a ‘sex facility’ (similar to large sex clubs, escort 
agencies or window brothels), independent sex workers who chose 
to work from home are subject to the same, expensive and extended, 
procedures to obtain a license, and must comply with the same health 
and safety regulations, and monitoring and inspection procedures, as 
large facilities. Moreover, obtaining a license requires that the name 
and address of the sex worker is publicly available, that the license is 
entered into a national register and that it is visible on the façade of 
the building where she works. This combination of rules makes it de 
facto impossible for home workers to start a business.93 Moreover, as 
92 The following section has benefited from letters and unpublished documents from 
Marjan Wijers, Laurens Buijs and Esther Verrips. 
93 The official criterion for being designated as a business is ‘operating like a business’ 
(bedrijfsmatig werken). The criteria are very broad, however. Advertising (on the 
internet for example) is already an indicator for ‘operating like a business’. 
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the proposed law makes unlicensed prostitution punishable (with a 
maximum of six months in prison or a fine), the sex worker is forced 
to work for an established proprietor. For the first time in more than 
a century the proposal criminalises sex workers in the Netherlands. 
The clients of ‘unlicensed sex workers’ are also criminalised and face 
a large fine. The law has also extended the powers of local authorities 
to enter premises, including private homes, without the permission 
of the residents if they have a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that unlicensed 
prostitution is taking place. This opens the door for arbitrary behaviour, 
as a number of recent incidents confirm.94 Finally, the proposal aims 
to reduce the number of work sites for prostitution. The law has 
increased the powers of municipalities to refuse a license to a new 
sex facility. Traditionally the only ground for refusal, apart from the 
criminal antecedents of the proprietor and not meeting health and 
safety standards, was in cases where the sex facility is in an area subject 
to zoning. Changing zoning is a long and tedious procedure that 
involves approval by the municipal council. In the proposal licenses 
can also be refused on grounds of ‘public order’ or ‘housing and living 
environment’, designations that can be established by officials without 
democratic approval. The law also makes it possible for municipalities 
to ban prostitution altogether. Taken together the expectation is that 
the number of work sites will shrink. 
That this is not just speculation has been proven by subsequent 
developments. Emboldened by the proposal for the new national law 
and the radical closure of Utrechts’s prostitution zone, several cities 
(Amsterdam, Alkmaar, Groningen) have announced the closure of large 
numbers of window brothels. In Amsterdam the red-light district is 
part of a large urban renewal project that aims to attract more tourists 
through hotel construction and the gentrification of the inner-city 
area. If the closures go ahead, prostitution will have to be removed 
94 In the town of Alkmaar at 6 am, officials from the Department of Construction 
and Housing, accompanied by police officials, entered the houses of a number 
of foreign sex workers who legally worked in the local window area. The sex 
workers had to provide personal information (for example, about boyfriends who 
lived there or visited them) and their personal address in their country of origin. 
The sex workers were very upset as in most cases their families back home did not 
know that they worked in the prostitution sector. In another town a sex worker (a 
taxpayer) tried to register as such; shortly thereafter her home was invaded by six 
police officers (source: letter from M. van den Burg to members of the Standing 
Committee for Security and Justice of the Lower House, protesting against the 
WPG).
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from these areas. In the meantime the VNG, in anticipation of the 
new law, has formulated a model General Local Ordinance (APV) 
for prostitution. In addition to the elements already discussed, it has 
added some of its own. In particular it obliges proprietors to conduct 
an intake with every sex worker who wants to work in his or her 
establishment. The purpose of the intake is to establish that the sex 
worker has not been forced or exploited. To this end the proprietor 
needs to establish if the sex worker is zelfredzaam, a term that is difficult 
to translate but that evokes ‘independency’. The sex worker needs 
to be able to communicate with proprietors, inspectors and clients. 
To this end the proprietor may subject the sex worker to an official 
language test. The APV formulates a wide range of other stipulations 
regarding business administration of the sex worker and the proprietor 
and the management of the brothel. The upshot of these measures is 
that the sex worker is now wholly dependent on the proprietor if she 
wants to work. 
National policy in Austria
As in many European countries prostitution is more or less accepted 
as part of the social landscape in Austria. This does not mean that 
sex workers have the same rights or enjoy citizenship to the same 
extent as other citizens. The pervasive stigma that rests on prostitution 
makes itself felt in the way that prostitution laws are formulated and 
in the design and implementation of administrative measures that aim 
to regulate the sex trade. Similar to the Netherlands, much of this 
regulation is not very effective, and has been designed and implemented 
without the necessary regard for the human and civil rights of sex 
workers. The goal of containing and controlling prostitution pervades 
every aspect of the political-legal-administrative system in Austria. 
This makes Austria, like the Netherlands, a fascinating example of a 
larger pattern: even countries where prostitution is legalised and that 
uphold the rule of law and values of fairness, equality and justice in 
relations between citizens and the state, show little compunction in 
suspending these values when it comes to the treatment of sex workers. 
This infringement of rights seems to be accepted as an inevitable by-
product of regulation that is designed to control prostitution, despite 
politicians’ official rhetoric of protecting the position and circumstances 
of a vulnerable group. We illustrate this by looking in more detail at 
four areas of law and the regulation of prostitution in Austria: the legal 
status of prostitution as ‘against morals’, compulsory checks for sexually 
transmitted disease (STD), the tax regime for sex workers and their 
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access to Austrian social security programmes, and immigration law as 
it pertains to migrant sex workers. But before we do this, we describe 
the policy network that is involved in prostitution policy.  
Austria is a federal state, in which the nine Länder have considerable 
autonomous decision-making power. In domains such as education, 
welfare, and also prostitution, policies with national import are largely 
shaped by regional governments. The most important legal change 
regarding prostitution policy came along with a major amendment of 
the Criminal Law of 1975. Within this framework each province has 
introduced its own legislation regarding the regulation of prostitution. 
This major change we take as the starting point to describe the social 
and policy environment in Austria in general and Vienna in particular.
Similar to the Netherlands, Austria has an active, progressive and 
well-institutionalised women’s policy that has gradually developed 
since the 1970s. In the period of the Social Democratic government 
under the legendary chancellor Bruno Kreisky (1970-83), not only was 
Criminal Law amended but also the Family Law and the Civil Code. 
For the first time in Austria’s history (1975) women achieved legal 
equality with men and were no longer subordinated to their husbands. 
Although it was only recently that a Ministry of Women’s Affairs was 
established, a State Secretary for Women’s Affairs was introduced in 
1979 and finally a Minister for Women’s Affairs (within the Federal 
Chancellery), in 1990. On the regional level, a Women’s Department 
of the city of Vienna followed in 1992. The institutionalisation of 
women’s policy was a result of the growing pressure of the second 
feminist movement that demanded gender equality, the representation 
of women in politics and also the consideration of the gender-specific 
effects of policies. Further milestones in achieving gender equality were 
set in the field of employment and the domestic sphere. For example, 
in close cooperation with feminist groups, Austria has developed and 
implemented one of the first and still one of the best violence protection 
laws (1997) in Europe (Dearing and Haller, 2005).
With regard to prostitution several conferences about sexual violence 
were held at the national level in which prostitution and trafficking 
were important topics. These conferences were organised to coincide 
with the world women’s conference in Beijing in 1995. The Minister 
for Women’s Affairs and the Viennese Women’s Department have been 
active in a number of areas such as financing research on prostitution 
and NGOs working in the field of sex work. Furthermore, in 2001 the 
Viennese Women’s Department, together with NGOs LEFÖ/Tampep 
and MILENA, and with the cooperation of La Strada (based in Prague), 
organised a seminar on prostitution as a transnational phenomenon in 
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Prague. Similar to the Netherlands, a densely interconnected policy 
subsystem around the issue of prostitution emerged in Austria in the 
1980s. Feminists, both in an advocacy role and in institutional positions 
that extended deep into the political sphere and the government 
bureaucracy, played an important role in this subsystem. Members 
of the subsystem promoted progressive prostitution policies and the 
acceptance of prostitution as work, while acknowledging the risks of 
trafficking. 
The institutionalisation of prostitution as a policy domain led to 
a flurry of legislative activity in Austria. In the 1990s the federal 
government established a task force on human trafficking led by the 
Ministry for European and International Affairs and composed of 
various ministries and institutions at the regional level as well as NGOs. 
The task force recommended a review of prostitution legislation. It 
also promoted the development of legislation for workplace safety 
and social security in prostitution. This eventually resulted in the 
first National Action Plan against human trafficking in 2007 and 
2008. This recommendation was informed by the insight that the sex 
trade would not vanish with prohibition and that working conditions 
can only be influenced with legalisation. Subsequently, under the 
guidance of the women’s section at the Federal Chancellery, experts 
developed a comprehensive catalogue of measures (ExpertInnenkreis 
Prostitution, 2008), among them the establishment of a working group 
that deals with regulations at the level of the Länder. This working 
group, Länderkompetenzen Prostitution,95 was finally installed in 
2009 within the framework of a task force on human trafficking (AG 
Länderkompetenzen Prostitution, 2012, p  4 onwards). The federal 
working group, chaired by the Ministry of Education and Women’s 
Affairs (now the Ministry of Health and Women’s Affairs), consists of 
representatives of the Länder administration, police forces, health offices, 
NGOs and an academic expert in prostitution.96 Sex workers and sex 
worker organisations have not yet been appointed to the working 
group. The group’s main task is the review of the diverse regulations 
concerning prostitution and their effects on working conditions. 
The discussions in the working group – it meets twice a year – are 
summarised in periodical reports that aim to support regional and 
95 In 2015 the working group was renamed Arbeitsgruppe Prostitution (Prostitution 
Working Group).
96 So far the position of academic expert has been held by Helga Amesberger.
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local politicians in their decisions.97 Although the positions towards 
prostitution are not uniform within the working group, a general 
agreement about a regulative and decriminalising approach exists. The 
working group also took a firm position against the legal ban on the 
purchase of sexual services and against the punishment of clients (AG 
Prostitution, 2014).
NGOs working in the field of prostitution always had and still have 
an important role in the national and regional public discourse. In the 
1990s the NGOs, especially LEFÖ and several others that no longer 
exist,98 always acted from a perspective that defines prostitution as a 
service profession.99 Not all Länder have NGOs specialised in sex work. 
Most of these NGOs live a precarious existence as they are financially 
dependent on the public sector. In Vienna the situation for both NGOs, 
LEFÖ and SOPHIE, temporarily improved with the implementation 
of the new Prostitution Act, but they have been affected by budget cuts 
again since then. With the expansion of outreach work and counselling 
programmes these NGOs have obtained financial contracts with the 
city of Vienna. 
Alliances of feminist groups and sex worker initiatives emerged from 
time to time in Vienna in the 1980s, but they did not last long. The 
sex worker initiatives themselves were short-lived. One example is a 
protest involving sex workers who operated the self-organised brothel 
Weinstock in Vienna. As police repression got more severe in the early 
1980s they wrote a pamphlet protesting against the marriage prohibition 
for sex workers, paternalism in the sex trade and other harassments.100 
97 Two reports have been published so far; see AG Länderkompetenzen Prostitution 
(2012) and AG Prostitution (2015).
98 For instance Lilith, which wanted to enhance the communication among sex 
workers and between sex workers and non-sex workers. It was the successor 
project of Schlußstrich, an EU-funded project that did not gain enough funding 
to continue (Amesberger et al, 1999, p 70 onwards). 
99 At the end of 1990s the NGOs maiz and LENA were founded in Oberösterreich; 
in the 2000s there followed SOPHIE in Vienna, SXA-Info (information and 
counselling for sex workers and multipliers) in Styria, Caritas in Carinthia, Frau 
& Arbeit in Salzburg and iBus in Tyrol. This list is not complete. There are some 
departments within organisations that offer counselling for sex workers and do 
outreach work; some are connected with churches. The Sexworker-Forum für 
professionelle Sexarbeit has special status – it is primarily an internet platform, 
which nevertheless provides, besides information, support for sex workers. It is 
financially independent (source: interview, Christian Knappik). This forum is hardly 
acknowledged by the authorities as a stakeholder/representative of sex workers.
100 The building in which the brothel was located was bought by the city of Vienna 
and afterwards demolished in March 1981. This meant the end of this sex worker 
initiative.
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At the same time another initiative launched by a group of 13 Viennese 
sex workers demanded the abolition of prohibition zones and the 
legalisation of street prostitution and hour hotels (Gassenstrich and 
Stundenhotels) as well as self-governed brothels (Waldenberg, 2012, 
p 116 onwards). In 1986, to give another example, Ms Eva founded the 
Association of Austrian Prostitutes (Verband der Prostituierten Österreichs, 
or VdPÖ) as reaction to the three-year retrospective taxation of sex 
workers.101 The VdPÖ launched an extensive catalogue of demands 
requesting improvements in tax law and health provisions as well as 
measures against the discrimination of sex workers, such as the repeal 
of the occupational ban in certain fields for former sex workers, 
the abolition of registration and the decriminalisation of sex work 
(Neuweg, 1990, p 80 onwards; Waldenberg, 2012, p 120 onwards). 
Waldenberg concluded that the VdPÖ acted more like a union – it did 
not offer counselling in areas such as AIDS/HIV or exit programmes 
– and this might have been the reason for it not being awarded state 
funds (for counselling or meeting rooms, for example) (Waldenberg, 
2012, p 124).
Since the 1990s self-organisation has decreased, although in Vienna 
the Initiative for Whores (Initiative für Huren) campaigned against the 
expansion of prohibition zones. This group also submitted a petition to 
political representatives of the city of Vienna, which politicians declined 
to accept. Nevertheless, a loose coalition of sex worker initiatives, 
feminists and NGOs that denounced the moral double standard with 
regard to prostitution generated enough political pressure for sex 
workers to gain access to national insurance (AG Länderkompetenzen 
Prostitution, 2012, p 4). In 2005, an online forum – the Sex Worker 
Forum – was established to represent the interests of sex workers in 
Austria: ‘[t]he Forum works to protect and to promote the human 
rights of adult women, men and transgender persons in voluntary sex 
work’ (Sex Worker Forum Austria, 2013, p 3). It is a platform for those 
seeking to improve their life and working conditions and a forum for 
exchange and networking. Its main political aims are complete equality 
of prostitution with other occupations, the decriminalisation of the 
entire sector and the abolishment of compulsory registration and health 
checks for sex workers (Amesberger et al, in press).
101 The association had a branch in Innsbruck (Tyrol) and in Vienna. The association’s 
newspaper Horizontal was published four times a year. In 1989 it had 28 members. 
Non-sex workers could be members of the VdPÖ but were not entitled to vote 
(Neuweg, 1990, p 80 onwards) It is not known how long this association existed.
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This brief historical retrospective serves to illustrate that a rich 
substratum of sex worker advocacy organisations and NGOs exists 
in Austria, and in its capital Vienna in particular, keeping sex worker 
rights on the political agenda. However, similar to the Netherlands, 
this discourse of labour rights and decriminalisation of the sex trade 
has increasingly lost out against the abolitionist discourse of trafficking. 
As a result most sex workers’ demands still have not been met by 
Austrian/Viennese prostitution policies; in fact since the early 1990s 
the situation of sex workers situation has worsened in several respects. 
In the 2000s the Viennese parliament frequently debated prostitution. 
The political discourse, like the public one, was marked by heated 
debates. The fragile consensus of the 1980s and 1990s that had framed 
prostitution as an issue of sex worker rights had disintegrated by then. In 
Vienna, too, prostitution had acquired all the characteristics of morality 
politics. Politicians of all parties (except for the Greens and the LIF102), 
the media and various civil society stakeholders exerted considerable 
political pressure in favour of accepting the abolitionist trafficking 
agenda. One indication of this, among others, is that between April 
2004 and June 2011 (when the WPG 2011 was accepted by the 
Viennese government) prostitution and human trafficking in relation 
to prostitution were addressed 29 times in the Viennese parliament. 
The framing of the political discourse in Vienna (and the rest of 
Austria) had evident regressive tendencies, demonstrating themes and 
patterns that were common in the 19th century.103 Prostitution was 
once again regarded as a threat to public order, morals, public health 
and minors. With the influx of migrant sex workers from eastern 
Europe, the discourse became ethnicised and the already previously 
existing polarisation between ‘good’, registered, and ‘bad’, illegal, sex 
workers deepened (El-Nagashi, 2010). At the same time the discourse 
somehow lost its gender dimension; prostitution was described as 
something that is unrelated to gendered labour market positions and 
inequality. Consequently, policies were primarily focused on the 
reduction of prostitution, especially of visible prostitution, as we saw 
in the preceding chapter.
In the 1990s, prostitution was partially framed as a social problem, a 
matter of poverty. Therefore, counselling, harm reduction and assistance 
to quit sex work, as well as the improvement of working conditions, and 
social rights, were considered effective means of problem resolution. 
102 LIF – Liberales Forum (Liberal Forum). The party does not exist anymore.
103 The description of the discursive frames in Austria follows largely the analysis by 
Amesberger et al, in press.
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Nevertheless, ‘[w]hile this frame gained some importance in the 
period leading up to the partial inclusion of sex workers in the social 
security system in 1997, it was never particularly strong and has been 
rather de-articulated since then’ (Amesberger et al, in press). The same 
befell the prostitution-is-work frame, which has been promoted by 
counselling services for sex workers since the 1990s. Although this 
discourse never gained much power, the lobbying for the recognition 
of sex work as a deliberatively chosen occupation by these NGOs 
was important insofar as it kept alive the decriminalisation track in 
prostitution policy (Amesberger, 2014, p 224). The sex work frame 
was overpowered, however, by the discourse of human trafficking and 
forced prostitution. The focus on problem resolution shifted towards 
persecuting traffickers and reducing illegal immigration and away from 
harm reduction and support for victims of human trafficking. The 
discourse about prostitution has become re-gendered in the past few 
years by defining prostitution as male violence. Since 2010, a small 
feminist group supported by several Christian NGOs like Solwodi and 
Herzwerk have campaigned for a prohibition of sex purchase and the 
introduction of the Nordic model of client criminalisation.104 
As Hrzeniak and colleagues (2007) have shown for Austria and 
Hamen (2011) for Oberösterreich, different frames are tied to different 
political parties but elements of various frames are found within all 
political parties. In Vienna, too, prostitution is discussed in connection 
with criminality (coercion, illegality, human trafficking and drugs) and 
as a threat to juveniles and to the moral order. This kind of discourse 
is mainly led by the right-wing populist Freedom Party and People’s 
Party and to a lesser extent by the Social Democrats. As everywhere 
else, this ‘criminalisation frame’ propagates both the criminalisation 
and victimisation of the sex workers. The Social Democrats promote 
the view that prostitution is a manifestation of our patriarchal system; 
here again the sex worker is seen as a victim. The Green Party pursues 
an approach that emphasises the socioeconomic situation and human 
rights of sex workers.105 As in the Netherlands, the media play an 
important role in fuelling the political und public discourse in general 
and the criminalisation frame in particular. By way of illustration, 
in 2011 alone at least 80 articles in the national daily newspapers 
dealt with the issue of prostitution. Trafficking of women in sexual 
104 See www.stoppsexkauf.at.
105 This summary description of the political parliamentary discourse in Vienna is 
based on the analysis of of the minutes of the Viennese State Legislative Assembly 
(Landtag) and the city council (Gemeinderat) (2001-11). 
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exploitation, forced prostitution and street-based sex work were their 
main concerns. Opponents of street prostitution areas (residents and 
business managers) often succeeded in promoting their views via these 
newspapers and local TV programmes. 
‘Against good morals’ 
In 1975 prostitution was removed from criminal law, which regulated 
prostitution, pimping and client punishment. The background to this 
measure was that the Constitutional Court regarded police discretion in 
enforcing the vagrancy law as unconstitutional and its consequences as 
inequitable (Sauer, 2003, p 12). Similar to the Netherlands, prostitution 
is now within the remit of civil and administrative law and regional 
and local administrative ordinances and bylaws. The highly regulatory 
character of Austrian prostitution policies is reflected in the multitude 
of specific regulations for sex workers within the Civil Code, alien 
police law, income tax law, immigration police law, AIDS law, STD 
law and the National Insurance Act, to name the most important 
ones. In addition, criminal law still specifies several offences related 
to prostitution.106 
The majority of the criminal offences that are delineated in 
Austrian criminal law aim to protect sexual integrity and sexual self-
determination; a few are related to the restriction of liberty. It is not 
the single offences and regulations that are of interest here, but the 
intentions of the legislator, which disclose political values and attitudes 
towards prostitution and the framing of prostitution and sex workers. 
Criminal law expert, Lyane Sautner, identifies three major objectives 
in Austrian prostitution law: the protection of juveniles, the protection 
of sex workers against (structural) disadvantages, and the prevention of 
adults from entering prostitution (Sautner, 2012, p 6 onwards). The 
legislation considers juveniles and sex workers especially worthy of 
protection as prostitution touches on sensitive areas of sexual integrity, 
freedom of will and property. At the same time, by declaring ‘leading 
106 Among them are ‘pimping to exploit’ (CC § 216), ‘soliciting’ (CC § 219) and 
‘illicit sexual acts in public’ (CC § 218), which are liable to prosecution under the 
Penal Code. Trade in prostitution across the borders is also subject to penalty (CC 
§ 217). On other words, it is illegal for a sex worker to cross the border with the 
client. Trafficking in women – into prostitution and into other forms of coerced 
labour – is punished according to the Austrian Penal Code (CC § 104a). The 1975 
legalisation of prostitution concerned only heterosexual prostitution; same-sex 
prostitution remained a criminal offense (CC § 210) until 1989 (Sautner, 2012, 
p 2).
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into prostitution’ (‘Zuführen zur Prostitution’, CC § 215) a felony, 
the law discourages prostituting oneself. The conclusion is that the 
state considers prostitution socially undesirable. Moreover, the law is 
paternalistic towards women and it stigmatises and limits the liberty 
of sex workers (Sautner, 2012, p 7). In the remainder of this section 
we discuss the ways in which it does this.
Although prostitution is no longer a criminal offence, in 1989 the 
Supreme Court of Justice defined it as ‘sittenwidrig’ – ‘against good 
morals’ (OGH 28.06.1989, 3 Ob 516/89).107 This had far-reaching 
consequences for sex workers, because, although legal in a formal 
sense, prostitution could for this reason never be a legally recognised 
occupation that for example granted the right to enter a contract 
(such as a labour contract with a proprietor) or other workers’ rights. 
This made the position of sex workers in Austria very ambivalent. 
The Supreme Court of Justice provided several justifications for its 
decision. Prostitution is inherently against morals because it occurs 
in a situation where male clients are inherently weak-willed, often 
drunk and overcome by lust. Moreover, families need to be protected 
against the effects of prostitution, as it promotes adultery. In general, 
the Sittenwidrigkeits clause was meant to impede the commercialisation 
of sex (Marktler, 2012, p 15 onwards). These arguments illustrate how 
gender and the red-light ‘milieu’ are socially constructed. Prostitution 
is considered a danger for irrational, instinct-driven men and their 
families, and the sex trade is criminalised as it allegedly takes advantage 
of the client’s weaknesses. Contrary to the aforementioned intentions 
of criminal provisions relating to prostitution, for the Supreme Court 
of Justice it is the client and the family as an institution that have to 
be protected, not the sex worker. 
In April 2012 the Supreme Court of Justice unexpectedly removed 
the Sittenwidrigkeits clause (Oberste Gerechtshof, 3 Ob 45/12g). With this 
reversal of its earlier position the court acknowledged the inconsistency 
of the former decision. It emphasised that prostitution is allowed in 
Austria and sufficiently regulated in specific prostitution laws at the 
provincial level. The court also disagreed with the previously stated 
need for the protection of clients and the family and declared sex 
workers a vulnerable group that requires protection by the law. In its 
decision the court also clearly stated that the Sittenwidrigkeits clause 
had weakened the position of the sex worker. So far the consequences 
for the prostitution field cannot be overseen. The removal of the 
107 Austria is not an exception in this; prostitution was also sittenwidrig in Germany 
and Switzerland. 
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Sittenwidrigkeits clause has so far not been integrated into labour or trade 
law, and it seems unlikely that this will happen anytime soon. Although 
the repeal was the outcome of a claim in which the Supreme Court 
had to prove whether the demand for payment of delivered sexual 
services opposed the Sittenwidrigkeits clause (Marktler, 2012, p 17), 
there are no indications, and it seems in fact quite unlikely (as we will 
see later in the discussion about the inclusion of prostitution in the 
national insurance system) that prostitution will be recognised as work. 
Compulsory STD checks 
Austria’s national policy has a strong regulatory dimension with 
an emphasis on public order, public health and fiscal compliance. 
Compulsory STD checks are one of the longest-standing policy 
instruments in Austria for controlling sex workers. The discourse about 
compulsory health checks is fierce, and as we show in the following 
discussion, it is a prime example of the pervasive effects of stigma and 
the gendered nature of policymaking in this domain. Compulsory STD 
checks were introduced in Vienna in the middle of the 19th century 
– at the time, twice weekly. This temporary measure for preventing 
the spread of syphilis became, as Sabitzer (2000) puts it, a permanent 
condition. This regional regulation was adopted nationwide in a 
decree from 1918 and has remained in force with few changes since 
(Amesberger, 2016, p 178). Female sex workers can only work when 
they carry a booklet that states that they passed the STD check. As 
of January 2016 a decree has been issued that reduces the frequency 
of the STD checks to once every six weeks.108 The requirement for 
sex workers to provide medical proof of being free from STDs before 
commencing sex work remained unchanged, along with the ban on 
providing sexual services if a sex worker has symptoms of STD. 
Control through public health measures, in conjunction with 
registration, is a central element of Austrian prostitution policy. Austria 
is one of the few countries in the world that sticks to compulsory STD 
checks (Jahnsen and Wagenaar, in press). Yet historically there has also 
been strong opposition to compulsory medical investigations (see, for 
example, Schlesinger, 1868; Grün, 1907). At the beginning of the 
20th century, in an early intuition of the working of morality politics, 
the Viennese medical doctor Heinrich Grün expressed his anger that 
every layperson, every doctor or non-doctor, teacher, priest, politician, 
108 Medical tests for syphilis and HIV have to be repeated every third month. Some 
provinces additionally demand checks for tuberculosis. 
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police officer or suffragette, intervenes in the discussion out of moral 
indignation but without any knowledge of the subject (1907, p 2). 
It outraged him because the discourse had an impact on the choice 
of regulation. Today the issue of compulsory health checks is as alive 
as it was in fin-de-siècle Vienna. During the research interviews for 
this book, one of the authors (Amesberger) was often astonished by 
officials’ visceral defence of compulsory STD checks. Whether police 
officers, administrators or politicians, they all considered the abolition 
to be to the detriment of migrant, poorly educated, sex workers. 
The discussions within the federal working group on prostitution 
also displayed the controversial nature of this topic. Whereas service 
providers advocate voluntary STD checks of good quality and free of 
charge, members of police and administration insist on maintaining 
their compulsory nature (AG Prostitution, 2015, p 36), often with a 
frequency that makes no medical sense. 
The stalemate over compulsory STD checks suggests that issues 
other than the health of sex workers or the public are at stake. At 
least three characteristics of morality politics are at work here. First, 
although the underlying ideology is not overt in this discourse, the 
debate is a manifestation of the struggle over the (female) body. It is 
not by accident that compulsory STD checks became a popular form 
of regulation in the middle of the 19th century. Foucault describes in 
a ground-breaking work that the body became the focus of scientific 
and political interest in the 18th century (1983, p 95 onwards). He 
names four powerful strategic complexes – four specific ‘dispositifs’ of 
knowledge and power – that emerged in the realm of sex at this time 
and were used as a form of social control through societal institutions.109 
With this transformation (supported by medicine, biology, pedagogy 
and other fields), sex became an affair of the state, a concern for the 
entire social body. According to this genealogy compulsory, STD 
checks can therefore be considered a form of social control over the 
female body and female sexuality. Second, moral policy is lay policy. 
As discussed earlier, anyone may claim to be well informed and to 
have an opinion on the subject and the solution. Third, morality 
politics ignores evidence. Although the preface of the draft regulation 
states that scientific medical standards should be met, the legislator 
ignores empirical research that shows low STD infection rates among 
109 These four mechanisms comprised a rendering of the female body as hysterical; a 
pedagogic interest in children’s sexuality; the socialisation of reproductive behavior; 
and a psychologising of perverse lust.
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sex workers and suggests adverse effects stemming from compulsory 
STD checks. 
Furthermore, the social construction of sex workers has changed 
little since the 19th century. Grün already denounces the construction 
of prostitutes as ‘fallen girls’ who are either too lazy to work or naïve 
and uneducated and therefore prone to seduction. He ascribes these 
collective images as a lack of knowledge about the socioeconomic 
conditions that support prostitution. He also states that clients are 
released from liability. In today’s discussion remarkably similar images 
abound. While at the time of Heinrich Grün it was the poor, innocent, 
naïve, uneducated migrant girl from the countryside, now it is the 
poor, uneducated migrant girl from abroad (primarily from Romania 
and Bulgaria and from Roma communities). Proponents think that 
compulsory STD checks are necessary because migrant sex workers 
are assumed to have scant knowledge about health protection and 
because too many would be willing to provide unprotected sexual 
services on the request of clients or brothel managers. Opponents 
consider compulsory STD checks to be a violation of human rights 
and a measure that contributes to the stigmatisation of sex workers, 
as it fosters the assumption that they are endangering public health.110 
Furthermore, compulsory STD checks are deemed counterproductive: 
on the one hand, clients feel that it is safe to ask for unprotected sex, 
and on the other hand, such an obligation undermines the personal 
responsibility of both clients and sex workers. 
The formulation and implementation of the law concerning 
compulsory STD checks tell us a lot about political culture in Austria 
with regard to prostitution policy. Like the repeal of the Sittenwidrigkeits 
clause, the new decree on compulsory STD checks took many by 
surprise. Although for about five years there had been infrequent 
meetings to discuss the issue at the Ministry of Health, an amendment 
of the regulation seemed far off. In 2014, the Viennese outpatient 
clinic prepared a proposal for new regulations that it sought to discuss 
with the federal working group on prostitution before submitting it 
to the Ministry of Health. It is not known whether such a proposal 
was ever submitted. However, in May 2015 the Ministry of Health 
published a draft regulation for review by the wider public. The 
working group had not been consulted about the new law, but at the 
invitation of the group’s chairperson, the draft was presented by a 
110 The Sexworker Forum submitted a complaint to the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights with regard to discrimination against sex workers in terms of 
rights to work and to health (28 June 2013).
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member of the ministry. But neither the subsequent discussion, nor the 
written statement by the working group and the statements of others 
involved in the review process (that all raised, among others, concerns 
about the feasibility of the regulation) led to substantial changes to the 
draft. This short description of the process depicts again the absence 
of a willingness to cooperate with others outside of a small and tight 
circle of officials. A political culture of cross-sectional collaboration 
and knowledge exchange still seems to be at best in its infancy in the 
Austrian regulatory process with regard to prostitution. With regard to 
implementation of the new rules the ministry sought cooperation with 
members of the working group on prostitution, who were invited to 
speak at a seminar for public health officers. It became evident that the 
public health officers felt quite unprepared for their new information 
tasks – during the first medical investigation, they would have to inform 
attendees not only about protection measures concerning STDs and 
pregnancy but also about counselling and support services for sex 
workers. Outreach workers and counselling services indeed report 
that sex workers are not at all informed about the new regulation and 
the effect it will have.111
Fiscal law 
The history of taxation of sex workers and their inclusion in the 
social security regime in Austria is another example of the absence of 
implementation design with all the attendant consequences regarding 
equal treatment, and of a lack of collaboration at all stages from law 
formulation to implementation. It is also demonstrates that such 
failures almost always have a negative effect on the position and rights 
of sex workers. Since 1983 sex workers have had to pay taxes, for 
which purposes they are administratively categorised as independent 
contractors. Since 1998 they have also been eligible for some social 
security programmes. Depending on their income, sex workers have to 
pay income tax and value added tax. Above a certain income threshold it 
is mandatory to be insured through the social security system for private 
enterprises (health, accident and pension insurance).112 Irrespective of 
level of income, self-employed people must still register with the SVA 
111 Source: personal conversation with members of the prostitution working group.
112 All self-employed people come under the remit of the Social Insurance Authority 
for Business (SVA). Insurance is only compulsory in cases where income is more 
than €5,000 per year. Sex workers who earn less than this may opt in to the SVA 
insurance scheme, but will only be insured against illness and accident.
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within one month.113 Insurance cover for health and accidents starts 
at the moment of registration, or the beginning of self-employment, 
whichever comes first.114 The opt-in system does not cover pensions 
insurance. This was the law until July 2014; implementation of the law 
varied greatly among the Länder and even the districts. 
Until then the fiscal authorities considered sex workers (including 
those working in clubs/brothels) predominantly as ‘newly self-
employed’ (Neue Selbständige), who either registered themselves at 
the local fiscal office or paid a flat tax of between €250 and €350 per 
month via the sex facility manager. The flat tax model was introduced 
because of problems with assessing sex workers’ incomes and because 
of sex workers’ resistance to these assessments.115 It was an easy and 
efficient way to collect taxes that did not require many resources 
from the tax offices: the brothel owner was held responsible; the tax 
office had to administer only one rather than multiple tax accounts 
(depending on the number of sex workers working in an establishment); 
and there were no complicated and lengthy procedures. One of the 
great advantages of devolving tax collection to proprietors was that 
it guaranteed that more mobile migrant sex workers paid taxes. For 
those sex workers who had a net income above €1,800 per month, as 
well as for those who did not want to bother with bookkeeping and 
income declarations, this type of tax collection was advantageous too. 
This is one side of the coin. 
The other side is that the flat tax lacked legal foundation, which led 
to its abolishment in July 2014. Moreover, the flat tax was an example 
of a ‘postcode regulation’ – in other words, sex workers were taxed 
according to where they worked. Moreover, the lump sum itself varied 
from province to province (between €250 and €350 per month) and 
only a few tax offices agreed to a reduction in cases of part-time work. 
NGOs reported that the flat tax model caused some tax offices to refuse 
to register sex workers individually, a right that was guaranteed only 
with the support of an NGO. This flat tax system made sex workers 
wholly dependent on the proprietor in their fiscal dealings with the 
113 According to verbal information from the SVA (27 January 2011), although 
freelancers are exempted from paying for insurance if they earn less than €5,000, 
they must nevertheless register with the SVA. 
114 It is not known how many sex workers obtain social insurance. Inquiries at the SVA 
revealed only low numbers. It is assumed that the majority of sex workers mention 
other professions (such as masseuse or dancer) when they apply for insurance.
115 As described earlier, the sex worker organization VdPÖ protested against the 
arbitrary income assessment that was driven by the myth of exorbitant earnings in 
the sex industry.
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state. Proprietors collected the money but sex workers had no proof 
that they had transferred it. Moreover, sex workers paying the flat tax 
did not have personal tax accounts and so were unable to prove their 
yearly income, something that is a precondition for renting a flat, 
obtaining credit or – and this is relevant for migrant sex workers – 
receiving permanent residency in Austria. All these aspects resulted in 
considerable unequal treatment of sex workers by authorities. 
Convenience trumped legality, but because of the unlawful 
implementation of the tax law and because of the fact that some work 
relations in brothels resembled dependent employment, the Ministry 
of Finance eventually released a decree that listed a number of criteria 
for assessing work relationships as dependent or self-employed.116 To 
summarise a complex set of laws and regulations, when the tax office 
considers work relations to be ‘dependent’, the employer pays social 
security contributions in respect of the employee’s wages. In fact, in 
practice the sex worker pays the contributions, without gaining much 
advantage, as the contributions only generate limited entitlement to 
benefits. The only advantage is that the sex worker is insured against 
illness and disability and builds up a pension. But ‘regular’ employees 
also have the right to paid sick leave and paid holidays. Almost all 
proprietors circumvent these rights (source: interview with NGO). 
The dependent employment decree was unilaterally developed without 
consultation with experts in the field of prostitution. It is not surprising 
that it was widely criticised for its adverse effects on sex workers. 
Brothel managers pass on all social security contributions to the sex 
workers, so their income is considerably reduced. It is common practice 
for proprietors to withhold client payments from the sex worker until 
all taxes and contributions are covered. As taxes have to be paid in 
advance at the beginning of the month, sex workers who want to 
change their workplace have to stay at their current establishment for 
the whole month in order to avoid paying tax twice. 
With the annulment of the Sittenwidrigkeits clause, secure employment 
contracts for sex workers became theoretically possible. The dependent 
employment decree seemed to acknowledge this development. 
However, in autumn 2015 the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and 
Consumer Protection published a draft amendment to the national 
Social Law (SRÄG) that stipulated that sex workers were to be 
explicitly excluded from General Social Security (ASVG) even when 
the tax office classified the work relationship as dependent. According 
to the legislator, inclusion in the ASVG would contradict Article 8 
116 Decree BMF-010203/0243-VI/B/2014.
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of the European Convention on Human Rights (the ‘right to respect 
for private and family life’). The right to sexual self-determination 
contained within Article 8 was considered incompatible with 
dependent employment.117 The draft amendment drew considerable 
criticism from a wide range of actors.118 The consensus was that 
the exclusion of sex workers from the ASVG would contradict the 
principle of equal treatment, would therefore be discriminatory and 
would have serious detrimental effects for sex workers. Furthermore, 
sexual self-determination is protected by the Austrian criminal law, 
while the employer’s right to give instruction is also restricted in other 
occupations, such as judges. This unanimous reaction led the executive 
to withdraw the proposal. 
This short overview of fiscal and employment law regarding sex 
workers once again demonstrates that administrative agencies regularly 
violate the rights of sex workers when applying administrative 
regulations. Perhaps the most distressing aspects of this are the habitual 
ease with which sex workers’ needs and rights are overlooked and the 
fact that the uncertainty and impairment that are caused by these rules 
and their implementation would be widely considered unacceptable 
with any other occupational group. 
Immigration law
As in most European countries, prostitution regulation in Austria is 
strongly shaped by immigration laws. In 2013 about 95% of registered 
sex workers in Vienna were migrants (source: Viennese Police 
Directorate). With respect to the right of residency and work Austrian 
immigration law distinguishes three groups of non-EU nationals: 
citizens of the European Economic Area (EEA), non-EEA citizens, 
and asylum seekers. EEA citizens have the right to take up residence 
117 169/ME XXV. GP; see ‘Explanations to the Ministerial Draft “Sozialrechts-
Änderungsgesetz 2015”’, p 7 onwards (https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/
XXV/ME/ME_00169/fname_480262.pdf). Dutch brothel owners also used this 
article, rather self-servingly, to argue against labour contracts with the attendant 
social security contributions. 
118 Among them are counselling services for sex workers (LEFÖ, LENA), legal 
experts from university departments, the Austrian Association of Female 
Lawyers, the City of Vienna and Carinthian Government, the Klagsverband zur 
Durchsetzung der Rechte von Diskriminierungsopfern (Association of NGOs 
Against Discrimination) and the Federal Chamber of Labour. It is interesting that 
the Austrian Trade Union Federation did not comment on the exclusion of sex 
workers from the ASVG. All reviews on the SRÄG are accessible at https://www.
parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/ME/ME_00169/index.shtml.
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and, similar to EU citizens, have full access to the labour market. They 
can work in paid employment and work as a self-employed person 
or freelancer – also as a sex worker. For the citizens of those member 
states that accessed the European Union in May 2004 and January 
2007 access to the labour market in Austria was restricted to a seven-
year period, and they could only work as self-employed persons.119 
Non-EEA citizens who want to work as prostitutes in Austria need a 
specific visa according to the Alien Police Law.120 Such a visa can be 
issued for self-employment or employment, but only for three to six 
months within a 12-month period. These visas are very hard to obtain 
and are the only opportunity for non-EEA-citizens to enter Austria. 
Since 2003, asylum seekers have been able to work as self-employed 
sex workers after a period of three months from applying for asylum. 
Although immigration law is for the largest part not specifically 
directed at sex workers, it nevertheless affects the sex trade in Austria. 
As immigration law determines who has access to the Austrian 
labour market, changes in the law are immediately reflected in the 
national composition of migrant sex workers. A few figures by way 
of illustration: in 2006, half of Viennese sex workers came from one 
of the EU-25 countries (those that accessed the EU in 2004); in 2012 
this number dropped to 38%. Sex workers from EU-27 countries 
(including those in the 2007 EU accession) constituted only 2% of 
all Viennese sex workers in 2006 and 45% in 2012, suggesting a large 
influx of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens in the Viennese sex trade.121 
These numbers indicate that sex work is an entrance door for low-wage 
female migrants who do not have full access to the Austrian labour 
market. The effects of immigration law are also reflected in the number 
of ‘third-country’ members: only seven of 100 sex workers belong to 
this group, whereas 83 of 100 are members of states that accessed the 
EU in 2004 or 2007. For the first group the Austrian labour market is 
de facto closed (Amesberger, 2014, p 157). The possibility for asylum 
seekers also to work in the field of prostitution frequently raises 
concerns, as it is believed (not evidenced) that many are victims of 
119 Those countries gaining accession to the EU on 1 May 2004 were Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Poland, Cyprus and Malta 
(Malta and Cyprus were not subject to a transitional period for free movement). 
Bulgaria and Romania accessed the EU on 1 January 2007. Citizens of the former 
group gained full access to the labour market in May 2011, and those of the latter 
states obtained full access in January 2014.
120 This law came into force on 1 January 2006.
121 A detailed statistical analysis of the Austrian sex market is provided in Amesberger, 
2014, ch IV.4.
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trafficking (ExpertInnenkreis Prostitution im Rahmen der Task Force 
Menschenhandel, 2008, p 46; interviews; media reports). According to 
the Viennese police 1.9% of Viennese sex workers are asylum seekers, 
mostly Nigerian citizens. 
Immigration law and its implementation also affect the mobility of 
sex workers and often induce mobility. Dora, whose story opens this 
book, expresses this aspect of the immigrant sex worker’s life when 
she says: “You go to bed with one law and wake up with another.” 
She referred to the abolishment of the aforementioned ‘prostitution 
visa’, which rendered all sex workers with such a visa illegal overnight. 
Another example is an EU regulation covering ‘third-country’ nationals 
with a Schengen visa in Vienna, which stipulates that such persons 
are allowed to stay for three months in another EU country but must 
not work there. Nevertheless, the Viennese police did not apply this 
regulation until spring 2012.122 The new rulings restrict the work 
possibilities of non-EU nationals in the sex trade. Although EU citizens 
who are sex workers have a less vulnerable position with regard to 
working and residency rights, their legal status is nevertheless weak. To 
give an example, in cooperation with the police the city of Salzburg 
developed a ‘concept’ stating that sex workers who have received 
three police reports because of illegal prostitution will be deported to 
their home countries when caught a fourth time. This measure was 
deemed necessary for the protection of public health, according to the 
vice-mayor of the city (Ruep, 2015). In fact, it is an experiment to 
contain illegal street prostitution on one neighbourhood of the city by 
way of forced mobility. Dora’s observation about overnight changes 
in the law is still valid.
Conclusion 
In Chapter Three we argued that, from a practice perspective, the 
common distinction between central and local policymaking does 
not hold up. Local government is only subordinate to central law-
making institutions in the eyes of national politicians and of journalists 
who are traditionally focused on national politics. Instead, as we 
argued, the actors who are involved in prostitution policy, their ideas, 
understandings and actions, overlap to the point that it is hard to 
disentangle national policy decisions from local policy initiatives and 
122 This is another instance of postcode law: according to NGOs working in other 
Austrian provinces this regulation is not applied outside Vienna.
The national governance of prostitution
188
Designing prostitution policy
implementation. According to Peter John, this insight holds across 
other policy areas as well: 
(T)here is a tradition going back to the mid-nineteenth 
century tradition of Parliament simply reproducing in 
common form what local authorities are already doing … 
(T)here is an informal network of decision makers operating 
across central and local government where many actors 
influence decision making. Ideas and influence circulate 
among the different bodies that have an input into policy 
by virtue of their role in the implementation of decisions. 
(John, 2012, pp 43-44)
While John’s observation relates to the UK, the previous chapters show 
that it is equally applicable to the continental democracies of Austria 
and the Netherlands. 
Both countries have pursued an approach to prostitution policy that, 
on the surface at least, can be characterised as pragmatic (Sullivan, 2010, 
p 104; Outshoorn, 2001, p 476). Pragmatism is an attitude towards 
the governance of morally contested issues in which the societal 
outcomes of policy interventions are weighed against moral principle 
and principle is overruled when outcomes are deemed negative. This 
results in the position that criminalising prostitution would it make 
more difficult to control, would drain resources away from other more 
pressing enforcement areas, and would be detrimental to the position 
of sex workers. Pragmatism leads to harm reduction policies, for 
example. Pragmatism was also the underlying principle of the Dutch 
policy of regulated tolerance, in which authorities considered the price 
of enforcing the prohibition on brothels as greater than entering into 
an informal agreement with brothel owners to regulate the sex trade. 
The problem with pragmatism, as these chapters show, is that it is not 
immune to the corrosive effects of the pervading stigmatisation of 
prostitution. In both the Netherlands and Austria, stigma eventually 
undermined whatever pragmatist or idealist ambitions existed in 
prostitution policy and both countries reverted once more to a repressive 
stance towards prostitution that aims at control and abatement. We saw 
in Chapter Three that, on the level of policy implementation, agency 
capture and an aggregation of small, instrumental measures and local 
bylaws gradually shifted the implementation of national prostitution 
law away from its original goals towards an outright repressive stance. 
But what are the mechanisms that push national policy from its initial 
legalising goals towards a much more repressive outcome? 
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The formulation and adoption of national law is the result of coalition 
politics – coalitions of stakeholders within, between and outside parties. 
Groups of stakeholders, loosely organised in networks of more or 
less likeminded actors, develop and try out ideas and solutions. Key 
players, often those who occupy veto points, introduce these ideas 
in parliament. Based on the composition of parliament, a winning 
majority for a particular proposal is more or less likely. In this sense 
national policymaking is remarkably fragile. The Dutch example 
both shows how a law can pass the legislature and afterwards still be 
defeated by deft political manoeuvring, or conversely, how a sudden 
parliamentary majority opens the way for the repeal of the ban on 
brothels. However, the adoption of a law says little about its acceptance 
in society, or the larger political and administrative community. The 
New Zealand Prostitution Reform Act of 2003 was passed with a 
razor-thin majority of one vote. Nevertheless the decriminalisation 
of prostitution has since then been accepted by the public, the media 
and the political and administrative community in New Zealand. In 
Vienna and the Netherlands more comfortable parliamentary majorities 
for the legalisation of the commercial exploitation of prostitution were 
reversed at both the administrative and legal level. 
The first factor in the lack of acceptance of a more normalised 
position of prostitution in society is discourse. While in New 
Zealand prostitution is discussed in the media and in political forums 
in pragmatic and reasonable terms, in Austria and the Netherlands 
the national discourse has become virulently abolitionist. In fact, 
national and local policymaking were linked by a dominant discourse 
of prostitution as trafficking and inherently coerced and by an urge 
to control and contain a stigmatised activity. Although both countries 
have made prostitution and its commercial exploitation legal, after 
decades of legalisation prostitution is still discursively, morally and 
emotionally connected with criminality, human trafficking and 
ethnically charged images of migrant victims (and perpetrators). Despite 
an official rhetoric of transforming prostitution into a regular business 
sector and protecting and improving the civil and labour rights of 
sex workers, prostitution is still subjected to special, sector-specific 
laws and regulations whose explicit aim is to control an activity that 
is thought to be out of control or forever threatening to veer out of 
control. Thus, Sullivan’s observations about Australian prostitution 
policy have a much wider resonance. She argues that legalisation is 
accompanied by a:
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… deep and ongoing ‘social ambivalence’ towards both 
prostitution and all parties who participate in selling and 
buying prostitution services … so legal brothels are operated 
by ‘mainstream’ business people but are not treated as 
‘mainstream’ businesses. Sex workers are also not treated 
like ‘normal’ workers (this is particularly evident in the 
requirements for health examinations). (Sullivan, 2010, 
p 103) 
This unequal treatment and social ambivalence is reflected in the 
full panoply of constituents of public policy, from legal regulations, 
their justifications and underlying problem definitions, to the 
implementation of the law and choice of policy instruments, the 
selection of implementing agencies, and the ideas and intrinsic values 
that suffuse all of these. This ambivalence about prostitution, expressed 
in a dominant discourse of prostitution as crime and trafficking, 
explains how two countries with two different national legal and 
administrative traditions, both of which have legalised prostitution and 
its commercial exploitation, have ended up with by and large identical 
repressive policies.
Discourse paves the way for an important mechanism that 
complements the regulatory drift and agency capture that operate at 
the level of policy implementation. At the national level the sex trade 
is shaped as much, or perhaps even more, by laws that are tangential to 
prostitution as by laws that are specifically directed at it. In both Austria 
and the Netherlands immigration law, labour law and fiscal law have 
determined the legality of (certain forms of) prostitution for certain 
national groups, the type of labour arrangement, the locations that are 
available for work, the level of earnings, and the possibilities for social 
mobility. Public health laws in Austria have singled out sex workers as 
an increased risk and subjected them to unnecessarily frequent STD 
testing. Moreover, these laws, in place since the mid-19th century, 
have proved remarkably resistant to change, even in the face of medical 
evidence contesting their effectiveness, suggesting that they are to be 
regarded more a measure of control than as a public health measure. 
Austrian fiscal law provides similar inconsistencies. While prostitution 
is legally considered to be ‘against good morals’, preventing sex workers 
from entering into contracts, this has not deterred the tax office from 
bringing sex workers into the fiscal framework of the Austrian welfare 
state. In the Netherlands a law that governs the collection of data on 
taxes, social security and criminal justice was used to limit the number 
of sex facilities and thus the number of workplaces available to sex 
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workers. In the next chapter we will see how immigration and labour 
laws are used – and in some cases strategically resisted – to limit the 
possibilities for work for migrant sex workers. The rationale behind 
the application of accessory law to regulate the sex trade derives from 
stigma, moral revulsion and a generalised aversion of immigrants. 
National discourse expresses and sustains the stigma and the feelings 
that the sex trade and immigration engender. Formal decisions to 
legalise prostitution, on the other hand, are the contingent outcome 
of coalition politics and do little to alleviate the social stigma and make 
prostitution acceptable among the general population and political 
decision makers (Jeffrey, 2015). The fear of uncontrollable expansion 
and contagion as well as the urge to eradicate prostitution from the 
urban landscape, or at the very least to contain it as much as possible, 
leads to the use of a broad spectrum of legal instruments in the fight 
against prostitution. The book of law is rarely uniform. Accessory law 
– as is the case in both Austria and the Netherlands – can counteract 
national prostitution law, undoing or preventing the application of 
legal sector-specific law. 
This opportunistic use of accessory law and policy instruments to 
contain prostitution even extends to the public sector. For example, 
since the 1980s government bureaucracies at the national and city level 
have widely experimented with collaborative forms of governance, 
attempting to involve civil society actors in policy formulation and 
implementation. Such experiments also extend to the administrative 
process itself, particularly in overcoming the perennial problem 
of information deficiencies and horizontal coordination in public 
administration (Rein, 1983b; Peters, 2006). In Chapter Three, we saw 
how local administrators in Rotterdam and The Hague have created 
so-called chain management arrangements to coordinate the fight 
against trafficking. In chain management, complementary services 
are linked laterally and sequentially, often led by a ‘chain manager’, in 
an attempt to coordinate resources for delivering client- or patient-
centred services. Chain management originated in the desire to improve 
healthcare and social services in a fragmented service landscape (Vos 
and Wagenaar, 2014). The point we make is that public innovation 
is a costly endeavour that requires resources, perseverance and strong 
political support. It is testimony to the power of the abolitionist 
ideology that this wealth of resources has been dedicated to creating 
enforcement arrangements in the fight against prostitution. Moreover, 
as we have seen, the law is often applied in such a way that it violates 
the human rights of sex workers. In Austria the laws regulating STD 
checks, and fiscal law and immigration law, are applied in inconsistent, 
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and in some instances even legally dubious, ways. With the Wet Bibob 
the Netherlands has adopted a law that ignores the universal human 
right of presumption of innocence. 
Thus, while both countries, despite an initially pragmatic and 
accepting stance towards prostitution, have reverted to control, 
containment, and in the case of the Netherlands, the forced closure of 
a large number of brothels, the two countries, because of their different 
political structure and regulatory traditions, have taken a somewhat 
different road towards repression. Law and political tradition in the 
Netherlands stipulate that while local government has considerable 
autonomy, both in terms of regulations, and personnel and mutual 
dependencies, there are strong links between the national and the 
local. It can be argued, and this chapter provides ample evidence for 
this observation, that in the case of prostitution policy the national and 
the local form a single policy subsystem. Austria is a federal state in 
which the Länder enjoy considerable autonomy in setting prostitution 
policy. National law forms a loose regulatory framework that allows 
the provinces discretion in formulating their own policies. As we have 
seen, a federally organised platform has hardly any impact on policy 
coordination. What binds Austrian public administration is a strong 
regulatory tradition, a shared belief that societal sectors can be fairly 
and effectively governed by issuing detailed rules that are grounded 
in laws that have been democratically debated. Stigma has affected 
regulation in different ways in these two legal-administrative systems. 
In the densely networked policy system of the Netherlands the 
intrinsic suspicion, distaste and anxiety that prostitution evokes among 
the general public influenced the agenda-setting process first of all. 
Early, and initially isolated, abolitionist reactions to the repeal of the 
brothel ban, such as Christian Democratic parliamentarians’ warnings 
of uncontrollable migration and the factually dubious and rhetorically 
charged report of two Social Democratic councillors in Amsterdam, 
reverberated throughout the policy subsystem. It only took one actual 
case of gross exploitation for national politicians, powerful aldermen, 
radical feminists, pundits, and Christian news outlets and broadcasting 
stations to jump on the trafficking bandwagon. By 2005 the political 
agenda on prostitution was firmly reframed in terms of trafficking, 
organised crime and reversing the legalisation of sex facilities (see 
also Outshoorn, 2012). The trafficking agenda, and the acrimonious 
national debate that supported it, permeated the offices of countless 
administrative bodies, acting as a virtual coordination mechanism that 
inexorably led to ever more authoritarian and repressive measures. 
193
In the more fragmented Austrian administrative system, the 
national debate was more subdued than in the Netherlands. Austrian 
prostitution policy of the past five decades has been characterised by 
continuity: continuity in restraining visible prostitution, continuity 
in the deployment and extension of police power, continuity in a 
minimal respect for the rights and wellbeing of sex workers, and 
continuity in the non-involvement of sex workers in the process of law 
formulation and implementation. Discontinuities, in the sense of abrupt 
changes, are mostly found in the field of immigration policy. Yet, the 
relatively sober approach to prostitution does not make the country 
immune to the effects of stigma. One of the unintended negative 
consequences of the fragmented federal system is that differences in 
regional policy design and implementation have led to far-reaching 
unequal treatment of sex workers in Austria, which some consider a 
violation of fundamental civil rights (Prantner, 2006, p 34). But more 
important is the insidious effect of stigma in the design of rules and their 
implementation by the police. Despite a strong tradition of allegiance 
to the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) and a bureaucratic ethos of impartial 
and fair administration, Austrian regulation of prostitution has been 
consistently aimed at containing and opposing sex workers. The effect 
has been the legally sanctioned and administratively facilitated erosion 
of the position and rights of sex workers in Austria. 
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FIVE 
Understanding the policy field: 
migration, prostitution, trafficking 
and exploitation
Introduction: prostitution as a complex policy field
In this chapter we discuss the complex and intricate relationship 
between migration, prostitution, trafficking and exploitation. What 
makes this relationship a difficult topic for policy makers and analysts 
alike has empirical, conceptual and practical grounds. Empirically, 
there is a lack of solid, reliable evidence on the extent of trafficking and 
slavery. In addition the field of migration and unfree labour conditions 
resists any form of simplification or even categorisation. Weitzer speaks 
in this regard of ‘tremendous complexity and heterogeneity’ (2015, 
p 224). Conceptually the migration issue poses two problems. The first 
is the entanglement of global with national and local phenomena. For 
example, because of the stigmatised nature of prostitution, it proves 
to be difficult for policy makers to see the continuities between the 
exploitation of vulnerable immigrants and the everyday exploitation 
of sex workers, or, to put it differently, to regard the exploitation 
that is emblematic even of large swathes of the regulated sex trade 
as a form of labour exploitation (see the section on prostitution and 
exploitation later in this chapter). The second problem is the difficulty 
of distinguishing between reality and rhetoric: between the reality of 
(female) migration into prostitution and its interpretation in the media, 
in policy and in law, in particular the framing of migrant prostitution 
as trafficking. Practically, it is exceedingly difficult to disentangle the 
reality of prostitution ‘on the ground’ from the effects of national 
immigration and labour law. As we show in this chapter, the latter 
have as much, if not more, impact on the everyday life of sex workers 
as designated prostitution law. In fact, most of the rules and bylaws 
that regulate prostitution are a hard to disentangle from the amalgam 
of prostitution, immigration, labour, fiscal and social security law. 
There are important policy lessons to be drawn from this argument. 
Because of the disturbing nature of exchanging sex for money, 
prostitution is in the public’s imagination – and that of most officials 
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as well – at heart seen as a dyadic transaction between two people: 
the sex worker and the client. This transaction can be ‘distorted’ by 
third parties such as brothel owners, managers or pimps, but that 
does not detract from the basic template that shapes our perception 
of prostitution.123 Our argument suggests a wholly different template, 
however. Prostitution is not a dyadic relationship but is simultaneously 
part and outcome of a larger, geographically dispersed, system that 
involves a score of actors. And even this image is not quite correct. The 
system is not just a network of actors; it also consists of the relationships 
between these actors, their understandings and explanations of the 
situation at hand, and the specific political-economic-cultural spaces 
within and between which these actors move. We call such a system 
a policy field. By this we mean a domain of concerted action that is 
characterised by multiplicity, complexity, interdependency, emergence, 
uncertainty and unpredictability (Wagenaar, 2007; Ison, 2010, p 10).
The idea of a policy field is not specific to prostitution. All domains 
of concerted human action – health, education, monetary policy, 
climate change, energy, public transport – are policy fields. The abiding 
characteristic of a policy field is complexity. Complexity means that 
it is the connections between the actors and between the actors and 
their environments that drive the system. That means that systems are 
always dynamic, in movement, developing. More importantly, it means 
that the properties of the system are emergent; that is, the properties 
of the system (for example an influx of sex workers from Hungary in 
Vienna, the rise of internet recruitment in prostitution, or the sudden 
criminalisation of the client) ‘arise or come into being at a particular 
level of organisation and … are not possessed by constituent sub-
systems. These properties emerge from the operational or relational 
dynamics between the elements or subsystems that comprise a system’ 
123 The quotation marks around the term ‘distorted’ are meant to capture a simplified 
and erroneous image of prostitution. Third parties form a much larger category 
that forms the biotope of (migrant) prostitution. We will see examples of this in the 
remainder of this chapter. Tampep, a European network for HIV/STD prevention 
and health promotion among migrant sex workers, defines third parties as follows: 
‘This term is used to describe anyone involved in the transaction of sex work who 
is neither the client nor the sex worker. The term third parties is broad as it can 
refer to people sex workers work for (owners, managers, agents), work with (agents, 
bookers), and hire (drivers, web designers) as well as individuals (receptionists, 
security). A third party is understood as an individual who controls, coordinates 
or supervises the sex workers’ labour practices (how they work) or labour process 
(when and where they work) for direct or indirect financial compensation. Also 
sex workers can be considered as third parties when they work with together with 
other sex workers.’ (Stella, 2015, p 1).
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(Ison, 2010, p 21). Emergence means that the properties of the system 
are the outcome of the interactions between the parts, not of the 
properties of the parts themselves. For example, the liquidity of water 
is the emergent outcome of the interaction between molecules that 
do not have that property. In human systems actors continually adapt 
to each other’s actions thereby reshaping their collective destination 
(Axelrod and Cohen, 2000, p xi). 
The property of emergence has two important implications for policy 
makers and analysts alike. First, emergence makes dynamic systems, 
and by implications, policy situations highly unpredictable. In fact, 
the denser the interconnections, the messier and more unpredictable 
the situation. Second, we are never outside systems. A policy maker’s 
interventions are an inherent part of the policy field. Policy makers or 
analysts might think that they are observing the situation objectively, 
from an external point of view, but their interpretations and the actions 
that flow from them influence the perceptions and actions of the other 
actors in the system, who will adjust their own actions, resulting in 
new and unforeseen emergent outcomes. These are, of course, the 
unintended consequences that bedevil all policymaking (Merton, 1936; 
Sieber, 1981; Wagenaar, 1995; Ison, 2010, p 30). 
The following example illustrates these complex relational dynamics. 
Felicia, a Romanian sex worker who works from a window in 
Amsterdam, describes her decision to work in prostitution thus:
I had a regular job in Romania. I worked in a small 
supermarket where I made €200 to €250 per month. I 
also went to school. I studied graphic design, but I didn’t 
finish that program.… I had it with life in Romania. It was 
without any perspective. A friend of mine who worked here 
already asked me if I would consider sex work. I wanted 
more in life. Make money. Money is the only reason why 
I now do this work.124
What Felicia tells us is that working in the sex trade is, for her at least, 
based on an assessment of the earnings potential and work conditions of 
the different job options that were realistically available to her. In other 
words the choice was to continue living in poverty and dependency, 
or make a better life for herself. As we also saw in Dora’s story, a 
young woman in Romania or Bulgaria, with some education, comes 
to see her perspective on the job or marriage market as hopeless. She 
124 www.polshoogtemagazine.nl/felicia-anna
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harbours certain images of life in the affluent countries of western 
Europe, images that are obtained through the internet, the media 
or stories of friends who already live there. She is not alone in her 
situation. A postwar legacy of economic extraction during Soviet rule 
has left these countries with an underperforming economy, corrupt 
officials and a compromised rule of law (Judt, 2005). In some parts 
of Eastern Europe gender relations are downright patriarchal. As a 
result thousands of young women and men, often those with some 
education and initiative, choose to leave the country to find a better 
life in western Europe. Many end up working in the low-end service 
industry, some in prostitution. Migration is difficult and requires 
support, so the woman asks relatives to help her (or relatives in equally 
dire straits offer practical support in the hope of profiting from the 
move), or the migrant finds people in the arrival country to help her 
find housing, a place to work, and negotiate rules and regulations. She 
also discovers that the rules for legal employment of new immigrants 
restrict her possibilities, possibilities that are not so rosy to begin with 
for female immigrants without money and with little education and/
or education that is not highly valued in the arrival country. Often 
migrants pay these third parties money for their services, in some, but 
not all, cases because these third parties pressure the migrants to hand 
over their earnings. Officials in the arrival country witness an increase 
in the number of young women from eastern European countries who 
work in prostitution, who barely speak the language, and who seem to 
be handing over money to third parties. They interpret this situation 
as trafficking and begin to design and implement policies (such as the 
enforcement schemes described in Chapter Three) to deal with this. 
This puts the women in a difficult situation as their possibilities for 
legal work become even smaller.125 They react by moving to a different 
city or country. 
We could continue, but the point, we hope, is clear: prostitution is 
a complex system. In fact, our example is misleading in that it is too 
linear. The relationships, interactions and understandings described 
are recursive; they operate simultaneously on different levels of 
aggregation, creating complex loops of positive and negative feedback 
that strengthen or weaken effects (Ison, 2010). Prostitution is a policy 
field ‘of coexisting and mutually interdependent factors’ and relations 
that produce unexpected and often unforeseen outcomes (Wagenaar, 
125 See the discussion in Chapter Four of the different categories of sex workers, and 
the consequences for their work status, that have been created by the repeal of the 
ban on brothels in the Netherlands. 
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2007; Ison, 2010, p 32). The results of some processes within the 
system are the input to other processes, so that the process is modified. 
The result is a policy situation with uncertain boundaries that is 
characterised by complexity, uncertainty, interdependency and agency. 
Within the organisation of this book, we see that after the local politics 
of policy implementation described in Chapter Three, and the national 
politics of policy formulation in Chapter Four, we now have moved 
up one more level to the transnational and comprehensive politics of 
(labour) migration and the ways nations and municipalities react to 
this. The analysis of a policy field such as prostitution requires that 
we understand and bring together all these levels and all the different 
actors, relations, interactions, understandings, stories and discourses, 
and trace the emergent outcomes of the field. 
In Chapter Two we argued that the challenges of prostitution policy 
put local policy makers in a difficult position. We now return to this 
observation and conclude that it applies even more when we think of 
prostitution in terms of a dynamic policy field that is characterised by 
complexity. Policy makers are entrusted with the task of designing rules 
and measures to regulate prostitution in the neighbourhoods and streets 
of their locality while these same phenomena are the outcome, the 
substrate, of transnational forces that are wholly outside of their control. 
Moreover, the laws, bylaws, policy instruments and organisational 
procedures that officials have at their disposal instantly become part of 
the larger policy field and create a thicket of unintended consequences 
that fall outside the horizon of most officials and elected officials. It is 
not just that policymaking in such circumstances can only be reactive 
and, as a result of the intrinsic lack of reliable data, myopic; there is 
also a real risk that, as a result, it will be confused, latching onto the 
wrong aspects of the problem, in the process worsening instead of 
alleviating the problem. In fact, as we will see, in many cases the laws 
that are designed to combat or prevent harsh exploitation in prostitution 
not only fail to address the root causes of the problem, but also have 
adverse effects that increase the vulnerabilities of the target groups 
and even bring the very categories, such as ‘slavery’, that ‘create’ the 
problem, into being (Kotiswaran and Okyere, 2015). In Chapter Six we 
suggest how to harness such complexity. One important strategy is to 
allow more diversity into the (analysis of) the complex policy situation 
instead of fitting the elements into simplified schemata (Axelrod and 
Cohen, 2000). For example, instead of projecting on the migrant sex 
worker the collective images that are driven by radical feminist and 
anti-immigrant ideology, it would be more productive to take seriously 
the migrant sex worker’s self-understanding of prostitution as work, as 
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a discerning occupational choice in a situation in which thousands of 
female migrants find themselves worldwide, both today and in the past. 
This reframing of prostitution as a legitimate occupation will then draw 
attention to the continuity of the situation of sex workers with that of 
other migrant groups, to the exploitative labour arrangements these 
new migrants encounter in the arrival country, and to the unintended 
effects of the very laws and regulations that are intended to support 
migrant (sex) workers. 
Our purpose in this chapter is to take the transnational character of 
prostitution seriously, and to situate it in an analysis of labour migration 
and labour exploitation. We then trace the effects of policy makers’ 
framing of migration and exploitation on prostitution policy. We also 
suggest a workable alternative for the concept of trafficking, which, 
as many experts agree, currently exerts such a negative influence on 
prostitution policy worldwide. Instead of trafficking we suggest ‘labour 
exploitation’. We argue that an exploitation framework not only 
does more justice to the experiences of migrant sex workers than the 
trafficking framework, but also avoids the negative consequences on 
sex workers’ rights of the trafficking framework, and augurs a more 
humane and effective prostitution policy. 
Migration, prostitution and coercion 
Julie Bindel @bindelj. @mvdbeer @RachelRMoran @
amnesty LOL! I called you a PIMP, not a TRAFFICKER. 
Both the same, but Dutch cops believe diff. YOU ARE 
A PIMP! (Tweet from Julie Bindel, Guardian journalist, 
addressed to Mark van de Beer, IT specialist, prostitution 
activist and partner of a sex worker in the Netherlands)
In our interviews with sex workers we tried to construct in detail 
the pathways into prostitution. How did the respondent arrive at the 
decision? What did they know about prostitution? Were they aware 
that they were going to work in prostitution in the destination country? 
Who helped them with the immigration process and with the entry 
into the prostitution business? We were also interested in the issue of 
coercion. In the public debate coercion at the point of departure is 
a central issue. According to abolitionist activists and their followers, 
young women enter the sex trade because they are deceived, coerced 
or threatened with violence against themselves or their family. So we 
asked if coercion and exploitation was involved. In the Appendix we 
discuss the nature of the sample and the procedure for collecting the 
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data. We are confident that the sample is representative of the majority 
of migrant sex workers who worked in Austria and the Netherlands 
at the time of the research and that the use of (ex-)sex workers and 
outreach workers as interviewers guarantees reliable data. 
It did not prove to be easy to obtain these personal histories. A large 
number of our respondents were initially reluctant to reconstruct in 
some detail the road that led them from a village in Romania or Costa 
Rica to a brothel at the Austrian-Italian border or a window in the red-
light district in The Hague. Typical answers were, “It just happened”, 
or “I don’t know”, which we read as expressions of an initial resistance 
to address the issue. But usually, when the interviewer managed to 
establish sufficient trust with the respondent, the latter began to relate 
in more detail her personal pathway into prostitution. Friends, family 
and acquaintances turned out to be crucial. 
Most of our interviewees learned about the possibility to work in 
prostitution from friends, family or acquaintances who already worked 
as sex workers (see also Dekker et al, 2006). The latter informed our 
interviewees about what the work entailed, provided information about 
work types and sites, helped to find a workplace, and supported them 
in organising the journey to the destination country and finding a 
place to live. This is in accord with the literature on the migration of 
low-income groups. One of the defining factors in this process is the 
availability of role models of people who have already migrated and 
have returned with money. They were the first in a chain of migration 
of friends, family members and villagers. This seems indeed the most 
appropriate description of the prostitution trajectory of the women we 
spoke with in the course of our research. This also explains the choice 
of the country of destination. The newcomers use the networks and 
the information of migrants who have arrived before them. Having 
a personal relationship with someone who has already worked in 
prostitution not only results in much practical support but also helps 
to lower thresholds of misgiving, doubt and shame:
“I knew this already when I still lived in Bratislava, from my 
friends. When I visited them. So, I was familiar with it. And 
when I came to Vienna my friend told me the truth, that 
she works in a nightclub and that she makes good money. 
I said, okay, I don’t know this. I don’t know this in Austria. 
And she took me with her and said, without any coercion, 
‘Try it, for two or three days, when it is okay and you like 
it, then you can work with us. When not …’ So no one had 
forced me. It was my own decision. I decided for it myself 
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and I said, okay, I will do it. I didn’t have the possibility at 
that time to work somewhere else.” (Interview 80)
Most sex workers received their introduction to prostitution from 
friends and colleagues, who conveyed practical knowledge about 
various sexual practices, safe sex, sexual routines with clients, fees, 
how to refuse clients or unwanted sexual practices, basic German or 
English vocabulary to be able to communicate with clients, and so 
on. These social networks were also decisive in deciding to which 
country or city to emigrate to, as well as what type of prostitution to 
undertake. A Bulgarian sex worker was very outspoken about this; 
she came from a small town in which many women had experience 
with prostitution, so that “there were different ways to this activity” 
(interview 2). Many of our interviewees also searched the internet for 
information about prostitution or work opportunities and regulation 
in Austria or the Netherlands. The pathway into prostitution is not 
different therefore from other forms of labour migration. Social 
networks are crucial to obtaining information about the possibilities 
of and conditions for work, finding a place to live, and integrating 
into a new environment. All but one of our interviewees who were 
introduced by friends/colleagues declared that they chose prostitution 
voluntarily. Nevertheless, similar to the experience of most who 
migrate for work reasons, the first two or three months in the new 
job and the new country were not always easy. (See also Felicia’s story 
later in this section.)
Many immigrants make use of a support structure of family, friends, 
acquaintances and helpers to gain a foothold in the new country. The 
following interview selections show not only how such support ranges 
from straightforward assistance to downright exploitation, but also 
the different perspectives of our interviewees on “pimps” and their 
agency.126 For example, a number of women who had prepared for 
126 The quotation marks around the term ‘pimp’ demonstrates the difficulties the 
term presents to the analyst. First, the term is vague. As the Bindel tweet at the 
beginning of this section demonstrates, very different third parties who have very 
different relationships with sex workers are labeled ‘pimps’. In the end it is hardly 
possible to identify the defining characteristics of a pimp, and subsequently to treat 
it as an analytical category. Second, the category of pimp has almost only negative 
connotations that are frequently taken for granted, even though, as we see later 
in this section, sex workers themselves characterised services provided by third 
parties typically labeled ‘pimps’ as indispensable. Although we do not deny the 
existence of exploitation by third parties, the term ‘pimp’ seems to be used mostly 
as a shibboleth in the struggle for abolitionism. 
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immigration through the internet or who had replied to an advert, 
usually made use of helpers to effectuate the move to another country. 
These helpers would pick the woman up from the station or the 
airport, help her find a place to live and mediate in finding a suitable 
workplace. These people would then be paid for their assistance. In 
some cases this ended the service relationship and others not. Beate 
is a case in point:
“No, when I arrived in this country, there was, how shall 
I say this, euphemistically speaking, a helper. He was not 
a brothel owner. He and some woman had looked for 
workplaces for me.… I didn’t have to pay for the trip, but 
later, when I began to work, some money was deducted 
from my earnings, about €5 per client, irrespective of what 
I had earned that night.” (interview 93) 
Eventually this interviewee found herself a new workplace to escape 
these charges. A sex worker from the Czech Republic who had replied 
to an advert told us about attempts at extortion. The man who had 
picked her up from the station and had taken her to her new workplace 
tried to extract money from her afterwards. Our interviewee refused to 
pay him and informed the brothel owner. She told us in the interview 
that two of her colleagues not only paid the extortionist but were also 
unable to put an end to the payments by changing their workplace 
(interview 1). Veronyka, a Moldavian woman who was forced into 
prostitution by violent criminals, managed to escape from her captors 
with the help of the Dutch police. When she was free she voluntarily 
started in prostitution again on a part-time basis. As she explains: 
“I wanted to find out how it was like to work independently, 
without being forced. I had read something about 
prostitution and had met people who did it voluntarily.… 
The first few weeks it felt odd. I had promised myself that 
I would stop if it would not feel ok. Now I was able to 
choose my own clients. Those were nice men. I enjoyed 
myself. I became more and more self-confident. I continued 
doing so for two years, but I stopped when I got a serious 
relation. Another positive effect: until I re-entered I had 
problems relating to men. But because of the job I became 
more self-confident.” (interview 23).
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When sex workers are thought of as having a pimp, it is generally 
assumed that their entry into the sex trade was involuntary. Five of 
our interviewees indicated that they arrived in Austria with their pimp 
– this is what they called him – who was around when they started 
in prostitution, but also said that they were not coerced into it. In a 
number of cases exploitation, and violence, started later. Natasha, for 
example, related that a woman brought her from Moldavia to Vienna 
by car. This woman was a pimp according to Natasha. She said that 
Natasha only needed to pay the rent and some money for food. She 
lived in a room with three other women. The pimp lied about the 
rent; she said that she would keep Natasha’s earnings for her, to keep 
them safe. Natasha said that she was naïve enough to give the woman 
her earnings. When she asked for her share of the money the woman 
said she only had €1,000; the rest has been spent on food and costs for 
various documents. Natasha lost about €8,000. Dora, as explained in 
the interview relayed in Chapter One, also lost her earnings, but she 
and some of her colleagues filed a complaint with the police; she for 
pimping, the others for rape and physical violence as well as pimping. 
The man was convicted to two years in prison. 
An illustration of the difficulty in assessing the precise nature of the 
relationship between the sex worker and third parties is illustrated by 
Anna’s story. She came from Hungary to work in Austria. She had 
already worked as a sex worker in Hungary. She also had a pimp – 
her word – there who had been “like a father” to her and whom she 
had given half her income. In Vienna she managed and worked in 
her own studio. Her pimp acted as her agent and put her in touch 
with other sex workers who could work in her studio. Anna would 
receive a small commission from the women, which she would split 
on a 50–50 basis with her procurer. “Live and let live. That is what I 
learned from, how shall I say it, my helper, my father.” She adds that 
she was never exploited and that she would never exploit anyone else. 
This interviewee portrays her procurer as a mainstay of her professional 
life, who is remunerated for his services. She cannot and will not 
perceive this as exploitation. 
What makes these situations difficult to judge is that the sex worker 
has an emotional relationship with the alleged procurer. When there is 
no physical or emotional violence involved, it is exceedingly difficult 
to disentangle logistical and emotional support from dependency and 
economic exploitation. Some women said that they came to Austria 
with their partners to look for work. When they were unable to 
obtain a work permit, prostitution offered a way out. Does this make 
the partner a pimp? Three examples. Tina came to Vienna with her 
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boyfriend. Neither one of them managed to obtain a work permit. 
Her boyfriend knew the owner of a nightclub and Tina decided to 
work there as a sex worker (interview 40). Anjuta’s story is different. 
She came to Austria to study. She fell in love with an Austrian man 
whose business was not doing well. She supported him financially with 
money that she borrowed from her parents and friends. Nevertheless 
the firm went bankrupt. Anjuta’s partner could not find work and 
Anjuta decided to offer sexual services to pay off her and her partner’s 
debts (interview 48). In another case, a Czech sex worker said that 
her husband was responsible for looking after their children and for 
doing the household chores. Until recently the family lived off her 
income; now her husband has a part-time job (interview 1). Despite 
repeated questioning, all three women maintained that their entry into 
prostitution was voluntary, and that they were in personal relationships 
in which income sharing is commonplace. 
As Julie Bindel’s tweet illustrated, a lot of confusion exists around 
the issue of pimping. Some of that confusion is inadvertent, as when 
The Guardian (11 December 2013) reported that pimping is legal in 
the Netherlands. ‘Pimping’, the abuse of dependency relations, often 
enforced by violence, threats of violence and sexual exploitation, is 
in fact a criminal activity according to the law and remains subject to 
punishment as an element of trafficking. What has been legalised in 
the Netherlands is the operation of a licensed brothel. Some of that 
‘confusion’ is wilful. The concept of a pimp has been caught up in the 
trafficking controversy that afflicts the prostitution debate, as Bindel’s 
angry accusation of Mark van de Beer illustrates. Our interviews with 
migrant sex workers paint a complex picture of the contentious issue 
of procuring and forced prostitution. First, the distinction between 
‘helper’ and ‘procurer’ is vague; many helpers act as procurer and many 
sex workers perceive their procurers as a source of vital support. Clear-
cut coercion backed up by violence, as in the case of Veronyka, was 
rare in our sample. Migrants need third parties to secure a job, a house, 
and to negotiate their interactions with the authorities, but this might 
provoke dependency and make them vulnerable to exploitation. As 
Sanghere concludes: ‘(T)he perpetrators of trafficking in the form of 
recruiters and agents are primarily small-time operators functioning 
mostly in an individual capacity, and are based upon personal and 
sometimes familial sets of relationships’ (Sanghere, 2012, p 16). The 
stigmatisation of prostitution and the criminalisation of the work 
settings of sex workers increases this vulnerability. Moreover, as we will 
see below, the lack of access to labour rights makes it impossible for 
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sex workers to challenge third parties and access justice. Dora’s story 
at the opening of this book is illustrative here. 
Second, the interviews also showed that although many women had 
a procurer at some stage of their career, only one of them indicated that 
she was forced into prostitution. However about 10% of the sex workers 
in our sample declared that they had been economically and/or sexually 
exploited while working as a sex worker in the arrival country.127 We 
will return to this later in the chapter. Third, most of the interviewees 
were able to free themselves from an exploitative relationship with a 
procurer. Singlehandedly, or with the help of friends, club owners, 
clients or the authorities, they resisted, left the house that they shared 
with the procurer, found a new workplace, and moved on to a more 
independent working situation. Fourth, personal relationships make 
it difficult to establish the nature of procurement. Is the procurer a 
scrounger who lives off the proceeds of the woman’s prostitution or is 
he someone who provides essential services and/or emotional support 
to the sex worker? Are the partners, parents, siblings or (grown-up) 
children who are supported by the earnings of sex workers procurers? 
Where does one draw the line? Fifth, the pervasive stigma attached 
to prostitution and the laws in many countries that make it illegal to 
provide services such as housing or transport to sex workers force 
many sex workers to rely on ‘personal’ contacts or shady persons who 
are willing to run the risk ‘for a price’. Both Dutch and Austrian 
law define procuring broadly, so that anyone who benefits from the 
earnings of sex work would be considered as engaged in the criminal 
activity of procuring. 
We think our research allows us to draw two important lessons for 
policy makers on the issue of procuring. The first is that we need to 
take the voice of sex workers seriously. Like anyone else, sex workers 
have relationships that provide practical and emotional support in work 
and personal life. What from the outside looks like procuring may be 
experienced as a more supportive relationship by the sex worker, or, 
in a more ambivalent vein, a relationship that has both exploitative and 
supportive elements. When it comes to prostitution, however, it seems 
that ambivalence is not tolerated. Yet, the interviews showed that sex 
127 This number is similar to the percentage of migrant sex workers who reported 
being exploited by middlemen in Mai’s study of migrant workers in the UK sex 
industry (Mai, 2009). Given the convergence between these two different samples 
in three different countries at two moments in time (2009 and 2013), one wonders 
if the statistic of 10% represents the incidence of exploitation by middlemen in the 
population of migrant sex workers. 
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workers were capable of distinguishing when affective or supportive 
relationships became exploitative, and act on it. This is not an argument 
to leave sex workers to their own means when it comes to dealing with 
procuring, but instead to accept their agency and listen to them. Our 
interviews show that the current public discourse that distinguishes 
between voluntary and forced prostitution is misguided. Apart from 
the fact that the distinction is not always clear, that it denies the agency 
of sex workers, ignores their voice, and ascribes to them the blanket 
status of victim, it is quite likely counter-productive in that it covers 
up real exploitative situations. We will discuss this in the section on 
prostitution and exploitation. Second, as we discuss more extensively 
in the next section, the laws and regulations that regulate migration 
in Europe and its nation states, such as Austria and the Netherlands, 
do not deter but in fact facilitate dependency and exploitation. Most 
immigration laws seriously curtail the autonomy of sex workers. In 
this sense prostitution does not differ appreciably from other forms 
of labour migration such as the construction industry, cleaning and 
domestic services, and agriculture. Migrants, particularly those who 
do not speak the language of the destination country, have to rely on 
supportive networks and have to operate within legal frameworks that 
make them vulnerable to exploitation. This applies even more to female 
migrants (O’Connell Davidson, 2006; Le Breton, 2011; Vance, 2011). 
Perhaps it is instructive to end this section by returning to Felicia. 
Felicia writes a blog on prostitution and prostitution policy (http://
achterhetraamopdewallen.blogspot.nl/?m=1) and was a member 
of the Dutch sex workers’ organisation PROUD. In one of her 
blogs (translated by the authors) she describes how she came to the 
Netherlands: 
I am Felicia, a 27-year-old sex worker from Romania … 
I have worked here for about 4 years now, non-coerced, 
not exploited and wholly out of my own free will. … 
About 4 years ago I came to this country to work here 
in the Netherlands as a sex worker. I was aware of what 
I came to do here, nobody lied to me that I would be a 
dancer, or work in a restaurant or become a model or 
something. I was told the truth that I would go and work 
as a sex worker in a country where prostitution is legal 
and an honest occupation. Nobody forced me to do this, 
nobody lied to me about what I would be doing here, and 
nobody exploited me. But to come to the Netherlands, to 
get all the paperwork straightened out, and to find a place 
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to work and a place to live, is something that you simply 
can’t manage on your own without help. The people that 
helped me were a couple. She worked as a sex worker in the 
Netherlands for 7 years already and he was her boyfriend. 
They helped me to come to the Netherlands, they paid 
my flight tickets, they moved to a new apartment so that 
I could stay with them, they helped me with the different 
registrations in this country, they helped me to find a place 
to work, to arrange the paper work that I needed to be 
able to work, they paid the rent for my work place, etc. I 
knew from the start that they would pay all this for me and 
that I would pay them back later. As they invested a lot of 
time and money in me, paying them back was the least I 
could do. It never was a matter of exploitation or signing a 
contract or something like that. After about 9 months I left 
the apartment of the couple that helped me and lived by 
myself. In the mean time I knew the ropes in Amsterdam. 
I now knew how to get to work, and how to get things 
done. I didn’t need their help anymore. 
Felicia’s story is familiar to anyone who has emigrated to another 
country to start a new life there. The migrant finds herself in an alien 
environment. She has not mastered the rules, procedures, organisations 
and customs that are required to establish herself as a citizen, employee 
and resident. She feels lost at times and is dependent on the advice, 
support and kindness of others. However, according to the definition 
of trafficking in the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and the even 
broader definition in the trafficking article in the Dutch Penal Code, 
Felicia would be considered a victim and the couple that helped her 
pimps or traffickers. 
How immigration and labour law shape the ‘modern 
slavery’ problem
In the affluent countries of north-western Europe, prostitution is to 
a large extent a migration issue. As reported earlier in the book, 90% 
per cent of sex workers in Austria and about 70% in the Netherlands 
are migrants. This is a common situation in most of the countries of 
north-western Europe. Most of these immigrants are from central and 
eastern European countries such as Hungary, Romania or Bulgaria. 
The remainder are from African countries (mostly Nigeria), Asian 
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countries (Thailand and increasingly, China) and Latin America. 
The migratory nature of sex work is part of a larger trend in which 
structurally wide income inequalities, limited economic and social 
opportunities and deeply embedded corruption lead many of its citizens 
to migrate to the affluent, mature democracies of western Europe to 
improve their employment prospects and to sustain their families at 
home. Internet access, low-cost transportation and travel opportunities 
bring the possibility of migration within the purview of many. The 
absence of visa requirements for citizens of EU and European Economic 
Area (EEA) countries removes yet another barrier for cross-border 
movement. Poverty and lack of prospects among women, combined 
with injurious gender relations in the home country, have resulted in 
the feminisation of migration; many young women, particularly those 
with some secondary or higher education, look for better prospects 
elsewhere (Phillips, 2015). The result is that in our connected, 
networked world, migration is an ineluctable reality.128 
But even if migration is legal, even in the best of times it is a 
highly ambivalent issue for the high-income administrative states of 
north-western Europe. Inescapably immigrants are graded according 
to desirability with respect to the cultural, economic and religious 
make-up of the arrival country. Highly educated and/or high-income 
immigrants are favoured, both in public opinion and formal law, 
over groups with little requisite education, the ‘wrong’ skills and 
no independent wealth. Certain ethnic or religious groups are held 
in higher esteem than others. The moral politics of desirability is 
expressed in the language with which we designate immigrants. The 
most frequently applied labels in policy parlance are ‘undocumented’ 
and ‘temporary foreign worker’.129 This framing of people, who in 
the case of EU and EEA countries are making use of the (somewhat 
constricted) legal right to free movement of people within the EU, 
has, as always, strong repercussions for the target group. Discursively, 
migrants, and sex worker migrants in particular, are considered ‘cheap’ 
and ‘disposable’, a marginal, substandard class of citizen. Legally, the 
categories ‘illegal’ and ‘temporary’, and the laws that give expression 
128 The United Nations estimates that in 2013 there were 232 million international 
migrants worldwide, 57 million more than there were in 2000. Today much (but 
not all) of human migration is shaped by enormous spatial disparities in prosperity, 
peace and power (Sharma, 2015, p 36). The author does not discuss how these 
numbers were arrived at. 
129 This is official, bureaucratic language. We are not talking about crude popular 
designations such as ‘fortune seekers’, ‘people whose values are fundamentally at 
odds with our Christian culture’, or the currently popular (in the UK) ‘vermin’. 
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to these designations, limit the labour market options of such migrants 
to low-skilled, dead-end, poorly protected jobs or nominal self-
employment, and limits their rights and mobility (Cruz, 2015, p 70; 
Sharma, 2015, p 36). In the ironic dialectic of public discourse this 
entrapment is then held against these migrants, and reinforces their 
public image as deficient, non-citizens. 
In every country immigration law is highly complex and exceedingly 
difficult to navigate.130 Several factors contribute to this complexity. A 
large part of immigration law consists of bylaws, which are formulated 
and applied by officials in various agencies outside the purview of 
elected legislators.131 In addition immigration law, like all law, is shaped 
by value positions that favour the interest of one group over that of 
another. There are also EU laws, like the Employers’ Sanction Directive, 
the Return Directive and the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
that have significant impact on migrants’ situation by criminalising 
migrant sex workers. Finally, law on paper is different from law in 
practice; the implementation of immigration law is dependent on the 
allocation of resources to national and local immigration offices, local 
policy choices, agency capture, and so on – the familiar dynamics of 
130 The personal experience of one of us (Hendrik Wagenaar) serves to illustrate 
this point. As a PhD student in the United States in the 1980s, I found myself at 
some point in between two visas. My old exchange visitor’s visa had expired and 
I needed a student visa that allowed part-time work. The new visa however was 
not forthcoming. Legally I was no longer allowed to work, but my employer at the 
time (Harvard Medical School) was kind enough to continue the contract in an 
informal way by safeguarding my salary until I had a new visa. I took the services 
of an immigration lawyer. He was a practical, savvy man who quickly found out 
where my application was languishing: an office of the US Immigration Service 
in Washington DC that, as he said, “had no address and no telephone number”. 
While we chatted about immigration law he commented on its complexity. By 
way of illustration he pointed to a thick tome on his desk. I asked if this contained 
US immigration law. He smiled wryly and said: “No, only the changes of the 
last six months.” As he saw no way to contact the officials who were responsible 
for my visa application, he suggested that I contact the constituency office of 
my congressman. As a foreigner who could not vote, I was not represented by a 
congressman, but a journalist friend of mine knew the head of the constituency 
office of senator Barney Frank. The office took on my case and within two weeks 
I received a message that I could pick up my new visa at the Boston branch of the 
US Immigration Office. Personal connections, and a spouse who had an income 
while mine was frozen, solved the problem, but only because I was a privileged 
immigrant with financial resources and personal connections. 
131 Under the rule of law these by-laws can of course be, and sometimes are, challenged 
in court. 
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policy implementation as described in Chapter Three. Finally, as we 
explain in this section, immigration law, and related prostitution law, 
is closely allied to criminal law, while its presentation is often couched 
in the language of human rights. The effect is twofold. Immigration 
law presents a bewildering and contradictory maze of claims, 
images, agencies and practices to its target group of immigrants. Yet, 
immigration law powerfully shapes the position, possibilities, rights and 
capacities of the people to whom it applies. To grasp these complex 
relationships, we look at the example of domestic workers in the UK. 
A change in the immigration rules for overseas domestic workers 
in the UK that was introduced in April 2012 removed the right of 
such workers to change employers. In fact, the name of the employer 
is entered on the migrant’s visa. As Roberts argues: ‘This effectively 
removes any bargaining power from within an already unbalanced 
employment relationship, with migrant domestic workers left unable 
to resign, question, or challenge any aspect of their treatment’ and 
expose them to exploitation and abuse (2015, p 15). That this is not a 
mere theoretical issue is borne out by numbers provided by Kalayaan, 
a charity that supports overseas domestic workers. Kalayaan reports 
high numbers of domestic workers who are not allowed to leave the 
house unsupervised, who do not have their own room, who work more 
than 16 hours per day and who earn less than £50 per week (Roberts, 
2015). In 2015 the House of Lords voted for an amendment to the 
Modern Slavery Act 2015 that would abolish the controversial ‘tied 
visa’ requirement that was introduced by the coalition government in 
2012 and reinstate the right to change employers. However, the House 
of Commons overturned the amendment and passed an amendment of 
its own that allows only those workers who have entered the National 
Referral Mechanism (NRM) and have been identified as trafficked 
to be given the possibility of obtaining a six-month visa as a domestic 
worker. The purported reason for this amendment is that it helps to 
report and prosecute abusive employers. As Roberts makes clear the 
NRM is largely ineffective as it has not led to any convictions for 
trafficking for domestic servitude. Domestic workers consider it risky 
to register with the NRM as there is no guarantee of protection until 
they receive a positive decision through the NRM. The alternative 
is to run away, which automatically makes the worker illegal. The 
government’s stated reason for restricting the right to change employers 
in 2012 was to reduce migration into the UK. 
The case of domestic workers and the Modern Slavery Act illustrates 
several aspects of the nature of immigration legislation and its effects 
on the migrant worker. First, it is an example of the kind of ‘light-
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touch regulation’ that governs immigration and immigrant labour 
in a neoliberal economy. By providing information that will enable 
customers, campaigners, and shareholders to hold big businesses to 
account instead of imposing licensing requirements or enforcing 
labour legislation, the regulation overwhelmingly relies on information 
instruments instead of licensing or enforcing labour requirements. The 
rationale for this is in the distinction between criminal and labour 
law in regulating migrant labour. The British government is reluctant 
to impose labour regulation on high-income households (see the 
statement by Karen Bradley, the minister responsible for slavery and 
organised crime in the then coalition government, in Fudge, 2015, 
p 22). Yet, via the Modern Slavery Act the government signals it is 
willing to subject those same households to criminal law. However, 
as virtually no prosecutions have been started in practice this amounts 
to little more than symbolic policy. The reason is the biased division 
of labour in fighting labour exploitation that is hardwired into the 
body of law and regulation and puts the onus of discovery, challenge 
and redress on the shoulders of the weakest party. It is the marginal 
worker who has to carry the burden of exploitation, its exposure and 
the precarious position she puts herself in when she challenges her 
employer. The second, related, point is that this illustrates the powerful 
symbolic effects of immigration law. The 2015 Act is part of a concerted 
drive by the UK government to fight ‘modern slavery’. However, the 
label and its associated legal technology powerfully shape the moral and 
practical division of labour in dealing with migrant labour. As Fudge 
puts it: ‘The problem with the modern slavery paradigm is that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge it from the technologies of legal 
governance, criminal law and border controls, that are mobilised in its 
cause. These technologies tend to target marginal players rather than 
tackle the social processes that normalise exploitation’ (2015, p 23). 
We will see that the case of domestic workers is paradigmatic for 
the way that sex workers are treated under immigration law, with the 
added consideration that the stigma attached to prostitution makes the 
position of sex workers vis-à-vis immigration law even more precarious. 
Prostitution and exploitation 
In 2005, the Dutch NGO Rode Draad engaged in a unique programme. 
It had received a small grant from the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labour Relations to visit all sex facilities in the Netherlands (clubs, 
window brothels, massage salons, including even some unlicensed 
facilities) to distribute information about labour rights. The Rode 
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Draad saw this as an opportunity not only to distribute but also to 
collect information on labour relations and work conditions in the 
Dutch prostitution sector. It collected the addresses of 633 of the 
estimated 800 sex facilities in operation and visited over half of them 
(Altink and Bokelman, 2006). At the same time, as part of the official 
evaluation of the repeal of the ban on brothels, a team of researchers 
interviewed 354 sex workers and 49 facility owners about labour 
relations and working conditions in the Dutch sex industry (Dekker et 
al, 2006). The picture that emerges from these two studies is ambivalent. 
In their study Altink and Bokelman are more negative about 
labour relations in the sex trade than Dekker and colleagues.132 What 
they discovered, five years after the repeal of the brothel ban in the 
Netherlands, was a widespread pattern of labour exploitation (Altink 
and Bokelman, 2006). Almost none of the facilities offered adequate 
employment contracts; the women who worked there were allegedly 
self-employed, which was often a euphemism for informal and insecure 
work arrangements. In almost all facilities the sex worker was self-
employed only in name; in reality the contractual relationship had all 
the obligations of employment and few of the rights. (In quite a few 
facilities the Rode Draad field workers were not allowed to speak to 
the ‘self-employed’ women.) In quite a few cases the proprietor had 
created elaborate contractual constructions that allowed them to skim 
off large fees from the sex worker’s earnings and that put all the risk of 
business with the sex worker. In more remote rural areas sex workers 
often lived on the premises, making them completely dependent on the 
proprietor. On average, these sex workers received only 50% of their 
earnings, often less if the proprietor made deductions for VAT or even 
non-existing social security payments. Owners often did not provide 
invoices for earnings or rent paid. Many sex workers experienced 
difficulties with obtaining their earnings from the proprietor, and had 
to ask repeatedly for their money. The Rode Draad points out that 
this almost universal commission system acts as an incentive for the 
proprietor to put pressure on sex workers to engage in additional sexual 
activities or unsafe sex to increase earnings. Work hours were long. 
Many facilities issued ‘fines’ to sex workers for issues such as showing 
up late to violating  (illegal) competition clauses. 
132 One reason for the difference might be that Dekker and colleagues interviewed sex 
workers in facilities where the owner or manager had given his or her permission 
for the interview (2006, p 12). The field workers in the Altink and Bokelman 
study showed up at the facility unannounced. 
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In the report by Dekker and colleagues, however, 80% of sex workers 
stated that they could refuse clients and determine the activities they 
preferred to engage in (2006, p 45). Agreements – about work times, 
dress code, earnings, house rules – between the sex worker and facility 
owners and managers were mostly verbal. Sixty per cent of sex workers 
set their own working hours (this differed between windows and escort 
on the one hand and clubs and massage salons on the other). Escorts 
and window workers mostly set their own rates; those who worked 
in clubs followed the ‘house’ prices. Over 60% of sex workers were 
free to take a day off, go on holiday or decide what clothes to wear. 
Security was an important reason to work in a club. Managers would 
remove unpleasant clients from the premises; 86% said that they did not 
feel threatened by the comments or behaviour of managers (Dekker 
et al, 2006, p 46). Dekker and colleagues also found a high level of 
mobility in sex facilities. Two thirds of interviewed sex workers had 
changed facility. The prospect of higher earnings elsewhere (a new 
sex worker initially attracts more clients) was mentioned in 30% of 
cases; but 48% had moved because of problems with management, bad 
atmosphere in the facility or bad treatment by management (Dekkers 
et al, 2006, p 24).
These two studies of labour relations in the Dutch sex trade present 
a mixed picture. Although the licensed sector in the Netherlands 
presents a relatively decent, ordered image, labour relations are a far 
cry from what they are in most other sectors. According to Dekker and 
colleagues, most sex workers prefer to work as independent contractors 
for the freedom it offers them and accept the relationship of authority 
in licensed brothels for the security and peace of mind it gives them 
(Dekker et al, 2006, p 82). However, the prevalence of independent 
contracting also makes sex workers vulnerable to labour exploitation. 
Because most agreements are oral, sex workers are dependent on 
owners and managers for honouring them and do not have recourse 
to formal dispute procedures in cases of disagreement. The result is 
that many sex workers seem to accept everyday forms of exploitation. 
Dekker and colleagues also seem to acknowledge this when they 
state: ‘[Sex workers] understand that in practice this [the authority 
relationship in sex facilities] has always been the case and that in the 
prostitution sector labour relations and rules differ from other sectors’ 
(Dekker et al, 2006, p 53). 
This is the face of labour relations in prostitution: not the 
alleged coercion in the country of departure or the relatively rare 
violent exploitation by criminal gangs but instead the widespread, 
everyday, taken-for-granted (‘This has always been the case’) labour 
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exploitation in the clubs and brothels of the arrival country. In 2016 
the International Committee on the Rights of Sex Workers in Europe 
(ICRSE) published a report on exploitation in the sex trade (ICRSE, 
2016). ICRSE defines exploitation as ‘labour arrangements that 
enable one person to take unfair advantage of the work of another 
person’ (ICRSE, 2016, p 4). ICRSE then makes two observations. 
First, exploitation in prostitution has received little attention. Second, 
exploitation belongs to the realm of work and can only be understood 
by situating it in the wider field of exploitative work practices: ‘Only 
by focusing on sex workers’ working conditions, as well as employment 
practices and arrangements under which sexual services are sold and 
exchanged can we come to a better understanding of and challenge 
exploitation in [the] sex industry’ (ICRSE, 2016, p 4). 
The scarcity of analysis of labour exploitation in prostitution is not 
accidental, of course. The current dominant framing of prostitution 
as trafficking and slavery directs the attention of policy makers and the 
public away from work conditions and labour relations and towards 
immigration and criminal law. In country after country governments 
are not only reluctant to intervene in labour relations in the sex 
industry, they also formulate laws that codify the slavery framework 
and cut back on measures and agencies whose task it is to uphold and 
enforce labour regulations (Robinson, 2015, p  26; ICRSE, 2016, 
pp 6-7). Instead, as we have seen, considerable amounts of time and 
energy are invested in ‘enforcement schemes’, ‘chain arrangements’ 
to coordinate the fight against trafficking, and registration schemes to 
detect ‘signals of trafficking’, while the police force is the agency of 
choice for implementing prostitution policy. Yet, the reality is that in 
every country thousands of sex workers exchange sexual services for 
money in a large variety of sex facilities. By framing these services as 
a form of slavery obscures the reality of these women’s lives and the 
ubiquity of exploitative work practices to which they are subjected. 
What did ICRSE find in its survey of exploitative work practice 
in the sex industry in Europe? It observes that in the vast majority 
of countries the sex industry is part of the informal economy. This is 
that part of the labour market that is not recognised by the state, that 
is outside regulation and control (although often not outside the reach 
of taxation), and where therefore protection and benefits granted to 
people working in formal economies are lacking (ICRSE, 2016, p 8). 
Informality in the labour market is a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand, it provides low-threshold jobs to unskilled workers or workers 
who would otherwise be excluded from the formal economy such 
as migrant labourers; on the other hand, it creates the conditions for 
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labour exploitation where third parties unduly profit from the labour 
of sex workers. ICRSE points out that according to self-reports by sex 
workers and contrary to the abolitionist perception, these exploitative 
third parties are rarely clients, and that instances in which clients refuse 
to pay or otherwise violate the service agreement are considered a form 
of abuse or sexual violence (ICRSE, 2016, p 8).
Labour exploitation expresses itself foremost in the contingent and 
casual character of the labour arrangement. This applies as much to 
prostitution as any other form of precarious work. With regard to 
prostitution ICRSE observes that, similar to the two Dutch industry-
wide surveys: ‘The vast majority of sex workers in the region [Europe 
and Central Asia] are engaged in insecure, irregular and flexible labour 
arrangements, which do not grant them certainty of employment 
or income stability’ (ICRSE, 2016, p 8). These deliberately unclear 
contractual arrangements have far-reaching implications for the labour 
relations and work conditions of sex workers. Seemingly self-employed, 
most sex workers suffer high levels of control over and regulation of 
their work (ICRSE, 2016, p 9). The insecurity of the contractual 
arrangement results in economic dependency on the proprietor 
or manager. In most countries sex workers do not have access to 
social security benefits such as sick or parental leave, paid holiday 
leave, or sickness, disability and pension benefits. On the other hand 
exploitative work practices, such as abrupt and arbitrary termination of 
employment, income manipulation and extremely long working hours, 
are widespread. Exploitative labour arrangements in prostitution are 
determined by two factors. The first is the prevailing business model 
in the sex industry. In its essence it is an informal relationship that 
on the one hand serves the interests in freedom and cash payments of 
the sex worker, but on the other hand deprives her of her rights and 
earnings. Or as ICRSE puts it: 
What is rarely being discussed, however, is that the prosperity 
of the sex industry is largely guaranteed and furthered at 
the expense of sex workers’ income and their economic 
security. This is due to the unfair internal organisation 
of workplace economies within the sex industry, which 
allows third parties – venue owners, bosses, managers, 
administrators, procurers, or landlords – to take advantage 
of and capitalise on sex workers’ earnings, labour, skills, and 
time. (ICRSE, 2016, p 11) 
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This exploitative business model results in common practices such 
as taking commissions that can reach 50% or more (in some cases 
because flat fees are decoupled from the actual number of clients the 
sex worker receives), entry fees to the facility or fees for ‘services’ such 
as safe-sex supplies, cleaning, laundry and security, arbitrary fines, and 
mandatory charges for room rental, drinks or food (ICRSE, 2016, 
p 12). Although this was hardly the case in the licensed sector in the 
Netherlands (and according to our own interviews the same applies 
to Austria), ICRSE reports that many sex workers in Europe suffer 
hazardous and substandard work conditions, that responsibility for 
financing personal safety equipment and health services is shifted on 
to sex workers, and that in too many cases proprietors or managers 
pressure sex workers into unsafe sex exchanges. 
The second factor relates to the structural determinants of labour 
relations in the sex industry such as the fact that sex workers operate 
in a context of illegality and repressive regulation and are not covered 
by the employment laws that apply in other industries. It goes without 
saying that the position of (undocumented) migrant sex workers in the 
sexual services industry is even more precarious than that of indigenous 
workers. The common practice of tying the right to work of migrant 
workers to their employer, the continuous threat of being deported 
and workers’ dependency on immigration bureaucracies for the proper 
licenses and papers to be able to work, put the migrant sex worker 
in an even more vulnerable position vis-à vis-owners, managers and 
unscrupulous middlemen. 
Three additional circumstances contribute to the insecurities inherent 
in the sex worker’s labour relations. The first is the criminalisation 
of the sex worker (and in many countries clients and third parties) 
through a range of repressive laws and administrative measures that seek 
to regulate prostitution. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the 
often deliberate over-association of prostitution with crime reinforces 
the stigma of prostitution, puts sex workers in an even more vulnerable 
position and disempowers them in the workplace. We will return to 
this point in the next section. This disempowerment is augmented by 
the unwillingness of governments to actively protect the labour rights 
of sex workers. As we saw in Chapter Three after the repeal of the 
brothel ban that elevated sex facilities to the status of regular businesses 
subject to civil and administrative law, the Dutch government took 
the position that the relationship between the sex workers and the 
business owner was a matter of civil law and precluded the interference 
of the state. While formally correct, this position was both naïve and 
disingenuous. It was naïve because the unionisation that the minister 
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counted on had never taken place and is a difficult challenge in general 
in the sex industry (Gall, 2014; we return to this point in Chapter 
Six). It was disingenuous because Labour Inspection, the agency that 
is responsible for monitoring and enforcing labour law and does so in 
most other industries, kept itself at a distance from the sex industry. 
We saw a similar attitude being displayed by the UK government in 
the monitoring and enforcement of its laws in the case of domestic 
workers. Third, many countries and municipalities have closed the 
only route available to sex workers to escape the precarious labour 
relations governing the sex industry, namely true self-employment. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, out of fear of losing control over the 
sex trade, most governments have made it illegal for sex workers to 
start their own business and/or work from their own house, or treat 
such arrangements as similar to large commercial sex clubs or even as 
a form of pimping or trafficking. 
We return to the regulation of prostitution and the issue of 
exploitation in the next and final section of this chapter. But first we 
discuss the all-important issue of trafficking and prostitution. 
Prostitution, trafficking and exploitation: an alternative 
framework
In a rational world this would be a brief section. As the voices of 
the migrant sex workers we interviewed testified, exploitation in 
the country of origin happens but is part and parcel of the process 
of migrating, often involves family members or other people with 
whom the sex worker has an emotional bond, and is usually effectively 
handled by the sex worker herself, if necessary with the help of the 
police, friends or clients. We have also seen that economic exploitation 
in the sex trade is widespread, but that it happens at the workplace in 
the arrival country and flows from the prevailing business model in 
which informal work arrangements put sex workers in a position of 
dependency on owners. All this is made possible and perpetuated by 
legal frameworks that fail to recognise sex work as a legitimate form of 
work or employment. Yet, few things in prostitution policy are rational, 
and the concepts of trafficking (and, in the Anglo-Saxon world, the 
increasingly popular ‘slavery’) play a central role in the law, policy 
and the public discourse surrounding prostitution and immigration. 
Trafficking, and the associated concepts of ‘victim’ and ‘forced 
prostitution’, have become the central symbols in the morality battles 
over the place of prostitution in contemporary society. Conforming 
to the characteristics of morality politics of Chapter Two, trafficking 
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must above all be regarded as an emotional shibboleth that expresses 
disgust and revulsion at the idea of women exchanging sexual services 
and intimacy with male clients for money. The experiences of one of 
our interviewees – a Dutch police officer who monitors brothels in 
search of ‘signals of trafficking’ – illustrate this point. 
The official is an experienced police officer with a long career in 
the serious crime unit of the police force. During the interview he 
exclaimed in an emotional voice that he considered trafficking “one 
of the most heinous crimes”. To put this in perspective, this is the 
view of someone who has witnessed aggravated assault and murder. 
When asked to elaborate on this statement, he embarked on a long 
exposition that showed a strong identification with “innocent young 
women” whose “lives were destroyed” by ruthless traffickers. He related 
a lengthy story about a sex worker whom he had persuaded to leave 
the sex trade to continue with her education. To his dismay, however, 
she subsequently returned to prostitution. He attributed this to a 
combination of bureaucratic inertia (the delay of financial support to 
allow the woman to study) and the irreversible effects on her personality 
of having worked in prostitution. In discussing his work of inspecting 
brothels and detecting ‘signals of trafficking’, he said that some of the 
women whom he designated ‘victims’ objected to his characterisation. 
This was not just because they received a negative work notation, he 
said. He gave an example: “One of the women was from Romania. 
She had a university education. But she only made €350 a month there. 
Here she makes €700 a day. It doesn’t bother her that she has to pay 
someone €300 a day” (interview, police officer).133 
The police officer continued by stating that the legal article that 
defines trafficking is very broad. This, in his view, is an advantage. It is 
not only about coercion and violence, he said: “You find the nuance 
in the transport, the housing, the recruitment, and in taking advantage 
of the women. It is of those things that the cleverness of the trafficker 
consists.” He went on to complain that district attorneys and judges 
often “don’t get it” – they do not understand how trafficking works 
– and quoted a district attorney, who said of a sex worker who came 
from Hungary to work on a ‘50–50 basis’, that that was ‘reasonable, 
wasn’t it’. The police officer expressed astonishment at so much naïveté. 
“No”, he said emphatically, “it isn’t reasonable. This is trafficking” 
133 The fact that we repeatedly heard similar stories among police officers suggests 
that the figures on earnings are not accurate, but serve a rhetorical purpose. Our 
data show that earnings are generally lower and more erratic. 
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(interview, police officer).134 It is not our intention to criticise this 
police officer – he was a reasonable and dedicated public official – but 
to illustrate a frame of mind that has engulfed the political debate on 
prostitution in Austria, the Netherlands and the rest of the world in 
the 2000s in which trafficking functions as the rallying point for groups 
who seek to abolish prostitution from society. 
Trafficking means different things to different people. In the extensive 
literature on trafficking, the concept has been framed as sexual violence 
against women, as a form of organised crime, as a human rights 
problem, as a migration issue and a problem of labour rights. But this 
misses the point. The inherent fuzziness of the concept is an advantage 
as long as it fulfils its role of tying prostitution unfavourably to migration 
and crime. We saw in Chapter Two that the vehement discussions of 
the formulation of the trafficking article in the UN Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children reflected the stand-off on this point between abolitionists 
and those who were in favour of decriminalising prostitution. The 
result was a partial victory for the abolitionist camp in two respects. 
The trafficking article was deliberately framed in a broad way to allow 
member states to interpret it according to national circumstances. And it 
tied the concept of exploitation to the migration process (and measures 
that involve policing borders and enforcing migration law against sex 
workers) while ignoring exploitation at the workplace. The concept 
of trafficking with its emphasis on organised crime and what transpires 
in the country of origin obscures the exploitative relationships in the 
host country and the risks to which recent immigrants are exposed. As 
O’Connell Davidson observes, the UN protocol has had the negative 
consequence that it puts the alleged threat of organised crime instead of 
the human and labour rights of immigrants at the centre of attention: 
[T]he Trafficking Protocol is problematic from a human and migrants’ 
rights perspective because it attaches special significance to situations in 
which abuses at the point of destination are linked to the use of force 
or deception within the migration process. State parties are not being 
required to meet newer or higher standards with respect to protecting 
the rights of any migrant person who is subject to deception, force and 
exploitation within their borders, but only with respect to those who 
have also been cheated and exploited within the migratory process. 
(2006, p 9) 
134 We agree with the police officer here; it is not reasonable. But we disagree that 
commissions are an instance of trafficking. As we have seen, they constitute labour 
exploitation. 
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The UN protocol put the concept of trafficking centre stage in the 
public debate, bestowed it with legal authority, and framed it as sexual 
violence against women and a form of organised crime, instead of as 
a human rights problem and a problem of labour rights. The protocol 
is far from a neutral or benign tool that helps nations to develop 
policy instruments or uniform data collection procedures, but has 
very real negative effects ‘on the ground’ on sex workers’ rights. The 
development of prostitution policy in the Netherlands is a case in point. 
The trafficking article is the longest and most unclear article in the 
Dutch Penal Code.135 Its main elements concern recruitment, transport 
and exploitation. The UN protocol is interpreted expansively in the 
Netherlands and declares all recruitment of women for sex work in 
another country as illegal.136 The issue of the motivation, advance 
knowledge or consent of the woman to enter into the sex business that 
used to play a role in court proceedings has thereby become moot. Since 
the signing of the UN Protocol, exploitation is a key element of the 
definition of trafficking in Austria and the Netherlands. Clause 2 of the 
trafficking article in Dutch criminal law specifies the legal definition of 
exploitation: ‘The exploitation of another person in prostitution, other 
forms of sexual exploitation, forced or indentured labour, other forms 
of sexual exploitation, forced or indentured labour or services, slavery 
or indenture that is comparable to slavery.’137 The legal definition of 
exploitation could in principle be considered a positive development 
that makes it possible to design policy strategies and policy tools to fight 
135 According to District Attorney O.V.J. ten Kate at the launch of the book De Fuik 
by Henk Werson in Amsterdam on 19 January 2012 (Werson, 2012). 
136 Strictly speaking that would mean that someone who, for example, gave a sex 
worker who works in Dortmund a ride across the border to Amsterdam would 
be guilty of trafficking. In practice these broad-spectrum definitions of trafficking, 
while ideologically gratifying, do not work. Dutch law, for example, makes a 
distinction between acts of trafficking that are ‘strafwaardig’ and ‘niet-strafwaardig’. 
This translates roughly as ‘punishable and ‘non-punishable’. ‘Punishable’ requires 
the well-known elements of gain, deception and/or violence. Giving a cross-border 
ride to a befriended sex worker would be considered ‘non-punishable’ and would 
not lead to prosecution. Austrian law makes distinguishes between trafficking 
and trans-border trade in prostitution (Grenzüberschreitender Prostitutionshandel) 
which is also punishable according the Penal Code but not as severely as human 
trafficking. Indeed often accusations of human trafficking are later downgraded 
to Grenzüberschreitender Prostitutionshandel as the existence of exploitation cannot 
be proven. The conclusion must be that the expansive definition of trafficking is 
symbolic politics. 
137 Austrian law also puts exploitation at centre stage, be it exploitation in prostitution, 
begging, labour in general, or the sale of organs.
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the kind of exploitation that is endemic in a stigmatised profession such 
as prostitution, were it not for the fact that the dominant trafficking 
discourse has led to much confusion, myopia, incoherencies and 
contradictions that have precluded such a development so far. First, 
as Sanghere perceptively notes, ‘The dominant trafficking paradigm 
rests upon an absence of the critical distinction between trafficking 
and migration on the one hand and trafficking and prostitution on 
the other’ (2012, p 10). One of the implications of this confusion 
between trafficking, migration, prostitution and coercion has been 
a persistent misdirection of the focus of policy. Equating trafficking 
with migration has resulted in a move to stop and curb the latter. Yet, 
as analysts and international organisations have concluded over and 
over again, the solution exacerbates the problem: ‘Lack of legal rights 
to mobility and legally accepted forms of livelihood compel marginal 
and vulnerable groups to lead underground lives, enhancing manifold 
their vulnerability to harms such as trafficking, bondage, slavery-like 
working and living conditions, and HIV/AIDS’ (Sanghere, 2012, p 8; 
see also Vance, 2011, p 935). The effect of this persistent anti-migration 
stance is to approach the migration of low-wage workers with an ‘ethos 
of criminality’ (Vance, 2011, p 936), particularly when the migrants 
are women and sex workers. Every step in the sex worker’s migration 
trajectory, from the journey to the country of destination, the people 
whom she enlists to assist her in travelling and settling, the housing she 
finds in the country of residence, the conditions of work, the wages she 
earns, her partners and colleagues, are all tainted by an assumption of 
illegality. The assumption of illegality only perpetuates the vulnerable 
position of low wage migrant as it keeps them from accessing the 
services and enjoying the rights that are extended to recognised citizens 
(Sanghere, 2012, p 9; see also Baptista and LEFÖ, 2014, p 10 onwards). 
At the same time the confusion between prostitution and coercion 
has resulted in an attempt to eradicate prostitution altogether, and to 
expose prostitution policy to various forms of religious and radical 
feminist-inspired abolitionism. The result is that policy initiatives 
are misdirected. In the popular discourse and the minds of officials 
exploitation of migrants is restricted to ‘forced prostitution’ instead 
of the much more commonplace and persistent forms of exploitation 
in occupations such as the cleaning industry, meat packing, domestic 
services, construction and agriculture that are available to low-wage 
migrants (Caixeta, 2005; Vance, 2011, p 939). Moreover, the very real 
problem of workplace exploitation in prostitution dissolves in vague 
allusions to ‘trafficking’, ‘forced or illegal prostitution’ and the alleged 
iniquity of clients. 
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The basic meaning of exploitation, as we saw in the previous section, 
centres on the notions of taking unfair advantage of someone’s else’s 
work, unacceptable work conditions and/or the deprivation of worker 
rights.138 We argue that the concept has considerable advantages in 
guiding both an effective and humane policy towards sex workers 
and other migrants. First, it reorients attention from the complexities 
and ambivalences of what transpires between the women and the 
middlemen in the country of origin and the irresolvable issue of 
women’s alleged consent or naïveté, to the work situation and labour 
rights in the destination country (Andrijasevic, 2004; O’Connell 
Davidson, 2006; Amesberger, 2014; ICSRE, 2016). Second, it brings 
into the purview of the policy maker the endemic exploitation that 
occurs in sex facilities, including licensed ones (Altink and Bokelman, 
2006; O’Connell Davidson, 2006, pp 11-14; ICRSE, 2016). Third, 
it moves us away from prostitution essentialism, or the belief that 
exploitation is a defining factor of prostitution only.139 Instead, 
exploitation is a feature of many types of work, particularly, but in 
our neoliberal economy not exclusively, at the lower end of the labour 
138 The Austrian jurisdiction distinguishes Ausnutzung (taking unfair advantage) and 
Ausbeutung (exploitation). According to the High Court, taking unfair advantage 
is given when there is no or no commensurate reward and at least 50% of the 
income is taken away; exploitation is defined as a cut-off of 75% or more (source: 
OGH [Oberste Gerichtshof – Supreme Court] 13Os65/06t from 23 June 2006, 
15Os122/07s from 21 January 2008, 12Os24/07g from 31 May 2007). It seems 
that Austrian facility owners are aware of this distinction and play the system 
accordingly.
139 Essentialism is a common fallacy in social and political analysis. ‘If a group of objects 
referred to by a common term (be they people, institutions, or practices) do not 
have any universally shared attributes, then clearly they do not have a common 
essence. If they do have some shared attributes, this alone does not mean these are 
essential rather than accidental, even if they occur in 100% of cases. “Associational 
thinking”, which assumes that what happens to go together must go together, is 
therefore analytically feeble. If we are to understand the structure of any object of 
study, we need to distinguish those features that merely happen to coexist – and 
perhaps interact – but could exist apart from those that could not exist without 
a certain other feature’ (Sayer, 2000, pp 84-5). Essentialism is important because 
it does two kinds of moral work, particularly, but not exclusively, in a morally 
contested area as prostitution policy. First, it cuts the object’s ties with its social 
context and defines it as somehow unique, incomparable to any other object 
or activity. Essentialism thereby obscures the wider context that sustains a social 
object. To be aware of the constructionist nature of a social or policy definition 
helps us to look for similarities with and analogies to other social objects, which 
in turn enables us to broaden our understanding of the object. Second, as we have 
allegedly reached the rock bottom of determining factors, essentialist reasoning is 
meant to shut down any further discussion.
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market, such as agriculture, the construction industry, the cleaning 
business domestic services and the rapidly expanding ‘gig economy’ 
(Kapur, 2012; Kempadoo, 2012b; Sanghere, 2012).140 Moreover people 
with a vulnerable position in the labour market, such as children, 
women or recent or illegal immigrants, run a greater risk of being 
exploited (Caixeta, 2005; Baptista and LEFÖ, 2014). 
In the conclusion of this chapter we put forward a policy alternative 
to the concepts of trafficking, forced prostitution and exploitation as an 
intrinsic element of the migration process. Our alternative is meant to 
help policy makers recognise situations of labour exploitation and abuse 
in prostitution in an unequivocal way and design appropriate measures 
that target the perpetrators instead of the victims of exploitation. Our 
starting point is that exploitation is a potential characteristic of many 
(employment) relationships. Because of the stigmatised and migratory 
nature of prostitution as well as its precarious legal status, exploitation, 
like in the low-end service industry in general, is prevalent in the sexual 
services industry. Such labour exploitation can be broken down into 
different categories: working for substandard wages or income; overly 
long working hours; dependency on third parties; and forms of sexual 
violence such the inability of the sex worker to choose or refuse clients, 
to refuse unwanted sexual activities (from clients, managers or third 
parties) or to determine the conditions for sexual service provision. 
Reframing trafficking in terms of labour exploitation has six 
beneficial effects on policymaking. First, we become aware that labour 
exploitation is not restricted to prostitution, but instead is a risk factor 
in all forms of employment, particularly of vulnerable populations such 
as children, migrant women, recent and undocumented immigrants 
and those with little education.141 Second, it directs the attention of 
policy makers to the site where the exploitation occurs, the workplace, 
and away from the ambiguous and usually misunderstood migration 
process. The concept of labour exploitation also makes us aware, third, 
that exploitation in prostitution is not a monolithic phenomenon 
140 On the gig economy, see www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/26/
will-we-get-by-gig-economy.
141 The current practice of so-called zero hour contracts or unpaid ‘internships’ are 
examples of economic exploitation in the regular labour market. Also, sexual 
violence is not only a problem in the field of sex work but also in other fields 
of work. One of us (Helga Amesberger) has just finished some research on the 
sexual harassment of young people in work and training situations. She found that 
it was very difficult for the young women and men in question to talk about the 
harassment with persons of trust within their company or with functionaries of 
trade unions, and to seek help.
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but that it exists in different forms and gradations. Fourth, framing 
prostitution and its various forms and gradations of exploitation as a 
form of labour migration restores agency to the migrant sex worker. 
The concept of trafficking prevents us from grasping the diversity 
of reasons why immigrant women choose to enter prostitution, the 
exploitation that occurs in the host country after immigration, and 
the fact that exploitation is experienced by immigrants and local 
(low-income) women alike. Instead of a helpless victim the (migrant) 
sex worker becomes an individual who makes conscious choices in a 
situation of, often considerable, constraints. Indeed in our fieldwork 
we encountered many women who had voluntarily decided to move 
from, for example, Romania or Bulgaria to Austria or the Netherlands 
to work in prostitution, who endured excessively long working hours 
and had to hand over a considerable part of their earnings to brothel 
owners, but who nevertheless managed to send money home on a 
regular basis, and who claimed that, despite everything, life was better 
than in the country of origin where they had no prospects at all. This 
does not detract from the exploitative nature of the labour situation in 
which these women find themselves. The measure of exploitation is 
relative to the labour and workplace laws of the host country. Therefore 
the concept of labour exploitation lays the responsibility, and the 
leverage points for policy intervention, at the doorstep of those who 
are responsible for this situation: the middlemen, the venue and business 
owners and the officials who develop and implement migration, sex 
work and labour policies that create and sustain precarious labour. And 
finally, the concept of coercion prevents awareness that there are long-
standing laws, administrative measures and enforcement agencies in 
the destination country that play – or should play – a role in preventing 
labour exploitation in the workplace, for nationals and immigrants alike. 
The concepts of trafficking (and its widely used corollary, forced 
prostitution) enjoy their popularity because of their symbolic meaning 
(Doezema, 2010). They signal the moral position that prostitution 
is ‘essentially’ a form of male domination over women. Reframing 
these concepts as different forms of exploitation creates a productive 
set of analogies with similar phenomena in other occupations. It also 
redefines the problematic and muddled concept of trafficking as one, 
extreme, manifestation of the sexual and economic exploitation of 
recent immigrants from low-wage, underdeveloped countries to high-
wage, developed nations. The net effect is to take the different forms 
of sexual and economic exploitation out of the morality politics of 
prostitution and bring it within the remit of labour, economic and 
administrative law. 
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SIX 
Prostitution policy beyond 
trafficking: collaborative  
governance in prostitution 
The challenges of prostitution policy revisited: harnessing 
a complex policy field
Every policy domain imposes its own specific demands on the 
politicians and officials who bear responsibility for it. In Chapter Two 
we delineated five domain-specific challenges that face those officials 
who are entrusted with regulating prostitution. In Chapter Five 
we added the general challenge – a challenge that is not specific to 
prostitution policy, that every policy maker faces to a greater or lesser 
extent, but that constraints and shapes the capacity and possibilities for 
policymaking – that prostitution is a complex policy field. 
The domain-specific challenges are the following. Prostitution is 
stigmatised. Trading sex for money is considered to be demeaning 
to women and involve the unacceptable commodification of female 
sexuality (Nussbaum, 1998; Radin, 2001). The stigma surrounding 
prostitution results in public condemnation, or at the very minimum, 
public distrust, lack of acceptance and a generalised anxiety about 
prostitution’s effects on marriage and community. It also leads to sex 
work taking place at the margins of society, usually in designated urban 
spaces, undertaken by those such as low-income immigrants who 
are at a far remove from the general public, or by ordinary women 
working and living among us who conceal their work as a sex worker. 
Stigmatisation transforms female prostitution into an unspecified threat 
from an unknown other; a contagious activity that affects the morals of 
our daughters, sons and husbands and threatens public health, morality 
and the status of women (Corbin, 1990; Nussbaum, 1998, p  709; 
Chuang, 2010). This combination of fear, approbation and ignorance 
leads to an urge among authorities to control prostitution. 
In addition to the stigmatised, covert nature of prostitution, and 
partly as a result of it, precise and reliable statistics are hard to obtain. 
Prostitution is an occupation that is characterised by, sometimes extreme, 
mobility, which makes it almost impossible to collect basic statistics 
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such as the daily number of sex workers in a specific geographically 
bounded location. Another reason for the lack of reliable statistics is 
the difficulty of precisely defining core policy categories, in particular 
categories such as ‘trafficking’ and ‘forced prostitution’. We return to 
this issue later in the chapter. The combination of cultural ignorance 
about prostitution and sex workers, and the lack of numbers, creates 
a situation in which, even in the best of circumstances, policy makers 
are ‘sailing blind’, without the solid base of evidence to guide their 
assessments and decisions that exists in many other policy domains, 
such as health, education and employment. 
But these are not the best of circumstances. Prostitution policy is an 
archetypical case of morality politics. We spelled out the implications 
of this in Chapter Two. The topic of prostitution in society is 
engenders strong ideologies. As everyone considers morality their own 
provenance, morality politics is lay politics – everyone has an opinion 
about it. Morality politics occupies a peculiar position in relation to 
evidence: facts are instruments in the service of a moral argument; facts 
that contest the moral position are resisted, if necessary, adjusted, or in 
some instances, fabricated to fit the position (Weitzer, 2007; Doezema, 
2010). This radically changes the perspective on the role of evidence 
in prostitution policy. Instead of a lack of facts, as suggested in the 
previous paragraph, evidence, with all the trappings of scientific and 
political authority, fulfils the function of a fantasy. Policy analysts speak 
in this regard of fantasmatic logic, a concept inspired by psychoanalysis 
to denote the need among policy makers and the general public to 
improve or complete an imperfect reality with utopian narratives of 
stability, repair and control (Schön, 1971; Stone, 1997; Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007; Mert, 2015). In the context of morality politics 
ignorance is an advantage and evidence an allure, a temptation to shape 
and bend policy towards some preconceived moral position. As we 
have seen, morality politics upsets the balance of stability and change 
in public policy. Where in normal circumstances stability comes from 
laws, constitutional structures and stable configurations of value and 
understanding, change is inspired by policy learning, a change of actors 
or strong exogenous shocks (Cairney, 2012, pp 208-9). All this is moot 
in the case of morality politics where fantasmatic logics induce both 
sudden, sharp changes in local rules and strategies and longitudinal drifts 
from policy goals. This is substantiated both by the frequent twists and 
turns in local prostitution policy and the wider regulatory drift away 
from legalisation towards a de facto repressive policy that attenuates and 
disowns the goals and assumptions of earlier policies. 
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Prostitution policy is hard to disentangle from immigration policy. 
In this world of large population movements, and with most sex 
workers being immigrants, prostitution policy has a close political 
and legal association with immigration policy. This association has 
a predominantly restrictive character. Nations do not like poor 
immigrants; they certainly do not like poor immigrants who choose 
to work in prostitution. Despite the right to free movement of labour 
within the constitutional space of the EU, nation states still try to 
discourage and unsettle sex worker migrants from EU countries after 
they have habituated to the destination country. This dynamic is 
reinforced by the trafficking discourse. Vance rightly encourages the 
observer of contemporary prostitution policy to distinguish between 
‘law in the books’ and ‘law in action’. Where the first is clear about 
human rights, labour rights and the free movement of labour within the 
EU, the second focuses on criminal codes relating to police borders, on 
the criminalisation of prostitution even in the licensed sector, on the 
fight against ‘forced prostitution’, and on labour laws that disempower 
immigrants. 
The general challenge we identified is that prostitution policy has 
all the characteristics of a policy field. Policy fields are characterised 
by multiplicity, complexity, interdependency, emergence, uncertainty 
and unpredictability. From the vantage point of the policy maker 
who operates from within a policy field, the world looks messy and 
disordered. The dynamic complexity of policy fields has two important 
implications for policy makers. First, because emergence, the relational 
dynamics within the system, is the main ‘engine’ of the policy field; 
its behaviour is inherently unpredictable. That does not mean that 
the field lacks any regularity; interactions between elements can settle 
into regular patterns. For example, the exploitative business model of 
brothels that can be found in almost all countries is an example of such 
patterned regularity. However, because of the extensive nature of the 
field and its open boundaries, it is always prone to destabilising shocks 
that ripple through the system making it inherently unpredictable. The 
Sneep case that shook up Dutch policy makers in 2005 is an example 
of such a shock. 
Second, dynamic complexity means that interventions result in 
unforeseen, unintended consequences. As we have seen over and over 
again in the preceding chapters, even well-meaning policy interventions 
in the domain of prostitution tend to result in, mostly negative, 
unintended consequences. In most cases these concern the human and 
civil rights of sex workers and immigrant women; in other cases they 
extend to the constitutional integrity of a legal code or governance 
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system, or the social status of a group (clients of sex workers). It is 
not always easy to specify the causal link between policy intervention 
and unintended consequence. In some cases the ideological zeal of 
officials narrows their understanding of the possible consequences of 
their actions – one goal (control, the prevention of trafficking) trumps 
other considerations, such as privacy or fair treatment. In some cases 
unintended consequences (but how unintended were these really?) 
result from the deliberate selection of one set of interests (citizens’ 
comfort, employers’ freedom to act) over those of another (sex workers’ 
rights to freedom of movement in the city and to change jobs). 
Perhaps the most common unintended consequence in prostitution 
is policy failure. The causal mechanism is a lack of information and 
understanding of the world of prostitution that results in measures that 
do not address the concerns or incentives of the parties affected, and 
that are easy to evade or counteract (Wagenaar, 1995). 
What does all this add up to? We have observed that prostitution 
policy, although hotly debated at the national level in parliament and 
media, is realised at the local level. This means that local officials have 
been entrusted with the task of translating broad laws into workable 
programmes, selecting the policy instruments that give hands and 
feet to vague and unclear policy goals and statutory language, and 
above all interacting with the actors on the ground to induce them 
to be compliant with the law, to adjust their behaviour to conform 
to the goals and spirit of the law. Localism is an inherent quality 
of prostitution policy. We encapsulate the challenge faced by local 
policy officials dealing with prostitution regulation as follows: How 
can local officials design and implement an effective and humane prostitution 
policy that is cognisant of the global and moral forces that shape prostitution 
in contemporary society? Differently put, how can they steer free from 
the eroding influence that morality politics has on fairness, truth and 
human decency, accommodate the uncertainties and ambiguities 
created by the lack of evidence in this sector, understand and take a 
humane stance towards the global forces that compel scores of poor 
people to try their luck in other countries, and take the ineradicable 
stigma that is attached to prostitution into account in their mediation 
between sex workers and the larger society? How can policy makers 
effectively navigate a complex policy field? 
We believe that these challenges are not confined to the two 
countries that were part of our research project, but that they apply to 
each and every country that attempts to regulate prostitution. Stigma, 
morality politics, lack of data, immigration, dynamic complexity and 
negative unintended consequences are forces that influence the sex 
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trade everywhere, although perhaps not always with exactly the same 
potency, given the singularities of individual countries. Similarly, the 
national–local relationship is crucial to prostitution policy everywhere. 
National legislation has to be translated into local policy design to be 
implemented, but at the same time, as we have seen, the local exerts 
considerable discretion in shaping public policy. The literature on 
complex adaptive systems contains many suggestions for dealing with 
dynamic complexity, too many to discuss here in depth. One principle, 
however, underlies all this advice: complexity cannot be eliminated or 
denied. It also defies control. Control, as we have seen, is a governance 
fantasy. The best we can hope for in addressing these formidable 
challenges is to harness dynamic complexity, to take advantage of the 
opportunities it offers and use it for productive ends (Axelrod and 
Cohen, 2000, pp xi-xii), in other words ‘[S]eeking to improve but 
without being fully able to control’ (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000, p xvi). 
Harnessing complexity boils down to three broad strategies: increasing 
variation, changing interaction and selecting and nurturing solutions 
that work (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000). By increasing variation we 
introduce new ideas, insights and experiences into a policy field that 
open up unproductive routines and stagnant problem solutions. By 
changing interaction we effectively create new relational dynamics 
and thus new emergent outcomes in the field (Wagenaar, 2007). By 
selecting and strengthening procedures and routines that work, we 
enhance the governance capacity of the field (Bourgon, 2011). In this 
chapter we focus on the variety and interaction pillars of this three-
pronged strategy. We suggest that policy makers need to organise the 
policy process in such a way that it provides space for the voice of the 
sex worker to be heard where it counts, and create operating routines to 
allow sex workers to influence policy design and implementation. The 
technical term for this form of policy design is collaborative governance. 
But we will also see in the next sections that in the real world of 
policymaking, enhancing governance capacity through variation, 
interaction and selection requires attention to essential additional factors 
such as building trust, enhancing self-organisation, managing emotions, 
and engaging in deliberative forms of communication. 
Introducing collaborative rationality in prostitution 
governance 
Before we describe and illustrate the possibilities of collaborative 
governance in prostitution, we need to discuss – and dismiss as 
inadequate – some ‘common sense’ reactions to the challenges described 
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in the preceding section. The first would be to formulate clear national 
goals and make sure, through sufficient oversight and monitoring, that 
local policy makers adhere to this script. This is the impetus behind 
the new national prostitution law (WRP) in the Netherlands. The law 
is supposed to create uniformity among the welter of local licensing 
systems. Apart from the fact that this solution fails to address any of 
the challenges formulated earlier, there are theoretical and legal reasons 
why it is likely to falter on the localism that is inherent in prostitution 
policy. As we discussed in Chapter Five, policy formulation and policy 
implementation are not strictly demarcated phases of the policy process, 
but are, instead, continuous, consisting of overlapping competences, 
actors, activities and materialities. In practice national laws act as 
instructions, or rather suggestions or admonitions, to lower-level 
officials to draw on a set of administrative routines to transform the law 
into a more or less workable programme. Legally, in many countries, 
and this is certainly the case in Austria and the Netherlands, the local 
level has considerable constitutional autonomy in designated areas 
to raise taxes, design policy, and organise and deploy police capacity. 
Moreover, as the WPG shows, key concepts in the national law are 
often vaguely formulated and open to different interpretations. Local 
autonomy is in itself neither a good nor a bad thing. It depends on 
how it is deployed. But in a moral climate in which prostitution is 
considered synonymous with trafficking, regulations drift into ever 
more repressive measures in the Netherlands, or the Viennese police 
make autonomous decisions such as banishing street workers to ever 
more remote and dangerous areas of the city, the dangers of unchecked 
localism in prostitution policy are clear. 
A second policy reaction would be to make a serious commitment to 
eradicating prostitution from society, as this moral blight and affront to 
women has no place in a highly developed, civilised society. We possess 
the legal and administrative tools – prohibition and the criminalisation 
of clients – and we must make sure that we deploy sufficient means and 
are serious in enforcing these prohibitions stringently. This solution 
addresses the morality dimension in prostitution policy. It would 
satisfy all those who perceive prostitution as morally unacceptable 
and degrading to women and it would send a signal to men to take 
gender equality more seriously. Moreover, by eradicating prostitution 
from society, it would solve most of the other challenges. Most, but 
not all. Apart from the considerable and probably insurmountable 
enforcement problems, prohibition does not address the issue of mass 
immigration. Nations, such as Italy, Spain and most countries in the 
Global South, that have long prohibited and criminalised prostitution 
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still receive many immigrants from poor countries, some of whom 
choose to work in prostitution.142 The results are the well-known 
effects of driving women, whose social position is already precarious, 
into illegality where they are even more vulnerable to harm such as 
exploitation, dependency, indentured labour, and corruption by public 
officials. Dora’s story at the beginning of this book is a stark reminder 
of that perverse dynamic. The problem is that, as far as we can see, no 
society has ever been able to completely eradicate prostitution. It is 
one of those utopias, one of those fantasmatic logics that, in one form 
or another, inhabit every policy domain.143
So, where does this leave us? As we argued in Chapter Three, 
policymaking is a practice. It is an ongoing and routinised 
accomplishment (Nicolini, 2012, p 3). Policymaking, in any domain, 
is a practical attempt to improve or accommodate a situation that 
is regarded as being in need of improvement. That means that 
policymaking is deeply embedded in the ideational-material world, to 
which we bring our competences, routines, habits and improvisations, 
our ideals and values, our worries and personalities (Wagenaar, 2004). 
The means we have at our disposal to deal with this ideational-
material world are equally commonplace: set up a meeting, write 
minutes, compose a report, have an informal talk with a colleague, 
assign a task to a junior associate, monitor agreements from an earlier 
meeting, visit a brothel for the monthly hygiene inspection, process an 
application for license – the list is as endless as it is tedious (Freeman, 
2016; Rhodes, 2015). Somewhere in that everyday reality of public 
administration problems get solved, or not, and policy goals reached, or 
not. How does this humdrum take on policymaking address any of the 
formidable challenges formulated before? Through, what the practice 
theorist Pickering calls a ‘dialectic of resistance and accommodation’, 
where resistance denotes a temporary failure to capture the agency of 
an object or person and accommodation a response to this resistance 
(Pickering, 1995, p 22). From the perspective of the administrator the 
challenges that beset prostitution policy are shorthand for a bundle of 
142 This includes indigenous women within the affluent countries of north-western 
Europe who, for a variety of reasons, exchange sexual services for money.
143 Moreover, the prohibition solution does not address the sexual agency of women. 
Even in societies where gender relations are fairly equal, some women (and men) 
will decide, for financial or other reasons, to provide sexual services to men. Most 
countries, and certainly the countries that have prohibited prostitution, also harbour 
domestic sex workers, often at the higher end of the market, and frequented by 
the societal elite. In such societies the existence of this segment of the sex trade is 
a public secret that is shrouded in discretion. 
Prostitution policy beyond trafficking
234
Designing prostitution policy
resistances as they manifest themselves ‘on the ground’: evasion tactics 
by brothel owners or sex workers, conflict with brothel owners or sex 
workers, a lack of coordination between different agencies, mutual 
misunderstanding between the main actors (often exacerbated by 
language and cultural differences), distrust, anger and anxiety on the 
part of the sex worker, aggressive media that are waiting to inflate 
small mistakes into major administrative embarrassments, conflicts 
with colleagues, a restless, angry public that demands to be heard 
(Wagenaar, 2006) – resistances that add up to a situation, common to 
much contemporary local governance, that the democratic theorist 
Mark Warren calls ‘pluralized ungovernability’ (Warren, 2014). 
The literature also suggests accommodations to pluralised 
ungovernability that show remarkable similar ities with the 
recommendations of fostering variability and interaction: government-
initiated democratic participation. ‘There is a lot of political work in 
today’s societies,’ Warren argues, ‘that electoral democracy is unable 
to accomplish’ (2014, p 45). This kind of participation, he continues, 
opens up a number of ‘opportunities’ to increase the governing capacity 
of local administrations. One is that it allows for the inclusion in 
decision making of those affected by an issue. The second is a more 
direct and specific form of empowerment of those affected. The second 
opportunity logically follows from the first, as inclusion without the 
actual capacity to influence decisions is hollow.144 The challenge is of 
course how to realise that empowerment. The third opportunity is 
trickier. It is about the capacity of the administration to build more 
effective forms of representation than electoral representation (which, 
given their precarious citizenship status, are ineffective for a large 
number of sex workers anyway) into the policymaking process. The 
strength and legitimacy of electoral representation is that it is based 
on equality; everyone has an equal vote. But that is also its weakness. 
The representative chain is not only weak but also largely unspecified. 
Local administrations are usually not elected because of their stance on 
the sex trade. Invited participation allows for more effective forms of 
representation. ‘What matters most from the perspective of democratic 
representation,’ Warren argues, ‘is that the selection processes results 
in a body that includes the interests, values, views, and opinions of 
those potentially affected, as well as has the capacity for considered 
144 Although many participatory schemes initiated by governments amount to 
exactly that: inclusion without decision-making influence. Think of the myriad 
information or consultation meetings, where participation is largely tokenistic and 
their purpose merely to placate the public (Arnstein, 1969).
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advice or decisions that represent the affected’ (2014, p 55). More 
specifically, invited participation makes it possible for administrations 
to avoid advocacy-based representation (as in the Viennese case in 
which citizens captured the press and the police) and open up the 
policymaking process to influence by marginal or excluded groups. 
In 2002 Wagenaar studied the implementation of the legalisation of 
brothels in the city of The Hague. What he, unexpectedly, found was 
an instance of government-initiated participation. It was imperfect (it 
was as much aimed at improving interagency coordination as including 
societal actors; it included only brothel owners and excluded sex 
workers and their advocates; there were such major conflicts and so 
much ill will on the part of the brothel owners that parties had to seek 
recourse to the courts) but in the end it did the trick: the city relatively 
quickly and painlessly introduced a licensing system for brothels and 
slowly and grudgingly a measure of mutual trust developed between 
city officials and brothel owners (Wagenaar, 2006). The example is 
important for the lessons it contains. Collaboration emerged out of 
an astute analysis of the situation at hand by the official in charge of 
the licensing project. He showed awareness of the sheer complexity 
of the situation (the licensing meant that the regulated tolerance 
of the preceding years had to be transformed into a coordinated 
administrative effort involving a dozen city agencies), as well as of 
the obstructive power of brothel owners. To avoid a long hard slug 
towards implementing a licensing system, and assure compliance with 
the system once it was in place, the official concluded that it was better 
to include the owners in the design of the licensing. The story of 
the, sometimes difficult, deliberations and negotiations demonstrates 
mutual learning (about the sex trade on the part of officials, about the 
desirability of closing times on the part of the owners, and about the 
importance of taking responsibility for your tasks on the part of all 
involved) (Wagenaar, 2006). 
Let us call invited participation Solution CG, where CG stands 
for collaborative governance, and see how it stacks up against our 
list of challenges. First, in thoroughly pragmatic spirit, it takes the 
situation at hand as its starting point, not just in the sense that there 
is prostitution in a particular urban space and an imperative that the 
administration deal with it, but also that the only means that we have 
in our possession to deal with it consists of routine, unremarkable, 
practical, common sense. This answers both to the localism aspect 
that is inherent in prostitution policy and the intrinsic pragmatism of 
public policy. It is no coincidence, for example, that in their survey 
of collaborative governance, Ansell and Gash discovered that many of 
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these collaborative local projects ‘bubbled up’, similar to the initiative 
in The Hague, in response to governance problems. As they observe: 
Collaborative governance has emerged as a response to 
the failures of downstream implementation and to the 
high cost and politicization of regulation. It has developed 
as an alternative to the adversarialism of interest group 
pluralism and to the accountability failures of managerialism 
(especially as the authority of experts is challenged). (Ansell 
and Gash, 2008, p 544)
By including ‘those affected by the issue’, Solution CG answers to 
a number of other challenges to prostitution policy: lack of data, 
ignorance about the understanding of the immigration experience 
of poor women and the cultural distance created by the stigma on 
prostitution. Solution CG is especially strong on the problems of 
ignorance and lack of reliable and accurate data. Participating parties 
– sex workers and brothel owners – are able to contribute their 
experiential knowledge of the sex trade to assist in better policy design 
and criticise misguided or unworkable policy tools. Solution CG does 
not accommodate all ideological positions on prostitution, however. 
In the claustrophobic moral space of morality politics, pragmatism, 
with its conditional acceptance of prostitution, is itself an ideological 
position – as is every other policy approach to prostitution. 
However, before we discuss the possibility of collaborative 
governance in prostitution policy, we need to address the question of 
who the partners are in such a collaborative relationship. In the The 
Hague case sex workers did not play a role in the deliberations over the 
design and introduction of a licensing system. In complexity terms, by 
not including sex workers the officials did not optimise the requisite 
variety in the policy field that is a condition for successful learning 
and adaptation. This deprives policy makers of the opportunity to be 
exposed, in a non-antagonistic setting, to knowledge, experiences, 
affects, personal histories and solutions that lie outside the reigning 
administrative frameworks. We are aware of the practical difficulties 
of involving sex workers in arrangements for policy design. Pervasive 
stigma and its sedimentation in law and implementation practices, 
results in mutual distrust, personal isolation and high mobility, and 
makes sex workers hard to reach. The experiences in Vienna with the 
design of the new Viennese Prostitution Act (Chapter Three) are case in 
point. A one-off hearing of individual sex workers by the authorities did 
not add up to a stable mechanism for securing the latter’s input into the 
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routines of policy design in Vienna. There was increased variation but at 
the system level the traditional interaction mechanisms did not change 
and there was insufficient selection of positive learning mechanisms to 
effectively counteract the usual interactions in the policy field between 
politicians, citizens and the media (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000, pp 156-
7). In the end the opportunity to learn from sex workers’ experiences 
in designing a licensing system for brothels was limited. To benefit 
from the experiential knowledge of sex workers these collaborative 
relationships require the existence of stable, autonomous, self-assured 
partners. While most countries have sex worker organisations, we need 
to look more closely into the organisation and relational dynamics of 
such organisations to assess their capacity for collaborative governance. 
Sex worker advocacy and the state
Governance scholars agree that societal interests participate most 
effectively in policy networks when they are organised. This 
understanding is partly theoretical and partly practical. Theoretically 
it derives from the sway that political pluralism holds over theories 
of the policy process. This, largely American, approach states that 
numerous interest groups attempt to influence the political agenda and 
decision-making process, while the state acts an arbiter between such 
groups. Practically, the internal dynamics of policy networks are easier 
to navigate when the participants represent organisations or organised 
interests (Rhodes, 1996). 
Like most occupational groups sex workers organise themselves 
to exert influence to protect their rights and campaign for safe work 
conditions and sex workers’ wellbeing. However, due to the stigmatised 
nature of prostitution, self-organisation in sex work differs from that 
in other occupations. Two events, both dating from the mid-1970s, 
mark the beginning of contemporary sex workers’ self-organisation. 
In 1973 COYOTE (Call Off Your Own Tired Ethics), seen by many 
as the first contemporary sex worker advocacy group, was founded in 
San Francisco (Gall, 2014). COYOTE’s strategy was a combination of 
political campaigning and the provision of services to sex workers. It 
supported the creation of many similar groups in other American cities. 
On 2 June 1975, around 100 sex workers in Lyon occupied the Saint 
Nizier church in the centre of the city. The occupation was a reaction 
to the prison sentences that 10 of their colleagues had received for 
soliciting, and the culmination of a period of protest and (unsuccessful) 
negotiations with the authorities about repressive policies, police 
harassment and corruption in the municipal administration regarding 
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the governance of prostitution (Mathieu, 2001, p 108). The occupation 
received support from unions and political organisations in France, 
attracted widespread positive media coverage, and grew into a rallying 
point for sex worker rights organisations in France and abroad. Both 
COYOTE and the more loosely organised French groups were 
ignored, and in the French case repressed, by government authorities. 
However, both were successful as vehicles for consciousness raising 
and self-affirmation within the community of sex workers (Mathieu, 
2001, p 122). 
These early initiatives were followed by the foundation of the 
International Committee for Prostitutes’ Rights, and the first 
international conference for sex workers in 1985 in Amsterdam. The 
HIV/AIDS crisis in the 1980s, although it identified sex workers as 
one of the sources of contagion, proved to be a window of opportunity 
for the formation of sex worker advocacy groups and the possibility of 
collaboration with government authorities. Protecting the health of 
their colleagues through the promulgation of safe sex practices became 
one of the main goals of many emerging sex worker advocacy groups. 
Long-standing, effective sex worker rights organisations such as the 
New Zealand Prostitutes’ Collective (NZPC), the Scarlet Alliance in 
Australia and the Rode Draad (Red Thread) in the Netherlands (now 
defunct) were all founded in the 1980s. Similarly the fight against HIV/
AIDS initiated numerous advocacy organisations in Asian countries. 
At the same time public health authorities in several countries began 
to see that the involvement of community organisations, with their 
experiential knowledge of the work circumstances that increased 
and decreased the risk of HIV/AIDS and the means to design and 
support prevention measures, were a valuable ally in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS. Although the police attitude to prostitution scarcely 
changed, self-organisation and the positive experience of collaborating 
as a trusted partner with public health professionals proved to be an 
important form of self-definition and group affirmation (Beer and 
Tremblay, 2014, p 291). 
Sex worker self-organisation is shaped by a number of characteristics 
in which prostitution differs from other occupations. Every occupation 
is to greater or lesser extent regulated, by state agencies that impose 
national regulation on the occupational group and through self-
regulation by trade bodies or professional organisations. These 
regulations guarantee the quality of the product, organise appeal 
procedures in cases of conflict, specify sanctions in cases of dysfunctional 
or dishonest professionals, and in general promote adequate workplace 
conditions and labour rights. Because of the stigmatised, and in many 
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cases criminalised, nature of prostitution, its regulation has a wholly 
different character from that of other policy fields. First, as we saw in 
the Chapter Five, regulation of prostitution is not about the quality 
of the service or the adequacy of workplace conditions. And, second, 
trade bodies and professional organisations do not play a role in the 
regulation of prostitution; prostitution is regulated by the state, and 
the policy instrument of choice is criminal law or authoritative forms 
of regulation (Gall, 2014, p 222).145 As we argued in Chapter Two, 
the legalisation of prostitution does not make the stigma go away. 
To improve the conditions under which they work sex workers are 
therefore forced to address the wider climate of hostility towards 
prostitution and sex workers. This almost automatically compels them 
to unite in sex work advocacy organisations that address the issues of 
stigma, criminalisation and the personal isolation that follows from 
that. That also suggests that social protest and pressure group tactics 
that aim to improve general civil, political and human rights are the 
strategy of choice for sex work advocacy groups (Gall, 2014, p 224). 
Gall argues that unionisation, the route of choice for workers to 
create independent interest representation, is an inadequate strategy 
for sex workers. First, although improvement of workplace conditions 
is an important goal, the causes of substandard workplace conditions 
in prostitution do not lie solely with the ‘employer’, the brothel 
owner, but are also, if not largely, the result of the criminalisation of 
prostitution by the state.146 The combined effect of stigmatisation and 
criminalisation is that sex workers are relegated to an informal economy, 
where they work in isolation and in competition with each other, 
suffer precarious labour relations (with the attendant high mobility), 
and earn much of their income in the cash economy. Second, most sex 
workers are self-employed. This does not preclude unionisation per se, 
but, in combination with the other characteristics of sex work, makes 
it more difficult (Gall, 2014, p 222). Gall thinks that ‘[Sex workers’] 
“right to do business” as entrepreneurs and their view of themselves 
as individuals does not sit easily with the solidaristic and collectivist 
underpinnings of unionization’ (Gall, 2014, p 223). We should add, 
third, that the fact that many sex workers are (recent) immigrants, who 
do often not master the language of the arrival country, and whose 
social bonds are mostly with family in the country of origin or the 
145 In the Netherlands brothel owners have set up a number of umbrella organisations. 
However, these do not regulate the business but act as advocacy groups, similar to 
employers’ organisations. 
146 Moreover, not all sex workers work in brothels. 
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community of nationals in the arrival country, augments the difficulties 
of collectivisation. Gall therefore concludes that:
[B]ecause of the difficulties and obstacles facing all sex 
worker organizations (including unions) and the need 
for any sex worker organization to confront the extra-
workplace political and legal regimes that regulate sex work, 
both union and nonunion forms of sex worker collective 
self-organization in the workplace have coalesced around 
a form and modus operandi of extra-workplace pressure-
group activity that I call ‘independent collectivism’. A key 
aspect of independent collectivism is that it is independent 
of operators, employers, the state and any other third parties. 
Thus, it is an organization composed of, by, and for sex 
workers only. (Gall, 2014, p 224; parentheses in original)
This is an important argument, well supported by empirical evidence. If 
it were true, it does not bode well for the possibilities for collaborative 
governance in prostitution policy. Collaborative governance requires 
an attitude of openness to the other party, a willingness to listen to 
the other’s arguments. In theoretical terms, collaborative governance 
requires agonism instead of antagonism. Independent collectivism, with 
its disposition of independence, struggle, protest and resistance, sits 
closer to antagonism and resistance than to agonism. Yet, we also think 
that the argument overstates its case. First, solidarity and collectivism, 
just as well as individualism, protest and resistance, are not individual 
traits but dispositions and practices that are conditioned by the way 
situations are structured. The political climate in which sex workers 
operate determines the possibilities of constructive collaboration. Gall’s 
own work bears this out. The cases of self-organisation from the US 
and Canada all involve advocacy groups, usually locally organised, in 
opposition to the political regime and the local police. In Australia the 
Scarlet Alliance rapidly managed to become a national group, recognised 
by federal and provincial governments, and was subsequently awarded 
contracts to provide health and education services to sex workers. 
The same story can be told about the NZPC (from interviews with 
Hendrik Wagenaar). The difference is that in the first two countries 
prostitution is criminalised, the social climate, fuelled by sensational 
media items, is hostile to prostitution, and the police, either hostile or 
indifferent to sex workers, are entrusted with the implementation of 
the law. In Australia and New Zealand on the other hand, prostitution 
is decriminalised, the political and social climate is more accepting of 
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prostitution, and the police act more as a partner towards sex workers 
than as an enemy. 
Second, research on sex worker organisations shows that they are able 
to combine advocacy and independence with a service provision task. 
It is widely observed that advocacy organisations operate in a perennial 
tension between services and politics. Members feel that the degree 
of formalisation that is required to fulfil service tasks, often funded by 
the state, conflicts with the broader goal of changing societal attitudes 
towards sex work and fighting police corruption. Also, formalisation 
implies some form of registration and record keeping, which members 
perceive as endangering their anonymity. Moreover a real danger exists 
of being co-opted by the state through subsidies and grants, where 
the conditions that are attached to the funding allow state agencies 
to impose their agenda on the advocacy group (Beer and Tremblay, 
2014, p 299). Members of the NZPC trenchantly express this tension: 
In the beginning, the NZPC resisted the formality of things 
such as group registration and membership lists because it 
wanted to create a more fluid movement that people could 
move in an out of easily. These kinds of formalities were 
seen as barriers to becoming part of a move for change, as 
many sex workers were reluctant to be formally identified as 
such. A flat structure was preferred where everyone would 
have a part to play and the idea of having formal meetings 
did not initially appeal to the group. (Healy et al, 2010, p 46)
However, evidence from Canada, the US, New Zealand and the 
Netherlands demonstrates that it is possible to establish a sufficient level 
of trust between the sex worker organisation and government agencies 
to establish a productive working relationship (Healy et al, 2010, p 47). 
The state is never a monolithic entity; while it might not be possible to 
develop trust with some agencies or officials, others prove to be more 
open and pragmatic in their relations with sex worker organisations. 
For example, while its relationship with the mayor of Amsterdam 
was openly antagonistic, the Rode Draad always had a cordial and 
reciprocal working relationship with officials from the tax authority 
and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour Relations (personal 
observation, Hendrik Wagenaar). Similarly, the NZPC established a 
good working relationship, which eventually included funding, with 
the New Zealand Ministry of Health (Healy et al, 2010, p 48). Since 
then the NZPC has managed large and complex public health contracts 
for the ministry (interviews with Hendrik Wagenaar). The latter is a 
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splendid example of harnessing the complexity of a policy field: the 
introduction of the NZPC as a full partner increased variation, changed 
interaction patterns and created a new effective management routine 
that improved the delivery of public health services to sex workers in 
the fight against HIV/AIDS. Surveying evidence from Canada, Beer 
and Tremblay observed that sex worker organisations were able to 
develop both community and advocacy capacity: ‘With stable funding, 
community-based nonprofit organizations both expand the arena of 
social service provision and act as potential sites of civic engagement’ 
(Beer and Tremblay, 2014, p 300). In fact, in a political favourable 
climate the benefits of funding might outweigh its risks. As Beer and 
Tremblay conclude, ‘research indicates that resources are central to 
social movement organizations sustaining themselves over the long 
term, and this longevity is necessary to mobilize an autonomous voice 
for disenfranchised populations in local and national politics’ (Beer and 
Tremblay, 2014, p 301). The conclusion is that there is no necessary 
contradiction between state support and advocacy, and that in fact, 
the existence of a stable, politically recognised sex worker organisation 
might be a potent force in the battle for acceptance of prostitution 
as a legitimate occupation. However, does this mean that sex worker 
organisations and state agencies are able to jointly engage in the more 
demanding enterprise of collaborative governance? It is to this question 
that we turn in the next section. 
Governance capacity and collaborative governance
The key word in modern theories of governance and public 
administration is capacity. The challenge of any governance system is to 
build and maintain effective governance capacity to tackle the numerous 
challenges that governments face. These challenges are such that the 
traditional management of societal sectors by hierarchically organised 
and siloed government bureaucracies that provide services to meet 
universal needs no longer suffices (Healey et al, 2003, p 60). Different 
authors describe these challenges in different ways, but they generally 
boil down to the following. The first relates to the increasing complexity 
and pluralisation of politics and social life. Political complexity, as we 
saw, is characterised by a general dispersion of power and a high degree 
of interdependence (Bourgon, 2011, p 21). The causes of political 
complexity are the globalisation of a range of issues such markets 
and trade, migration, urban development, environmental issues and 
security. These processes of globalisation reduce both the territorial 
effectiveness of public administration and, partly as a consequence, 
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the democratic effectiveness of national or local electoral democracy 
(Ansell, 2011, p 4; Warren, 2014). A second challenge is what Warren 
calls the ‘general post-modernization of culture’ (Warren, 2014, p 47). 
This trend expresses itself in a less deferential attitude towards authority, 
a widespread disaffection with politics (Norris, 2011) and a tendency 
for civil society groups to create associations, parallel to the institutions 
of the state, that organise for purposes of advocacy, knowledge creation 
and self-government (Warren, 2001). When seen as a threat to 
traditional government this dense civil society environment results in 
highly adversarial politics (Ansell, 2011, p 4), but when regarded as a 
resource, it might open up new opportunities for political innovation 
(Bourgon, 2011, p 25; Wagenaar, 2014). The upshot of these trends 
is a state of ‘institutional incapacity’ (Warren, 2014, p 46); at all levels 
of government we witness disjunctions between government agencies’ 
capacity to deliver on their political promises through traditional policy 
instruments, citizens’ capacities to understand and govern their own 
social and physical environment, and the tendency of an increasingly 
beleaguered state to bear down on citizens with authoritative forms 
of regulation and surveillance (Norris, 2011). 
The remedy for this institutional incapacity is generally seen as a 
form of government that actively involves citizens and communities 
(Healey et al, 2003, p 63; Ansell, 2011; Bourgon, 2011; Warren, 2014; 
Ansell and Torfing, 2016). Governing capacity is seen as residing in 
the ability of government institutions to leverage the problem-solving 
power of civic associations and effectively collaborate with stakeholders 
in identifying, framing and solving collective problems. This forms an 
alternative to three traditional forms of governance: adversarial politics, 
in which the party in power makes decisions by imposing its will on 
minority parties; coalition politics, where parties, none of which can 
expect to gain an outright majority, make decisions by bargaining 
among themselves; and managerial governance, in which management 
processes, often but not always outsourced to corporate actors, function 
as means for collective problem solving and service delivery. 
What is collaborative governance? In broad-brush strokes 
collaborative governance is a mode of governance in which public 
agencies engage with various stakeholders to jointly deliberate about 
public problems (Ansell, 2011, p 167). Collaborative governance differs 
from the more generic term ‘governance’ in that it requires more 
stringent, more demanding standards of working together. Or, to put 
it differently, collaborative governance requires quite a bit of reflection 
on the design of the collaborative relationship. Just inviting people over 
and sitting around a table in a meeting room will not necessarily result 
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in a productive exchange of ideas. Ansell and Gash express this in the 
following, more demanding definition of collaborative governance:
A governing arrangement where one or more public 
agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in 
a collective decision-making process that is formal, 
consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make 
or implement public policy or manage public programs or 
assets. (Ansell and Gash, 2008, p 544) 
This definition covers various types of collaborative arrangements, 
from conflict resolution platforms in which parties who are locked in 
intransigent conflict try to find mutually acceptable accommodations 
(Innes and Booher, 2010) to the kind of long-standing contractual 
relationships that the NZPC in New Zealand or the Scarlett Alliance 
in Australia holds with public health agencies (Healy et al, 2010; Gall, 
2014). But whatever the nature of the arrangement, to designate it as 
collaborative, to allow it to build effective governing capacity, it needs 
to have the following characteristics. 
First, it is essential that actors from civil society who are affected 
by the policy, who are stakeholders in other words, are involved in 
the governing arrangement. But this in itself is not sufficient. To 
infuse the collective problem-solving situation with genuinely new 
insights and knowledge, it is particularly important that peripheral, 
marginal or vulnerable groups are involved. Innes and Booher stress 
the importance of increasing variation in the stalled policy field. 
Contrarian and disadvantaged stakeholders are necessary to break 
open the unproductive understandings and dysfunctional policy 
arrangements that make collaborative governance necessary in the 
first place and to benefit from the reciprocity and creative potential 
of genuinely inclusive relationships (Innes and Booher, 2010, pp 
101, 102). Inclusion of marginal groups is much more difficult and 
much less common than one may think, as the example from The 
Hague demonstrates. There are often good reasons to exclude these 
groups. They may be hard to find or to organise; they speak, dress, 
and behave differently from other stakeholders; there are often difficult 
language issues and cultural misunderstandings between groups; there 
may be well-founded mutual distrust; and often peripheral groups 
bring a long history of humiliation, marginalisation and pain to the 
negotiating table (Forester, 2009). Inclusiveness must be actively 
sought (Ansell and Gash, 2008, p 556). All these considerations apply 
to the inclusion of (immigrant) sex workers. But, as experience 
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with collaborative governance and policy mediation suggests, these 
obstacles can be overcome (Forester, 2009; Innes and Booher, 2010). 
Inclusiveness is essential to securing legitimacy (this forum represents 
all stakeholders), diversity (a precondition for dealing with social and 
technical complexity (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000, p  32; Innes and 
Booher, 2010, p 36) and mutual recognition as genuine participants 
in the policy process. Recognition is particularly important for the 
most peripheral and vulnerable partners, as they feel isolated in their 
struggle to get heard.
Second, the collaborative arrangement needs to be authoritative – 
that is, it must be aimed at, and have a mandate for, decision making. 
It must be exclusive in the sense that it cannot be a sideshow to the 
‘real’ political process of decision making. The time and energy that 
participants put into the process must result in genuine influence. 
This will provide an incentive for sceptical or reluctant participants 
to join the collaborative forum (Ansell and Gash, 2008, p  557). 
Authority is also signalled through the membership and longevity of 
the collaborative arrangement. If participants with a true mandate to 
make decisions represent government, the administration signals to 
the outside world that it takes this forum seriously as a governance 
body. Similarly, the longer the collaborative forum is in operation, 
the more it will communicate that this is an important element of the 
administration’s governing capacity.
Third, a condition for authority is that the collaborative arrangement 
has a formal and not a casual character. This implies a minimum of 
organisation and institutionalisation, such as agreeing on rules and 
procedures for meeting and decision making, a contractual arrangement 
with accountability procedures for situations where services are 
delivered, transparency (meetings are reported), an insistence on 
exclusivity (no forum hopping) and the sharing of resources. For 
example, marginal groups might need training in basic skills such as 
chairing a meeting, drawing up minutes or reading balance sheets 
(Fung, 2004). Sometimes governments decide to fund sex workers’ 
organisations, not only to make it possible for them to spend time 
on working with government agencies, but also as a token of their 
recognition as valued partners in the desired governance arrangement. 
So far, our description of design has been static, aimed at the proper 
structure and organisation of collaborative governance. But what is it 
that the parties in a collaborative arrangement actually do? The fourth, 
key element of collaborative process consists of engaging stakeholders 
in the twin processes of joint problem definition and joint-fact finding: 
exploring how each party perceives the central issues at hand and 
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discovering the facts that the parties can agree about. This is more than 
just having each party state how they perceive the problem or list what 
they consider key evidence. In almost all policy conflicts, problems, 
definitions and relevant evidence are the most contested aspects in 
the adversarial relationship. The fact that parties are willing, with an 
attitude of sceptical acceptance, to listen to the other is itself a major 
achievement. By opening up, if ever so slightly, to the other’s point 
of view, parties begin to discover what unites them as well as what 
divided them. They discover what worries, needs, values and goals 
they share. Joint problem definition has three effects. As an inquiry 
into the nature of an intrinsically complex problem it leads to a joint 
reconstruction of each stakeholder’s conception of the problem (Ansell, 
2011, p 172). When done well that experience can be transformative:
During the course of deliberation, people may discover new 
information and new perspectives about what is at stake 
in the decision before them. This may lead individuals not 
only to modify their choice of means for achieving ends, 
but to reconsider those ends. (Reich, 1985, quoted in 
Ansell, 2011, p 172)
Moreover, by jointly reflecting on the nature of the problem, the parties 
involved begin to own the transformed problem definition. Parties 
begin to see that the problem is too complex and unpredictable for any 
one party to fully comprehend, let alone, control. Participants discover 
– perhaps the better term is experience – their mutual dependency 
in harnessing the problem. This can also be seen as a form of social 
learning, in which the transformed understanding of the problem 
forms the basis for an inquiry into new ways of problem solving 
and reframed standards and criteria of what constitutes a successful 
solution. Joint problem definition also has important relational 
effects. Participants reframe their relationship away from a contest of 
emotionally held positions and preferences towards what Ansell calls 
a ‘position of shared uncertainty’ (Ansell, 2011, p 174). Joint problem 
definition is at the core of the process of breaking down stereotyping, 
the untested ascription of reprehensible views or negative character 
traits to opposing parties, and other barriers to communication that 
prevent exploration of mutual gains in the first place. It is at the heart 
of a process of building trust, mutual respect, shared understanding 
and commitment to the process. Put differently, in collaborative terms 
‘authentic dialogue’ may begin to occur. 
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Authentic dialogue is a technical term that signifies a process 
of communication that observes the requirements of accuracy, 
comprehensibility, sincerity and legitimacy (Innes and Booher, 2010, 
pp 97-9). Authentic dialogue can only be achieved in situations of 
face-to-face dialogue. It represents the hard-to-capture communicative 
process that forms the beating heart of every collaborative dialogue. It 
is a necessary condition for mutually learning new ways to think and 
act together. To get a sense of what the process of authentic dialogue 
entails in practice, it is perhaps useful to quote Innes and Booher at 
some length: 
Authentic dialogue requires collaboratively adopted 
ground rules that will enable a productive dialogue. The 
rules typically include an injunction against criticism of 
others; acceptable ways of dealing with the press; avoiding 
repetition; and not dominating the conversation. Dialogue is 
apt also to require admonitions about listening respectfully. 
Many people come in with their own ideas and spend 
meeting time rehearsing to themselves what they want to 
say, rather than listening, much less keeping an open mind. 
Changing these habits might require training exercises.… 
[S]ome participants assume that since collaboration is 
about finding common ground, they should not bring up 
anything controversial. But without sincerity and without 
the questioning of given knowledge and assumptions, a 
dialogue cannot be collaboratively rational. It will not break 
through the socially constructed and often disempowering 
assumptions that may be the cause of the problem’s 
intractability.… There are nonetheless stakeholders who 
are confrontive [sic] and fight for positions rather than 
listen. Some are highly emotional and angry. While process 
managers need to try to get these individuals to speak in 
terms of interests rather than positions and avoid attacking 
others, it is equally important that they not gloss over the 
conflict. Sometimes managers may even have to surface 
and address hidden conflicts to assure the dialogue does 
not result in what many critics are concerned about – a 
lowest common denominator agreement, with peer pressure 
stifling unpopular voices.… Hidden differences can lead to 
an agreement that is thin and fragile rather than one that 
has engaged the deep issues and bound the stakeholders 
together in reciprocal arrangements. (Innes and Booher, 
2010, p 100)
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When done properly the stakeholders in a process of collaborative 
governance may begin to reformulate how they understand the problem 
and in the process reformulate what they want to achieve. This often 
unleashes the creative potential that the combination of inclusiveness 
and authentic dialogue may bring to the collaborative forum. By 
learning to let go of favoured solutions and by opening themselves up 
to the knowledge and experiences of others, stakeholders may arrive 
at solutions that address shared interests. The most important part of 
this process is that this is a joint achievement. The learning about the 
issue at hand is shared: from each other and with each other. As Innes 
and Booher state: ‘The goal of collaborative dialogue is not to choose 
who or what is right, not even what is true or best, but to find actions 
that all or most can support and that are workable ...’ (2010, p 100).
Finally, fifth, successful collaborative governance requires leadership. 
In the literature on collaborative governance leadership is usually 
discussed in terms of facilitation. Facilitative leadership helps to navigate 
conflicting parties through the ups and downs of conflict resolution. 
Facilitative leaders engage in ‘assisted negotiation’ by mediating, or 
when the parties are stuck in a conflict and cannot reach a consensus, 
drafting a solution in non-binding arbitration (Ansell and Gash, 2007, 
p 554). ‘Leadership is crucial for setting and maintaining clear ground 
rules, building trust, facilitating dialogue, and exploring mutual gains’ 
(Ansell and Gash, 2007, p 554). In addition facilitative leadership is 
essential in empowering the weaker stakeholders in the collaborative 
platform, both to protect the democratic rights of the weaker parties 
to influence decisions that affect them, but also to guarantee the 
requisite diversity that is required to ‘think outside the box’ and arrive 
at genuinely creative solutions. 
In a wider perspective of collaboration leadership is important in a 
different way. All newcomers in an established policy subsystem have 
to ‘prove’ themselves to the established stakeholders. They have to 
demonstrate that they are reliable, trustworthy, representative of their 
constituency, and that they possess resources that provide added value 
to the subsystem. This applies a fortiori to self-organisations of marginal 
groups who strive to find partners in the world of governance, in 
particular when that group also has to bridge the gender divide. Initially 
such advocacy groups, whose members dress and speak differently 
and are not able or willing to use the behavioural codes that guide 
the subsystem’s interactions, are met with reserve if not downright 
suspicion. In such situations a leader who is able to communicate with 
a wide range of stakeholders is a huge asset. Such a leader creates the 
necessary bridging capital that is required for effective functioning in 
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the subsystem. At the same time, while the advocacy group is opening 
up to the values and interests of other stakeholders, it is essential that 
the group recalibrates its balance between advocacy and accord. This 
can be a genuinely agonising process in which some members feel that 
the soul and identity of the organisation are at stake. In such a crucial 
phase of the advocacy organisation’s development, effective leaders 
are able to reformulate the value commitments that fix the nature of 
the enterprise. They recommit the organisation to its distinctive aims, 
methods and role, both in the original community of stakeholders and 
in the wider policy subsystem. In terms of the advocacy organisation’s 
position in the policy subsystem, the role of leaders is to ‘develop 
a close alignment between meaning and action’ by articulating an 
organizational mission around which the original members can unite 
(Ansell, 2011, p 67). 
Is collaborative governance in prostitution policy 
possible?
Is collaborative governance, in the demanding sense as described above, 
possible in prostitution policy? And, if so, under what political or 
cultural conditions? At first blush the prospects are not hopeful. The 
case in The Hague excluded sex workers, and although it brought about 
a functioning licensing and monitoring system, and created a shared 
sense of what it takes to responsibly manage and govern commercial 
sex in a city and a modicum of trust between brothel owners and 
authorities, it was one of those ‘thin and fragile’ arrangements that 
are the result of a deficient collaboration process (Wagenaar, 2007). 
Moreover, the arrangement was exclusively focused on producing an 
administrative arrangement and ignored the workplace conditions of 
the sex workers. A study by Genevieve Fuji Johnson paints an even 
bleaker picture. The focus of her study was the ‘governance capacity’ 
of policy communities that dealt with prostitution policy across 
Canada. Fuji Johnson was particularly interested in the inclusion 
of ‘organizations that support sex workers in terms of recognizing 
their agency, advancing their human rights, and responding to their 
needs/assets’ (2015, p 1). The focus of the research was on how these 
organizations interact with each other and with municipal governments 
and police services (Fuji Johnson, 2015, p 2). Fuji Johnson distinguishes 
five types of interaction: collaborative, agonistic, siloed, antagonistic 
and emergent. In her careful description of policy communities in 
the domain of prostitution policy, she distinguishes between non-state 
and state organisations. Non-state organisations comprise support/
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education/advocacy organisations by and for sex workers, service 
organisations, ally-support organisations and pragmatic prohibitionist 
organisations. State organisations consist of the various agencies of 
the municipal government and the police department. In addition she 
includes third sector agencies such as community mental health centres. 
Fuji Johnson finds that there is a considerable amount of 
interaction between sex worker organisations both within and 
between municipalities, interactions ‘that most closely approximate 
collaboration’ (2015, p  3). However, she characterises none of the 
interactions between non-state and state organisations as collaborative. 
The best she found was a form of agonism, best described as a ‘form 
of relational realism in the context of competing interests’ (2015, 
p 14). These relationships are not based on trust and not aimed at 
consensus building, but display a form of pragmatism to respond to 
particular problems. Only in the city of Vancouver did Fuji Johnson 
find agonistic forms of interaction between municipal organisations 
and non-state actors. In all the other jurisdictions she studied she 
found relationships that were either siloed (mutual awareness but 
little interaction), antagonistic (open conflict and hostility between 
non-state and state actors, with the latter attempting to dominate the 
first), or emergent (nascent attempts at productive communication). 
Fuji Johnson’s is a qualitative study, so we cannot draw any conclusions 
about the distribution of distrust in the population of local policy 
subsystems from it. Yet, the picture she paints is bleak indeed. State 
agencies and sex worker advocacy groups seem unable to engage in 
productive collaboration; implicitly at least, she attributes this state 
of affairs to the unwillingness of state actors to include sex worker 
organisations within their governance arrangements. 
However, it would be wrong to dismiss the possibility of collaborative 
governance in prostitution policy out of hand on the basis of these 
examples. First, there are few examples of research into collaborative 
governance in prostitution policy and, as is the norm in this field 
(Ansell and Gash, 2008, p 544), these are all qualitative case studies. 
The problem with case studies is that the political-cultural context 
of the case is usually not considered. For example, a truncated form 
of collaboration was made possible in The Hague because of the 
consensual, coalition politics that characterises the political culture 
of the Netherlands, while Canada has a much more antagonistic, 
majoritarian system. We have also seen that in some cases sex 
worker-led organisations have entered into long-standing contractual 
relationships with state agencies to deliver essential services to the 
community of sex workers (Majic, 2013; Beer and Tremblay, 2014; 
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Gall, 2014). For example, while city officials in The Hague were 
wrangling with brothel owners to implement a licensing system, the 
city of Rotterdam had invited the Rode Draad to provide policy advice 
to the city administration regarding municipal prostitution policy. 
In 1999 the Rode Draad was invited to become a participant of 
the municipal Prostitution Advisory Commission in Rotterdam. 
Members of the commission, each representing an organisation with 
some authority and mandate in the domain of prostitution policy, 
came from the police, the tax authority, social work, public health, the 
city administration responsible for prostitution policy, and the Rode 
Draad. Council members did not participate in the commission for 
fear that they would impose their political agenda on its activities. 
The commission met once a month and its tasks were to formulate 
policy advice, to design policy solutions, to monitor the situation 
‘on the ground’ in the city, and to signal instances of trafficking and 
exploitation. For example, the Rode Draad had observed that illegal, 
coerced prostitution took place in Turkish coffee houses in the city. 
This is an excellent example of what Bourgon calls ‘adaptive capacity’, 
the ability to react swiftly and effectively to unexpected emerging 
situations (Bourgon, 2011, p 60). Almost adventitiously the commission 
achieved a considerable amount of policy coordination, another 
instance of the adaptive and resilient capacity that such a collaborative 
arrangement brings to the governance system (Bourgon, 2011, p 60). 
The Rode Draad participated in the commission from 1999 to 2008. 
To make this possible it received a small subsidy and an office from 
the city administration. One of the contributions of the Rode Draad 
was to emphasise the privacy of sex workers in any situation in which 
sex workers were asked to report on the state of the field. Finally, 
the Rode Draad operated a low threshold information and support 
centre in the city that was managed by a sex worker (source: Sietske 
Altink). The arrangement was terminated when the Rode Draad 
lost its subsidy and had to close its operations. Municipal prostitution 
policy had by then taken a repressive turn as we saw in Chapter Five, 
and the commission was replaced by one of the chain management 
arrangements aimed at enforcing anti-trafficking measures. In hindsight 
the Rode Draad successfully managed the precarious balance between 
advocacy and service; the city did not always follows the advice of the 
Rode Draad, yet this did not affect the mutually respectful relationship 
in the commission. 
Perhaps the most successful example of collaborative governance 
in prostitution policy concerns the NZPC in the prostitution policy 
subsystem in New Zealand. In the final section of this chapter we 
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will discuss some elements of the collaborative relationship with state 
agencies and reflect on the contextual characteristics that make it 
possible. We admit that this is yet another qualitative case study, but 
such is the state of the art in this field, and the study hopefully generates 
insights that allow for more systematic testing. The NZPC was not 
only one of the driving forces in the passage of the 2003 Prostitution 
Reform Act that decriminalised prostitution in New Zealand, but 
in the late 1980s it was already involved as a provider of services and 
government adviser in New Zealand’s fight against HIV/AIDS in the 
sex worker community. When the Prostitution Reform Act was passed 
by the New Zealand parliament the NZPC and its leadership were 
already well-known and trusted members of the policy community. 
It was therefore not a large step for government agencies to turn to 
the NZPC for advice and guidance. What follows is an observation 
by a public health officer, taken from a review of public authorities’ 
experience of implementing the Prostitution Reform Act (Bruton, 
2010). The interviewee in question, an occupational health nurse, 
was charged with monitoring brothels under the new legal regime, 
whereby inspectors receive information from the NZPC about possible 
infractions of hygiene or safe sex rules:
Most interviewees [public health inspectors] also highlighted 
the importance of the role of NZPC. Several alluded to the 
professional support for sex workers provided by NZPC and 
the assistance and information they provided to regulatory 
officers: ‘Um, we’ve kept in contact with the NZPC and 
I’ve tended to feel that is probably the best way to go because 
I’m not an expert in the industry … I think the NZPC are 
the people who have got an actual good grasp of what the 
realities are.’ (Brunton, 2010, p 185) 
What does this quotes illustrate? First, it shows that the NZPC 
managed to find and sustain the right balance between service delivery 
and advocacy. The NZPC has successfully held contracts with public 
agencies for the delivery of public health services since the late 1980s. 
Second, it demonstrates that government agencies and the NZPC have 
succeeded in building collective governance capacity, in which the 
former provide legitimacy and accountability and the latter credibility 
and effectiveness (Bourgon, 2011). 
The organisation of the NZPC allows it to act as an advocate for sex 
workers while at the same time providing services and maintaining a 
working relationship with government agencies. With its head office 
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in the nation’s capital, the NZPC is set up as a dispersed organisation 
with local offices in every town in New Zealand that has a prostitution 
scene. The staff composition of the local offices reflects the ethnic 
composition of the local sex worker population. This guarantees that 
the organisation is representative of the sex worker population. The 
offices have low thresholds; as one of us (Hendrik Wagenaar) observed, 
sex workers can walk into the offices freely and spend time relaxing 
and chatting with others. The NZPC creates trust with its clientele by 
providing some essential services such as STD checks, general health 
advice, practical advice and representation in workplace disputes 
with brothel owners. New Zealand has a system of labour mediation 
boards; the NZPC represents sex workers who bring their case to the 
mediation board. The close ties between the NZPC and the sex worker 
population allows the NZPC to be informed about the situation ‘on 
the ground’ in the prostitution scene in New Zealand’s towns and 
cities. This in turn has given it authority among government officials 
and brothel owners. But the role of the NZPC in New Zealand 
society goes much further than the capacity for governance and service 
delivery. The professionals and politicians we met were unanimous in 
their admiration about the moral leadership of the NZPC and its two 
directors, Catherine Healy and Calum Bennachie, in normalising the 
image of prostitution as work and of sex workers as regular citizens 
with the rights that accrue to all New Zealand citizens.  
What have we learned from these examples? First, collaborative 
governance in the pragmatic sense as described here is probably 
more prevalent in prostitution than one might surmise from the 
current antagonistic atmosphere that prevails in the field. In fact, 
collaborative arrangements emerge precisely in situations of policy 
failure through the high costs of the politicisation of regulation and 
persistent implementation failures (Ansell and Gash, 2008, p  544). 
Policy failure is of course not a guarantee for the emergence of 
collaborative governance, but it creates the incentives and need 
among stakeholders to try something else. Second, the emergence of 
collaborative arrangements in prostitution policy is probably facilitated 
by the pre-existing political culture. Both the Netherlands and New 
Zealand have a culture of cooperation, striving for consensus and 
respect for minorities.147 Even if actors in these two countries are 
147 Several of our interviewees in New Zealand pointed out the importance of the 
Treaty of Waitanga for shaping political culture in New Zealand. The treaty 
was signed by representatives of the British Crown and various Māori chiefs. 
It established British sovereignty over New Zealand but also recognised Māori 
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locked in conflict, they have deeply ingrained cultural models available 
to suggest an alternative course of action. But more adversarial 
political cultures also contain local pockets of opportunity for setting 
up collaborative experiments. Fuji Johnson describes how in the 
deeply divided community of Downtown Eastside in Vancouver a 
spate of murders of sex workers, many of whom were members of 
ethnic minorities, acted as a catalyst for formerly antagonistic parties 
to enter into a more collaborative relationship. Fuji Johnson observes 
how the neighbourhood, for all its problems was also a ‘nexus of 
strength, persistence and organization’ that contributed to political 
mobilisation of residents and sex workers (Fuji Johnson, 2015, p 266). 
In addition, a Commission of Inquiry concluded among other things 
that ‘a clear correlation [existed] between law enforcement strategies of 
displacement and containment and increased violence’ (Fuji Johnson, 
2015, p 267). The combined effect of community mobilisation and 
a report that condemned the police and the city administration for 
racist and counter-effective policies was that the authorities began to 
actively reach out to the community of women and sex workers in 
Downtown Eastside. Police, sex workers and advocacy groups were able 
to converge on a policy framework of harm reduction that resulted in 
various concrete policy measures, such as jointly negotiated Sex Work 
Enforcement Guidelines that emphasise safety, respect and dignity of sex 
workers, and a still fragile but nevertheless more positive relationship 
between sex workers and the police (Fuji Johnson, 2015, pp 267-9). 
Finally, the examples also show that collaborative arrangements are 
fragile and reversible when political attitudes towards prostitution 
change. The repressive turn in local prostitution policy in the 
Netherlands led to the dissolution of the Prostitution Advisory 
Commission in Rotterdam and its replacement by an enforcement 
group. When the Rode Draad lost a major subsidy after it criticised 
ownership of lands and forests and gave Māoris the same citizenship rights as 
British subjects. From its inception the treaty has been contested, with Māori and 
non-Māori New Zealanders attaching different interpretations to it. However, the 
treaty represents the recognition of minority rights and citizenship. In 1989 the 
government, spurred by several court cases and the recognition that the original 
treaty no longer applied very well to the conditions in contemporary New Zealand, 
recommitted the nation to an updated version of the treaty by adopting the 
Principles of Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitanga. In addition to principles 
of government, self-management and equality, a principle for cooperation was 
formulated that simultaneously acknowledged the existence of cultural duality 
and established the requirement for cooperation in good faith and common sense 
to attain a partnership between the peoples (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Principles_of_the_Treaty_of_Waitangi). 
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the city administration of Amsterdam about its choice of advisers on 
prostitution policy, it had to close its doors after operating for 27 years 
as an internationally recognised centre of expertise on prostitution 
policy and advocacy for sex workers. Currently another advocacy group 
is trying to represent the interests of sex workers in the Netherlands. 
While the signs look promising (Amsterdam’s city administration has 
indicated that it wants to talk and the Ministry of Justice has granted 
the group an annual subsidy), the city administration engages in blatant 
forum hopping, underhandedly exploring with the Minister of Justice 
the possibilities for sidestepping national privacy regulation to introduce 
a sweeping registration and information system for sex workers, the 
same type of system that has been rejected by the Dutch Senate as 
contrary to EU privacy regulations.148 
148 The minister has recently declared that the city is free to introduce a registration 
system within the bounds of national privacy regulation.
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SEVEN 
Summary and conclusion
The purpose of the book is to describe and analyse prostitution policy 
– how it is formulated, how it is implemented, and what outcomes it 
leads to. The analysis in this book departs from the presumption that in 
Europe, at least since the 19th century, prostitution has been a pressing 
concern for professional elites and nascent state institutions. Through 
feverish, almost obsessive, theorising – or perhaps it is more accurate to 
say, moralising – elites attempted to obtain cognitive and moral closure 
about the phenomenon, simultaneously mystifying, threatening and 
alluring, that women exchange sexual services for money, and thereby 
situate themselves outside the norms and boundaries that regulate sexual 
behaviour (Corbin, 1990).149 This concern was then translated into 
concerted attempts by state agencies to contain, redirect or eradicate 
prostitution. As a result, the organisation and manifest appearance of 
the sex trade, at least in Europe, has always been, directly and indirectly, 
the outcome of state involvement. If one likes it or not, every state, for 
better or worse, is deeply implicated in the sex trade through regulation 
(Jahnsen and Wagenaar, in press).
Despite the ubiquity of regulation, policymaking, as we argued in 
Chapter One, is underrepresented in the now voluminous literature 
on prostitution. This book is an attempt to close that gap. To this end 
we have compared prostitution policy in Austria and the Netherlands. 
Both countries make interesting objects of analysis. Contrary to the 
US, where from around 2000 onwards prostitution policy has been 
dictated by neo-abolitionism (Chuang, 2010), most western European 
countries have taken a more or less pragmatic approach to regulating 
prostitution. When the Netherlands decriminalised brothels in 
1999 it was widely regarded as a vanguard of progressivism. Austria, 
although less in the limelight, has always had a tradition of societal 
acceptance, women’s rights and administrative ethos when it comes to 
regulating prostitution. Yet, a fine-grained analysis of the formulation 
and implementation of prostitution policy in both countries reveals 
that under the surface the political forces opposing prostitution have 
found ways to undermine and eventually undo progressive policies. We 
149 Of course men also exchange sexual services for money, but that has somehow 
always raised less moral concern.
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think the analysis in this book led to two important conclusions. First, 
prostitution policy is fragile. Legitimisation and decriminalisation are 
easily reversed, and revert back to criminalisation and heavy-handed 
regulation and control. This is a complex process that largely occurs 
at the local level, thereby deviating from, and even undoing, national 
policymaking. Second, without a detailed exposition and analysis 
of the design and implementation of prostitution policy at different 
scales of governance, statements about its nature or outcomes remain 
necessarily superficial and are at worst misleading.
One of the aims of this book is to confront our data with insights 
from the policy sciences. However, although we bring the insights of 
policy theory to bear on prostitution policy, we want to do more than 
just ‘apply’ policy theory. We want to go beyond describing prostitution 
policy in terms of, for example, the advocacy coalition framework or 
interpreting its development as a punctuated equilibrium trajectory. 
Instead we have attempted as much as possible to take a pragmatic, 
practice-oriented stance in our analysis, that is, to analyse prostitution 
policy from the perspective of the politicians and officials who are 
charged with regulating prostitution in their country or municipality. 
Throughout the book the questions that guided our analysis were: 
What are the challenges that policy makers face when regulating 
prostitution? What does the world of prostitution look like from their 
perspective? How do they understand prostitution and what forces 
shape that understanding? What are the possibilities of and constraints 
on (local) policy makers to design effective and humane prostitution 
policy? Our empirical material consisted of quantitative and qualitative 
data on prostitution and its regulation in Austria and the Netherlands 
from roughly 2000. The Appendix describes the design of the research 
in greater detail. 
What were the results of our inquiry? All politicians, professionals 
and administrators charged with the management of a particular 
societal domain will find that they face a set of specific challenges. 
These specific constellations of challenges issue from the nature of the 
problem at hand. They define the possibilities and constraints of state 
action. They are as it were the actionable ‘fingerprint’ of a particular 
policy domain. For the field of prostitution we identified five such 
challenges: the enduring stigma of prostitution; the highly moralised 
nature of prostitution and the ensuing fact that prostitution policy is 
morality politics; the high proportion of migrants in prostitution and 
the consequent confluence of prostitution policy with immigration 
policy; the lack of precise and reliable data on almost every aspect of 
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the sex trade; and the circumstance that prostitution is largely a local 
phenomenon and that effectively its regulation occurs at the local level. 
Chapters Three, Four and Five form the heart of the book. These 
three chapters describe what in effect is a tripartite policy system 
in prostitution, three intersecting, nested, levels of policymaking. 
In Chapter Three we described small groups of administrators who 
implement policy by designing and selecting policy instruments. 
Sometimes these groups are knitted together through advanced 
coordination technologies such as chain management or ‘enforcement 
protocols’; sometimes they operate in a loosely networked way, or are 
dominated by one agency that has captured the local implementation 
of prostitution policy. In many countries NGOs are an important 
part of these implementation communities, even though they often 
operate at arm’s length from government agencies. The important 
insight is that these groups of administrators and professionals operate 
in relative autonomy from the national legal frameworks and institutions 
that formulate policy and make decisions, despite the fact that there 
is often considerable exchange at personnel level. In fact, in the two 
countries we studied local policy makers often deviated considerably 
from national policy goals. In the Netherlands, through a gradual 
accumulation of small, instrumental implementation decisions that are 
mostly taken under the political radar, a process we call regulatory drift, 
repressive policy goals have come to replace the more emancipatory 
goals of national law. In fact, local policymaking drives national 
policymaking, a situation that is now codified in the new national law 
that reverses some of the ideals of the repeal of the brothel ban. In 
Vienna the implementation of a new prostitution law that aimed to 
regulate all aspects of the sex trade was monopolised by the police and 
its effects were restricted to the removal of a relatively small number 
of outdoor sex workers from the city. The upshot of our analysis 
is that prostitution policy cannot be understood without a detailed 
understanding of local policymaking. 
In Chapter Four we describe the national policy subsystems or policy 
networks where ideas are formulated and solutions designed and tested. 
These subsystems are loosely coupled to political decision-making 
bodies such as parliaments and state bureaucracies in which some of 
the actors involved occupy veto points. The actors in these subsystems 
proactively attempt to influence the national policy agenda, whereby 
those subsystems that are tied to the state bureaucracy are able to muster 
considerable influence. When through elections or an unexpected 
extraneous event a political opportunity arises, or, as Kingdon (1997) 
would put it, a policy window suddenly opens, the key actors in the 
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subsystem are ready to act decisively. Conversely, when a subsystem, 
such as the policy network of progressive feminists in the Netherlands 
between 1980 and 2000, loses its perch in the bureaucracy, political 
influence diminishes immediately. The chapter also demonstrates 
another important dynamic in prostitution policy. In both Austria 
and the Netherlands additional national laws, such as immigration, 
labour, and fiscal law, and even laws regulating the use of information 
by government, have been applied to regulate prostitution and have 
had the effect of criminalising sex work. In other words, to understand 
how authorities regulate prostitution a focus on prostitution law is not 
sufficient and the analyst must take into account the full panoply of 
laws that are brought to bear on the sex trade. 
In Chapter Five we described the wider policy field in which both 
local administrators and the national subsystems operate. The policy 
field has loose and shifting boundaries, and is geographically widely 
dispersed with often global dimensions. More importantly the key 
actors in the policy field are not only, or even exclusively, politicians 
or officials but ordinary people and opinion makers; equally important 
are the meanings these actors attach to their world, artefacts such as 
IT technology, travel and economic arrangements, and even trends 
and events, such as international treaties and economic developments. 
The aggregate of these ‘actors’ constitutes the extraneous effects that 
deeply influence national and local prostitution markets. For example, 
global economic inequalities in combination with easily available 
internet, mobile phone technology and low-cost travel opportunities 
have resulted in the migration streams that span the globe. We have 
described the policy field in almost ontological terms as characterised 
by complexity, interdependency, uncertainty and emergence. Both the 
local and national levels of policymaking are embedded in this complex 
adaptive field. In that sense it presents a sixth challenge to policy 
makers, but in this case the policy field presents the general challenge 
of dealing with dynamic complexity that policy makers in all domains 
of public policy have to face up to. The importance of the notion of a 
policy field is that it helps us to understand the predicaments of policy 
makers who attempt to regulate prostitution.
The policy field is also the level where public and political discourse 
emerges. It is hard to overestimate the importance of discourse for 
policymaking at all levels. Policy makers swim in a sea of images and 
narratives from which they have little opportunity to extract themselves. 
In particular we have seen how deeply the currently dominant discourse 
of abolitionism has influenced both local and national policymaking, 
how the abolitionist discourse was the ‘glue’ that bound the local and 
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the national in prostitution policy, and how it functioned as an implicit 
coordination mechanism between a host of political, administrative and 
societal actors.150 This discourse – with its powerful imagery of sex 
workers as victims, clients as predators, prostitution as by definition 
forced, prostitution as a form of modern slavery, and thus an affront 
to women’s rights, the crime of trafficking as the symbol of modern-
day prostitution, and the sex trade as a market in which the state can 
successfully intervene by persecuting clients and thus suppressing 
demand – originated in Sweden in the 1980s and has since spread 
around the world, capturing the hearts and minds of radical feminists 
and mainstream politicians and officials. 
There is a direct connection between the nature of the policy field 
and the discourse that emanates from it. The policy field presents itself 
to the local (and national) policy maker as a bewildering world, an 
unknowable and uncontrollable forces. This results in an irresistible 
urge to simplify the mess by reducing it to clear, apprehensible policy 
narratives, moral schemata and fantasmatic control schemes. This is a 
universal dynamic that is not unique to prostitution policy, but because 
of the highly moralised nature of prostitution policy the dominant 
abolitionist narrative has effectively crowded out alternative policy 
narratives. This inevitably results in partial, misdirected policies that 
lead to persistent policy failure and negative unintended consequences. 
We have encountered many examples of this dynamic. For example, 
policy makers are irresistibly attracted to registration systems. The 
150 The following anecdote illustrates our point. When we began the research the 
three participating Dutch cities argued for a comparative approach based on a most 
similar systems design. In other words, they preferred to compare the Netherlands 
with a country that had a comparable approach to regulating prostitution. Their 
argument for excluding countries such as Sweden in the comparison was that it 
was unlikely that client criminalisation would be introduced in the Netherlands 
any time soon. About six months into the project representatives of the three cities 
attended a seminar on client criminalisation organised by the Swedish Embassy. At 
the next project meeting the consensus was that the meeting had failed to convince 
them about client criminalisation: “It was mostly ideology with little evidence.” 
Yet, in hindsight this was also about the time that the cities began to design and 
implement the ‘enforcement arrangements’ that dominated local policymaking for 
years to come. Two years later, at the end of the project, the cities experimented 
with registration, promoted the ‘signals of trafficking approach’ and vehemently 
argued for a national law that would introduce a national registration system and 
partial client criminalisation. A revised version of the law was passed in parliament 
on 21 June 2016. Somewhat similar to Finnish law, it proposes criminalising paid 
sex with non-registered sex workers. One of the fundamentalist Christian parties 
introduced client criminalisation in its policy platform in recent parliamentary 
elections.
Summary and conclusion
262
Designing prostitution policy
registration of sex workers, preferably in a system of national coverage, 
is considered to be an instrument of control. However, not only do 
such schemes violate European and national privacy regulation, but 
all the available evidence suggests that they are largely ineffective. 
Similarly, the criminalisation of sex workers (and their support system) 
undermines the human rights of the very group it purports to help. 
Similarly, the effort to police national borders by restricting the migrant 
sex workers’ labour market closes off job opportunities and erodes the 
labour relations that would have helped them to establish themselves. In 
fact, as we observe, the framing of prostitution as ‘trafficking’ or ‘slavery’ 
has resulted in labour relations, and its corollary labour exploitation, in 
prostitution being excluded from the agenda of all the policymaking 
bodies we encountered in our research. The outcome of such policies, 
which are informed by one-sided, misdirected moral schemes, is that 
the stated goal of reducing the presence of prostitution in our society 
has not been reached and an already stigmatised group has been even 
further marginalised. In city after city and country after country the 
ideal of the regulation of prostitution repeatedly collides with reality 
(Jahnsen and Wagenaar, in press). 
Prostitution policy is largely designed and executed at the local level, 
as we have seen. But what is a local official to do when the reality 
on the ground is determined and shaped by the emergent events in 
a widely dispersed, emergent and transnational policy field that is 
made up of a bewildering variety of human and non-human actors? 
It is not realistic to expect the official, or anybody for that matter, to 
have a comprehensive grasp of all that transpires in this dynamically 
complex system. What can policy makers do to negotiate the 
complexity and unpredictability of the policy field? The literature on 
complex adaptive systems is unanimous: instead of denying complexity 
policy makers should embrace it. Simplified policy narratives and 
control arrangements are forms of denying complexity. Embracing 
complexity means not to approach it as a liability but to make it 
productive. Stimulating variation, facilitating new communication 
lines and selecting and promoting solutions that work are general 
strategies for effectively navigating complexity. In Chapter Six we 
focused on collaborative governance with stakeholders, particularly 
sex workers, as a practical way of facilitating requisite variation and 
interaction in prostitution policy. Following the literature we defined 
collaborative governance as a governing arrangement where one 
or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a 
collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented 
and deliberative, and seeks to make or implement public policy or 
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manage public programmes. Collaborative governance is inclusive 
(it involves all stakeholders, particularly marginalised and contrarian 
groups) and authoritative (it has an official decision-making mandate 
from political authorities), and it proceeds by ‘authentic dialogue’. 
Authentic dialogue is a particular form of face-to-face dialogue that 
observes the requirements of accuracy, comprehensibility, sincerity and 
legitimacy. While we identified a number of potential obstacles, we 
also discussed real opportunities, backed up by empirical evidence, for 
successful collaborative governance in prostitution policy. 
Summary and conclusion

265
Appendix:  
research design and methodology 
Goals of the project 
The research that forms the basis of this book was a collaboration 
between Platform 31 (a knowledge and network organisation in the 
area of urban policy), the Dutch cities of Rotterdam, Utrecht and The 
Hague, the Austrian city of Vienna, and the University of Leiden in 
the Netherlands. The Dutch partners contributed one third of the 
budget each; Vienna contributed a smaller amount. The research was 
designed to compare the implementation, outcomes and effects of 
prostitution policy in two countries, Austria and the Netherlands, that 
have a discernible and more or less coherent approach to regulating 
prostitution. The focus on policy implementation issues from the fact 
that in prostitution policy, as in most policies, a considerable gap exists 
between policy formulation and its actual implementation in the field, 
and that it is the actual delivery of public policy that determines the 
impact on the target group and on society at large. The main goal 
of this study is therefore to provide a detailed, in-depth analysis of 
the implementation of prostitution policy in the countries of study. 
A second goal of the study is to bring policy theory to bear on our 
data about prostitution policy, for the purpose of obtaining a better 
understanding of how such policies are designed and implemented. 
Research questions
The project focused on the following research questions:
1. What is the size and state of the prostitution market in the 
Netherlands and Austria? 
2. How is prostitution regulated in both countries at the implementation 
level? Which policy instruments are used? Which rationale is given 
for the use of different policy instruments? Are the policy instruments 
used in an effective and efficient manner? Which conditions have to 
be fulfilled (organisationally, financially, and from the perspective of 
political-administrative relationships) for the effective and efficient 
use of various instruments? Is the use of the mix of instruments 
consistent, effective and efficient?
266
Designing prostitution policy
3. What are the effects of the mix of instruments in the prostitution 
field? Effects are based on the stated goals of the policy. We would 
also look for general effects such as public order, trafficking and 
illegal prostitution, labour rights, work conditions and human rights 
of sex workers, and unintended consequences such as transfer of 
prostitution to different areas (national or international) or impacts 
on the social position of sex workers. 
4. What unintended consequences does the policy have? Here we 
think of increases or decreases in the number of sex workers or sex 
facilities, transfer effects, the disappearance of prostitution into an 
invisible underworld, or an increased risk for sex workers. 
We want to emphasise that the participating cities were interested in 
the possibilities of effectively regulating prostitution. That implied that 
they were less interested – at the time at least (see Chapter Seven) – in 
a study of trafficking.151 Although trafficking was not the subject of 
the project, if it emerged in the course of the research as a topic that 
respondents were dealing with (for example, local policies that were 
designed to recognise and fight trafficking), we of course analysed it 
and integrated it in our conclusions. 
Design of the study
The research was not designed as a formal outcome study with 
a controlled pre-test and post-test design. The complexity of the 
prostitution domain, in combination with the rapid developments in 
this field, prohibited, in our opinion, a formal, quasi-experimental 
design (Shadish et al, 2001). Such a design would provide us with a 
mere semblance of scientific control while the rigour of the design 
would result in missing out on most of the dynamic complexity that 
characterises this field. Moreover, authoritative knowledge about actual 
approaches to the regulation of prostitution is so scarce, that a mixed-
methods, process-based research design seemed to be indicated. For 
this reason, we opted for a comparative case study design (Landman, 
2000). A mixed-methods, comparative case study allowed us to map 
regulatory approaches, the societal and administrative context in which 
regulation operates, and the impact of regulation on the prostitution 
field. Policies are put into effect to remedy or alleviate a particular 
151 Like all EU countries, the Netherlands and Austria have a National Rapporteur in 
Trafficking in Human Beings. This agency collects data on trafficking. The reports 
of the National Rapporteur have been used in our work. 
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problematic situation. By studying the prostitution field in depth 
we aimed to obtain both an understanding of the societal origins 
and validity of the original problem formulation, the administrative 
context in which policy and regulation is designed and implemented, 
and the impact, or lack thereof, of policy measures that have been 
designed to address the problem. Policy effects are the intended and 
unintended consequences that follow from the implementation of a 
range of policy instruments with the goal of solving problems and/or 
attaining aspirations in the field of prostitution. 
The main comparison was between the Netherlands and Austria. 
The participating Dutch cities (see below) expressed the desire for a 
most similar systems design (MSSD; Landman, 2000). The scientific 
rationale of a MSSD is that, when most independent variables are held 
constant, differences in the dependent variable are explained by those 
independent variables that do differ (Landman, 2000, p 71). An MSSD, 
as well as its counterpart, a most different systems design (MDSD), 
are strong designs that yield important comparative knowledge. One 
must distinguish between large n and small n comparative studies. 
Clearly this is a small n study: a comparison of two countries. Such 
a comparison does not allow the researcher to hold the independent 
variables constant, simply because there are too many of them; this 
is the problem of ‘too few cases/too many variables’ problem that 
dogs so much social science research (Goggin, 1986). The value of 
small n comparative studies must be sought in the rich contextual 
comparison. Or as Landman puts it: ‘The comparison to the researcher’s 
own country is either implicit or explicit, and the goal of contextual 
description is either more knowledge about the nation studied, about 
one’s own political system, or both’ (Landman, 2000, p 5).152
The cities’ argument for an MSSD was that a comparison with a 
most different policy regime (in particular, one of client criminalisation, 
as in Sweden) would generate important information, but from a 
practical point of view it would be more useful to see what the policy 
implementation and effects are of a country with a similar regime. The 
cities thought it unlikely that the Netherlands would move towards a 
152 Landman speaks of a trade-off in international comparative research between a 
design with a large n, few variables, a high level of abstraction and rather robust 
conclusions versus a design with a small n, many dynamically interrelated variables, 
and detailed data and conclusions. Differently put, there is a trade-off between 
hard knowledge on a few, abstract variables versus less certain but more contextual, 
meaning-oriented and practical knowledge about the dynamics of everyday societal 
systems. Given the paucity of knowledge about prostitution policy, there are strong 
arguments to choose an in-depth comparison of a few countries.
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client criminalisation policy any time soon. On the other hand, we 
know so little of the effects of regulation (and decriminalisation) that it 
is expected that an in-depth comparison of such policy regimes would 
yield more interesting and relevant knowledge. Austria was selected 
for various reasons. Similar to the Netherlands prostitution is legal in 
Austria and in most provinces brothels are a more or less accepted part 
of society. Austria regulates prostitution. It has also experimented with 
decriminalisation-type policy measures, such as improving the working 
conditions of sex workers, sex workers’ taxation and their eligibility 
for social security. Interesting to the Netherlands is that Austria has 
a long experience with the registration of sex workers. Similar to 
the Netherlands, Austria has a large number of migrant sex workers, 
mostly from eastern Europe. In an administrative sense the countries 
also show similarities. Each can be called a decentralised unitary state, 
although the Netherlands does not have a federalised structure such 
as Austria, and the Dutch cities are less autonomous than the Austrian 
Länder. Prostitution policy therefore shows more regional variation in 
Austria than in the Netherlands. Politically, both countries are governed 
by coalition governments in which, until recently at least, Christian 
Democrats and Social Democrats are the dominant forces.153 Both are 
relatively small and affluent; they do not have the extremes of poverty 
and degradation that are among the drivers of prostitution in other 
countries. Finally, there were various pragmatic reasons behind the 
choice of countries, such as language, available contacts and accessibility. 
Partnered research
A major funding condition of Platform 31 was that the research 
team and the participating cities formed a consortium. As a result the 
research has been developed and executed in close collaboration with 
the three Dutch partner cities Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht; 
Platform 31 participated in an observing role. Soon after the start of 
the project the city of Vienna also joined the consortium. The three 
Dutch partner cities indicated that they would like to obtain policy-
relevant information early on in the research and not at the end of 
the study. The study was therefore practice-oriented and designed and 
executed in close interaction between the research team and the partner 
cities. What did this co-production of research entail? As there are no 
blueprints or handbooks available that instruct researchers and partners 
153 In both countries’ politics the grand postwar equilibrium has become destabilised 
by the increasing popularity of right-wing populist parties.
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how to engage in co-producing usable knowledge, the interactive 
design was developed ‘in vitro’ in the course of the research. In 2009 
the research questions and research design were formulated in a series 
of meetings with the Dutch cities. At the meetings the participants 
jointly formulated questions that were practically relevant (that is, 
emerging from and speaking to practical concerns of policy makers) and 
scientifically feasible (meaning they can be researched in a scientifically 
adequate manner). In hindsight this resulted in a process of mutual 
learning and trust building. With regard to learning, the researchers 
obtained unique, ‘hands-on’ insight into the challenges and particulars 
of designing and implementing measures for regulating prostitution 
at the local level (shaped by national legislation and extraneous 
developments). For the representatives of the cities it meant a growing 
awareness of the possibilities and limitations of scientific research. 
The cities, aware of the lack of knowledge about the regulation of 
prostitution, were above all interested in more precise and reliable data 
about the size and nature of the sex industry, in learning about policy 
theory, and in general in obtaining a knowledge base for effective 
administrative action in regulating prostitution. 
From the start of the project the research team and the Dutch partner 
cities met every three months. At the meetings a programme manager 
from Platform 31 was always present. A scientific advisory board was 
created to guarantee the scientific quality of the research. The board 
agreed to review all reports that were to be produced by the research 
team. The board consisted of Professor Joyce Outshoorn, emeritus 
professor of women’s studies at Leiden University, Professor Ronald 
Weitzer, professor of sociology at George Washington University, 
and Dr Anton van Wijk, senior researcher at Beke, a research agency 
that has done extensive, policy-oriented, research on prostitution in 
Amsterdam. 
Data collection
A key feature of the project is the way that data were collected. Data 
collection in prostitution research faces numerous threats to validity 
and is affected by numerous practical obstacles. A large proportion of 
sex workers are very mobile. Many migrant sex workers do not speak 
English. Because of the stigma attached to prostitution, sex workers 
protect their anonymity and are reluctant to be interviewed. Sex 
workers distrust government officials, as they expect nothing good to 
come from them. They also distrust researchers, as they believe that 
nothing is done with the results anyway. Given these challenges, data 
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collection in prostitution research will always be a compromise between 
ambition and convenience, and results and conclusions of any study 
will be surrounded by uncertainty and problems of interpretation. In 
fact, only a series of carefully designed and executed studies comprising 
different policy contexts will gradually converge in more robust results 
and conclusions. 
In this project the emphasis has thus been as much as possible on 
original data collection by field workers who are familiar with the local 
situation. Our insiders were outreach workers from local NGOs in 
Austria (some of them former sex workers), one of the authors (Sietske 
Altink, former worker of the Rode Draad) and an active sex worker 
in the Netherlands. The interviewers received training in qualitative 
interviewing. The advantages of using insiders over academic field 
workers are obvious. Insiders find it easier to gain trust and are in a 
better position to interpret the answers. In addition, insiders are in a 
unique position to obtain the serendipitous insights that come with 
moving about in the field. A risk of using insiders is that they share 
a context with their respondents and/or identify with them. In both 
cases this can compromise the quality of interview and observation data 
(Weiss, 1995). In general local researchers conducted the research in the 
two countries: Helga Amesberger in Austria and Hendrik Wagenaar 
and Sietske Altink in the Netherlands. Not only will local researchers 
have better access to national and local data sources, but they are also 
in a better position to situate what the respondents say in its proper 
political-cultural-historical context.154
Sampling turned out to be strongly dependent on the specific 
situation in the respective countries. Since 2000 the Dutch prostitution 
market has been the subject of a considerable number of research 
studies (Daalder, 2002, 2007 and Van Wijk et al, 2010 are the most well 
known, but numerous smaller studies have been conducted by local 
commercial research agencies). National and international researchers 
and journalists regularly approach Dutch field organisations for 
cooperation in gaining access to sex workers. Also, licensed sex facilities 
are subject to frequent inspections from various kinds of officials. In 
general the Dutch prostitution field is much more interconnected with 
154 One of the major problems of qualitative international comparative research that 
is conducted by one researcher is the problem of understanding the history and, 
often tacit, cultural understandings of a research site. In our opinion it is simply 
impossible to obtain a valid and solid grasp of the meaning of an issue by spending 
a limited time in a country, no matter how careful one is in selecting spokespeople. 
This problem is enhanced when researchers do not speak the language of the 
country where they are undertaking their research.
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official organisations than in most countries. Outreach work is largely 
done by municipal health and social work organisations that have long-
established, stable trust relationships with the prostitution field in their 
city. Professionals often feel that they put this trust relationship at risk 
by mediating for research access. In a relatively small market where 
many actors know each other personally, this has resulted in a certain 
research ‘fatigue’, a reluctance with field workers to mediate among 
sex workers to collaborate with researchers. In those cases where we 
did get access to sex workers we discovered that the interviews were 
not without risk to the sex worker. In at least one case the interviewee 
lost her job in the brothel where she worked after being interviewed by 
us. Although we could not establish a clear causal link, it nevertheless 
proved to be demoralising to our insider interviewer who felt guilty 
about this. The Austrian prostitution market on the other hand has 
been much less researched. In addition, outreach work is largely done 
by independent NGOs who have to go out and contact sex workers for 
purposes of providing information. Officials have a more arm’s-length 
relationship with the field than in the Netherlands. Sex workers and 
outreach workers suffer less from research ‘fatigue’; in fact we had the 
impression that our fieldwork was one of the first instances that Austrian 
sex work had been researched ‘on the ground’. We found two major 
outreach organisations (LEFÖ and maiz) willing to conduct interviews 
with sex workers. For most interviews specific appointments were 
made; a few interviews were done in the course of outreach work.
The different situations in Austria and the Netherlands have led 
us to use different sampling and data-collection strategies, each 
with their own strengths and weaknesses. In the Netherlands the 
emphasis was on the use of insiders for recruiting respondents. In 
addition to interviewing, the two Dutch field workers engaged in 
extensive observations of management practices in sex facilities and of 
management–sex worker interactions. The two field workers hung out 
in clubs where possible and had numerous conversations – although 
short of a formal interview – with hostesses, bar personnel and clients. 
From this participant observation we learned a lot from actors’ off-hand 
comments. The Dutch sex worker insider also kept a diary. 
In the Netherlands we interviewed 44 sex workers, and six to 
eight administrators, professionals and police officials for every city, 
covering administration, public health and the police. Three of the sex 
workers had participated in the so-called B9 arrangement for victims 
of trafficking (a national referral system) and were therefore officially 
designated ‘victims of trafficking’. Interviews were held in Dutch or 
English. Two of the authors (Sietske Altink and Hendrik Wagenaar) 
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interviewed officials, administrators and police officers. In an earlier 
study (Wagenaar, 2006) Hendrik Wagenaar interviewed around 25 
facility owners and over 50 municipal officials; we have drawn on 
those data in this study. In Austria we interviewed 85 sex workers 
(59 in Vienna, 26 in Oberösterreich), three facility owners, and 29 
administrators, professionals (NGOs), politicians and police officers. 
Outreach workers from two NGOs, LEFÖ in Vienna and maiz in 
Oberösterreich, conducted the interviews with sex workers; our 
Austrian researcher (Helga Amesberger) did four additional interviews 
with Austrian sex workers. The interviews covered topics ranging from 
the pathway into prostitution to earnings and working hours. The 
Austrian interviewers were fluent in the languages the sex workers are 
speaking (Bulgarian, Romanian, Hungarian, Czech/Slovakian, Polish, 
Spanish, Russian, English and German). In both countries we paid the 
sex worker a fee of €50 for the interview. Table 1 gives an overview of 
the characteristics of the sex workers interviewed in both countries.
Table 1: Austrian and Dutch sex worker interviewees: main characteristics
Austria 
(n=82)
The Netherlands 
(n=44)
Gender
Female 80 38
Male 0 4
Transgender 2 2
Nationality
Austria 8 0
Belarus 1 0
Bulgaria 15 3
Czech Republic 5 0
Hungary 11 1
Italy 1 0
Israel 0 1
Latvia 2 0
Moldavia 0 1
Nigeria 4 0
Poland 1 0
Portugal 0 1
Romania 15 3
Russia 1 0
Slovakia 6 0
Spain 1 0
The Netherlands 1 31
Ukraine 3 1
Meso- and South 
America (Venezuela, 
Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Chile, Jamaica)
7 2
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Austria 
(n=82)
The Netherlands 
(n=44)
Work venue
Brothel, (night)club 29 5
Studio, private club 11 11
Escort 2 1
Streetwalking 9 1
Window, Laufhaus 22 4
Massage parlour, sauna 4 10
From their own home 0 5
Mixture (more than one 
work venue)
6 0
Others (hotel 
prostitution, illegal 
brothel/bar)
2 7
Age at the time 
of interview 18-20 0 2
21-29 39 16
30-39 25 12
40-49 14 11
50+ 4 3
Years in sex work 
<1 year 8 5
1-5 years 34 9
6-10 years 27 10
11-15 years 7 4
16-20 years 3 4
>20 years 1 7
Unknown 2 5
Age at the time 
of commencing 
sex work
15-17 4 0
18-19 10 7
20-24 27 12
25-29 12 11
30-39 18 4
40-49 3 0
>50 3 0
Unknown 5 10
Interviewers in both countries were equipped with the same interview 
guidelines. The interviews with sex workers took place at the 
workplace of the interviewee, in cafés or at the offices of the NGOs. 
One guiding principle for conducting the interviews was not to disturb 
the sex worker’s business. That is, if the sex worker solicited a client 
during the interview, the interview was terminated. This happened 
in a few cases. The interviewers tried to speak alone with the sex 
worker, but sometimes colleagues and friends were present who also 
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provided information.155 The interviewers took care that the manager 
or facility owner was not present during the interview – not an easy 
task as in one case the interviewers were requested to lower their 
voices because otherwise the owner could listen to the interview via 
the surveillance cameras. 
Because of the growing importance of the internet as a platform for 
recruiting clients in the Netherlands, the cities asked us to do an analysis 
of internet prostitution. A major problem with monitoring internet 
prostitution is double-counting. From client forums we learned that sex 
workers only advertise when they are actually available; this offered us 
an opportunity to estimate the number of sex workers who are active 
on the internet per day.156 Sex workers provide the prospective client 
with one or more mobile numbers and ask him to call using the number 
recognition facility. Sex workers indicate that they will not react to 
text messages or emails. This led us to try to google mobile numbers. 
This turned out to be a successful method for tracing sex workers. As 
a mobile number is linked to the same person (or persons), it offers a 
good indication of the number of unique sex workers who are actively 
recruiting on a given day. We learned that the same number appears 
on the same site at successive times of the day. Sometimes the same 
number advertises on the same site with different ads (although the 
site managers discourage this). Less than half of the mobile numbers 
appeared on only one site. The conclusion is that the term ‘double-
counting’ is an understatement in internet prostitution. It was no 
exception to see numbers appear 200 to 300 times in one day (2011) 
when entered as a Google search, with some generating 2,000 hits or 
more. On 10 different days we counted the number of unique mobile 
numbers on a single sex site in the Netherlands. By double-checking 
two major sites on later days, we learned that the figure for unique 
numbers is quite stable. Figures can be an underestimate, as we cannot 
exclude the scenario where sex workers share a phone number. 
We collected and analysed policy and administrative documents, 
and newspaper and other media reports on prostitution. As one of the 
main goals of the study consisted of conceptualising prostitution policy, 
we consistently used our empirical findings to confront the policy 
literature. Often the literature suggested insights and explanations of 
155 When more than one sex worker participated in the interview, it was counted 
nevertheless as one interview.
156 This would apply in Austria more or less only to webcam sex. Internet ads are paid 
on a weekly or monthly basis, so they are on the website for the requisite amount 
of time. This does not necessarily mean the sex workers work each day.
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the data, but almost just as often the data suggested important revisions 
of the standard theory. Finally, Hendrik Wagenaar interviewed New 
Zealand politicians, officials, professionals, scholars and members of 
the New Zealand Prostitutes’ Collective (NZPC) on two occasions 
(in 2013 and 2015) about the New Zealand Prostitution Act and the 
role of the NZPC in it. 
Generalisability 
While the data on which this book is based are collected in two 
relatively small European countries, we believe that their importance 
exceeds these two cases. Despite obvious differences in political culture 
and structure, both the prostitution markets and the policy dynamics 
surrounding prostitution in Austria and the Netherlands have a lot 
in common with those in other north-western European countries. 
Many countries in this area experience high rates of immigration, 
predominantly from eastern Europe, but also from Africa, south-
east Asia and Latin America. Some of these immigrants end up in 
prostitution. In almost all countries in the north-western corner of 
Europe, prostitution occupies a prominent position on the political 
agenda. The Swedish approach of criminalising clients acts as strong 
beacon to pundits and politicians in many countries (including those 
in the EU), and leads to venomous public debates over the moral 
nature of prostitution and the direction of prostitution policy. Both 
Austria and the Netherlands have made concerted efforts to regulate 
prostitution with the stated purpose of reducing harm to sex workers 
and containing public nuisance that is caused by prostitution. To this 
end local policy makers in both countries deployed a range of policy 
instruments. These policies contain lessons for every nation or locality 
that tries to regulate prostitution in one way or another. The upshot 
is that Austria and the Netherlands are representative of the efforts of 
many affluent, highly developed countries to give prostitution and its 
direct stakeholders, sex workers and proprietors, a place in society – 
morally, spatially and institutionally. 
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While the debate on regulating prostitution usually focuses on national policy, it 
is local policy measures that have the most impact on the ground. This book is the 
first to offer a detailed analysis of the design and implementation of prostitution 
policy at the local level and carefully situates local policy practices in national 
policymaking and transnational trends in labour migration and exploitation. 
Based on detailed comparative research in Austria and the Netherlands, and 
bringing in experiences in countries such as New Zealand and Sweden, it analyses 
the policy instruments employed by local administrators to control prostitution 
and sex workers. Bridging the gap between theory and policy, emphasising the 
multilevel nature of prostitution policy, while also highlighting more effective  
policies on prostitution, migration and labour exploitation, this unique book fills  
a gap in the literature on this contentious and important social issue.
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